Nuclear disarmament

Working paper submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran

1. In the course of the negotiations leading to the NPT, an integrated and balanced package of rights and obligations was introduced according to which non-nuclear-weapon States undertake not to acquire nuclear weapons, and to place their facilities under the safeguards agreements. In return, nuclear-weapon States undertake not to transfer and develop nuclear weapons and commit themselves to practical steps towards nuclear disarmament. Moreover, all States parties to the Treaty undertake to cooperate and ensure the implementation of the inalienable rights of the States parties for peaceful use of nuclear energy in a non-selective and non-discriminatory manner. In addition, universality of the Treaty has been assumed as a common international commitment of all Member States.

2. Since 1978, when the final document of the special session devoted to disarmament confirmed nuclear disarmament as the highest priority on the disarmament agenda, the international community has had to wait for more than two decades to witness a comparable endorsement of its long sought goal contained in the final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. The 2005 Review Conference was a sad setback in this direction. The 13 practical steps adopted by consensus at the 2000 NPT Review Conference still constitutes the hope for achieving the ultimate and urgent goal of the international community of complete nuclear disarmament. We should not permit hopes to fade again.

3. With the adoption of the 13 practical steps in the 2000 Review Conference, including the “unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament under article VI of the Treaty”, hopes for the implementation of this fundamental part of the NPT was renewed. The 13 practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the NPT was considered to be the most important achievement of the 2000 Review Conference in the field of nuclear disarmament. What non-nuclear-weapon State parties to the NPT are expecting now is consideration of the national reports of the nuclear-weapon States with respect to their implementation of article VI of the Treaty, including their measures adopted in the implementation of the 13 practical steps.
4. Since the 2000 NPT Conference, developments in the area of nuclear disarmament have not been promising. Despite the obligations under article VI and undertakings by the nuclear-weapon States in 1995 and 2000, in particular the 13 practical steps, the continued development and deployment of thousands of nuclear warheads in the stockpiles of the nuclear-weapon States still threaten international peace and security.

5. The non-entry into force of the START II agreement, the reluctance to pursue the START III negotiations and the abrogation of the ABM Treaty are among the serious setbacks to the implementation of the 13 practical steps. The international community has noted the signature of the Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions in 2002. However, reductions, as stipulated in this Treaty, are far below the international expectations for real steps towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The Moscow Treaty does not go beyond the decommissioning of nuclear weapons, and parties do not have any obligation to destroy their nuclear weapons. Also, no verification mechanism is envisaged. It therefore does not take into account the principles of “increased transparency”, “diminishing role for nuclear weapons” and “irreversibility”, which were agreed by the nuclear-weapon States at the 2000 NPT Conference.

6. During the 2000 Review Conference, the nuclear-weapon States committed themselves to “the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the arms reduction and disarmament process”. In spite of that, no practical steps have been taken to reduce tactical nuclear weapons by the nuclear-weapon States.

7. The adoption of the Nuclear Posture Review by the United States, and the United Kingdom’s Trident plan, provide for the development of new types of nuclear weapons, the possible use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and targeting nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, in contravention of the assurances given by the nuclear-weapon States at the time of the conclusion of the NPT and its indefinite extension.

8. Today, in spite of the allocation of hundreds of millions of dollars to projects aimed at developing mini-nuclear weapons or the so-called bunker busters, they are claimed to be simple research programmes. The Preparatory Committee and the 2010 NPT Review Conference have an urgent task to address the concerns of the non-nuclear-weapon States emanating from the development and deployment of new nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and to alleviate these concerns by considering a decision on the prohibition of development and the production of any new nuclear weapons, particularly mini-nukes, as well as a ban on the construction of any new facility for the development, deployment and production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery in home and foreign countries.

9. Moreover, real concerns of the international community over vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, the transfer and deployment of nuclear weapons in territories of non-nuclear-weapon States, lowering the threshold of resort to nuclear weapons and the danger of using such inhumane weapons in conventional conflicts and against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT, remain. Ironically, not only do some nuclear-weapon States not take steps towards the total elimination of their arsenals, and give no security assurances to non-nuclear States parties, they also threaten to be the first users.
10. In accordance with article I of the NPT, “Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly”. Contrary to this obligation, hundreds of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery have been and are still being deployed in other countries and air forces of non-nuclear-weapon States train in the delivery of these weapons under the cover of military alliances. In the same context, the nuclear sharing between nuclear-weapon States and between nuclear-weapon States and States not parties to the Treaty is also a grave source of concern for NPT parties. The nuclear-weapon States should comply with their obligations under article I by refraining from nuclear-sharing, regardless of the pretext or the security arrangements or military alliance.

11. The NPT, in its article III, paragraph 2, commits all States to refrain from the transfer of sensitive technology and materials to non-parties to the Treaty unless they are placed under the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Accordingly, the prepcom sessions and the Review Conference should reaffirm the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to non-parties to the NPT, without exception and in particular to the Israeli regime, whose unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and continued programme for the development of nuclear weapons are a real threat to all countries of the Middle East and to international peace and security. The United States is being a non-compliant party in its undertakings under the provisions of the NPT by continuing nuclear-sharing with the Zionist regime of Israel and by strongly supporting this regime by keeping silence on the recent acknowledgement of the Israeli Prime Minister of their nuclear arsenal. The policy of inaction of the United States and some other nuclear-weapon States in dealing with the real threats of the nuclear arsenal of the Zionist regime to regional and international peace and security in the Security Council and other relevant forums constitutes an act of horizontal proliferation, adding to their vertical one.

12. Although the nuclear testing moratorium has been maintained since the CTBT signature, some efforts are under way in the United States to allocate millions of dollars to reduce the time necessary to resume a nuclear test to 18 months, which has put into question its commitment to the moratorium. The prospect for the entry into force of the CTBT has faced a serious setback in the rejection of the ratification process by the United States. Similarly, at the time the prospect for commencing the negotiations of a fissile material cut-off treaty was high, the unwarranted insistence from the same country for excluding the element of verification and past stockpiles from the negotiating mandate of the ad hoc committee to be established at the Conference on Disarmament has created an obstacle for the realization of this longstanding commitment of the international community. It is time to seriously consider that by changing the negotiating mandate of the ad hoc committee, and making it reasonably balanced and concurrent with the mandates of the other ad hoc committees, no basis remains allowing for the commencement of the cut-off treaty negotiations.

13. While new issues such as terrorism, non-proliferation threats and the role of non-State actors should be dealt with, it is very unfortunate that these issues are abused as pretexts to justify the pursuit of programmes on a new nuclear-weapons system and ignorance of nuclear disarmament obligations. Specific threats may not
be resolved through resorting to more dangerous weapons that would have catastrophic consequences well beyond any other threats in scope and effects.

14. The NPT review process should be able to reiterate once again its unconditional global call for the full implementation of the unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, and must assess the implementation of the 13 practical steps adopted by consensus at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

15. The parties to the Treaty, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, should engage in good faith in substantive work of the Conference for the speedy and meaningful implementation of obligations under the Treaty, including article VI and the commitments made at the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences.

16. We continue to believe in the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time limit, including a nuclear weapons convention, and in this regard reiterate our call for the establishment, as the highest priority and as soon as possible, of an ad hoc committee on nuclear disarmament in the Conference on Disarmament.

17. The question of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons has been an important issue since the inception of the NPT.

18. The final document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference reaffirmed, in the second paragraph of its section on article VII, the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and agreed that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to the non-nuclear-weapon States strengthen the nuclear proliferation regime and called upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2010 Review Conference. In view of this agreement, despite the inability of the Preparatory Committee, the NPT Review Conference has a clear mandate to make a decision on negative security assurances.

19. We regret that the past review processes had not been able to produce recommendations on the security assurances to the 2005 Review Conference. Therefore, we propose that the Conference would establish an ad hoc committee to work on a draft legally binding instrument on providing security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, and to submit the draft of the legal instrument to the Review Conference for its consideration and adoption.

20. As a first step to address the twin issues of illegality of use and negative security assurances, we believe that, as suggested by the NGO community, this Conference should adopt a decision by which the Conference “decides that the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States shall be prohibited”.

21. In conclusion, let me express our disappointment and dismay that the delegation of the United States, instead of opting to focus on the efforts that it has taken to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty, attempts, as cover-up, to forward accusations and pass arbitrary unjustified judgements against my country by presenting completely distorted facts and conclusions that contradict the reports and decisions of the IAEA and its Board of Governors. Despite the futile tremendous
efforts by the United States, no Member State or IAEA document, inter alia, has referred to the non-compliance of Iran with the NPT or the diversion of its peaceful nuclear activities, except for the very unhappy and frustrated case of the United States. The IAEA, on the contrary, has concluded in one of its latest documents that, following extensive inspections of all relevant facilities in Iran, no trace has been found to show any diversion of the Iranian activities to other than peaceful purposes.

22. It is unfortunate that a legacy that is wrong remains to be pursued and pronounced at the Review Conferences by stressing that the United States does not have particular obligations under article IV of the Treaty and the United States delegation should utilize every forum available to direct politically motivated accusations against Iran.