Mr. Chairman,

I would like to associate my delegation with the Non-Aligned Movement’s statement on this cluster.

The Islamic Republic of Iran as a steadfast supporter of the nuclear disarmament objective is firmly committed to the nuclear nonproliferation objective. From our perspective, the objective of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons derives its legitimacy from the larger objective of nuclear disarmament. As clarified in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, the overwhelming majority of States entered into legally binding commitments not to receive, manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons in the context, inter alia, of the corresponding legally binding commitments by the nuclear-weapon States to nuclear disarmament.

We believe that the best way to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects is the full and effective implementation of the terms of articles I, II, III and VI of the Treaty and universal adherence to the Treaty.

It is a matter of satisfaction that with the full compliance by the non-nuclear-weapon States with their non-proliferation and safeguards commitments under articles II and III of the Treaty the objective of preventing further nuclear weapon proliferation has been achieved. However, this achievement has not led to making parallel progress towards the attainment of the nuclear disarmament objective because of the non-compliance by certain nuclear-weapons States with their unequivocal nuclear disarmament commitments. We share the concern that the continuation of this obvious imbalance in the implementation of the non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament undertakings presents a serious threat to the credibility and legitimacy of the Treaty.
As long as the nuclear weapons exist, the risk of their proliferation both vertically and horizontally will persist. This is the lesson learned of the history of nuclear proliferation which began with the development, testing and use of nuclear weapons by the United States during the World War II and prompted a chain reaction of proliferation of such weapons. The most effective guarantee against the proliferation of nuclear weapons is the total elimination of such weapons and maintenance of a world free of nuclear weapons backed by a strong verification and monitoring system which makes the acquisition of nuclear weapons impossible for any state.

Under the terms of article I of the Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States are committed not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or control over such weapons and not in any way to assist any non-nuclear-weapon States to control over such weapons. Accordingly, they should refrain from nuclear-weapon sharing, under any kind of security arrangements, among themselves, with the non-nuclear-weapon States parties and those not parties to the Treaty.

Nuclear-weapon-sharing of any kind is a clear violation of the explicit obligations under articles I and II of the Treaty. By transferring hundreds of nuclear weapons to certain NATO non-nuclear-weapon States, the United States of America, for a long time, has been in non-compliance with its obligation, under article I of the Treaty. We call on the U.S. to move promptly to full compliance with its Treaty obligations on non-proliferation by terminating nuclear-weapon-sharing arrangements and withdrawing all its tactical nuclear weapons that are stationed in the territories of certain NATO non-nuclear-weapon States. Furthermore, we urge the NATO non-nuclear-weapon States to renounce their participation in the NATO’s nuclear-sharing arrangement because such arrangement runs contrary to the letter and spirit of the NPT and the objective of nuclear disarmament.

Universal adherence to the Treaty is essential in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The universality of the Treaty is of utmost importance in a region such as the Middle East, where the nuclear weapons program of the Israeli regime remains a source of nuclear-weapon proliferation in the region and presents the most serious threat to the security and stability in the region. The nuclear non-proliferation norm should be applied globally and without exception.

Israel’s nuclear weapons program is the result of the application of double standards by certain nuclear-weapon States, in particular the United States and their failing to abide by the non-proliferation norm that they are legally committed to comply with. They oppose the acquisition and development of nuclear weapons by some States, but ignore the nuclear weapons programs of their allies that are outside the NPT and even have nuclear cooperation with them.
The 2020 Review Conference should call on all States parties for the total and complete prohibition of nuclear cooperation with, and the transfer of all nuclear facilities, resources or devices to, the Israeli regime.

The decision of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to allow nuclear cooperation between its members and a non-party to the Treaty is another manifestation of double standards and discrimination in implementing the NPT’s non-proliferation norm. That decision made in complete disregard of the principle 12 adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference and reaffirmed in 2000 by the Review Conference (paragraph 36 of the Final Document), according to which acceptance of the IAEA’s full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons is a necessary precondition for the transfer of nuclear material or equipment. Such actions and decisions have significantly undermined the prospects for achieving the universality of the Treaty.

Non-proliferation measures, including the IAEA’s safeguards-strengthening measures and nuclear-related export control measures, must be consistent with the inalienable right of all States parties, without discrimination, to develop, acquire and use nuclear technology, equipment and materials for the peaceful uses and to participate in peaceful nuclear cooperation.

The implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements pursuant to article III of the Treaty provides assurance of compliance by non-nuclear-weapon States with their nonproliferation and safeguards undertakings. Notwithstanding such assurances, various restrictive measures and initiatives continue to be applied to limit the inalienable right to peaceful nuclear development and participation in peaceful nuclear cooperation. Such constraints are inconsistent with the Treaty as they jeopardize the full exercise of the inalienable right of the States parties to apply and develop their programs for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and therefore, must be eliminated.

Thank you