European Union

Statement on Cluster II issues

By

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Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
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Mr. Chairman,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

The Candidate Countries North Macedonia*, Montenegro*, Albania*, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, and Georgia, align themselves with this statement.

As we approach the 2020 Review Conference, we encourage all States Parties to focus on seeking common ground. The EU will play a constructive and active role in ensuring the implementation of the obligations and commitments assumed under the NPT and undertaken during the previous Review Conferences. In our General Statement, we have outlined the EU’s balanced approach in support of the NPT and its three pillars which are equally important and mutually reinforcing and contribute to international peace, security and stability. We recall that all States Parties have committed to pursuing policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons. All States Parties have also committed to applying the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their Treaty obligations.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT and an important element in the development of nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes. Our priority is to uphold and preserve the NPT as a key multilateral instrument for reinforcing international peace, security and stability: to promote its universalisation and to strengthen its implementation.

* North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.
The world continues to face major proliferation threats to international peace and security. They must be addressed in a resolute way in order to maintain the credibility and effectiveness of the NPT regime. In this context, we underline the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The second Summit between the US and the DPRK (27-28 February 2019) provided an opportunity for dialogue to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula. We welcome the US commitment to continue negotiations and call on North Korea to engage towards complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation. The EU regrets that the DPRK has so far failed to take the necessary credible steps in that direction. We urge the DPRK: - to abandon all its nuclear weapons programmes as well as their delivery systems programmes - to comply with its obligations under multiple UNSC resolutions - to maintain its declared suspension of testing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles - to return to compliance with the NPT and the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement including by signing and ratifying the Additional Protocol - and to sign and ratify the CTBT. Until the DPRK does take these concrete actions, we will continue to strictly enforce existing sanctions. We reaffirm that the DPRK cannot have the status of a nuclear-weapon State in accordance with the NPT. The EU continues to promote a concrete negotiation process permitting the IAEA to verify the exclusively peaceful nature of the DPRK’s nuclear programme. The verification effort would also benefit from technical assistance by the CTBTO and would need to take due account of non-proliferation obligations.

Almost 8 years ago the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution concluding that Syria is in non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement. Unfortunately, Syria has failed to respond adequately. The EU urges Syria to cooperate promptly and transparently with the Agency to resolve all outstanding issues. Syria remains responsible for urgently remedying its non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement, and for concluding and bringing into force the Additional Protocol as soon as possible.
The EU calls upon all States to become party to and strictly comply with the obligations of the NPT, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. In the context of the Middle East, this would be an important confidence- and security-building measure, which could constitute tangible steps in the direction of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East.

The EU continues to strongly support the outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference on the Middle East and reaffirms its full support for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems in the Middle East. We will further elaborate our view on this topic under the specific agenda item.

Mr. Chairman,

The European Union recognizes the importance of effective export controls, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article III of the NPT, and in compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 2325. In this context, we invite all States to adhere to the guidelines of the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and support the full participation of all EU Member States therein.

The EU is seriously concerned by the proliferation of missile technology. The development, testing or use of ballistic missiles is clearly a destabilising factor in various regions of the world. In this regard, the EU strongly supports the MTCR. We are deeply concerned by the tests conducted in the past by the DPRK in violation of UN Security Council resolutions, especially in the context of the DPRK’s military nuclear programme and the findings by the UN Panel of Experts that its ballistic missile programme remains intact. Moreover, as the only multilateral transparency and confidence-building instrument against ballistic missile proliferation, the EU continues to provide political and financial support to
the Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC) to promote its universality, full implementation, and enhanced and improved functioning. We also reaffirm our grave concern about Iran's ballistic missile activity, with an increase of launches and technical improvement of its ballistic missile capabilities and we call upon Iran to refrain from these activities, in particular ballistic missile launches that are inconsistent with UN Security Council resolution 2231. We also call on Iran to take all the necessary measures to fully respect all relevant UN Security Council resolutions related to the transfer of missiles and relevant material and technology to state and non-state actors in the region. In a broader context we reiterate our long-standing concern at the regional military build-up.

The IAEA's system of safeguards is a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and plays an indispensable role in the implementation of the NPT. The EU considers the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements complemented by Additional Protocols to be the current IAEA verification standard based on Article III of the NPT. Without an Additional Protocol, the IAEA cannot draw conclusions on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The EU welcomes the fact that four more Additional Protocols came into force in 2018 and calls for the universalisation of CSAs and APs without delay. Further, the EU urges remaining States which have not yet amended their Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) to accelerate their efforts in this respect. The EU strongly supports the continued improvement of effectiveness and efficiency of safeguards through implementation of State-level Safeguards Approaches (SLA). A consistent and universal application of the SLAs strengthens global non-proliferation efforts.

The European Commission and EU Member States through their Support Programmes continue to provide expert and technical support to IAEA safeguards. The close cooperation between the Euratom Safeguards System and the IAEA contributes to the effective and efficient implementation of safeguards and allows the EU Member States to demonstrate continuing respect for their international non-proliferation obligations. The EU has also provided the
Agency with technology and expertise from the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre and its Directorates, designed to meet IAEA specific requirements in a wide range of fields.

The European Union expresses its resolute commitment to and continued support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA is a key element of the global nuclear non-proliferation architecture and an achievement of multilateral diplomacy. It was unanimously endorsed by UN Security Council resolution 2231, and it contributes to regional and international security. As confirmed in fourteen consecutive reports issued by the IAEA since Implementation Day and most recently in its report of 22 February 2019, Iran has continued to implement its nuclear related commitments. We call on Iran to continue to do so in full. We acknowledge the provisional application by Iran of the Additional Protocol to its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and strongly encourage its early ratification. We believe that the continued full and effective implementation of the JCPOA significantly strengthens the NPT. The European Union welcomes and fully supports the professional, technical and impartial work of the IAEA in verifying and monitoring Iran’s nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA through a robust monitoring and verification regime and based on all available Safeguards relevant information. The EU Council Conclusions on Iran from 4 February 2019 confirm in an unambiguous way the EU’s determination to further pursue its work with the international community to preserve the JCPOA as the important multilateral achievement.

Mr. Chairman,

The EU and its Member States recognise the fundamental importance of nuclear security. We remain greatly concerned by the threat of nuclear or other radiological material falling into the wrong hands. While recognising that nuclear security remains the responsibility of each State, international cooperation contributes to strengthening nuclear security. The IAEA has a central role in coordinating global nuclear security efforts and in strengthening the international
nuclear security architecture for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy including through provision of assistance to Member States using innovative approaches and lessons learned from other Major Programmes. We welcome the latest achievements with the implementation of the IAEA 2018-2021 Nuclear Security Plan and the preparations for the 2020 International Conference on Nuclear Security. We look forward to working with all IAEA Member States towards a strong ministerial declaration supporting the establishment of a robust nuclear security regime and helping the IAEA to further shape its nuclear security activities.

The entry into force of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), to which all EU Member States, as well as the Euratom Community, are Parties, is a milestone in strengthening nuclear security. The EU reached out to numerous countries to promote the universalisation of the A/CPPNM and is looking forward to the 2021 Conference to review the A/CPPNM. The EU will continue to help States in their efforts to fully implement the provisions of the Amended CPPNM. We call on all States to accede to the amended CPPNM as well as to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), another key legal instrument the universalisation of which the EU continues to advocate.

Together with the bilateral contributions from its Member States, the EU is among the largest donors to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund. The total EU financial contribution to the Fund, based on seven successive Council Joint Actions/Decisions has reached nearly €50 million for the period of 2009-2019. EU funding to the IAEA has helped the Agency to assist in particular developing countries to upgrade and ensure the physical protection of selected facilities, improve their national regulatory infrastructure concerning physical protection and the safety and security of radioactive material and to enact the necessary legislation. Achieving and maintaining a solid national nuclear security regime based on IAEA recommendations and guidance, including through TC projects that utilise nuclear or radioactive material, is in the interest of all countries.
In the past decade, the EU made significant progress with regard to globally enhancing chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security through the implementation of an EU plan. Furthermore, the CBRN Centres of Excellence (CoE) initiative provides a platform for voluntary regional cooperation with 61 partner countries on all CBRN-related hazard issues with a budget of €155 million for the period 2014-2020. The EU encourages the preparation of national action plans to identify needs for capacity-building on the basis of a risk assessment.

Mr. Chairman,

In the framework of its strategy against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the EU is actively supporting UN Security Council Resolutions 1540, 1887 and 2325. The EU and its Member States have actively contributed to international initiatives that strengthen nuclear security, such as the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the former Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process. The EU also participates in the Nuclear Security Contact Group (NSCG).

Furthermore, the International Monitoring System of the CTBTO, with a completion rate of above 90%, along with the International Data Centre, offers a unique international tool that no single country could alone develop. The CTBTO responded immediately and effectively to the nuclear tests of the DPRK, demonstrating its ability to provide independent and reliable data and that this ensures that no State carries out a clandestine nuclear test to develop an illegal nuclear weapons programme. The CTBTO has also developed and maintained a range of verification capabilities designed for site characterisation. The European Union is one of the largest providers of voluntary funds to the CTBTO, with contributions totalling over €23 million since 2006.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the European Union stresses the importance of the mentioned non-proliferation aspects and would like to see them reflected in the
outcome documents resulting from this review cycle. We will continue to fully support the Chairs of the NPT Preparatory Committee in order to ensure a successful review cycle.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.