Mr. Chair,

The nuclear weapons constitute the most serious threat for the survival of humankind and any use of nuclear weapons would have catastrophic humanitarian consequences. Safeguarding the security of peoples through eliminating the threats posed by the nuclear weapons and achieving the objective of nuclear disarmament has been the main purpose of the NPT.

We are deeply concerned that the objective of the nuclear disarmament has not yet been realized and article VI has not been implemented. Under article VI of the NPT, the nuclear-weapon States have undertaken to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

We regret that negotiations on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament have not been pursued by the nuclear-weapon States in non-compliance with article VI. The continued failure of the nuclear-weapon States to meet their legal obligations under Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to negotiate effective measures on nuclear disarmament has created a crisis of confidence in the capacity and ability of the Treaty to deliver its promise of nuclear disarmament and has put the Treaty under great stress.

The NPT States parties need to make special efforts to establish the necessary framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons. In this regard, we support the immediate commencement of negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention in the Conference on Disarmament consistent with Action 6 of the 2010 Action Plan on nuclear disarmament.

The implementation of the article VI obligation is not conditional. The unconditional nature of the nuclear disarmament obligation under article VI has been clarified in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in which the nuclear-weapon States agreed that they have “an
unequivocal undertaking” to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament.

Most of the 13 practical steps and 22-point action plan on nuclear disarmament agreed to in the Final Documents of the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences have not been implemented. Those agreed measures continue to be valid until their objective is realized.

We are concerned about the lack of progress in the implementation of the “Action Plan” on nuclear disarmament adopted by the 2010 Review Conference. Urgent action by the nuclear-weapon States is required to implement the steps leading to nuclear disarmament agreed to in the Final Documents of the 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences. The nuclear-weapon States, in particular the States with the largest nuclear arsenals, have the special responsibility to lead efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament.

In Action 1 of the 2010 “Action Plan” on nuclear disarmament, all States parties committed to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons. The recently announced nuclear policy of the United States, known as the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, which emphasizes the utility of retaining nuclear weapons and the threat to use them and massive plans for long-term expansion and modernization of its nuclear arsenal, is fully and fundamentally incompatible with that country’s Treaty commitments. The NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangement is also inconsistent with the object and purpose of the NPT and the nuclear disarmament obligation of NATO’s non-nuclear-weapons States parties to the Treaty.

The 2010 Review Conference reaffirmed the need for the nuclear-weapon States to reduce and eliminate all types of their nuclear weapons. On this basis, in Action 3 of the 2010 Action Plan, the nuclear-weapon States committed to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed. We note with concern that apart from the announcement on the completion of the implementation of a bilateral instrument known as the New START, which has a limited scope dealing only with the deployed strategic nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, there is no progress in implementing this commitment to reduce nuclear weapons in an irreversible, verifiable and transparent manner. Moreover, we note that no negotiation is underway between nuclear weapon States on follow-on measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals.

Certain nuclear-weapon States point to the limited reduction in their stockpile of deployed strategic warheads as evidence of their commitment to article VI. It should be noted that most of the retired systems were already obsolete and due for deactivation and that economic considerations and reducing defense expenditures rather than implementation of disarmament obligation led to such cuts.
In Action 5 of the 2010 Action Plan the nuclear-weapon States committed to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. But so far no concrete progress has been made in implementing those steps. One of the steps requires addressing the issue of tactical nuclear weapons in general and the tactical nuclear weapons that are stationed in the territories of the non-nuclear-weapon States in Europe in particular. Both of these issues have been left unaddressed. The 2020 Review Conference should call for deep and verifiable reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons as part of the process of pursuing the objectives of article VI. We call on the non-nuclear weapon States of the NATO to contribute to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty through their voluntary withdrawal of all tactical nuclear weapons from their territories. They should follow the example of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine.

Another step under Action 5 is the commitment to diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies. However, the role and significance of nuclear weapons in security and military policies and doctrines of certain nuclear-weapon States have dangerously increased. Just take a look at the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States of America. We must not forget that reckless policies and statements emphasizing on the role of nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of its possessor's security, coupled with the lack of progress on nuclear disarmament encourage the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The development of new mini-nukes indicates greater reliance on nuclear weapons. Such developments are very disturbing because the technical characteristics of these new weapons raise the temptation to use them.

Discussing policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and lessen the danger of nuclear war was the other step that the nuclear-weapon States committed to make progress in that area. Have such discussions taken place at all? If yes, what has been their result?

The cessation of all nuclear test explosions constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects. It contributes to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects and to the process of nuclear disarmament leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. On this basis, the 2010 Review Conference recognized the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as a core element of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. In accordance with Action 10 of the 2010 Action Plan, all nuclear-weapon States undertook to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. The nuclear-weapon States have the special responsibility to encourage Annex 2 countries, in particular those which have not acceded to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify. The recent public assertion of the United States of America not to seek ratification of the CTBT
represents a clear example of a policy inconsistent with the commitment made under Action 10 of the Action Plan.

Without addressing the concerns regarding the maintenance of the operational capacity by certain nuclear weapon States to resume test explosions in a short notice as well as conducting nuclear weapons tests by computer simulation and other alternative ways and methods, the objective of the CTBT to end the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons and qualitative improvement if the existing nuclear weapons would not be effectively realized. It should be recalled that under Action 11 of the 2010 Plan of Action, nuclear-weapon States have committed to refrain from the use of new nuclear weapons technologies and from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of CTBT.

Modernization plans and build-up of nuclear weapons present a dangerous obstacle to the nuclear disarmament process. Certain nuclear-weapon States are engaged in massive nuclear weapon modernization projects. They are also developing new types of nuclear weapons for new military missions. For instance, the United States plans to spend $1.2 trillion on a tremendous build-up of its nuclear arsenal. Such provocative plans should be considered a clear indication of, and an explicit invitation for, the start of a new nuclear arms race and a violation of the nuclear disarmament obligations under article VI of the Treaty, as they clearly contradict the object and purpose of the Treaty. The Final Document of the 2020 Review Conference should include a clear commitment by all nuclear-weapon States to cease completely and immediately all plans aimed at upgrading and refurbishing their existing nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, developing new types of nuclear weapons systems and constructing any new facility for the development, deployment and production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery at home and abroad.