Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

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Statement by

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on behalf of the European Union

Geneva, 25 April 2018
Mr. Chairman,

I have the honour to speak on behalf of the European Union.

The Candidate Countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*, Montenegro*, and Albania*, the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova and Georgia align themselves with this statement.

The EU will play a constructive and active role during this important review cycle to follow-up to the obligations and commitments assumed under the NPT and undertaken during the previous Review Conferences. In our General Statement, we have outlined the EU’s balanced approach to support the centrality of the NPT and its three pillars which are equally important and mutually reinforcing and contribute to international peace, security and stability. We recall that all States Parties have committed to pursuing policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons. All States Parties have also committed to applying the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency in relation to the implementation of their Treaty obligations.

Bearing in mind the current severe and ever-changing security environment, we stress the need to preserve and further advance the general arms control and disarmament processes and call for further progress on all aspects of disarmament to enhance global security.

* The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.
EU Member States remain committed to the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, in accordance with Article VI of the NPT. We stress the need for concrete progress towards the full implementation of Article VI, especially through the overall reduction in the global stockpile of nuclear weapons, taking into account the special responsibility of the States that possess the largest nuclear arsenals.

We note that a Russian missile system raises serious concerns regarding Russian compliance with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and urge Russia to address these concerns in a substantial and transparent way. We call upon the United States and the Russian Federation to remain engaged in active dialogue to preserve the INF and ensure its full and verifiable compliance.

We note the announcements by the parties that they have met the central limits of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) by 5 February 2018. We encourage the United States and the Russian Federation to extend this Treaty and seek further reductions to their arsenals, including strategic and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed nuclear weapons. In particular, the EU encourages the United States and the Russian Federation to include non-strategic nuclear weapons into arms control and nuclear disarmament processes, pursue further discussions on confidence-building, transparency, verification activities, and reporting, and to reduce the operational readiness of their nuclear weapons systems to the minimum level necessary.

In this context, the EU welcomes the increased transparency shown by the two European nuclear weapon States on the nuclear weapons they possess and the concrete measures they have taken in the field of nuclear disarmament.

All EU Member States have ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and are abiding by its obligations. We reiterate our call on all States that have not yet done so, in particular those listed in Annex II, to sign and ratify the CTBT without any preconditions and further delay. In the meantime, we call on all States to abide by a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, and to refrain from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Treaty.

During this Preparatory Committee session, the EU again hosted a side-event on the CTBT to highlight its crucial importance for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. The CTBTO responded immediately and effectively to the nuclear tests of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), demonstrating its ability to provide independent and reliable data, something that
no single country alone could do. The CTBTO operates what has become the world’s largest and most sophisticated multilateral verification regime and we are proud that the EU has contributed to its strengthening. Most recently, on 26 February 2018, the EU Foreign Ministers adopted a new EU Council Decision in support of the CTBTO’s monitoring and verification capabilities, worth more than 4.5 million Euros.

The EU remains united and committed to verifiable treaty-based nuclear disarmament and arms control and stresses the need to renew multilateral efforts and revitalize multilateral negotiating bodies, in particular the Conference on Disarmament (CD). We welcome the creation of the five subsidiary bodies in the CD in 2018 and encourage them to advance substantive work.

In the CD, our longstanding priority is to immediately commence negotiations of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT), on the basis of document CD/1299 and the mandate contained therein. At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, all States Parties reaffirmed the urgent necessity of negotiating and bringing to a conclusion a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable FMCT. We encourage all States Parties to support the work of the High Level Expert Preparatory Group, led by Canada, whose mandate is to present recommendations on substantial elements for a future Treaty, without prejudice to national positions in future negotiations. The EU and its Member States are actively contributing to these efforts, including through providing significant financial support to the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) to facilitate the participation of African, Asian, Latin American and Caribbean countries in the FMCT consultative process. This important cross-regional project, with a budget of 1.2 million Euros, will help to develop trans-regional ownership and keep positive momentum on the importance and relevance of the negotiation of an FMCT.

In the meantime, we call on all States possessing nuclear weapons that have not yet done so to declare and uphold an immediate moratorium on their production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. We welcome the action by the two European nuclear weapon States, which have declared relevant moratoria and dismantled or converted such facilities, and call on others to follow suit.

The EU welcomes the establishment of the Group of Governmental Experts on nuclear disarmament verification and looks forward to progress also in other fora, such as the International
Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV). While verification is not an end in itself, further development of the multilateral nuclear disarmament verification capabilities would assist in the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons. The relevant capabilities should be further developed to ensure their availability for future disarmament measures.

Our views on a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty and on nuclear disarmament verification are elaborated in more detail in the two EU working papers submitted to this Preparatory Committee session.

With regard to negative security assurances, the 2010 NPT Review Conference stated that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately begin discussion with a view to elaborating recommendations on all aspects of the issue, without excluding an internationally legally binding instrument. The EU recognizes the legitimate interest of non-nuclear weapon States in receiving unequivocal security assurances from nuclear weapon States as part of binding and agreed security arrangements. The EU calls on all nuclear weapon States to reaffirm existing security assurances noted by UN Security Council Resolution 984 (1995) and recalled in UN Security Council Resolution 1887 (2009) and Resolution 2310 (2016).

The EU recalls that Russia has specifically committed to refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or sovereignty of Ukraine under the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 on security assurances, in connection with Ukraine's accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon State. We call upon Russia to honour and fulfil this commitment.

We acknowledge the importance of nuclear weapon free zones for peace and security, in accordance with Article VII of the Treaty. In line with the 1999 Guidelines of the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC), they should be established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. The EU recognizes that treaty-based security assurances are available to nuclear weapon free zones and encourages nuclear weapon States to sign and ratify the relevant protocols to the Treaties establishing nuclear weapon free zones drawn up following the requisite consultations.

We support activities to enhance disarmament and non-proliferation education, carried out by the EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, the European network of independent think tanks. The EU Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament Conference has become an important annual forum to encourage global dialogue and we invite all interested stakeholders to participate in its next edition in Brussels in late 2018.

Finally, we believe that active and equal partnership and leadership of women in decision-making and action will be crucial in achieving further progress on nuclear disarmament.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman