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Article V, and article VI and preambular paragraphs 8 to 12

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

Working paper by Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway and Sweden (“the Group”)

1. The Group reaffirms that the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation in all its aspects and is vital to the NPT. The CTBT was an integral part of the indefinite extension of the NPT. The Group therefore stresses that the early entry into force of the CTBT is of the utmost urgency and importance and reiterates the agreement from the 2000 NPT Review Conference where the early entry into force of the CTBT was identified as the first of 13 practical nuclear disarmament steps. The Group reaffirms that the provisions of article V of the NPT are to be interpreted in the light of the CTBT.

2. The Group condemns the nuclear test carried out by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in October 2006. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea nuclear test highlighted the vital importance of early entry into force of the CTBT. The test was readily detected and its location determined by the CTBT International Monitoring System, demonstrating the capability of the system to detect and characterize even small nuclear explosions. The Group strongly supports all relevant Security Council resolutions, more specifically resolution 1718 (2006) and resolution 1695 (2006) unanimously adopted on 14 October 2006 and 15 July 2006, respectively, and continues to urge the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to sign and ratify the CTBT and refrain from any further nuclear tests. The Group welcomes the statement released on 13 February 2007 following the six-party talks in Beijing, which commits the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to move quickly to begin resolving international concerns about its nuclear programme.

3. The Group welcomes the progress made by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization to build the system to
verify compliance with the CTBT at its entry into force — in particular the 
establishment of the International Monitoring System. The goal of this work should 
be an effective, reliable, participatory and non-discriminatory verification system 
with global reach. Ultimately, however, this verification system can show its full 
worth only once the CTBT has entered into force.

4. The Group notes with concern that 11 years after it was opened for signature, 
the CTBT has still not entered into force. The Group welcomes the fact that the 
CTBT has been signed by 177 States, of which 138 have ratified, including 
34 whose ratification is necessary for entry into force. The Group renews its call 
upon all States yet to do so to sign and/or ratify the Treaty without delay. The Group 
particularly urges those States listed in Annex 2 of the Treaty, and whose ratification 
is therefore a prerequisite for its entry into force, to recognize the value of the 
CTBT for their national and for international security. The reliable performance of 
the International Monitoring System and the practical development of other aspects 
of the verification regime, as well as the example of a growing number of ratifiers, 
should help them with a positive decision.

5. The Group welcomes the results of the CTBT Article XIV (entry into force) 
Conference held in New York in September 2005. The Group acknowledges the 
valuable work of the Conference “Synergies with Science, 1996-2006 and Beyond” 
held in Vienna from 31 August to 1 September 2006, which was generously 
supported by the Government of Austria. The Group welcomes the Joint Ministerial 
Statement on the CTBT, which was launched on 20 September 2006 at United 
Nations Headquarters and with which 72 States associated themselves. The Group 
notes that a further CTBT Article XIV (entry into force) Conference is to be held in 
Vienna on 17 and 18 September 2007, and urges all States to participate actively in 
order to ensure a successful outcome.

6. Reiterating that the CTBT constrains the development of nuclear weapons and 
their qualitative improvement, the Group reaffirms that the CTBT combats both 
horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation. The Group is concerned that any 
development of new types of nuclear weapons may result in the resumption of tests 
and a lowering of the nuclear threshold. The Group calls on all States to refrain from 
any action which would defeat the object and purpose of the CTBT, pending its 
entry into force.

7. The Group underlines that existing moratoriums on nuclear-weapon-test 
explosions and any other nuclear-test explosions must be maintained, pending the 
entry into force of the CTBT. The Group stresses, however, that such moratoriums 
cannot serve as a substitute for ratifying the CTBT and that only the CTBT offers 
the global community the prospect of a permanent and legally binding commitment 
to end nuclear testing.