Mr. Chair,

I would like to thank you and your team as well as the Secretariat for efforts undertaken in conducting this session of the Preparatory Committee.

With regard to the draft Chair’s factual summary, I wish to share with you and other delegations our assessment and observations:

First, the author has taken an ultra conservative and highly cautious approach in summarizing the positions expressed and discussions made in consideration of cluster I issues, namely nuclear disarmament and security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons. This approach seems to tilt toward the positions and justifications of certain nuclear-weapon States for not implementing their nuclear disarmament obligations under article VI of the Treaty and the nuclear disarmament commitments agreed at 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. For instance, from paragraphs 20 to 24 of the draft, each nuclear-weapon State has been given the privilege of having one stand-alone paragraph to summarize their positions on how they have implemented their nuclear disarmament obligations and commitments. At the same time, the draft denies giving the non-nuclear-weapon States an equal treatment and opportunity to summarize the positions they expressed on how certain nuclear-weapon States are not complying with their nuclear disarmament commitments. This manner is discriminatory.

Second, the draft has undermined the integrity the 2010 Action Plan on nuclear disarmament by selectively highlighting some of the actions of the Action Plan while disregarding the others that are among the most important commitments which nuclear-weapon States have made but remain unfulfilled so far. For example, many States parties called for the implementation of the 2010
Action Plan on nuclear disarmament, but there is no specific reference to such a position. Many States parties stressed the urgent need for the nuclear-weapon States to implement obligations under article VI and the steps and actions agreed in the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, but this sense of urgency is completely disregarded in the draft. Many States called on nuclear-weapon States to live up to the commitment which they made in 2010 to accelerate concrete progress on the Thirteen practical steps, but such a position has no place in the draft. Many States parties expressed deep concern that the obligation under article VI to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament is not being implemented and called for the immediate commencement of such negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, but there is lack of reference to this position. Many States expressed concern about the plans and programs to develop advanced new types of nuclear weapons and mini-nukes as inconsistent with the object and purpose of the Treaty and called for the cessation of such programs, but even one word is not mentioned about such concerns and demands in the draft factual summary. Many States parties recalled the undertaking of all nuclear-weapon States made in the 2010 Action Plan to ratify the CTBT and urged them to implement that commitment, but the draft has not reflected this position factually. The Chair’s summary has disregarded the positions and proposals of the NAM States parties. When it comes to the security assurances against the use of nuclear weapons, the Chair’s summary not only refrain from including the position of the NAM group but also overlooks the terms of the 2010 Action Plan.

Third, the Chair’s summary regarding cluster II issues, namely nuclear non-proliferation, safeguards and regional issues particularly the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East, in most parts appear to be completely disconnected from the discussions that took place in this session of the Preparatory Committee. It seems they have been drafted by IAEA Secretariat in Vienna. Many delegations expressed concern regarding the nuclear-weapon sharing arrangements as a violation of non-proliferation obligations under article I. However, there is no even one reference to this concern in the Chair’s summary. My delegation would like to put on record that the first sentence of
paragraph regarding the provisional application of additional protocol does not reflect the consensus view of the States parties and there is difference of views on this issue.

Forth, during the discussion of the nuclear-weapon free zone in the Middle East, many delegations emphasized the importance of Israel’s accession to the Treat and the placement of its nuclear facilities under IAEA comprehensive safeguards as a requirement for realizing the goal of the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East, but the Chair’s summary unsurprisingly avoids to mention this undisputable fact.