Mr Chair,

Norway remains committed to the objective of a world without nuclear weapons. An effective, well-functioning non-proliferation regime is crucial for achieving this end. A credible and robust non-proliferation regime will also facilitate peaceful use of nuclear technology. Norway agrees with the working paper submitted by the Vienna Group of Ten. I would like to make some further comments:

The NPT forms the backbone of the global non-proliferation regime, and its implementation is under pressure. The NPT regime is not immune to tensions in the broader security landscape. Current outstanding proliferation concerns urgently need to be resolved. The DPRK’s nuclear and missile programme remains a serious challenge. The JCPOA has demonstrated that diplomacy can work, but its future is uncertain and the agreement needs our support.

In these volatile times, it is vital to preserve and consolidate the regimes that are already in place. It can be argued that the NPT has not delivered equally on all three pillars during its almost 50 years of existence. Nevertheless, without the NPT more states would probably have developed or have been developing nuclear weapons now.

Mr Chair,

The full and effective implementation of the NPT is the responsibility of all states parties. We must devote our attention to effective policies and practical measures and tools that will enable us to make further progress.

It is vital that all states parties cooperate fully with the IAEA in implementing their safeguards obligations. The IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and the Additional Protocol constitute the verification standard. Norway urges all states to bring the Additional Protocol into force.

We also call on all states to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, in particular the remaining eight Annex 2 states that are needed for the CTBT to enter into force. The CTBT is an essential instrument as it limits both horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation.

A treaty banning the production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices would be another important non-proliferation instrument. We call for the early commencement and conclusion of negotiations on a non-discriminatory and effectively verifiable Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).

Effective export controls are an integral part of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. Adequate domestic legislation is essential. We strongly encourage states to adhere to the export control guidelines of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Reducing the role of nuclear weapons in international affairs would be a key step towards a sustainable non-proliferation regime. Another important measure is the establishment and consolidation of nuclear weapons free zones, on the basis of arrangements freely reached by the states in the region concerned. In addition, the legitimate interest of non-nuclear weapons states in achieving legally binding negative security assurances has been recognised in NPT outcome documents.
Mr Chair,

The issue of nuclear security runs in parallel to the issue of nuclear non-proliferation. Instruments in the two areas are often mutually reinforcing. Norway attaches great importance to UN Security Council resolution 1540. We call for the full universalisation of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism as well as relevant guidelines and politically binding instruments. The IAEA plays a crucial role in coordinating nuclear security efforts internationally. We call on all states to ensure adequate funding for the IAEA’s activities in this field.

Norway is concerned about the large amounts of highly enriched uranium (HEU) still in use in civilian nuclear facilities. This poses a significant proliferation and security risk. Norway actively supports international efforts to develop sustainable low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel that would allow civilian facilities to operate at high performance levels. We also support the work to convert facilities for the use of LEU fuel, and to coordinate efforts in this field internationally. Norway has hosted two international symposiums on HEU minimisation in the civilian sector. A third will be held in Oslo on 5-7 June this year in cooperation with the IAEA. This event will provide an opportunity for closer dialogue on outstanding technical, economic and political questions with a view to moving forward on the transition from HEU to LEU for civilian use. We encourage member states to sign up to the IAEA Information Circular 912 and its reporting mechanism.

Thank you.