Chairman’s factual summary (Working paper)

1. States parties reaffirmed their commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. They recalled their resolve to seek a safer world for all and to achieve the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons in accordance with the objectives of the Treaty.

2. States parties underlined the fundamental importance of effective and balanced implementation of the Treaty across its three pillars, full compliance with all the Treaty’s provisions, and universal adherence to the Treaty. They emphasised that strengthening implementation of the Treaty and of decisions taken by States parties, complying with the Treaty and effectively addressing compliance issues, and achieving universal adherence to the Treaty were key challenges for the review process.

3. In this context, States parties underlined the necessity of implementation of Decisions 1 and 2 and the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Extension and Review Conference, the Final Document adopted by the 2000 Review Conference, and the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference.

4. States parties again called on India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without conditions and to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements as required by the Treaty.

5. While acknowledging some progress in the implementation of the commitments contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, States parties recognised that greater implementation efforts were required. States parties recalled the importance of regular reporting of their implementation efforts.

6. States parties looked forward to the remainder of the current review cycle as a time for further implementation efforts and to produce recommendations for possible consideration and adoption at the 2015 Review Conference in further pursuit of the Treaty’s objectives, including a world without nuclear weapons.

7. States parties recalled the unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI. Many States parties emphasised that the indefinite extension of the Treaty at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference did not imply the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons.
8. States parties recalled that significant steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament should promote international stability, peace and security, and be based on the principle of increased and undiminished security for all. It was emphasised that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation were mutually reinforcing. Many States parties expressed their concern that the continued possession of nuclear weapons might provide an incentive for additional States to acquire nuclear weapons.

9. States parties recalled their deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons. Many States parties stressed their serious concern that in such an event, these humanitarian consequences would be unavoidable and emergency relief could not be provided to affected areas. They expressed their expectation that the humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons would be addressed during the current review cycle.

10. Many States parties expressed a concern that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would be inconsistent with fundamental rules of international humanitarian law. Some nuclear-weapons States outlined that under their respective national policies any use of nuclear weapons would only be considered in extreme circumstances in accordance with applicable international humanitarian law. States parties reaffirmed the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.

11. Many States parties cited the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, issued at The Hague on 8 July 1996.

12. States parties recalled their commitment to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons. States parties recalled their commitment to apply the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency to the implementation of treaty obligations. Many States parties considered that this applied particularly in the field of nuclear disarmament.

13. Many States parties stressed the need for the negotiation of a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified time frame, including a nuclear weapons convention. Some States parties called for the construction of a comprehensive framework of mutually reinforcing instruments, backed by a strong system of verification and including clearly defined benchmarks and timelines, for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons. It was recalled that achieving progress on nuclear disarmament was a shared responsibility of all States.

14. States parties recalled the need for the full implementation of concrete actions leading to nuclear disarmament as contained in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference. States parties recalled the need for the nuclear-weapon States to reduce and eliminate all types of their nuclear weapons and encouraged, in particular, those States with the largest nuclear arsenals to lead efforts in this regard.

15. The nuclear-weapon States provided information on their efforts to implement their nuclear disarmament commitments. States parties took note of these efforts.

16. Many States parties welcomed the entry into force of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms on 5 February 2011. The Russian Federation and United States of America provided information on steps taken to implement that Treaty. While acknowledging this positive achievement, many States parties expressed concern that the total estimated number of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, still amounted to several thousands. The Russian Federation and the United States of America were encouraged to continue negotiations to achieve greater reductions in their nuclear arsenals, including non-strategic nuclear weapons.
17. The nuclear-weapons States informed States parties about their meeting, held in Paris 30 June – 1 July 2011. At that meeting, the nuclear-weapon States expressed their determination to implement the commitments made at the 2010 Review Conference and to achieve further progress in meeting the objectives of the Treaty. In this context, their discussions on transparency, mutual confidence, proposals for a standard reporting form, safeguards and responses to notifications of withdrawal from the Treaty and their work on verification and definitions of key nuclear terms continued. The nuclear-weapon States announced that they would meet again in Washington, D.C. 27-29 June 2012.

18. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland provided information on implementation of planned reductions of nuclear weapons. France announced that it had achieved a number of planned reductions. Many States parties acknowledged these efforts.

19. Many States parties considered that multilateralism and multilaterally agreed solutions in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations provided the only sustainable method of addressing disarmament and international security issues. States parties recalled the commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral measures.

20. Increased transparency by some of the nuclear-weapon States was welcomed by many States parties, including by disclosing the total number of nuclear weapons they possess. States parties recalled that transparency was essential to building trust and confidence as an important part of the disarmament process. Non-nuclear-weapon States parties encouraged the nuclear-weapon States to enhance transparency as an essential confidence-building measure.

21. States parties recalled that at the 2010 Review Conference the nuclear-weapon States were called upon to report on certain nuclear disarmament undertakings to the 2014 session of the Preparatory Committee. Non-nuclear-weapon States parties underlined the value and importance of nuclear-weapon States’ regular reporting to the Committee. Some States parties made specific suggestions as to the content of a standard reporting form for use by the nuclear-weapon States and the frequency of that reporting.

22. Many States parties stressed that, while important, reductions in deployments or in alert status could not substitute for the irreversible elimination of nuclear weapons. It was emphasised that concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of nuclear weapons systems were a step leading to nuclear disarmament. Many States parties continued to call for reductions in the operational status of nuclear weapons. Many States parties expressed concern over the continued modernisation of nuclear arsenals, including in connection with the ratification of nuclear arms reduction agreements, and the development of advanced and new types of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems and related infrastructure.

23. Many States parties expressed concerns regarding the continued role of nuclear weapons in national and regional military doctrines. In this connection, they emphasised the need to diminish further the role of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies. Some States parties stressed the need for progress in the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons which continued to be stationed outside the territories of the nuclear-weapon States.

24. States parties recalled that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament. Many States parties variously made specific proposals, including that the 2015 Review Conference adopt an action plan or a new package of ambitious agreements supported by concrete and measurable benchmarks for the elimination of nuclear
weapons. Such proposals included the convening of a high-level international conference to identify ways and means of eliminating nuclear weapons pursuant to a phased programme to prohibit the development, production, acquisition, testing, stockpiling, transfer, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and to provide for their destruction. Many States parties called for the establishment of a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament at the 2015 Review Conference.

25. States parties expressed deep concern at the continuing stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament, including the persistent failure to agree on and implement an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, despite further attempts to achieve consensus. The high-level meeting on revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations, convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations in September 2010 was noted. In light of the continuing stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament, a number of States parties stressed the need for the international community to consider options to ensure progress in multilateral disarmament negotiations.

26. States parties recalled that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately begin negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the report of the Special Coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein. Some States parties emphasised that negotiation of such a treaty was the next logical step on the negotiating agenda for the multilateral disarmament machinery. Pending the negotiation and entry into force of such a treaty, some States parties called for nuclear-weapons States and all other relevant States to maintain or implement declared moratoria on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Pending such negotiations, a number of States parties reported on their efforts to encourage substantive discussion of issues relevant to such a treaty.

27. The achievement of steps by the Russian Federation and the United States of America to implement the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement and its Protocols, including discussion with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of verification arrangements, was acknowledged by many States parties.

28. States parties stressed the importance of the application of the principles of irreversibility, verifiability and transparency to the removal from military programmes of fissile material designated as no longer required for military purposes. To this end, some States parties called for the earliest development of effective and credible multilateral verification arrangements, in the context of the IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes.

29. States parties reaffirmed that the total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. States parties recalled that non-nuclear-weapon States parties had a legitimate interest in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from nuclear-weapon States not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them. In this regard, many States parties emphasised that these assurances should be unconditional. States parties recalled that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately begin discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument. Many States parties emphasised the need to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States. Many States parties called for the establishment of a subsidiary body at the 2015 Review Conference on this issue.
30. Ahead of any such further steps, the nuclear-weapon States were called upon to respect fully and extend their existing commitments with regard to security assurances. In addition to its policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, some States parties recognised that China had declared an unconditional commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones.

31. States parties underlined the urgent importance of bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty into force, as a core element of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime. States parties welcomed the recent ratification of the Treaty by Indonesia, as a State listed in Annex 2, and the ratifications of Ghana, Guatemala and Guinea, as well as the signature of Niue.

32. All States that have not yet done so were called upon to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty without delay, particularly the eight remaining States whose ratifications were necessary for the Treaty to enter into force. States parties recalled that positive decisions on the Treaty by the nuclear-weapon States would have a beneficial impact towards the ratification of the Treaty. States parties recognised the contribution of the Article XIV Conferences on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty to the process of the Treaty’s universalisation, and encouraged the use of this and other mechanisms for the promotion of the Treaty, including outreach activities and capacity-building initiatives. All States, particularly those that have recently ratified the Treaty, were urged to engage with States that have yet to ratify, to share their experiences of ratification and to encourage further ratifications of the Treaty.

33. Pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, all States were urged to maintain or implement declared moratoria on the conduct of nuclear test explosions.

34. Many States parties called for the immediate closure and dismantlement of any remaining sites for nuclear test explosions and their associated infrastructure, the prohibition of nuclear weapons research and development, as well as for all States to refrain from the use of alternate means of nuclear testing and the use of new technologies to upgrade nuclear weapon systems. Many States parties expressed concern that any development of new types of nuclear weapons might result in the resumption of nuclear testing and defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

35. States parties stressed the need to support the important work of the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to establish the verification system for the Treaty, and encouraged development of related technical capacity in States. Support was expressed by a number of States parties for the civil use of data from the international monitoring system, particularly in the context of natural disasters and other emergency situations.

36. Some States parties welcomed various initiatives to explore the feasibility and complexity of nuclear disarmament verification, including the project by Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, which considered the technical and procedural challenges of nuclear weapons dismantlement, in the context of article VI of the Treaty.

37. States parties recalled the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation education, including continued efforts to educate young people, the use of new information and communications technology, as well as collaboration among governments, international organisations, non-governmental organisations, academic institutions and the private sector.

38. New proposals and initiatives from governments and civil society related to achieving a world without nuclear weapons were recognised and support was expressed for continuing future efforts in
these fields. States parties recognised the valuable role played by civil society in the implementation of
the objectives of the Treaty.

39. States parties underlined that IAEA safeguards were a fundamental component of the nuclear
non-proliferation regime, played an indispensable role in the implementation of the Treaty and helped to
create an environment conducive to nuclear cooperation.

40. It was emphasised that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was the competent
authority responsible for verifying and assuring, in accordance with the statute of IAEA and the IAEA
safeguards system, compliance by States parties with their safeguards agreements undertaken in
fulfillment of their obligations under article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty with a view to preventing
diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. A
number of States parties emphasised the statutory role of the IAEA Board of Governors and Director
General in the full implementation of safeguards agreements.

41. Many States parties considered that safeguards should be implemented in a manner designed to
comply with article IV of the Treaty and avoid hampering the economic or technological development
of the parties or international cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities.

42. States parties recalled the importance of the application of IAEA comprehensive safeguards to all
source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities in the States parties in accordance
with the provisions of article III of the Treaty. They welcomed that six additional States had brought
into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA since the 2010 Review Conference, and
urged the 14 States parties that had not yet brought their comprehensive safeguards agreements into
force to do so as soon as possible.

43. States parties recalled their encouragement for all States with small quantities protocols either to
amend or rescind them, as appropriate, and acknowledged that the revised small quantities protocol had
been accepted by 53 States.

44. States parties recalled their encouragement to all States that had not yet done so to conclude and
bring into force additional protocols and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force
as soon as possible. States parties welcomed the fact that since the 2010 Review Conference, 14 States
had brought the additional protocol into force.

45. Many States parties noted that comprehensive safeguards agreements were not sufficient for the
IAEA to provide credible assurances regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and
activities. They noted that implementation of an additional protocol provided the IAEA with additional
information and access, strengthened the Agency’s ability to provide assurances of the absence of
undeclared nuclear material and activities in a State, and provided increased confidence about the
State’s compliance with its obligations under the Treaty. A number of those States parties considered
that a comprehensive safeguards agreement, together with an additional protocol, represented the
current verification standard.

46. Many States parties noted that it was the sovereign decision of any State to conclude an
additional protocol, but once in force, the additional protocol was a legal obligation. Many States
parties emphasised the need to distinguish between legal obligations and voluntary confidence-building
measures and to ensure that such voluntary undertakings were not turned into legal safeguards
obligations. They noted that additional measures related to safeguards should not affect the rights of the
non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.
47. In order to achieve greater adherence to the additional protocol, a number of States parties highlighted the need to provide guidance and assistance in order to develop national processes and to build the required legal and institutional domestic infrastructure. Some States parties offered assistance towards that end.

48. Many States parties emphasised that adherence to the Treaty and to full-scope safeguards should be a condition for any cooperation in the nuclear area with States not party to the Treaty.

49. Some States parties noted the importance of the voluntary-offer agreements and related additional protocols implemented by the nuclear-weapon States. They noted that such agreements provided the IAEA with valuable experience in implementing safeguards. Many States parties proposed that the nuclear-weapon States undertake to accept full-scope safeguards.

50. States parties recalled that IAEA safeguards should be assessed and evaluated regularly. Decisions adopted by the IAEA policy bodies aimed at further strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of IAEA safeguards should be supported and implemented.

51. States parties acknowledged additional technical and financial contributions by States to help the IAEA meet its safeguards responsibilities, and to enhance the related technology base, including the construction of a new Safeguards Analytical Laboratory.

52. A number of States parties welcomed the work being undertaken by the IAEA in the conceptualisation and the development of State-level approaches to safeguards implementation and also welcomed the implementation of State-level integrated safeguards approaches by the IAEA.

53. Many States parties stressed the significance of maintaining and observing fully the principle of confidentiality with respect to safeguards information and underlined the responsibility of the IAEA in this regard. Given concerns about cases of leakage of such information, they emphasised that the confidentiality of such information should be fully respected and that the measures for its protection should be strengthened, with a view to preventing the leakage of sensitive or confidential information.

54. States parties recalled the importance in complying with non-proliferation obligations, addressing all compliance matters in order to uphold the Treaty’s integrity and the authority of the safeguards system. Many States parties expressed concern with respect to matters of non-compliance with safeguards obligations, including cases currently subject to resolutions by the United Nations Security Council and IAEA Board of Governors, and called on any non-compliant States to provide full cooperation with the IAEA and move promptly into full compliance with their obligations.

55. Many States parties underlined that the reporting of the IAEA on the implementation of safeguards should continue to be factual and technically based and reflect appropriate reference to the relevant provisions of safeguards agreements. It was stressed that, in accordance with article XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA and INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), the inspectors shall report any non-compliance to the Director General who shall thereupon transmit the report to the Board of Governors, which shall call upon a State in question to remedy forthwith any non-compliance which it finds to have occurred, and shall report the non-compliance to all members and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations.

56. Many States parties emphasised the importance of access to the United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly by the IAEA, including its Director General, in accordance with article XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA and paragraph 19 of INFCIRC/153 (Corrected), and the role of the Security Council and the General Assembly, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in upholding
compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements and ensuring compliance with safeguards obligations by taking appropriate measures in the case of any violations notified to it by the IAEA.

57. A number of States parties emphasised that responses to concerns over compliance with any obligation under the Treaty by any State party should be pursued by diplomatic means, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations.

58. States parties recalled the need to ensure that their nuclear-related exports did not directly or indirectly assist the development of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and that such exports were in full conformity with the objectives and purposes of the Treaty as stipulated, particularly, in articles I, II and III, as well as the decision on principles and objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament adopted in 1995 by the Review and Extension Conference. A number of States parties expressed the view that export controls were a legitimate, necessary and desirable means of implementing the obligations of States parties under article III of the Treaty. States parties recalled their encouragement for the use of multilaterally negotiated and agreed guidelines and understandings by States parties in developing their own national export controls.

59. Many States parties expressed deep concern regarding limitations and restrictions on exports to developing countries of nuclear material, equipment and technology for peaceful purposes, which those States considered to be inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty. They called for the immediate removal of any restrictions or limitations posed on peaceful uses of nuclear energy which were incompatible with the provisions of the Treaty. Many States parties expressed the view that effective export controls were essential for facilitating the fullest possible cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in conformity with the Treaty.

60. Many States parties stressed that any new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the full-scope safeguards and internationally legally binding commitments not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. A number of States parties expressed the view that any such new supply arrangements should also require acceptance of an additional protocol based on INFCIRC/540 (Corrected).

61. States parties noted the importance of effective physical protection of all nuclear material and the need for strengthening international cooperation in this respect. States parties recognised that the primary responsibility for nuclear security rested with individual States. States parties recalled that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, the use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by appropriate and effective levels of security, consistent with States’ national legislation and respective international obligations.

62. Some States parties considered that the IAEA had an essential role in efforts to improve the global nuclear security framework, and to promote its implementation. States parties recalled their encouragement to States to maintain the highest possible standards of security and physical protection of nuclear material and facilities. States parties were encouraged to apply, as appropriate, the recommendations on the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities contained in IAEA document INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 and in other relevant international instruments at the earliest possible date. States parties were encouraged to take full advantage of the IAEA advisory services in the field of nuclear security.

63. States parties welcomed the recent accessions to the amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and all States that had not yet done so were encouraged to ratify the amendment to the Convention at the earliest possible date. Some States parties welcomed the
establishment of the Nuclear Security Guidance Committee in the IAEA and the continuing development of the Nuclear Security Series.

64. A number of States parties noted with serious concern the issue of illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and radioactive substances. States parties recalled the need to improve their national capabilities to detect, deter and disrupt illicit trafficking in nuclear materials throughout their territories, in accordance with their relevant international obligations, and called upon those States parties in a position to do so to work to enhance international partnership and capacity-building in this regard. They also recalled the need for States parties to establish and enforce effective domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in accordance with their relevant international legal obligations. It was suggested that States parties could agree to share, subject to respective national laws and procedures, information and expertise through bilateral and multilateral mechanisms. A number of States parties emphasised the importance of developing nuclear forensics as a tool in determining the origin of detected nuclear and other radioactive materials and in providing evidence for the prosecution of acts of illicit trafficking and malicious uses. Some States parties noted the work of the IAEA in support of the efforts of States parties to combat such trafficking, including the Agency’s activities undertaken to provide for an enhanced exchange of information and the continued maintenance of its illicit trafficking database.

65. Many States parties expressed concerns related to the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors might acquire nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. The contribution of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism in enhancing the physical protection of nuclear facilities and fissile material worldwide was welcomed. The need to implement fully Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) was noted. States parties recalled that all States parties that had not done so should become party to the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.

66. States parties noted the Communiqué adopted at the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit on 26-27 March 2012. Many States parties acknowledged the new national commitments made at the Summit to strengthen nuclear security and address nuclear terrorism.

67. States parties recalled their support for internationally recognised nuclear-weapon-free zones established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned, and in accordance with the 1999 Guidelines of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. The contributions of the Antarctic Treaty, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga), the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty), the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty) and the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia towards attaining the objectives of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation were recognised. States parties welcomed the efforts to consolidate the nuclear-weapon-free status of Mongolia. States parties welcomed the increased cooperation amongst the parties to the zones and noted with satisfaction the preparations to convene in 2015 the Third Conference of the States Parties and Signatories to Treaties that Established Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones and Mongolia.

68. States parties welcomed progress towards consolidating existing nuclear-weapon-free zones, including the establishment of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy and the agreement between the parties to the Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone and the nuclear-weapon States pertaining to the Protocol to that Treaty. States parties looked forward to the nuclear-weapon States signing and ratifying the Protocol to that Treaty as soon as possible. States parties looked forward to the resumption of consultations with nuclear-weapon States on the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. Many States parties expressed concern that reservations and interpretive declarations with respect to the protocols to the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties had
yet to be withdrawn. Many States parties expressed the view that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones did not substitute for legal obligations and unequivocal undertakings of the nuclear-weapon states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

69. States parties recalled the importance of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recalled the affirmation of its goals and objectives by the 2000 Review Conference and in the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference. They recalled that the resolution remained valid until the goals and objectives were achieved and that the resolution, which had been co-sponsored by the depositary States of the Treaty, was an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty had been indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. States parties recalled their resolve to undertake, individually and collectively, all necessary measures aimed at its prompt implementation.

70. States parties recalled the importance of a process leading to the full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East and the practical steps to that end endorsed at the 2010 Review Conference. In that context, States parties welcomed the appointment by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, of Mr. Jaakko Laajava (Finland) as the facilitator, as well as the designation of Finland as the host Government for the 2012 Conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction. States parties expressed appreciation for the facilitator’s report to the Committee, contained in NPT/CONF.2015/PC.1/11, and looked forward to his report at the Committee’s second session. They welcomed his extensive and continuing consultations since his appointment.

71. States parties emphasised the importance of holding the Conference in 2012 with the participation of all States of the region, in implementation of the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference. States parties recognised that a successful Conference required further work by all in accordance with its terms of reference as endorsed by the 2010 Review Conference. States parties variously stressed the need for the facilitator, conveners of the Conference and all States of the region to accelerate and intensify their consultations.

72. Many States parties sought further clarity on outstanding issues including agenda, modalities, outcome and follow-on steps to a continuing process. Some States parties underlined the importance of inclusivity in the preparations for the Conference. States parties recalled the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, to convene the Conference. Some States parties expressed the view that the region itself bore the responsibility for creating a political environment favourable to a successful Conference. States parties looked forward to the Conference as a positive step forward toward the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction.

73. Many States parties emphasised that such a zone in the Middle East would greatly enhance international peace and security, as well as confidence in the region. Some States parties underlined the need to make use of the experience of other zones free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in establishing such a zone in the Middle East. Some States parties noted the helpful role the IAEA, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and the Implementation Support Unit of the Biological Weapons Convention could play to support efforts to create such a zone. Many States parties called for the establishment of a subsidiary body at the 2015 Review Conference to assess the implementation of the 1995 Resolution.

74. States parties recalled the necessity of strict adherence by all States parties to their obligations and commitments under the Treaty and the need for all States in the region to take relevant steps and
confidence-building measures to contribute to the realisation of the objectives of the 1995 Resolution. They recalled that all States should refrain from undertaking any measures that precluded the achievement of this objective.

75. States parties recalled the importance of Israel’s accession to the Treaty and the placement of all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. States parties recalled the urgency and importance of achieving universality of the Treaty and the need for all States in the Middle East that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States so as to achieve its universality at an early date.

76. On other regional issues, States parties recalled the need for India and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States promptly and without conditions and to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements as required by the Treaty. Some States parties called on India and Pakistan to restrain their nuclear weapon and missile programmes and, pending their accession to the Treaty, to take and advance practical nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation measures.

77. States parties recalled the need for the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to fulfil the commitments under the Six-Party Talks, including the complete and verifiable abandonment of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes in accordance with the September 2005 joint statement. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was urged to comply with its obligations under United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1718 (2006) and 1874 (2009). It was emphasised that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea could not have the status of a nuclear-weapon State in accordance with the Treaty in any case. Serious concern was expressed about its nuclear programme, including its uranium enrichment programme, as a challenge to the Treaty. The importance of achieving the goal of the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and the need for a peaceful resolution of this issue were stressed. Serious concern was expressed about the 13 April 2012 launch by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea was called upon to refrain from further actions, including nuclear test explosions, which would cause security concerns in the region.

78. States parties welcomed the outcome of the 14 April 2012 discussions between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the E3+3. Many States parties considered this an opportunity to take concrete steps, guided by a step-by-step approach and the principle of reciprocity, to negotiate a sustainable solution which would effectively address specific concerns articulated by many States parties and would restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of the Iranian nuclear programme, while fully respecting that country’s right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in conformity with articles I, II, and III of the Treaty. States parties recognised the essential role of the IAEA on this issue. The Islamic Republic of Iran stated that its nuclear programme was exclusively for peaceful purposes and was in conformity with the Treaty.

79. Many States parties stressed that they sought specific outstanding issues in respect of the nuclear activities of the Syrian Arab Republic to be resolved, including through that country’s full cooperation with the IAEA. The Syrian Arab Republic stated that it was committed to its comprehensive safeguards agreement and that it was awaiting the implementation of a work plan with the Agency.

80. States parties recalled that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. This right constituted one of the fundamental objectives of the Treaty. States parties stressed that this right must be exercised in conformity with obligations under the Treaty. States parties recalled that each country’s choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected
without jeopardising its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel cycle policies.

81. States parties recalled their undertaking to facilitate, and their right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in conformity with all the provisions of the Treaty. Many States parties considered such exchange as important in light of climate change, the growing demand for energy, the need to achieve the Millennium Development Goals and sustainable development. States parties recalled the importance of facilitating transfers of nuclear technology and international cooperation among States parties in conformity with the Treaty, and eliminating in this regard any undue constraints inconsistent with the Treaty. Many States parties emphasised that the transfer of nuclear technology and international cooperation should be supported and pursued in good faith without discrimination. States parties recalled that, in promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, taking the needs of developing countries, in particular, into account.

82. Many States parties stressed the importance of nuclear knowledge sharing and the transfer of nuclear technology to developing States for the sustainment and further enhancement of their scientific and technological capabilities, thereby also contributing to their socio-economic development. States parties underscored the central role of the IAEA in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy. States parties emphasised the value and importance of the IAEA technical cooperation programme, particularly in the areas of human health, food and agriculture, water resources, environmental protection, industrial application, nuclear and radiation safety, and nuclear energy.

83. States parties recalled the need to strengthen the IAEA technical cooperation programme in assisting developing States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. States parties emphasised the need for continued efforts, within the IAEA, to enhance the effectiveness, efficiency and transparency of its technical cooperation programme and to ensure that IAEA resources for technical cooperation activities are sufficient, assured and predictable. Many States parties stressed that the technical cooperation and assistance provided by the IAEA should not be subject to any conditions incompatible with the provisions of its Statute.

84. A number of States parties indicated their support for the IAEA Peaceful Uses Initiative (PUI). Some States parties provided information on contributions to the PUI since 2010, and urged all States in a position to do so to help further expand access to nuclear technologies and applications.

85. States parties acknowledged that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety rested with individual States. States parties recalled that, when developing nuclear energy, including nuclear power, use of nuclear energy must be accompanied by appropriate and effective levels of safety, consistent with States’ national legislation and respective international obligations.

86. Many States parties emphasised the IAEA’s central role in promoting international cooperation and in coordinating international efforts to strengthen global nuclear safety, including its role in the development and promotion of nuclear safety standards.

87. Many States parties emphasised that given the trans-boundary consequences of nuclear accidents, nuclear safety was not solely a matter of national concern and that international cooperation was vital for exchange of knowledge, technology, learning and best practices. They noted that the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station in March 2011 demonstrated the need to strengthen nuclear safety globally, including improvement of relevant international legal instruments. States parties welcomed the national, regional and global efforts to strengthen nuclear safety in response to the accident.

89. States parties acknowledged the efforts of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in relation to nuclear safety, including the convening of the High-level Meeting on Nuclear Safety and Security in September 2011.

90. States parties noted the planned Fukushima Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety to be hosted by Japan, in cooperation with the IAEA, scheduled for December 2012. States parties welcomed the decision to hold an extraordinary meeting of Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety in August 2012.

91. Many States parties expressed the view that measures and initiatives aimed at strengthening nuclear safety and security must not be used to deny or restrict the right of developing countries to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

92. States parties that had not yet done so were called upon to become a party to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident, the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. States parties welcomed new ratifications to these conventions since 2010. Further, States parties that had not yet done so were called upon to implement the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources and the Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources.

93. States parties encouraged further voluntary steps to minimise the use of highly-enriched uranium in the civilian sector, where technically and economically feasible. Some States parties provided information on their efforts to minimise the use of highly-enriched uranium and to return all stockpiles of highly-enriched uranium to the countries of origin. These efforts were welcomed. Some States parties encouraged the further use of low-enriched uranium targets for radioisotope production.

94. States parties recalled that it was in the interests of all States parties that the transport of radioactive materials continues to be conducted consistent with international safety, security and environmental protection standards and guidelines. A number of States parties welcomed the informal discussions on communication between shipping States and coastal States with IAEA involvement regarding concerns over potential accidents or incidents during the transport of radioactive materials.

95. Many States parties noted the decisions by the IAEA Board of Governors related to assurances of supply, including the establishment of a reserve of low-enriched uranium in the Russian Federation and the approval of the Model Nuclear Fuel Assurance Agreement to underpin commercial contracts. Preparations for Kazakhstan to host the low-enriched uranium bank under the auspices of the IAEA were also noted. A number of States parties encouraged further discussions on the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. Many States parties noted that such discussions should take place in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner without affecting rights under the Treaty and without prejudice to national fuel cycle policies, while tackling the technical, legal and economic complexities surrounding these issues.

96. States parties recalled that all States should abide by the decision adopted by consensus at the IAEA General Conference on 18 September 2009 on prohibition of armed attack or threat of attack against nuclear installations, during operation or under construction.
97. States parties recalled the need for States to put in force a civil nuclear liability regime by becoming party to relevant international instruments or adopting suitable national legislation, based upon the principles established by the main pertinent international instruments.

98. States parties recalled that each State party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interest of its country, in accordance with article X of the Treaty.

99. A number of States parties called for further discussion pertaining to article X of the Treaty, including possible responses to a notice of withdrawal, and the continued application of IAEA safeguards and the disposition of equipment and materials acquired or developed under safeguards while Party to the Treaty, in the event of a withdrawal. Some States parties stressed that a State party remained responsible under international law for violations committed while Party to the Treaty.

100. Some States parties did not support efforts to reinterpret or restrict the sovereign right of withdrawal, as these could be detrimental to the implementation of the Treaty. A number of States parties emphasised the importance of encouraging States to remain in the Treaty by variously reaffirming the role of the Treaty and achieving its universality, implementing all the conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions adopted at the 2010 Review Conference, and addressing the root causes that might lead a State party to withdraw.

101. A number of States parties expressed an interest in continuing the examination of means to improve the effectiveness of the strengthened review process of the Treaty in the lead up to the 2015 Review Conference. States parties raised a number of specific suggestions in this regard.