Statement by the Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran
On non-proliferation of nuclear weapons
At the Third Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
New York, 6 May 2019
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In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful.

Mr. Chairman,

I associate my delegation with the NAM statement.

Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons derives its legitimacy from the larger objective of nuclear disarmament. The best way to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects is the full and effective implementation of Treaty’s Articles I to VI and universal adherence to the NPT.

Fortunately, the non-nuclear-weapon States are in full compliance with their non-proliferation and safeguards commitments under Articles II and III. As a result, the non-proliferation objective has been achieved.

However, there is no progress towards nuclear disarmament objective, due to the non-compliance by certain nuclear-weapons States with their nuclear disarmament obligations.

We are concerned about the continuation of this obvious imbalance between successful implementation of Articles II and III and the complete lack of progress in implementation of Article VI. This situation will have negative implications for the Treaty’s credibility and legitimacy.

According to Article I, the nuclear-weapon States are committed not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or control over such weapons. Therefore, they should refrain from nuclear-weapon sharing, under any kind of security arrangements, among themselves, with non-nuclear-weapon States parties and those not parties to the Treaty.

Nuclear-weapon-sharing of any kind is a clear violation of the explicit obligation under Article I of the Treaty. By transferring hundreds of nuclear weapons to certain NATO non-nuclear-weapon States, the United States, for a long time, has been in non-compliance with its obligation.

We call on the U.S. to move promptly to full compliance with its obligations by terminating nuclear-weapon-sharing arrangements and withdrawing all its nuclear weapons that are stationed in the territories of certain NATO non-nuclear-weapon States. Furthermore, we urge the NATO non-nuclear-weapon States to renounce their participation in the NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangement. Such arrangement runs contrary to the NPT’s letter and spirit.
Universal adherence to the Treaty is essential in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is of utmost importance in a volatile region such as the Middle East, where the nuclear weapons of the Israeli regime remain a source of nuclear-weapon proliferation. It presents the most serious threat to the security and stability in the region as well.

Israel’s nuclear weapons is the result of the application of double standards by certain nuclear-weapon States, in particular the United States. They failed to comply with their non-proliferation obligations. They oppose the peaceful nuclear programs of some States parties, but ignore the nuclear weapons programs of their allies that are outside of the NPT. Israel should be forced to renounce nuclear weapons, accede to the Treaty and bring all its facilities and activities under the IAEA comprehensive safeguards.

The 2020 Review Conference should call on all States parties for the total and complete prohibition of nuclear cooperation with the Israel as well as the transfer of all nuclear facilities, resources or devices to that regime.

According to a decision made in the 1995 and reaffirmed in the 2000 Review Conference, the acceptance of the IAEA’s full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons is a necessary precondition for the transfer of nuclear material or equipment.

All non-proliferation measures must be consistent with all the inalienable rights of all States parties on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including to participate in peaceful nuclear cooperation. Unfortunately, contrary to the provisions of the Treaty, various restrictive measures and initiatives continue to be applied. This must come to an end.

The IAEA safeguards play a key role in the non-proliferation regime. Remarkable progress has been achieved in strengthening the effectiveness of safeguards. The IAEA is the only competent authority to verify compliance with safeguards obligations under article III of the Treaty. It is essential that the IAEA conducts its verification activities in an impartial and independent manner in order to maintain the credibility of the Agency which is its biggest asset. Recently, the U.S. has attempted to micro-manage and put pressure on the Agency in nuclear verification in Iran. As underlined recently by the Director-General of the IAEA, such attempts are counter-productive and extremely harmful for the credibility of the Agency and must be abandoned.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.