Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties
to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Statement by the delegation of Egypt

Cluster II

Non-Proliferation and Safeguards

Mr. Chairman,

International efforts aimed at implementing Treaty commitments in the
field of nuclear non-proliferation heavily rely on those dedicated to
fulfilling commitments on nuclear disarmament, as both goals mutually
reinforce the effectiveness of one another. In this context, Egypt believes
that all such efforts must be pursued in the multilateral context provided by
the Treaty and through the verification activities of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as the sole international body mandated by
the Treaty to conduct that function.

The comprehensive safeguards system of the IAEA was established to
create a balance between the inalienable right of Non-Nuclear-Weapon
States (NNWS) to benefit from peaceful applications of nuclear
technologies on the one hand, and the prevention of horizontal non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons on the other. Indeed, comprehensive
safeguards secure the non-diversion of peaceful nuclear activities or
material to military nuclear programs.

While the comprehensive safeguards system represents a central pillar in
the field of horizontal non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the IAEA has
so far an extremely limited role in the prevention of vertical proliferation of
nuclear weapons, or in effectively verifying nuclear disarmament. The
fulfilment of both such aspects of Treaty obligations practically depends
on the responsible implementation of disarmament commitments
undertaken by Nuclear-Weapon-States (NWS) in an effort that must be
combined with parallel work on achieving the universality of the Treaty.
Indeed, the universality of the Treaty can only consolidate its effectiveness
and ensure that it contributes to the security and stability of its members
which will then not face nuclear threats from within or outside the regime.
the main goal for which the Treaty was drafted and more recently, indefinitely extended.

For decades, including since the indefinite extension of the Treaty, the Comprehensive Safeguards System continues to verify, with ever progressing effectiveness, the peaceful nature of nuclear programmes in NNWS, both those operating a full nuclear fuel cycle capability and others operating facilities at less developed levels. Despite this strict control on NNWS, NWS continue to assume having a free hand outside safeguards control, except for what are so far symbolic arrangements. Furthermore, Non-NPT States remain outside the safeguards scope except for Limited Safeguards Agreements covering facilities already designed and dedicated to non-military use, while excluding all other facilities established to produce weapons of terror, destabilization and destruction, aimed at threatening the security of NPT States. The case of Israel's unsafeguarded nuclear programme and its negative destabilizing impact on regional security and stability in the Middle East, is one blunt example.

Despite all that, Egypt and other NNWS have remained keen on reiterating their commitments in accordance with the Treaty and subsequent Comprehensive Safeguards commitments while acknowledging their inalienable right to peaceful use of nuclear energy at a time at which energy needs of developing countries soar, stressing even further the crucial importance of that inalienable right, as it becomes more directly associated with legitimate development plans aiming at upgrading economic and social standards of the peoples of these countries.

Mr. Chairman.

The transfer of nuclear technology from developed to developing States remains very limited, and we continue to witness efforts exerted by some who try to redefine the safeguards system in order to limit the national options available to others in the nuclear energy area and to impose unjustified restrictions on the principle or scope of acquisition of NNWS of material and technologies to develop peaceful nuclear programmes. They try to do so through seeking reinterpretations of Article IV of the Treaty. Interpretations that have no relevance to Treaty provisions, and that only bring further division between NPT States and add unnecessary challenges to the credibility of the Treaty regime including that of comprehensive safeguards.

Not only has this been the case, but NNWS currently face additional pressures aiming at the imposition of more commitments on them in the
area of safeguards. Commitments that are neither obligatory nor related to the provisions of the Treaty. These efforts undermine and distract from work dedicated to the realization of the universality of Comprehensive Safeguards System.

Egypt believes that these developments require collective and intensified work by the international community to save the non-proliferation regime from its current challenges and to do that through enhancing IAEA comprehensive safeguards by strengthening the resolve to uphold their principle and legal foundations and work towards their universality, rather than seeking discriminatory reinterpretations and policies.

The delegation of Egypt hopes that the current review cycle will succeed in constructively addressing the highlighted issues in order to reiterate the principles and provisions of the Treaty and endorse their proper implementation.

Thank you