Building Bridges to Effective Nuclear Disarmament

Recommendations for the 2020 Review Process for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)

Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament

Working paper submitted by Japan

I. In Search of a Common Goal for a Divided World

1. The vision for a world without nuclear weapons has become blurred and needs to be refocused. Two opposing trends in disarmament have come into sharper relief. Deepening concerns over the deteriorating strategic environment impel some states to reaffirm their reliance on nuclear deterrence in the belief that nuclear deterrence benefits national and international security and stability and prevents a major war. At the same time, other states and civil society groups, including hibakusha, seek the total elimination of nuclear weapons without further delay, based on deep concerns about the risks of catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear use, as reflected in the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). This divide has deepened and become so stark that states with divergent views have been unable to engage meaningfully with each other on key issues.

2. The Group of Eminent Persons strongly believes that the stalemate over nuclear disarmament is not tenable. Whatever the disagreements expressed by states regarding the NPT process and the TPNW, it is not in any state’s interest to allow the foundation of the global nuclear order to crumble. Rather, it is a common interest of all states to improve the international security environment and pursue a world without nuclear weapons in line with Article VI of the NPT. The international community must move urgently to narrow and ultimately resolve its differences. Civility in discourse and respect for divergent views must be restored to facilitate a joint search for a common ground for dialogue, where all parties even though they might have different perspectives can work together

*The present Working paper is issued without formal editing.*
to reduce nuclear dangers.

3. Against this backdrop, the Group recommends that states should, with a sense of urgency, undertake the bridge-building measures prescribed in Part II. This is necessary to re-energize nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation during this cycle of the NPT review process, enhance the process itself and lay the ground for converging different approaches.

**Premises for upholding the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime**

4. The norm of non-use of nuclear weapons, which is backed by the 73-year practice of non-use, must be maintained by all means.

5. The NPT remains central to advancing our common goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

6. To preserve the NPT, all states parties should fulfill their joint commitment to the ultimate total elimination of nuclear weapons, and to the implementation of the Decisions on Principles and Objectives and Strengthening the Review Process of 1995 and the Final Documents of 2000 and 2010. Based on the resolution adopted in 1995 and Action Plan agreed in 2010, the concerned regional actors and co-sponsors/conveners – the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States – in close communication with interested states parties to the NPT and the United Nations, should work to convene as soon as possible a conference on the Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction to be attended by all states of the region of the Middle East.

7. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) plays a critical role in reinforcing the norm of non-testing, preventing nuclear proliferation, and contributing to nuclear disarmament. The Group urges the remaining Annex II States to sign and/or ratify the treaty without further delay and calls upon all states to refrain from nuclear testing. All states should make extra efforts to maintain the effectiveness of the treaty’s verification mechanisms and the Provisional Technical Secretariat and ensure adequate funding.

8. The Russia-US nuclear arms control framework constitutes a fundamental basis for the global nuclear arms and threat reduction effort. The Group urges the Russian Federation and the United States to spare no effort to re-engage and to rehabilitate the framework to secure further reductions in nuclear forces. The most urgent task is the extension of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) for five years.

9. Full compliance by all parties with all elements of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is essential to the integrity of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. All stakeholders should continue to support full implementation of the JCPOA, which is underpinned by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2231.

10. Catastrophic consequences from the North Korean nuclear and missile crisis must be prevented. All stakeholders are urged to make every effort to resolve the problems through peaceful means, and to achieve the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
II. Bridge Building Actions

11. A range of activities to build bridges across the nuclear disarmament divide should be designed to yield a clear common vision for achieving a world without nuclear weapons. “Bridge builders” should consider developing an agenda that requires diverse states to openly address the fundamental issues and questions that create the divide, so that possible pathways to common ground can be identified and concrete effective steps toward nuclear disarmament can be taken. In particular, despite their diverging approaches to achieving nuclear disarmament, the common commitment of nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states to the objective of the NPT offers a useful point of departure for bridge-building. The Group recommends the following actions with the recognition that governments along with civil society organizations can jointly play effective roles.

Enhancing the implementation of the NPT review process

12. All NPT states parties should demonstrate ownership of their treaty – in statements but also by making concrete and practical suggestions. These could be unconditional voluntary actions, reports on treaty implementation and bridge-building proposals that demonstrate states’ commitments during the review cycle.

13. National reports can be better utilized in the NPT strengthened review process. In particular, it would be useful to convene a session at the third PrepCom, at which nuclear-weapon states explain their national reports, followed by an interactive discussion with other states parties and civil society participants. Information on steps towards nuclear disarmament envisaged by the nuclear-weapon states in the step-by-step approach would be helpful.

14. “Bridge builders” could take initiatives in fostering a dialogue, involving both nuclear-armed states and non-nuclear-weapon states, to improve understanding of and develop enhanced transparency measures intended to: (1) contribute effectively to threat reduction and risk reduction; (2) address security concerns incurred during the process of nuclear disarmament; and (3) improve confidence and trust among all types of states – nuclear-armed states, states under extended nuclear deterrence and TPNW proponent states. The dialogue could address relevant issues, such as concrete measures for reduction, transparency about doctrine, and the policy dimensions of nuclear arsenals, through interactive discussions rather than repetitive statements. In addition, the dialogue should review the content, format, and cost of national reports.

Confidence-building measures as a foundation for bridge building

15. Nuclear-armed states, in cooperation with states under extended nuclear deterrence arrangements, should find ways to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in national security policies.

16. Nuclear-weapon states should strengthen negative security assurance commitments enshrined in UN Security Council Resolution 984 to NPT non-nuclear-weapon states and states parties to treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones. Those who are not able to do it should explain why. Nuclear-weapon states also should consider how to best utilize declaratory policies for confidence-building, including suggesting ways that would allow more empirical assessments that stated declaratory policies are actually operative.

Preparing the ground for convergence of different approaches
A) Identifying elements of nuclear disarmament

17. There currently exists no widely shared understanding of what security-enhancing, verifiable and enforceable nuclear disarmament should entail. The international community will not be able to decide on and implement nuclear disarmament without more clarity on what it will require. States that rely on nuclear deterrence – directly or through alliances – and states that support immediate prohibition should take up this challenge in the NPT process as well as through other forums.

B) Intensifying efforts to develop monitoring, verification and compliance mechanisms

18. Development of effective monitoring, verification and compliance mechanisms is necessary for the achievement of nuclear disarmament. The process of developing such means should in itself help build confidence among nuclear-armed states and between nuclear-armed states and non-nuclear-weapon states.

19. Several initiatives are currently being undertaken by individual states and groups of states, including nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states, to investigate technologies, techniques and methodologies to ensure effective monitoring and verification of nuclear disarmament. Reliable, cost-effective technologies that provide a high level of confidence without disclosure of sensitive information to non-nuclear-weapon states should be the goal. Current efforts should be continued and afforded the necessary resources. Ideally, there should be collaboration among current initiatives to help accelerate progress, with regular reports to the NPT review process. All states should begin to consider how they might contribute to monitoring and verification.

20. A technical study under the auspices of the UN should be undertaken that would ascertain the possibility of conducting verification activities without disclosure of sensitive information (such disclosure would run counter to the provisions of Articles I and II of the NPT), and lay the ground for further efforts to develop nuclear disarmament verification mechanisms involving all interested NPT states parties.

21. An even greater challenge than ensuring effective monitoring and verification is to design and agree on measures to ensure compliance by states with their legally binding obligations, including the use of enforcement measures, when non-compliance occurs. Among the worst-case scenarios that must be confronted is the “breakout” of a state from a nuclear-weapon-free world by acquiring a nuclear weapon or weapons. To give all states the confidence that nuclear disarmament will be effective and durable, agreed mechanisms must be created to ensure timely enforcement. Research into this relatively neglected but vital subject should be accelerated both by governments and civil society, and results shared in the NPT review process.

22. The control of weapons-usable fissile material – highly enriched uranium (HEU) and weapons-usable plutonium – is both a near term imperative and a prerequisite for disarmament. States are encouraged to end production of fissile material for nuclear weapons; those that continue to produce such material are encouraged to clarify what prevents them from stopping.

23. In this regard, all states should:
   a) Ensure the highest standards of physical protection and security for existing stocks of such
material; and

b) Work cooperatively to develop widely accepted techniques for the irreversible and verifiable disposition of excess ex-weapons fissile material.

24. A world free of nuclear weapons will require an agreed, legally-binding global regime that regulates production, provides verifiable accounting of existing material, provides adequate safeguards against its use in nuclear weapon, and disposes of it in an irreversible and verifiable manner. This regime should include effective provisions to ensure that HEU used in nuclear-powered warships or civilian uses cannot be diverted to weapons use. All states possessing HEU or weapon-usable plutonium should work toward developing the characteristics of such a regime.

C) Setting a nuclear disarmament agenda that addresses hard questions about the relationship between security and disarmament

25. There are fundamental differences within and between states regarding the utility of nuclear deterrence. The existence of these differences needs to be accepted and addressed constructively if they are then to be reconciled in a way that will make the elimination of nuclear arsenals possible. Proponents and opponents of nuclear deterrence must persist in bridging their differences. Although nuclear deterrence may arguably enhance stability in certain environments, it is a dangerous long-term basis for global security and therefore all states should seek a better long-term solution.

26. Meanwhile, all states should:
   a) Reaffirm the understanding that nuclear war cannot be won and should never be fought; and
   b) Restore civility in discourse, without which there is no cooperation.

27. In addition, nuclear-armed states should:
   a) Eschew any nuclear war-fighting doctrine; and
   b) Refrain from coercive action based on the threat of use of nuclear weapons;

28. “Bridge builders” should launch honest dialogue that:
   a) Seeks to design a disarmament process or framework with effective measures and benchmarks;
   b) Aims to establish common ground for all states by setting an agenda comprised of hard questions that: (1) address the right of self-defense, which under extreme circumstances of national survival could envisage the possibility of limited threat of use or use of nuclear weapons, mindful of international humanitarian law, taking into account the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and protection of civilians, non-combatants and the environment; and (2) ensure that human security is considered in designing a world free of nuclear weapons, while preserving international peace and security; and
   c) Seeks solutions to the ultimate dilemma facing nuclear disarmament: how to guarantee the security of all states by ensuring compliance with the obligations under such a regime, including timely enforcement when other measures fail to achieve compliance.

Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament
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Note: Ambassador Dr. Mahmoud Karem was not able to participate in the second meeting due to official affairs. Given to his absence at the finalizing process, he is not fully associated with this recommendation. However, his general agreement to this recommendation remains within his intention to participate in the next round of the meeting in 2018 Japanese fiscal year.
Annex

Chair’s Summary*
First and Second Meetings of
the Group of Eminent Persons for
Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament

March 2018

* This chair’s summary, prepared under his own authority and responsibility, outlines his understanding of the discussions at the first and second meetings of the Group of Eminent Persons for the Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament, held in Hiroshima and Tokyo in November 2017 and March 2018, respectively. The chair’s summary constitutes neither a consensus document nor recommendations of the Group.
I. Purpose of the Group and Report

(1) The Group of Eminent Persons for Substantive Advancement of Nuclear Disarmament was established under the initiative of former Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida, and announced at the First Session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2020 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference (in Vienna) in May 2017. The context for establishment of this Group is, among other issues, deterioration of the international security and nuclear policy environments, especially due to the crisis provoked by North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, and widening of serious schisms on approaches towards achieving a world without nuclear weapons between nuclear-weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS), as well as among NNWS.

(2) The mandate of the Group is to submit to the Foreign Minister of Japan policy recommendations on concrete measures for the substantive and effective advancement of nuclear disarmament. The Government of Japan will introduce these recommendations into NPT preparatory meetings leading up to the 2020 Review Conference, and will urge the international community to implement the Group’s suggested measures. Members of the Group participated in the discussions in their personal capacities, and do not represent any specific organizations or countries.

(3) The work of the Group will be implemented in two phases. In Phase I, the Group produced recommendations by March 2018 for input by representative of the Japanese government to the Second Preparatory Committee of the 2020 NPT Review Conference, to be held in late April 2018. In Phase II, the Group will make further recommendations for the 2020-2025 NPT review cycle and beyond, which will be presented at the Third Preparatory Committee in Spring 2019.

(4) The Group developed policy recommendations in Phase I that focus on urgent and immediate activities to build bridges across the nuclear disarmament divide. Among these are: 1) enhancing the implementation of the NPT review process; 2) implementing confidence-building measures as foundations for bridge building; and 3) creating the ground for converging different approaches. The last part includes three efforts: identifying elements of nuclear disarmament; intensifying efforts to develop nuclear disarmament monitoring, verification and compliance mechanisms; and setting a nuclear disarmament agenda that addresses hard questions about the relationship between security and disarmament.

II. State of Play

(5) Despite frequently-reiterated commitments to achieve total elimination of nuclear weapons by literally all countries, including nuclear-armed states, progress toward nuclear disarmament has stalled. Although there are some positive and important aspects of the current situation, notably the continued non-use of nuclear weapons for more than 70 years after atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, nuclear disarmament efforts have been hampered by both acute and chronic problems that have intensified in the past several years.

1. Acute problems

(a) North Korea

(6) The most immediate and serious crisis confronting regional and international security, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation—and which risks breaking the tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons—is caused by North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. The long-running challenges raised by North Korea’s declared withdrawals from the NPT in 1993 and 2003 have worsened considerably in the last couple years. Through frequent and alarming tests, North Korea has bolstered its nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities aggressively and rapidly. North Korea repeatedly threatens to use nuclear weapons (even pre-emptively) against Japan, the US and the ROK. There is a worrying possibility of
tensions with North Korea escalating to the nuclear level, either deliberately, or by miscalculation or accident. Deterrence or other means to avoid such escalation might not work to prevent the actual use of nuclear weapons in the future. Some experts also warn of the possibility of a domino effect, in which concerned countries in the region and beyond might alter their security and nuclear-related policies depending on how the North Korea issue evolves.

(b) US-Russia

Amidst deteriorating bilateral relations, the erosion of US-Russian nuclear arms control cooperation presents another immediate, serious concern with important ramifications for the overall nuclear disarmament architecture. Washington and Moscow each have accused the other of violating the Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF). Unless and until they resolve this issue, prospects look dim for further reductions in strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons, below the limits established under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The lack of momentum and political will for deeper cuts in US and Russian nuclear weapons is complicated by concerns that third countries may attempt to achieve strategic parity, or offset nuclear forces with ballistic missile defense (BMD) technology, conventional hypersonic strike weapons, or other emerging technologies.

(c) Geopolitical competition

Geopolitical competition along with ongoing power transitions, especially in Northeast and South Asia, Europe and the Middle East, cast doubts on the prospects for promoting nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation from several directions. Several concerned countries have re-evaluated the role of (extended) nuclear deterrence in addressing perceived security challenges. Nuclear-armed states continue to modernize their nuclear arsenals, aiming to maintain and/or bolster nuclear deterrence. Such activities in these states reflect beliefs that nuclear weapons remain crucial to deterring major aggression, to protecting national security, and as a guarantor of peace. According to these beliefs, states would more likely face aggression if they relinquished nuclear weapons, and conventional forces alone might not be sufficient to deter or defeat aggression. Countries whose security policy involves nuclear deterrence have become more cautious about the potential negative implications of nuclear disarmament efforts on their nuclear deterrence practices.

2. Chronic problems

(a) Multilateral nuclear arms control

Nuclear disarmament efforts face a chronic standstill. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), concluded in 1996, has yet to enter into force. Formal substantive negotiation on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) has not commenced at the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Outside of the CD, there have been very few meaningful multilateral nuclear disarmament initiatives in which nuclear-armed states have been involved.

(b) Roles of nuclear weapons

Nuclear-armed states (and their allies, to a lesser extent) continue to attach importance to nuclear weapons for, inter alia: deterring an adversary’s use of nuclear weapons (and, for some countries, other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and conventional weapons); preventing large scale warfare among major powers (or nuclear-armed states); stabilizing major-power relations through mutual deterrence; offsetting an adversary’s perceived superior military capabilities; and preserving status and prestige as a major power. Accordingly, nuclear-armed states’ perceptions of the value of nuclear deterrence and the status and prestige
derived from nuclear weapons remain as potential temptation for further nuclear proliferation.

c) NPT

(11) The NPT—the cornerstone of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime—and its review process are now facing great challenges. Among others, NNWS have been frustrated by perceived inadequate implementation of NPT Article VI by NWS. In this context, NNWS question what should constitute “meaningful measures” toward disarmament under the treaty. Some NNWS note that none of the five NWS have ever carried out nuclear force reductions expressly for the purpose of implementing Article VI, rather such reductions have been driven by national security considerations and not by fealty to the disarmament provisions contained in the NPT.

(12) Another outstanding challenge is the lack of universality of the NPT. India, Israel and Pakistan refused to join the NPT. Meaningful discussions on disarmament require the participation of all three countries, but their non-membership means this is not possible in the current NPT context.

(13) In addition, the NPT review process suffers from institutional fatigue. Among the contributing factors is inadequate implementation and marginal progress on previously-made consensus commitments on nuclear disarmament (i.e., the 13 steps agreed in 2000 and the 2010 Action Plan) following strenuous efforts at prior review conferences. Even reviews on implementation of these measures have not been conducted adequately. Discussions of Article VI and other provisions have become sterile and repetitive. Furthermore, many countries and civil society groups have seemingly become indifferent to the review process; instead, only a few states devote high-level attention to the reviews. This contributes to a vicious cycle that decreases the value of the review process, in which some states demonstrate incomplete understanding of the Treaty and inadequate preparation for its review process, which then hampers their ability to negotiate in real time or take part in interactive discussions.

3. Gap

(14) Persistent stalemate and erosion of progress toward nuclear disarmament have widened a gap between nuclear-armed states and NNWS, and among NNWS. In the group’s discussions, this divide was also characterized using the terms disarmers, who favor the immediate prohibition and abolition of nuclear weapons, and deterrers, who favor retaining nuclear deterrence.1

(15) The divide between disarmers and deterrers results from different perspectives regarding nuclear weapons, or lack of understanding between the two groups regarding, inter alia, geostrategic circumstances and divergent ways to improve global security. Deterrers argue for the necessity of maintaining nuclear deterrence for their national security. They perceive that nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence play essential roles for maintaining national security and stability, and preventing major-power conflict. Disarmers, on the other hand, mostly disagree with the argument that stability can be best achieved through a nuclear “balance of terror.” Instead, they insist that the continued existence of nuclear weapons threatens tremendous humanitarian consequences. They also argue that nuclear-armed states and their allies—who mostly argue for following a step-by-step or progressive approach to disarmament—should explain their approach more concretely: how to define the steps and the corresponding measures needed to reach them.

(a) Humanitarian dimensions

(16) The divide is also seen in debates over humanitarian dimensions of nuclear weapons. Disarmers and some deterrers, to an extent, recognize the humanitarian implications of continued possession of nuclear weapons. However, disarmers criticize deterrers for attaching less importance to, or giving insufficient recognition

1 How to define “disarmers” and “deterrers,” as well as whether to use these terms, were not agreed by the members, but are used in this chairman’s summary for the purpose of convenience to clarify the points of discussions.
of, humanitarian dimensions, and for refusing to accept a norm that delegitimates the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. For disarmers, humanitarian norms are gaining more prominence based on fears that an erratic, miscalculated decision, or misguided leadership, may lead to crisis, escalation, or war resulting in devastating impact on humanity. In this view, the survival of humanity requires that nuclear weapons never be used under any circumstances and should be eliminated.

(b) TPNW

(17) Based on these perceptions, states and civil society groups supporting nuclear disarmament took the initiative to establish the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), concluded in July 2017. The treaty stipulates a total ban on nuclear weapons and their related activities by signatory states. Proponents argue that the TPNW, which highlights international concerns about the potential disastrous humanitarian and environmental consequences of nuclear war, is itself an essential plank in the platform for elimination of nuclear weapons, and will increase awareness of the humanitarian dimensions of nuclear weapons, thereby enhancing a prohibition norm. For proponents, the initiative to conclude the TPNW was an expression of unwillingness to be blocked in venues where progress toward disarmament is currently being frustrated by nuclear-armed states. The treaty also demonstrates the political costs of the nuclear-armed states’ failure to live up to their NPT commitments regarding disarmament, and challenges the notion that nuclear weapons are acceptable armaments.

(18) Opponents criticize the conclusion of the TPNW. They insist that it will not be effective in eliminating nuclear weapons precisely because the nuclear-armed states refused to participate or sign the treaty. Opponents also argue that the leading governmental and nongovernmental advocates of the TPNW do not address the security issues which drive nuclear-armed states and their allies to rely on nuclear deterrence. Furthermore, they criticize the treaty for eliding how nuclear disarmament should be verified and enforced, most serious and complicated issues that must be resolved if nuclear disarmament is actually to be pursued.

(19) Opponents of the TPNW warn that the treaty risks neglect of the NPT and its review process, possibly leading to the delegitimization of the foundation of the international nonproliferation regime. Proponents, on the other hand, argue that the TPNW is not a cause but a symptom of the gap between NWS and NNWS that has already been “institutionalized” in the NPT and has widened for over a decade due to inadequate implementation of nuclear disarmament obligations/commitments by nuclear-armed states. Thus, the TPNW negotiation process and conclusion highlights how deep the gap between these two groups has become, and at the same time widened the gap further.

III. Agenda for Work

(20) In their discussions, the Group contemplated and discussed an agenda for work toward a world without nuclear weapons comprised of the following steps: first, reversing current negative trends by taking (even small) concrete measures; second, simultaneously and/or following efforts to reverse negative trends, formulating and beginning to implement nuclear disarmament measures, targeted at, for instance, a so-called minimization point; and third, establishing a common vision for global security without nuclear weapons. The second and third steps, including hard questions (see para 40), will be mainly discussed in the next round of Group meetings held in the Japan’s FY 2018 (starting from April 2018 through March 2019).

1. Short-term: Reversing negative trends

(21) Although the current situation surrounding nuclear disarmament cannot be solved or remedied in the short
term, it is imperative to arrest further deterioration in the nuclear environment and to foster political will to cultivate common ground.

(a) **North Korea**

(22) Addressing North Korea’s dangerous nuclear weapons and missile development is the top priority among short-term efforts to reverse negative trends in regional/international security, as well as nuclear disarmament. The uncompromisable goal, which might not be realized in the short-term, is to achieve the complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. North Korea cannot and should not be granted either de jure or de facto status as a nuclear-weapon state.

(23) Despite recent positive developments, namely the announcement of an inter-Korean as well as a US-North Korea summit, it is still difficult to find a way of reversing the North’s nuclear weapons program. Neither diplomacy, nor political and economic pressure, mounted over decades have led Pyongyang to renounce its nuclear program. Removing the nuclear arsenal through military means or by forcibly changing the regime are not viable options given the possibility of devastating damage that South Korea and Japan would suffer from North Korea’s retaliation, including potentially with nuclear weapons. Relevant states confronting North Korea’s nuclear threats must urgently act to both prevent further deterioration of the situation and configure a policy consisting of engagement, sanctions, pressure, deterrence, and containment, while also taking first steps toward a solution.

(b) **US-Russia**

(24) The Russian Federation and the United States, as two nuclear superpowers, bear special responsibility for advancing nuclear disarmament. In spite of -indeed because of–deterioration in the US-Russia relationship, they should make extraordinary efforts to maintain the bilateral nuclear arms control architecture. An important step in this regard is for both parties to agree a five-year extension of New START and to resolve issues regarding compliance with the INF Treaty. Establishing regular bilateral dialogues on nuclear arms control, disarmament, and strategic stability is critical to facilitating these efforts, and could also establish a basis for future negotiations on further reductions of strategic and non-strategic nuclear arsenals.

(c) **Dialogues**

(25) The Group underscored the importance of dialogue between disarmers and deterrers for easing current tensions, narrowing perception gaps, finding middle ground, and promoting cooperation on nuclear disarmament. Political leaders and a wide range of civil society actors need not only to acknowledge the differences that divide the groups, but also to seek common goals and values through collaboration and cooperation.

(26) Meanwhile, to revitalize meaningful dialogue on nuclear disarmament, both immediately and enduringly, the international community needs to renew its commitment to achieve a world without nuclear weapons. The following issues could be included in statements of renewed commitment, which not all nuclear weapon-possessing states have made clear: nuclear war must never be fought and cannot be won; nuclear weapons are only weapons of deterrence and not for war fighting; the use of nuclear weapons can only be considered in extreme circumstances; and international humanitarian law will be respected in all circumstances.

(d) **TCBMs**

(27) To help facilitate promotion of nuclear disarmament, transparency and confidence-building measures (TCBMs) could be pursued alongside dialogues.

(28) Transparency measures can provide a baseline for promoting nuclear disarmament. Enhancing the types
and scope of information that exists about each state’s nuclear weapons can facilitate more effective action to bridge the divide. It is unrealistic to expect full transparency, for example on the numbers and deployment status of nuclear weapons, given concerns that such information could decrease the effects of nuclear deterrence. However, transparency in strategy and doctrine—that is, how states think about nuclear weapons and why they think they need to possess them—is essential. To the extent possible, transparency in numbers, capabilities, deployments and modernization plans for nuclear arsenals should also be increased in this context.

(29) TCBMs can also help states to manage risks of deliberate, accidental, inadvertent or unintended nuclear escalation. Nuclear-armed states could usefully negotiate TCBMs for promoting multilateral nuclear threat reduction cooperation, for example. TCBMs should also be contemplated in the context of the establishment of the TPNW, aiming to reduce the possibility that nuclear weapons will be used and that such use would result in catastrophic humanitarian consequences.

(e) NPT

(30) Efforts to mitigate potential damage to the NPT are needed in advance of 2020 Review Conference. There are two important questions in this regard: how to use the review cycle to strengthen the NPT; and which issues should be prioritized in the lead-up to the Review Conference. Such priorities would include: issues regarding nuclear disarmament; the prospects for convening a conference on a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles (MEZFWMD); the situation on the Korean peninsula; and preservation of and compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which resolved the crisis over Iran’s nuclear program. A spirit of compromise and understanding is essential if NPT states parties are to ensure a productive 2020 Review Conference.

(31) It will be impossible to avoid issues related to the TPNW in the second and third NPT Preparatory Committee meetings and the Review Conference. Hypothetically, though unlikely, some NPT parties may become increasingly dissatisfied with the pace of progress on nuclear disarmament and decide to withdraw from the treaty. A more likely risk is that once the TPNW enters into force some NNWS party to the NPT shift their attention from the NPT to the TPNW, further weakening the NPT review process.

2. Mid-term: Pursuing a common vision

(a) Minimization point

(32) One of the important tasks for the Group is to re-evaluate the concept of a nuclear disarmament “minimization point,” which the Japanese government has advocated for several years. The International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) characterized the minimization point as one consisting of very low numbers of nuclear warheads (less than 10 percent of the nuclear arsenals that existed in 2005), adoption of “no first use” doctrines, and implementation of force deployments and alert statuses reflecting that doctrine.

(33) To clarify the concept and to make it more valuable in promoting nuclear disarmament, the Group discussed several issues regarding the numbers and roles of nuclear weapons that could be considered as a minimum level, including:

(a) Whether the number of nuclear weapons matter (quantitative minimization), or it is more important that the roles and objectives served by nuclear weapons are reduced (qualitative minimization).
(b) How many nuclear weapons would be regarded as necessary or acceptable to credibly maintain a minimum deterrent. And whether the numbers could be tailored to the individual nuclear-armed states.
(c) To what extent and how the importance given to nuclear weapons could be minimized, and the roles that nuclear weapons play in international security issues could be narrowed.
(d) What would constitute a “minimized role” for nuclear weapons in concrete terms: for example, whether it would involve precluding nuclear counterforce options, or giving up conventional military targeting entirely.

(e) How the relationship between a quantitative and/or qualitative minimization point and deterrence can be defined.
   ◊ Whether nuclear-armed states would also need to have more accurate and reliable weapons should they proceed to a certain “minimization point.” If so, whether that would mean acceptance of certain modernization programs, which are not usually welcomed by disarmers.
   ◊ How states that have chosen to maintain extended nuclear deterrence could maintain confidence in their security during work on this process.
   ◊ What it means for missile defense systems. Specifically, whether more missile defenses would be needed in order to limit potential damage, or fewer missile defenses to ensure that one’s adversaries would need less nuclear weapons for credible deterrence.

(f) Whether minimum deterrence can be achieved compatible with the objective of minimizing the risk of humanitarian disaster. If one tries to define a minimization point in connection with avoidance of humanitarian disaster at a global level, it could result in a new logic that has not been considered before.

(g) How enforcement of nuclear disarmament can be implemented if a state attempts to exceed or break out from the minimization point.

(34) A minimization point may be perceived as a risky term or concept. For those who regard the process of nuclear disarmament since the NPT entered into force as too slow, “minimization” could connote an “acceptable” minimum arsenal level. Nuclear-armed states, on the other hand, could attempt to use this concept as a way to avoid deep reductions in the numbers and roles of nuclear weapons, arguing that that the current level is a minimization point for them. The potential limitations of this concept should be considered by the Group.

(b) **Multilateral nuclear disarmament**

(35) In pursuit of a minimization point, multilateral nuclear disarmament should be reinvigorated as one of the most important mid-term efforts.

(36) The CTBT, which has yet to enter into force, is one of the most important pillars of tangible progress toward nuclear disarmament. Considering that the treaty remains not yet in force, the Group contemplated measures that could further advance the objectives of the treaty and reinforce the non-testing norm. According to Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, signatories to a treaty are legally bound to it. The CTBT is no exception: that is, signatories and ratifiers are all legally bound not to conduct a nuclear test explosion. Still, efforts to promote its entry into force are important, especially in regard to delegitimizing North Korea’s nuclear testing. In addition, states should ensure sufficient funding for maintaining and improving the CTBT’s international monitoring system.

(37) Commencing negotiation of an FMCT as early as possible would be a significant step forward for multilateral nuclear disarmament. Considering the challenges encountered in attempting to negotiate an FMCT in the framework of the CD, and the urgent need to find avenues for progress, like-minded countries could find some other venue in which to commence the negotiation. Other measures to improve accountability of fissile material stocks – and in particular military usable fissile materials, which constitute some 85% of global stocks – would be a useful step in this direction.

(38) In addition to prominent but traditional measures, the following ideas are also worth further consideration as mid-term multilateral efforts toward a minimization point, for example:
   (a) Committing to restraint and possibly freezing of nuclear weapons development and modernization programs;
   (b) Promoting multilateral reductions of nuclear weapons as part of a global initiative to reduce force
(c) Levels and the destructive power of nuclear weapons as a way to involve countries that have not undertaken reductions, accompanied by steps to maintain stability;
(c) Identifying additional steps to make reductions irreversible, such as unilateral but mutual dismantlement of nuclear warheads and disposition of weapons-grade plutonium and uranium; and
(d) Restricting and/or banning certain types or categories of delivery vehicles.

(39) Roles of nuclear weapons

Measures to reduce the roles of nuclear weapons have been widely proposed for many decades, including negative security assurances, no-first-use or sole-purpose declarations, and de-alerting of nuclear forces. In Phase I, the Group did not thoroughly examine such concrete measures, instead focusing on whether, what and how those measures could be taken.

(40) The Group, for example, raised hard questions that disarmers and deterrers should discuss and address so as to break the current impasse and achieve a common vision for a world without nuclear weapons, including, inter alia:
(a) What can be done to raise confidence that deterrence can be credibly maintained without actually using nuclear weapons. It may not be useful to say weapons are for deterrence but not for use, for if one is not going to use the weapon, it is hard to see how it contributes to deterrence. By the same token, if a state declares it is willing to use nuclear weapons, and its interests are so threatened it is determined to do so, it is hard to see what will deter it.
(b) Whether it is feasible to declare that nuclear weapons are only weapons of deterrence and can never be considered weapons of “war-fighting,” or deterrence and war fighting cannot exist separately.
(c) If disarmers say it should/could never be permissible to use nuclear weapons, then what that mean for the right of national self-defense.
(d) If deterrence fails and an adversary uses nuclear weapons when a state is still in the midst of hostility that threatens its vital interests, what would the threatened state do. There is no evidence to suggest how nuclear-armed states might act in this situation to manage conflict after the use of nuclear weapons.
(e) If a state facing aggression conclude that it will lose a war that threatens its existence unless it (or its allies) uses nuclear weapons, whether disarmers say that the state is required to commit national suicide.
(f) Whether there are non-nuclear threats today or on the horizon that cannot be deterred or defeated by means other than nuclear weapons.
(g) What can be done to resolve such threats, through diplomacy and other means.
(h) To what extent non-nuclear military capabilities can be alternatives to nuclear deterrence.
(i) What offensive and defensive military capabilities must be controlled, balanced, or eliminated in order to make roles of nuclear weapons feasibly decreased by all nuclear-armed states. What methods could be developed to define whether and how cross-domain balances could be achieved.

(41) Meanwhile, the Group emphasized the significance of accountability and responsibility that nuclear-armed states should take. In case of nuclear use, they should be legally and internationally responsible for any damage caused to the third parties.

(42) Regarding issues of status and prestige associated with nuclear weapons, the existing de facto coincidence between NWS status (N5) and permanent membership of the UN Security Council (P5) remains problematic. Reform of the UN Security Council membership could alter any misguided perception that nuclear weapons are instruments of prestige, which could help reduce temptation to proliferate based on the desire for status.
(d) Finding a middle ground

Finding and reaching a middle and/or common ground between disarmers and deterrers is indispensable for advancing nuclear disarmament. This task needs serious and consistent effort to establish a balance between seeking peace by deterring war and seeking peace through international legal regimes. The longstanding dispute over the way forward can only be addressed by reasoned discourse through face-to-face engagement, rather than unproductive finger pointing.

One possible fruitful avenue to reduce the gap between disarmers and deterrers would be to establish a common position that reliance on nuclear weapons is not an ideal option, even if one side believes that nuclear deterrence has brought more benefit than risk. For such an avenue to be productive, both sides must seek to restore confidence in a process based on consensus, while at the same time finding ways to ensure that the parties take responsibility for protecting the consensus principle from abuse.

Secondly, disarmers and deterrers should acknowledge that security concerns expressed by states that now rely on nuclear deterrence must be resolved, or at least redressed, if nuclear disarmament is actually to be pursued. By the same token, states that rely on direct or extended nuclear deterrence should address what can and should be done to limit risks of escalation that could cause humanitarian disaster. And advocates of nuclear prohibition should address how potential aggression can be deterred and defeated without recourse to nuclear weapons.

Thirdly, disarmers would demand that nuclear-armed states and allies explain their legal accountability for using nuclear weapons if they argue that they face threats in which they need to depend on nuclear deterrence. From a disarmers’ viewpoint, deterrers have not necessarily addressed those issues explicitly. Disarmers would call on deterrers to show what they are doing to demonstrate that their use of nuclear weapons will not actually pose a humanitarian disaster: on what basis anyone should have confidence that once nuclear weapons are used in a conflict involving two nuclear-armed adversaries the conflict will not escalate to the point of humanitarian disaster.

Fourthly, they could discuss how deterrence for and/or norms on preventing use of nuclear weapons can play a role in promoting nuclear disarmament. The common enemy may not necessarily be nuclear weapons, per se, but nuclear use. A world without nuclear weapons is not today’s world minus nuclear weapons. It is a fundamentally transformed world in which states and other actors do not feel the need to possess nuclear weapons, and therefore have dismantled the means to do so. Meanwhile, the important task must be to manage the existing world so as to reduce the risk of use, with its devastating consequences. In order to deepen the understanding of the humanitarian risks of nuclear weapons, visits to Hiroshima and Nagasaki could be an important starting point of such recognition.

Fifth, regarding the TPNW, countries opposing it need to explain reasons why they are not able to join, and propose much more concretely how to make progress on nuclear disarmament. At the same time, proponents and opponents could jointly consider, inter alia, what to do after the TPNW enters into force: what kind of steps to be defined and promoted under the NPT regime and also under the TPNW regime; and how they could design a verifiable and enforceable nuclear disarmament regime. These issues could be discussed at the NPT and/or TPNW review conferences, or other forums.

Lastly, engaging with civil society and academia is essential to advance nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. Increasing efforts to educate and inform citizens, especially the younger generation, about the various dimensions of nuclear weapons serves to construct a firm basis for valuable discussions.

(e) Regional issues

Regarding regional nuclear issues, the key driver for nuclear weapons acquisition (as opposed to mere
nuclear temptation) remains the combination of the perception of an existential threat and of the absence of a credible security guarantee. Whether real or imagined, addressing such threats is the key to disarmament. Therefore, vital efforts should be directed at unresolved political problems and to bring parties to the negotiating table. Track 1 and track 1.5 processes should encourage regional talks and strengthen confidence-building measures. In addition, states in key regions should consider: creating inter-regional dialogue mechanisms for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation; inviting states which have renounced the nuclear option to speak about their experiences; developing inter-regional talks to share experiences on addressing regional security and nuclear challenges, including how to minimize negative implications of a regional security environment for the NPT regime. In this regard, sustaining the international nuclear nonproliferation regime is essential to resolving regional security challenges.

3. **Long-term: Envisioning global security without nuclear weapons**

(51) Reaching a minimization point could be a useful step toward disarmament, but it is not an ultimate objective and there would remain very difficult issues that must be resolved to achieve a world without nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Group considers it of value to explore a model of what a sufficient nuclear disarmament regime would entail. What needs to be dismantled? What facilities and capabilities would need to be eliminated, or placed under international monitoring? How would verification be accomplished? And how would disarmament be enforced?

(a) **International system**

(52) Firstly, it is necessary to contemplate under what international security system total elimination of nuclear weapons could be achieved, and how the system should be maintained and bolstered after realization of the elimination of nuclear weapons. Advocates of nuclear disarmament should give greater thought to an after-nuclear world, what that world would look like, and how deterrence would work without the existence of nuclear weapons.

(b) **Verification**

(53) Secondly, the further nuclear weapons are reduced, the more important monitoring and verification for nuclear disarmament will become in order to maintain the confidence of the international community, to detect non-compliance, and to enforce obligations. This will require credible mechanisms to verify nuclear disarmament. Intensified research on nuclear disarmament verification is needed to develop robust approaches.

(54) At the same time, however, nuclear disarmament verification cannot rely solely on technology. Other complementary mechanisms, such as personnel exchanges, will be necessary to mitigate concerns about intrusiveness and espionage associated with potential misuse of monitoring and verification technology.

(c) **Enforcement**

(55) Enforcement after detecting non-compliance is one of the most difficult issues in disarmament and nonproliferation. How to devise an enforcement mechanism in a world of sovereign states that will work to deter and, if necessary forcefully reverse violations of any disarmament agreement, remains a paramount and as yet unanswered question. Without establishing an effective enforcement mechanism, it would be very difficult, perhaps impossible, to achieve a world without nuclear weapons.

(56) In the current international system, there is no other mechanism besides the UN Security Council (UNSC) that can deal with the violation of nuclear disarmament treaties. However, it is unrealistic to expect that this
mechanism may work for enforcing nuclear elimination obligations since the P5 is coincidentally the N5. Establishing a body for enforcement other than the UNSC would not be realistic if the P5 are not persuaded to support this. Nor is it reasonable to expect, at least for the foreseeable future, that the international community will acquire new technologies that could effectively neutralize the use of nuclear weapons. Achievement of cooperative security in which no country need be concerned about another’s violation of nuclear disarmament obligations is similarly remote.