Mr. Chairman,

At the outset, allow me to congratulate you on your election to preside over the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee to the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. I want to assure you of the Brazilian Delegation’s full support and cooperation. We are confident that under your able guidance this Second Prepcom will successfully build upon the results of the First Prepcom with a view to making recommendations to the Review Conference in 2010 and contribute to a balanced assessment of the operation of the NPT. We expect that with the procedural difficulties faced in the First Prepcom behind us, we can now concentrate on substantive issues and move forward in our endeavors. We still have ahead of us a tremendous task, namely to accommodate divergent and sometimes contradictory interests in the pursuit of a consensus on the commitments to be achieved.

Brazil wishes to associate itself fully with the statement previously made by Ambassador Don Mackay, of New Zealand, on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition.
Mr. Chairman,

The successful outcomes of the 1995 and the 2000 Review Conferences raised expectations that a significant progress would occur in the implementation of all aspects of the NPT’s obligations. The results achieved in the 1995 led to the indefinite extension of the Treaty and to the strengthening of the review process, as well as the establishment of a new set of principles and goals for non-proliferation and disarmament. In 2000, the “unequivocal commitment” made by the Nuclear Weapon States to achieve total disarmament, in accordance with the spirit and the letter of the Treaty, and to implement the “Thirteen Practical Steps” then adopted by consensus, renewed hopes for the strengthened effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime and was praised as a significant step towards the common objective of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Unfortunately, the 2005 review did not keep up with these successful records. Over the past years, the international community has witnessed disturbing developments in the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda. While an increasing emphasis has been given to non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament has received scant attention. Meager progress in the latter has been – much to the international community dismay – the result of unilateral decisions by Nuclear Weapons States instead of coming from multilaterally negotiated, irreversible and verifiable agreements. These unilateral actions can therefore be reversed at the total discretion and convenience of the States that have adopted them.

Although this is not an appropriate venue to try to interpret political trends, one is tempted to analyze why positive developments in the two previous Review Conferences came to a halt three years ago. It would seem that events in the first years of the current decade and the consequent atmosphere of insecurity prompted the Nuclear Weapon States to freeze their political will in terms of disarmament. One may be allowed to ask if this is the wisest political course of action. Is the unwillingness to advance in the path of nuclear disarmament the best way to promote peace and international security and to combat terrorism?

As a country that, long before its accession to the NPT, had decided to relinquish the military nuclear option and also that its national security should not be based upon the acquisition of nuclear armament. Brazil opposes attempts to reinterpret the commitments
by Nuclear Weapon States under Article VI of the TNP, commitments reaffirmed by them in the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences. In our view, commitments and decisions freely agreed upon in intergovernmental conferences and bodies and enshrined in their documents by consensus constitute clear-cut and legitimate undertakings and must be implemented by the countries that adopted them in good faith.

In the same token, Brazil shares the concerns of the international community regarding the emergence of new strategic and military doctrines which include the possibility of use of nuclear weapons on a pre-emptive basis even against non-nuclear weapon states. These new developments, in Brazil’s perspective, lower the threshold for the utilization of nuclear weapons and undermines the very legitimacy of the non-proliferation and disarmament regimes.

Mr. Chairman,

Brazil also acknowledges that one of the challenges facing the NPT is related to proliferation attempts, both overt and concealed, within or outside the Treaty’s framework, carried out by both state and non-state actors. While concerns with the new developments in the international security agenda in this regard are legitimate, action to curb proliferation must be taken in tandem with nuclear disarmament and the use of nuclear technology for exclusively peaceful ends. We reiterate our understanding that disarmament and non-proliferation processes are closely interrelated and mutually reinforcing. A balanced implementation of the NPT with equal focus on these pillars is essential if the present challenges to the mutual undertakings on which the Treaty is based are to be surmounted.

An effective and sustainable strategy in the domain of non-proliferation cannot prescind the implementation of concrete, multilaterally negotiated and verifiable measures on nuclear disarmament and control of fissile material. We were encouraged last year by the momentum created in the Conference on Disarmament over the adoption of a program of work that included negotiations on a fissile material treaty. We want to achieve a universal, non-discriminatory and internationally verifiable fissile material cut-off treaty. In a spirit of flexibility, however, we accepted to start negotiations “without preconditions” in the framework of the CD. For Brazil, a fissile material treaty represents the necessary
complement to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and would constitute a significant step ahead in our endeavors to reach complete and irreversible disarmament and to curb proliferation.

Brazil has always advocated the universalization of the CTBT, which we consider to be an essential element of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. While welcoming the recent accession of Colombia and Malaysia, we reiterate our call to those states which have not yet done so to ratify the treaty with a view of its early entry into force without delay and without conditions.

Mr. Chairman,

A system of international relations which upholds International Law, maintains justice and fosters development cannot be achieved without an environment of peace and stability. The NPT contains in its articles valuable elements to sustain such an environment. Hence the need to reaffirm all commitments undertaken under the Treaty and its Review Conference’s conclusions.

The announcements by some Nuclear Weapon States of steps in streamlining their nuclear arsenals and other control measures would gain in their benefits if they were better known. That is why Brazil offered a suggestion in the I Prepcom last year concerning the preparation of comparative tables showing those measures.

Another means of strengthening the NPT is through universality. In this regard, proliferation outside the Treaty is unacceptable and inconsistent with our efforts to strengthen the NPT’s provisions and obligations. One of the objectives of the Review Conference, which Brazil totally subscribes to, is to urge States non-Parties to accede to it without conditions and without delay, as non-nuclear states, and simultaneously to call on States Parties to refrain from adopting any measure that may contravene the obligations established by the Treaty or contradict its spirit.
Mr. Chairman,

The inalienable right of sovereign states to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as recognized by Article IV of the Treaty is imperative for a balanced implementation of the NPT. Countries that acceded to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon states and have maintained that status have an unbroken record of not developing nuclear arms. It is true, however, that the ability to master nuclear technologies for peaceful purposes does comprise the risk of proliferation. Brazil is fully aware of the importance of the non-proliferation pillar of the NPT and therefore has supported the strengthening of safeguards in the light of the wider disarmament and non-proliferation framework. Our commitment with the system of safeguards of the IAEA pre-dates our accession to the NPT. In the beginning of the 90's, Brazil entered in a Quadripartite agreement with Argentina, the Brazil-Argentina Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material (ABACC) and the IAEA, which is a full-scope agreement on the application of safeguards. Since then, Brazil's nuclear facilities, that were already under safeguards since the early 70s, have been under comprehensive safeguards. Likewise, the initiative launched last February by the Presidents of Argentina and Brazil to set up a joint uranium enrichment enterprise will necessarily contemplate ABACC's supervision of the pertinent facilities. Brazil's strategic cooperation with Argentina in the nuclear field is a concrete evidence of the commitment by the two countries to use nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes.

Mr. Chairman,

Brazil is a founding member of the First Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone covering an inhabited area of the globe. Established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco more than 40 years ago and now ratified by all countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, it has served as a paradigm for similar initiatives around the world. We therefore strongly support and encourage the establishment of Nuclear-Weapon Free Zones, including the Middle East Nuclear Free Zone, object of the decision adopted by the 1995 NPT Review Conference, as an important step towards disarmament and a much-needed confidence-building measure. In this spirit, Brazil reiterates the call on the Nuclear Weapon States to reconsider the terms of their adherence to the relevant Protocols of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, so as to
provide complete and unconditional negative security assurances to all countries in the region, pending nuclear disarmament.

Mr. Chairman,

In view of the substantive lack of concrete, positive results in the 2005 Review Conference, we now have, more than ever, a collective responsibility with regard to the new review process. We cannot afford another failure to address the challenges which have been undermining the full implementation of the NPT. This preparatory process for the 2010 Review Conference presents a great opportunity to test the willingness and good faith of all States Parties to live up to their commitments and to the fulfillment of the expectations generated by the 1995 and the 2005 Review Conferences. Let’s not miss it.