European Union

Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

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Statement by

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on behalf of the European Union

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Mr. Chairman,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

The Candidate Countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Montenegro*, and Albania*, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia align themselves with this statement.

The EU will play a constructive and active role during this review cycle to follow-up to the obligations and commitments assumed under the NPT or undertaken during the previous Review Conferences. In our General Statement, we have outlined the EU’s balanced approach in support of the NPT and its three pillars which are equally important and mutually reinforcing and contribute to international peace, security and stability. We recall that all States Parties have committed to pursuing policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons. All States Parties have also committed to applying the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their Treaty obligations.

For the European Union, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime, the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT and an important element in the development of nuclear energy applications for peaceful purposes. Our priority is to uphold

* The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.
and preserve the NPT as a key multilateral instrument for reinforcing international peace, security and stability: to promote its universalisation and to strengthen its implementation.

The world continues to face major proliferation threats to international peace and security. They must be addressed in a resolute way in order to maintain the credibility and effectiveness of the NPT regime. In this context, we underline the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The threatening and provocative actions of the DPRK confirm the urgent need to further strengthen the NPT and the CTBT. The DPRK is the only State to have conducted nuclear tests in the 21st century, in violation of several UNSC Resolutions, as well as its international commitments. It is the firm stance of the EU that the DPRK cannot have the status of a nuclear weapon State in accordance with the NPT. The EU welcomes the UN Security Council’s active engagement on this threat to international peace and security and calls on all States to fully and effectively implement its sanctions. The DPRK must abandon its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner in order to achieve a lasting peace and denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula through diplomatic means. The EU supports diplomatic efforts in this regard as well as the sanctions regime as approved by the UNSC maintaining the cohesion of the international community in its implementation. While the EU welcomes high-level talks between the Republic of Korea and the DPRK, and regards the announcement of a Summit between the US and the DPRK as a positive development to ease tensions in the Korean Peninsula, the DPRK must take concrete steps to enter into negotiations on denuclearisation and refrain from testing nuclear weapons or missiles. While it will be encouraging if the DPRK fulfils its recent commitments regarding testing, the international community must keep up maximum pressure on the DPRK until it embarks on a credible path towards complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation. The best proof of the credibility of the DPRK’s recent statement would be the signature and the ratification of the CTBT. We call on the DPRK to finally address international concerns related to its nuclear and ballistic missile programmes and to comply with its international obligations, especially those deriving from relevant UNSC resolutions. This also includes returning to compliance with the NPT and the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

The EU deeply regrets that, despite the resolution of the Board of Governors of the IAEA of 9 June 2011, the Syrian pledge to respond positively and without delay to the Agency’s request to resolve all outstanding questions, and in addition the renewed calls by the Director General, Syria has yet to
provide the necessary cooperation. Syria remains responsible for urgently remedying its non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement, and for concluding and bringing into force the Additional Protocol as soon as possible.

The EU calls upon all States to become party to and strictly comply with the obligations of the NPT, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. In the context of the Middle East region, this would be an important confidence- and security-building measure, which could constitute tangible steps in the direction of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

The EU continues to strongly support the outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference on the Middle East and reaffirms its full support for the establishment of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the Middle East. We regret that it has not been possible so far to convene a Conference on the establishment of such a zone. The EU calls on all States in the region to urgently and proactively engage with the Co-Convenors and each other with the aim of enabling the Conference to be convened as soon as possible, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at between all States of the region.

Mr. Chairman,

The European Union recognizes the importance of effective export controls, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article III of the NPT, and in compliance with UN Security Council Resolutions 1540 and 2325. In this context, we invite all States to adhere to the guidelines of the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Australia Group, the Wassenaar Arrangement and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and support the full participation of all EU Member States therein.

The EU is seriously concerned by the proliferation of missile technology. The development, testing or use of ballistic missiles is clearly a destabilising factor in various regions of the world. In this regard, the EU strongly supports the MTCR. We are deeply concerned by the tests conducted by DPRK in violation of UN Security Council resolutions; the development by the DPRK of a military nuclear programme further increases such concerns. We also reaffirm our concern with Iran's ballistic missile launches which are inconsistent with UNSC resolution 2231. Moreover, as the only multilateral transparency and confidence-building instrument against ballistic missile proliferation,
the EU continues to provide political and financial support to the Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC) to promote its universality, full implementation, and enhanced and improved functioning.

The IAEA’s system of safeguards is a fundamental component of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and plays an indispensable role in the implementation of the NPT. The EU considers the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements complemented by Additional Protocols to be the current IAEA verification standard based on Article III of the NPT. The EU welcomes the fact that three more Additional Protocols came into force in 2017 and calls for the universalisation of CSAs and APs without delay. Further, the EU urges remaining States which have not yet amended their Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) to accelerate their efforts in this respect. The EU supports the development and application of the State-level concept as a means to strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of the IAEA Safeguards System and to contribute to strengthening the global non-proliferation efforts.

The European Commission and EU Member States through their Support Programmes, continue to provide expert and technical support to IAEA safeguards. The close cooperation between the Euratom Safeguards System and the IAEA contributes to the effective and efficient implementation of safeguards and allows the EU Member States to demonstrate continuing respect for their international non-proliferation obligations. The EU, including through individual contributions by some of its Member States, has substantially contributed to the modernisation of the IAEA Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL). The EU has also provided the Agency with technology and expertise from the European Commission's Joint Research Centre and its Directorates, designed to meet IAEA specific requirements in a wide range of fields.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreed by the E3/EU+3 and Iran, is an important non-proliferation instrument and a successful, multilateral endeavour endorsed by the UN Security Council Resolution 2231, all provisions of which must be fully implemented. The EU has continued its key role in the deal, including through the EU High Representative Federica Mogherini, who is the Coordinator of the Joint Commission under the JCPOA and through the participation of France, Germany and the UK in the JCPOA Joint Commission. The European Union has clearly indicated its enduring commitment to the JCPOA, and calls on all parties to implement all its provisions fully and effectively. The EU underlines that the IAEA has, since Implementation Day, continuously monitored and verified, and regularly reported on, Iran's implementation of all its nuclear-related commitments following a comprehensive and strict monitoring system. While welcoming the
ongoing implementation, the EU reiterates the need for Iran to continue abiding strictly by all its nuclear-related commitments. The early ratification by Iran of the Additional Protocol is essential.

Mr. Chairman,

The EU and its Member States recognise that nuclear security is essential. We remain greatly concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that terrorists may acquire, traffic or use nuclear or other radioactive materials. While recognising that nuclear security remains the responsibility of each State, international cooperation contributes to strengthening nuclear security. The IAEA has a central role in coordinating the global efforts and strengthening the international nuclear security architecture for the peaceful uses of nuclear and other radioactive material as widely recognized by international initiatives which have contributed to strengthening nuclear security. In this regard, the entry into force of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), to which all EU Member States, as well as the Euratom Community, are Parties, is a milestone in strengthening nuclear security. The EU will continue to help States in their efforts to fully implement the provisions of the Amended CPPNM. We call on all States to accede to the amended CPPNM as well as to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, another key legal instrument the universalisation of which the EU continues to advocate.

Together with the bilateral contributions from its Member States, the European Union is among the largest donors to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund. The total EU financial contribution to the Fund, based on seven successive Council Joint Actions/Decisions has reached nearly €50 million for the period of 2009-2019. EU funding to the IAEA has helped the Agency to assist countries to upgrade and ensure the physical protection of selected facilities, improve their national regulatory infrastructure concerning physical protection and the safety and security of radioactive material and to enact the necessary legislation. Achieving and maintaining a solid national nuclear security regime based on IAEA recommendations and guidance, and applying them to TC projects that utilise nuclear or radioactive material, is in the interest of all countries.

Significant progress has been made in the last decade in the EU through the implementation of an EU internal plan to enhance chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security. The CBRN Centres of Excellence (CoE) initiative provides a platform for voluntary regional cooperation with more than 60 partner countries on all CBRN-related hazard issues with a budget of €156 million for
the period 2014-2020. The EU encourages the preparation of national action plans to identify needs for capacity-building on the basis of a risk assessment.

Mr. Chairman,

In the framework of its strategy against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the EU is actively supporting UN Security Council Resolutions 1540, 1887 and 2325. The EU and its Member States have actively contributed to international initiatives, such as the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process, which contribute to strengthening nuclear security. The EU participates in the Nuclear Security Contact Group (NSCG).

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the European Union stresses the importance of the mentioned non-proliferation aspects and would like to see them reflected in the outcome documents resulting from this review cycle. We will fully support the Chairs of the NPT Preparatory Committee in order to ensure a successful review cycle.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.