2015 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Main Committee II: Non-Proliferation

Statement by Canada

Mr. Chairman,

The integrity of the NPT, particularly the security, prosperity and development benefits that flow from it, are dependent on the fulfilment of obligations contained in the Treaty. Central among these obligations is full compliance with the NPT Safeguards Agreement between a non-Nuclear-Weapon-State and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as the implementation of export controls, pursuant to NPT Article III. Full compliance with these obligations provides assurances of compliance with Article II, and creates and sustains the stable international environment necessary to allow for the full realisation of the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under Article IV.

The IAEA plays a fundamentally important role in the context of the NPT. The safeguards system implemented by the IAEA pursuant to Article III of the Treaty provides assurance that States are complying with their undertakings and assists States in demonstrating their compliance. In this regard, Canada welcomes and actively supports the efforts being undertaken by the IAEA to continue to evolve safeguards implementation in order to strengthen its effectiveness and to improve its efficiency. For Canada, it is important that the Conference continues to recognize and support this unique role of the IAEA and its efforts.

Canada believes that a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA), together with an Additional Protocol (AP), is the verification standard pursuant to Article III.1. We commend those 124 States that have accepted this standard to date. Together, the CSA and AP provide the basis for the IAEA to draw annually a comprehensive conclusion regarding the peaceful nature of a State’s nuclear program – namely that all nuclear material within the State remains in peaceful uses. Fifty-three (53) states have attained and maintain this broad safeguards conclusion, and we encourage those remaining 71 States with a CSA and AP in force to continue working closely with the IAEA in order for the Agency to be in a position to draw this broad safeguards conclusion as soon as possible.

As full compliance with the IAEA safeguards agreement is a treaty obligation under Article III, Canada is deeply concerned with unresolved cases of non-compliance. Canada urges States Parties to consider how we can collectively ensure, through the NPT process, the return to compliance by Iran, North Korea, and Syria with their non-proliferation obligations.

Iran claims that the resolutions brought against it by the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council are motivated by a desire to prevent Iran from having access to nuclear energy. To be clear, the resolutions brought against Iran stem not from any pursuit of civilian uses of nuclear energy, but from Iran’s undeclared nuclear fuel cycle, its failure to deliver on its promises of cooperation with the Agency, its failure to implement modified Code 3.1 of its NPT Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, and its unwillingness to account for potentially ongoing nuclear weapons related activities, otherwise known as the possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. Of particular concern regarding verification, Iran continues to ignore the binding requirement of the UNSC that it take the necessary steps to fully implement its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and to implement an Additional Protocol.
The IAEA Director General’s quarterly report to the Board of Governors of 19 February shows that Iran is still not cooperating in good faith with the IAEA to resolve questions of serious concern to the international community. Iran may be fulfilling its commitments under the Joint Plan of Action it has concluded with the P5+1 group of countries, but it is failing to meet its commitments under the Framework for Cooperation with the IAEA. It is unacceptable that Iran continues to stonewall IAEA inspectors, particularly as Iran and the IAEA have each committed to their Framework for Cooperation. Despite repeated high-level assurances of cooperation, Iran has yet to provide any answers to the two PMD related questions from the Third Step of the Framework, specifically those related to the initiation of high explosives and to neutron transport and modelling calculations.

Iran has lost the confidence of the IAEA Board of Governors and the UNSC through its two-decade-long history of concealing nuclear activities. In light of this track record, as well as Iran’s failure to provide any plausible justification for its efforts to acquire the full nuclear fuel cycle, Canada fully supports the 10 UNSC Resolutions and 12 IAEA Board of Governors Resolutions brought against Iran. These resolutions express the international community’s desire for a negotiated diplomatic solution which respects Iran’s right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy while ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. The IAEA will only be in a position to conclude that all Iranian nuclear material and activities are peaceful in nature following the full implementation by Iran of its CSA, ratification and implementation of its AP, and the complete cooperation and access necessary to close the PMD file.

Until Tehran has verifiably addressed the international community’s well-founded concerns over its nuclear intentions, Canada’s sanctions regime against Iran – one of the most sweeping and stringent in the world – will remain fully in force.

Mr. Chairman,

The security and stability of Northeast Asia, as well as the integrity and authority of the NPT, continue to be threatened by North Korea’s irresponsible and belligerent nuclear and proliferation activities. Canada remains deeply troubled by North Korea’s persistence in further developing its nuclear and ballistic missile programs. We strongly condemn its continued provocations, including threats to carry out more tests and continued ballistic missile testing in contravention with successive UNSC resolutions. We are also gravely concerned with the continued signs of activity at North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear complex, within which the operation of its 5 MW experimental reactor can be interpreted to mean that North Korea is persisting in producing plutonium for the production of nuclear weapons.

Canada also deplores North Korea’s unrelenting proliferation activities abroad, and calls on the international community to work with us in strengthening our collective counter-proliferation regimes in order to stymie further development of weapons of mass destruction in North Korea. Canada has implemented all UN sanctions against North Korea as well as a robust array of domestic sanctions. We stand ready to support appropriate measures in response to any further provocations by North Korea. International sanctions should not be eased until North Korea takes concrete and irreversible steps toward denuclearization and works toward becoming a responsible international partner.

It is imperative that North Korea resume adherence to the NPT and re-engage in its review cycle. Canada also strongly urges North Korea to abide by its NPT Safeguards Agreement and to fully implement all relevant non-proliferation and disarmament obligations without delay. The IAEA has an essential role to play in the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and Canada
appreciates the Agency’s readiness to monitor nuclear activities in North Korea, including uranium enrichment, despite being unable to implement any safeguards measures there since its inspectors were expelled in 2009. It is deeply regrettable that a country unable to feed its own people continues to expend so much of its limited resources on these military programs. North Korea must refrain from further provocative acts including nuclear and ballistic missile tests, re-join the international non-proliferation community by fully renouncing its nuclear weapons aspirations.

With regard to Syria, efforts to resolve its non-compliance with its non-proliferation obligations have been largely overshadowed by the protracted civil war and security situation. Nevertheless, Syria must cooperate with the IAEA in particular by allowing the IAEA to investigate the Dair Alzour site and other related sites identified by the Agency, as soon as possible.

The efficacy and durability of the NPT is predicated on its integrity. Cases of non-compliance that are not addressed with timely and meaningful action undermine the Treaty. Thus the Conference must reaffirm the fundamental necessity of full compliance with Article III of the Treaty.

Mr. Chairman,

Concerning export controls, Article III.2 of the Treaty requires that each State Party undertake not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any Non-Nuclear-Weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the transfers are subject to the safeguards required by Article III.1 of the Treaty. We underline the need for all States to exercise vigilance in their nuclear export controls.

To this end, multilateral export-control regimes play a crucial role in facilitating legitimate nuclear trade among States while respecting non-proliferation commitments. Canada continues to value the importance of the Zangger Committee and encourages all States Parties to adopt its Understandings. Canada also places great value on other efforts to coordinate national export-control policies and practices, and we believe the Nuclear Suppliers Group continues to play a particularly useful role in this regard.

Finally, as a contributor to the efforts of “Vienna Group of Ten”, Canada draws attention to the VG10’s Working Paper on ‘Vienna Issues’ that has been submitted to the Secretariat. We believe this will make a valuable contribution to this Committee’s deliberations.

Thank you.