NPT Prep Com 2019 Cluster II Statement by Sweden

Mr. Chair,

Sweden aligns itself with the statement made by the European Union under this cluster. Our general priorities are also reflected in the comprehensive working papers prepared by the European Union and the Vienna Group of Ten. In addition, please allow me to make the following remarks in a national capacity.

Mr. Chair,

Sweden is a firm supporter of multilateralism. We believe that global challenges require global solutions. We believe in diplomacy, international treaties and international institutions. We believe in strong verification regimes that can build trust and confidence that States are fulfilling their obligations.

Mr. Chair,

Independent and impartial verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency plays an indispensable role under article III of the NPT. It is crucial that the IAEA can continue to carry out this essential task in an effective and efficient manner.

Mr. Chair,

Sweden has a long-standing tradition of support to the Agency. We are therefore pleased that the Western group has nominated Sweden as chair of the IAEA Board of Governors from September this year.

Mr. Chair,

Though the NPT has served us well in preventing non-nuclear states from acquiring nuclear weapons, there are still challenges. Not least the DPRK nuclear issue. In this regard, we welcome the commitment of continued diplomatic negotiations between the US and the DPRK, as well as inter-Korean dialogue. We call on the DPRK to show its seriousness by concrete actions and legally binding undertakings. As a first immediate step the DPRK should sign and ratify the CTBT. The world should not have to fear another nuclear test.

Mr. Chair,

Sweden, like the rest of the EU, firmly supports the JCPOA and we therefore deeply regret the US withdrawal. The JCPOA constitutes a part of the global non-proliferation architecture which we cannot afford to lose. If the agreement fails it would be detrimental for regional and international security. The JCPOA makes it possible for the IAEA to apply its most intrusive safeguards which in turn gives us confidence that Iran continues to fulfill its nuclear obligations.
Prompt Iranian ratification of the Additional Protocol would be a further critical confidence building step contributing to the sustainability of the JCPOA.

Iran's role in the region as well as missile activities are distinct matters of considerable concern. As such, they need to be addressed separately and not at the expense of the JCPOA.

Mr. Chair,

The Model Additional Protocol is an indispensable tool for IAEA safeguards. Not least against the background of more States developing nuclear energy. The Additional Protocol should, together with the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, be considered the current verification standard pursuant to Article III of the Treaty. It is high time for each State that has not already done so to bring into force an Additional Protocol.

Mr. Chair,

Nuclear security and nuclear terrorism remain global challenges. Sweden is actively involved in the Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction. We cooperate with several Eastern European countries to assist in upgrading nuclear security, and safeguards as well as preventing nuclear terrorism. We support the IAEAs work on nuclear security and continue to contribute to its trust fund.

Mr. Chair,

Another global challenge is the proliferation of ballistic missile technology. This is a matter that unfortunately comes more and more to the fore, not least because of new developments in missile technology. As the Chair of the Hague Code of Conduct, we wish to underline that such voluntary arrangements help increase transparency and build confidence. The Hague Code of Conduct - in its simplicity - is one piece in the mosaic constituting the international rules based order.

Mr. Chair,

Robust verification will be needed when nuclear weapons decrease in number and for upholding a world free of nuclear weapons. That is why Sweden is engaged in initiatives such as the IPNDV and the QUAD - initiatives that can further verification methods and technologies for nuclear verification disarmament. We encourage both States with nuclear weapons and non-nuclear weapon States to engage in this work.

I thank you.