Interlinkage between the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

1. The goal of prohibiting all nuclear tests is firmly embedded in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which includes in its preamble the objective “to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time.” The agreement on a partial test ban between a number of nuclear-weapon States (Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, 1963) constituted a milestone in nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, lending credibility to the commitments enshrined in the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the undertaking “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.” The prohibition on nuclear testing also found its way into the five treaties establishing Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, the first of which was concluded in 1967.

2. The realistic prospect of negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty provided one of the determining factors allowing for the agreement on the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The close interaction between the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty is further demonstrated by the agreement reached at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to interpret article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in the light of the provisions of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which bans all nuclear explosions, including peaceful nuclear explosions. The dynamics of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty have a clear bearing on the functioning and implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Challenge of the entry into force

3. The lack of entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty constitutes an obstacle to the fulfilment of the objectives of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. While recent signature (Tuvalu, 2018) and ratifications (Thailand, 2018; Zimbabwe 2019) by non-Annex 2 States are a welcome sign of the continuing salience of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to strengthening international security, the absence of any signature or ratification by Annex 2 States since ratification by Indonesia in 2012 is a worrying sign that commitments to advance the entry into force of the Treaty will not be fulfilled in the near future.

4. The objective of entry into force and universalization of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty has been promoted not only by the Conferences on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Treaty enshrined in article XIV of the Treaty, but also by other initiatives such as the biennial Ministerial Meeting of the Friends of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held in the margins of the United Nations General Assembly since 2002; the Group of Eminent Persons, launched in 2013; and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Youth Group, established in 2016.

Contribution of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and its verification regime to the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime

5. Despite its lack of entry into force, the Treaty has made a significant contribution to strengthening international security and the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime thanks to the ongoing commitment of its ever-growing membership and because of the provisional implementation of its verification regime. Almost 90 per cent of the 337 facilities making up the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization International Monitoring System are operational, which allows the Preparatory Commission for the Organization in Vienna to detect the tell-tale signs of nuclear test explosions in the atmosphere, underground and underwater all around the globe. The Organization has provided data to the international community in the wake of the six nuclear tests conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, notably in 2006, 2009, 2013, 2016 and 2017.

6. The data collected by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization verification regime, in particular the International Monitoring System, have also benefited scientific cooperation and research and have been used for applications such as tsunami warning or the analysis of nuclear accidents.

7. Moreover, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization on-site inspection capabilities continue to be tested and refined, in particular through the integrated field exercises that took place in 2008 in Kazakhstan and in 2014 in Jordan. It is vital that these capabilities be operationally ready when entry into force of the Treaty is achieved.

8. Signature and ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is not a prerequisite for hosting International Monitoring System facilities or signing a facility agreement. Actions undertaken by non-States Parties to complete the International Monitoring System stations in their territory show the firm global commitment to the object and goals of the Treaty. Currently, 297 out of 337 facilities have been certified and around 50 per cent of facility agreements with the 89 States hosting International Monitoring System facilities have entered into force.

9. The International Monitoring System is supported by the International Data Centre, which collects and processes the data transmitted by monitoring stations and
produces data bulletins that are submitted to the Member States for their analysis and evaluation. To facilitate the interaction with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, many States signatories have established national data centres, which play a pivotal role in the exchange of information. Given the fact that national data centres often have diverse and complementary expertise, notably with regard to the four technologies used by the International Monitoring System (seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide), there can be merit in regional cooperation among national data centres. The pooling of expertise allows for more profound and multidimensional analysis, which can generate more in-depth analysis reports of events to the benefit of the verification regime. Such regional cooperation was initiated by the Benelux countries (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg), who signed a memorandum of understanding on 31 January 2019.

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea

10. The developments regarding the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea nuclear file highlight the urgent need for entry into force of the Treaty. It also shows how progress in the field of non-proliferation is interlocked with the achievement of the objective of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. While the declared halt to nuclear testing is a welcome development, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea could turn this commitment into an international legal obligation by signing and ratifying the Treaty. Such action, coupled with the comprehensive and irreversible dismantlement of the nuclear test site at Punggye-ri under independent international verification would significantly strengthen the confidence of the international community in the commitment of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to permanently ending its nuclear testing. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization is well placed to play an important role in facilitating these steps, including through the characterization of the test site.

Recommendations for the 2020 Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle

11. In order to acknowledge the close interaction between the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty and to take stock of the steps taken on the road to achieving entry into force, the review conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty should properly reflect on progress, challenges and opportunities with regard to the prohibition of nuclear test explosions and formulate specific recommendations.

Entry into force and universalization

12. The 2020 review cycle should: welcome the recent signature (Tuvalu) and ratifications (Thailand, Zimbabwe) of the Treaty; urge the remaining States to adhere to the Treaty without further delay; remind the eight remaining Annex 2 States of their particular responsibility, as their ratification is necessary for the entry into force of the Treaty; and call upon these States to take individual initiatives to sign and ratify the Treaty without waiting for other States to do so first.

13. Request all remaining States Parties, in particular the Annex 2 States, to inform the membership of steps taken to advance the goal of accession to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

14. Encourage opportunities to engage non-signatory States, including through the participation of these States in future sessions of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization Preparatory Commission as observers.

15. Encourage the exploration of the merits of a regional approach to Treaty accession in regions where building confidence and security can help to overcome
obstacles and acknowledge that confidence-building can be advanced through 
coordinated or concurrent steps towards Treaty signature and/or ratification.

16. Reaffirm that a ban on nuclear test explosions will constrain the development 
of new nuclear weapons, as well as the development of advanced new types of nuclear 
weapons, thus contributing both to nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

**Role of the verification regime**

17. The 2020 review cycle should: acknowledge the progress made to establish the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty verification regime, as evidenced by the 
work of the International Monitoring System and the International Data Centre and 
by the experience gained with on-site inspections; support the completion of the 
International Monitoring System; and call upon all States that host International 
Monitoring System facilities to transmit data to the International Data Centre and to 
consider concluding and putting into force a facility agreement, subject to internal 
regulations.

18. Express appreciation for the scientific and civil benefits provided by the data 
gathered by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty verification regime, such as 
tsunami pre-warning, analysis of nuclear accidents and volcanic studies. 
Acknowledge that the primary function of the verification regime remains the 
detection of nuclear test explosions.

19. Welcome the international scientific cooperation fostered by the interaction 
between scientists in the framework of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
verification regime. Acknowledge the potential benefits of regional cooperation 
between national data centres in order to pool complementary expertise, allowing for 
more profound and multidimensional analysis, which can generate more in-depth 
assessments of suspected nuclear test explosions.

20. Acknowledge the role that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
Organization plays in education on non-proliferation and disarmament through its 
promotion of cooperation among scientists and through the Group of Eminent Persons 
of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty Organization Youth Group initiative.

**Democratic People’s Republic of Korea**

21. The 2020 review cycle should: condemn in the strongest terms the nuclear tests 
conducted by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and express serious concern 
over its nuclear weapons programme, which undermines the global non-proliferation 
regime; note with encouragement the stated commitment of the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea to complete denuclearization and moratorium on nuclear tests, as 
well as efforts towards dismantlement of the Punggye-ri nuclear test site; urge the 
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea not to conduct any further nuclear tests and 
formalize its moratorium on nuclear tests by acceding to the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty; urge the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to take concrete 
steps to comprehensively, verifiably and irreversibly dismantle its nuclear weapons 
and its nuclear weapons programme and to immediately cease all related activities; 
acknowledge the role that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization 
can play if requested, and as part of a coordinated suite of activities which would 
contribute substantively to complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.