STATEMENT

by the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the Second Session of the
Preparatory Committee of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on cluster II issues
(non-proliferation)
Mr. Chairman,

An effective system of international safeguards is one of the key elements of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT Treaty). In the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the verification system used by the Agency was called one of the pillars of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, playing an essential role in the implementation of the Treaty and facilitating the creation of a favourable environment for nuclear disarmament and cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Russia has consistently supported the IAEA's safeguards activities and relies upon the Agency's conclusions with regard to the nature of States' nuclear programmes. Universalization of the safeguards system will enable the Agency to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities at the global level. Concluding the safeguards agreements is an obligation of the States under the NPT. We call upon those States that have not yet done so, to conclude such agreements as soon as possible.

Mr. Chairman,

The history of the safeguards system has demonstrated the need for its constant improvement in order to adjust it to the dictates of time. The Additional Protocols to the Safeguards Agreements, which considerably increase the Agency's capacity to identify possible undeclared nuclear materials and activities and provide credible assurance of the absence thereof, have become an important instrument improving the efficiency of the safeguards activities.

We strongly believe that it is necessary to continue efforts to ensure that acknowledgement of the Additional Protocols be a universal norm to verify the compliance of the Parties to the NPT with their non-proliferation obligations, as well as constitute a new standard in the field of nuclear supplies arrangements. We understand the key role of the IAEA in this process.
this as soon as possible. We believe that the 2010 NPT Review Conference could adopt a relevant recommendation.

Mr. Chairman,

It is evident that as nuclear energy plays an increasing role in the world, and new production and energy facilities related to the nuclear sector are introduced into service, the volume of IAEA verification activities will also increase. In this context, it is high time to consider the issue of adjusting the Agency's technical capabilities to the increasing number of facilities covered by its safeguards. For this reason, it is essential to introduce integrated safeguards in the Agency's safeguards activities. We expect that their application in the States, which signed Additional Protocols, will enable the Agency to use its resources more efficiently.

Creation of proliferation-resistant nuclear energy technologies could be another way to optimize the IAEA safeguards system. The development of such systems is a key element of the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO), launched by the Agency in 2000 and initiated by Russia. Its further development is equally important for nuclear energy and safeguards activities. We believe that this work should be continued including in cooperation with the Generation IV International Forum.

Russia's assistance to the IAEA in verification also involves specific measures implemented within the framework of the national scientific and technical support programme. They include analysis of environmental samples in Russian laboratories, training of IAEA inspectors with regard to safeguards, arranging for personnel training on accounting and control of nuclear materials on the premises of specialized Russian institutions, development of new technologies to detect undeclared nuclear activities, and the analysis of information from the open sources.

Mr. Chairman,
expanding cooperation with other countries in atomic energy, as well as other spheres, which will consequently boost their economic growth. While the difficulties in applying the safeguards are fraught with tensions in the countries’ international relations, and prevent the countries from enjoying international nuclear trade and exchange and can have a negative impact on regional stability.

Mr. Chairman,

The inalienable right of all States Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes implies possible development of a national nuclear fuel cycle, some elements of which are sensitive. That is, in addition to peaceful uses, they can be used for production of weapon-grade nuclear materials. Thus, reliable conditions should be guaranteed for the implementation of national nuclear programmes, and ensure that non-proliferation issues are addressed in this context.

In our opinion, such a solution could be elaboration of nuclear energy development patterns involving reliable nuclear fuel supply programmes based on international cooperation as an alternative to proliferation of sensitive technologies.

Russia has made its practical contribution to implementing this particular approach, having established a multilateral center providing uranium enrichment services, in Angarsk. Localizing sensitive nuclear fuel cycle operations in an international center placed under the IAEA safeguards, allows for a more efficient control over the handling of nuclear materials while precluding its possible use for undeclared purposes. It should be specially noted that the Russian initiative does not require that its possible participants renounce the creation of their own nuclear fuel cycle elements. In other words, it does not prejudice the right of all States-Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We will cover this issue in more detail in our statement on Article II of the...
Mr. Chairman,

We believe it necessary to further strengthen multilateral nuclear export control mechanisms: the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. We believe that they have proven in practice that it is possible to establish a coordinated and indiscriminate nuclear export control procedure without prejudice for international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

We would like to stress the importance of the Article III paragraph 2 in this context. It can only be implemented if there are efficient national systems of accounting and control of nuclear materials, as well as export control procedures.

Russia has been constantly improving its national export control legislation. Bilateral and multilateral consultations on this matter contribute to increasing the transparency of export controls, exchange of experience and establishing a dialogue with the countries that are not parties to any multilateral export control regimes. We believe that it is necessary to develop cooperation with the countries that are not parties to the NPT in order to involve them in the efforts to strengthen the export control regimes.

It also should be pointed out that it is unacceptable to politicize the work of export control regimes. Any attempts to make these international mechanisms solve the tasks they are not meant to solve, will only have negative impact on their efficiency.

Mr. Chairman.

Establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) is an efficient measure strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime and enhancing regional and international security. Such zones are designed to facilitate nuclear disarmament and build a nuclear-weapon-free world, while achieving a larger task of general and complete disarmament under close and efficient international control.
We reaffirm our support to the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone and call upon all nuclear-weapon States to uphold it. We are prepared to settle the outstanding issues related to the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

The Russian initiative to concentrate nuclear weapons within the national territories of nuclear weapons States remains important. Its implementation would extend to the utmost the geographical scope of areas completely free from nuclear weapons.

Mr. Chairman,

Recently, due to terrorist threats there has been ever growing danger of nuclear weapons falling into the hands of terrorists. Such factors as accessible technologies to develop nuclear weapons, illicit trafficking in nuclear materials and technologies, weak or lacking national export controls, insufficient physical protection of nuclear materials make it easier for terrorists to get access to nuclear weapons, its components and technologies.

In this connection, it is very important to fully comply with UNSC Resolution 1540 initiated by Russia and aimed at preventing nuclear weapons from falling into terrorists’ hands, as well as ensuring the highest security standards in the nuclear field in order to make it adequate to the existing threats, first of all those posed by terrorists.

The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, put forward by the Presidents of Russia and the US in 2006 and joined by about 70 States, with their number still growing, has been actively implemented. This Initiative is a positive example of how to work together in today’s world to counter new challenges and threats. The Global Initiative is open for accession by all States that share its common goals and committed to combating nuclear terrorism.
important to continue supporting Agency’s efforts in this area. We suggest including this point in final documents of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to NPT.

Russia also calls on all countries to accede to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and to the amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.

To prevent the threat of highly enriched materials from falling into the hands of terrorists, Russia and the US, with the IAEA joined in, cooperate to get returned stockpiles of fresh and spent nuclear fuel from the foreign research reactors manufactured by Russia. Fresh fuel has already been exported from Serbia, Romania, Bulgaria, Libya, Uzbekistan, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Poland, Germany, and spent fuel from Uzbekistan and the Czech Republic. We are grateful to the IAEA for making a great contribution to carrying out this programme.

We support the IAEA programme intended to reduce nuclear fuel enrichment in research reactors in third countries to less than 20 percent. We think its implementation will allow to considerably reduce the danger of proliferation of highly enriched uranium.

Mr. Chairman,

Only a systematic approach of the Parties to the NPT Treaty to fulfilling their obligations under Article III of the Treaty will make it possible for us to be sure that their national nuclear programmes have exclusively peaceful purposes, and to adequately respond to new challenges and threats and prevent undeclared nuclear activities.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.