Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

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Preparing for a successful Review Conference 2010

Working paper submitted by the European Union

1. The European Union (EU) is committed to the preservation of the integrity of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the strengthening of its implementation. This commitment is enshrined in the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, agreed by our Heads of State and Government in December 2003. Integral to this Strategy is our conviction that a multilateralist approach to security, including disarmament and non-proliferation, provides the best way to maintain international order. Multilateralism is based on the concept of shared commitments and obligations, and we must ensure that these commitments are respected and all obligations are complied with within the NPT framework by all States parties. The NPT can only fulfil its role if we are confident of the compliance of all States parties to the obligations of the Treaty.

2. The NPT Review Conference in 2005 was unable to agree on a substantive final document to address the most pressing challenges to the Treaty. The EU believes this disappointment should spur all States parties into redoubling their efforts in support of a successful Review Conference in 2010. EU foreign ministers, for their part, on the occasion of the first Preparatory Committee of the new review cycle, have reiterated the EU commitment to the NPT in EU Council Conclusions of 23 April 2007.

3. The EU recalls that the NPT is based on the three mutually reinforcing pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The EU believes that the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with article VI of the NPT are essential for global peace and security. This holds true as well for the peaceful use of nuclear energy, in accordance with all provisions of the Treaty. We are therefore firmly committed to the objective of strengthening the international nuclear non-proliferation regime as underlined in the EU Common Position of 25 April 2005 by which we stand. The EU continues to support the decisions and resolution adopted at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference and shall bear in mind the current situation.
4. The EU member States continue to attach great importance to achieving the universality of and universal compliance with the NPT. The possession of nuclear weapons by States outside the NPT and non-compliance with the Treaty’s provisions by States Party to the Treaty undermine non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. Therefore the EU continues, in accordance with the Common Position of 25 April 2005 mentioned above, to call on all States not Party to the NPT to pledge commitments to non-proliferation and disarmament and to call upon those states to become States parties to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon States.

5. We recognize that serious nuclear proliferation events have occurred since the end of the 2000 Review Conference. The EU also remains deeply concerned by the growing risk of nuclear terrorism and is determined to combat this threat.

6. The illicit trade in highly sensitive nuclear equipment and technology is a matter of serious concern for the European Union and indeed all States parties to the NPT. The European Union is committed to strong nationally and internationally coordinated export controls, which we see as a necessary complement to our non-proliferation obligations under the NPT. EU member States abide by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) requirement that transfers of trigger list items can only be made to States which have in place a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). EU member States are also working within NSG to ensure that the ratification of the Additional Protocol becomes a condition of export of controlled nuclear and nuclear-related items and technology.

7. United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) complements our efforts to tackle proliferation by explicitly addressing illicit trafficking and procurement networks, and, in particular, the involvement of non-State actors in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technology. We urge States to remain committed to implementing Security Council resolution 1540. The EU welcomes the reiteration of Security Council resolution 1540 and the extension of the 1540 Committee mandate for a further period of two years by Security Council resolution 1673 (2006). We call for full implementation of these legally binding resolutions consistent with the goal in Security Council resolution 1673 to reach by 2008 compliance through the achievement of implementation of all provisions of Security Council resolution 1540.

8. In the current year of the fiftieth anniversary of the IAEA Statute’s approval, the EU reaffirms its full support for the work of this unique and indispensable organization pursuing the same objectives with us. IAEA is the world’s focal point for peaceful nuclear cooperation and nuclear safety and it has an indispensable global role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons andcountering new threats of nuclear terrorism. The three pillars of the IAEA Statute, verification, safety and technology, have been strengthened where necessary and remain solid in the face of their respective challenges.

9. The IAEA international safeguards system is an essential part of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. The universal adoption and implementation of comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols to them is a prerequisite for an effective and credible safeguards system.

10. The EU considers the Additional Protocols to be an integral part of the IAEA safeguards system and adherence to them should be considered an essential means
of verifying the fulfilment of States parties’ obligations under article III of the NPT. By raising the standard for compliance and by making it easier to detect violations, Additional Protocols strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The EU considers that the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols constitute the current verification standard, and accords a high priority to their implementation. We call on all States that have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force Additional Protocols with IAEA.

11. In 2005 the EU drew attention to the potential implications for international peace and security of withdrawal from the NPT. The contributions and discussions during the NPT Review Conference proved to be very useful and we will continue to reiterate the existing principles and urge, during the current review cycle, the adoption of measures to discourage withdrawal from the Treaty.

12. The unanimous adoption of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) reflects the international community’s profound concerns over the Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear programme. We deplore the Islamic Republic of Iran’s failure to comply with the earlier resolutions of the Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors. We are greatly concerned by the Islamic Republic of Iran’s increasing lack of cooperation with IAEA and the latest announcement by the Islamic Republic of Iran that it intends to begin uranium enrichment on a so-called industrial scale. Such a step directly contradicts the repeated requests of the IAEA Board of Governors, made mandatory by the Security Council decisions, to suspend all enrichment-related activities. We call upon the Islamic Republic of Iran to open the way for negotiations by complying with the requirements as set out in Security Council resolutions 1737 and 1747. We remain committed to seeking a negotiated solution that would address the international community’s concerns. A solution to the Iranian nuclear issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery.

13. At the same time, the EU will ensure the effective implementation of the measures contained in the Security Council resolutions. We call upon all countries to implement the measures in full and without delay. The EU is united in its resolve not to allow the Islamic Republic of Iran to acquire military nuclear capabilities and to see all consequences of its nuclear programme, in terms of proliferation, resolved.

14. While fully endorsing the diplomatic efforts undertaken in the framework of the six-Party talks, the EU continues to be concerned by the situation on the Korean peninsula. We urge the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to comply with Security Council resolution 1718 (2006) and to implement its commitments contained in the joint statement of September 2005. We urge the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to dismantle its WMD and ballistic programmes in a complete, irreversible and verifiable way, to observe the obligations under the NPT, to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), to refrain from any further tests of a nuclear device and to re-establish the moratorium on long-range missile testing. The EU remains committed to the objective of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and has made clear that it strictly condemns the nuclear test proclaimed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea on 9 October 2006.

15. The EU supports the pursuit of nuclear disarmament in accordance with article VI of the NPT and welcomes the reduction of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons and their delivery systems since the end of the Cold War. We stress the
need for an overall reduction of the global stockpile of nuclear weapons, in particular by those with the largest arsenals, while acknowledging the considerable nuclear arms reductions which have taken place since the end of the Cold War, in particular by two EU member States. In this context, we recognize the application of the principle of irreversibility to guide all measures in the field of nuclear disarmament and arms control, as a contribution to the maintenance and reinforcement of international peace, security and stability, taking these conditions into account. We are pursuing efforts to secure transparency as a voluntary confidence-building measure.

16. The EU notes that the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) is due to expire in 2009. We welcome the ratification of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (Moscow Treaty) by the Russian Federation and the United States of America in 2002, while at the same time stressing the need for more progress in reducing their arsenals. We also note that the Moscow Treaty will expire on 31 December 2012. The EU welcomes the reductions in deployed nuclear weapons which START and the Moscow Treaty have brought about, and stresses the need for more progress in reducing these nuclear arsenals through appropriate follow-on processes. We would welcome a further continuation of the above processes represented by a bilateral follow-on agreement to the expiring START I Treaty.

17. The issue of non-strategic nuclear weapons was included in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference. Reductions in these weapons are an integral part of the nuclear arms control and disarmament process. We look forward to the fulfilment of the United States and Russian 1991-1992 presidential declarations on unilateral reductions in their stocks of non-strategic nuclear weapons, as well as of the commitments made by relevant States at the 2000 Review Conference. We encourage States concerned to start negotiations on an effectively verifiable agreement to best achieve the greatest possible reductions in these weapons.

18. The EU recognizes the importance, from the point of view of nuclear disarmament, of the programmes for destruction and elimination of nuclear weapons and of fissile material as defined under the G-8 Global Partnership. The EU recalls that EU member States and the European Community participate in this effort which entails, inter alia, the deactivation of thousands of nuclear warheads, the dismantlement of nuclear submarines, and efforts to convert military stockpiles of fissile material into a physical state which can no longer be used in nuclear weapons.

19. CTBT is as essential to nuclear disarmament as it is to non-proliferation. Last year’s tenth anniversary of the opening for signature of the Treaty reminded us all of the need to redouble our efforts to complete the outstanding ratifications required for the Treaty to enter into force. The EU believes that a legally binding prohibition of nuclear weapons test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, as well as a credible verification regime, are vital. The occurrence of nuclear tests after the opening of the Treaty for signature underlines the need for as early entry into force of the Treaty as possible. The EU reiterates its call on States, particularly those listed in annex II, to sign and ratify the Treaty without delay and without conditions and, pending its entry into force to abide by a moratorium on nuclear testing and to refrain from any action contrary to the obligations and provisions of the Treaty. The EU would also like to express its appreciation for the substantial work of the
Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization. We will continue to actively support the work of the Special Representative of the States which have ratified the Treaty in his work promoting universal accession.

20. At the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva we were encouraged by the structured and substantive debates conducted during the sessions in 2006 and at the beginning of 2007. A new momentum has developed as a result of the initiative taken jointly by the six presidents of the Conference on Disarmament in 2006 as well as in 2007, which led to the recent tabling of a formal proposal by the current six presidents. The EU hopes that the deadlock in the work of the Conference on Disarmament can be overcome and significant work resumed. The EU will not object to the six presidents’ proposal as it stands. The EU attaches a clear priority to the negotiation without precondition in the Conference on Disarmament of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices, as a means to strengthen disarmament and non-proliferation. It constitutes a priority that waits to be seized.

21. As part of its weapons of mass destruction Strategy, the European Union will promote a stable international and regional environment and address the root causes of instability. The EU will play its part in addressing the problems of regional insecurity and the situations of conflict, which lie behind many weapons programmes. We recognize that instability does not occur in a vacuum and we are committed to fostering regional security arrangements and regional disarmament and arms control processes.

22. The EU recognizes the continuing high value of the existing legally binding security assurances, provided for by the protocols of the nuclear weapons free zones and unilateral declarations of nuclear weapons States, noted by United Nations Security Council in its resolution 984 (1995) and reaffirmed at the sixth NPT Review Conference, to non-nuclear weapon States Parties to the NPT on the use of or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Positive and negative assurances can play an important role in the NPT regime and can serve as an incentive to forgo the acquisition of WMD. We are committed to promoting further consideration of security assurances.

23. The EU continues to attach great importance to the development of internationally recognized nuclear weapon free zones, established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States of the regions concerned, as elaborated in the guidelines adopted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) in its 1999 substantive session. Effective nuclear weapon free zones enhance regional and global peace and security and are a means to promote nuclear disarmament, stability and confidence. The EU welcomes and encourages the signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols to the nuclear weapon free zones following completion of the necessary consultations. We hope that outstanding issues concerning nuclear weapon free zones can be resolved through full consultations in accordance with UNDC guidelines and with the agreement of all parties involved.

24. The EU remains committed to the full implementation of the resolutions on the Middle East adopted by the United Nations and the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. The EU calls upon the States of the region to establish an effectively verifiable zone free of nuclear weapons, as well as of other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. We call upon all States in the region
that have not yet done so to accede to the NPT and the biological and chemical weapons conventions, and to conclude with IAEA a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an Additional Protocol. We believe that the accession of all States in the area to IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols should be a priority for the international community as a whole and would represent a crucial contribution to an overall improvement for security and confidence in the Middle East.

25. The EU stresses the need for general disarmament. Non-proliferation, disarmament and arms control remain indispensable elements of cooperative security between States.

26. In accordance with article IV of the NPT and article II of the IAEA Statute, the EU reaffirms its support for the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, without discrimination and in conformity with articles I, II and III of the Treaty. The EU notes in this regard that a growing number of States parties to the NPT are showing interest in developing nuclear programmes aimed at addressing their long run energy requirements and other peaceful purposes. The EU recognizes the necessity for the 2010 Review Conference to address this issue.

27. The EU underlines the importance of continuing international cooperation in order to strengthen nuclear safety, safe waste management and physical protection of nuclear material and calls upon States that have not yet done so to accede to all the relevant conventions as soon as possible. The EU also recalls the importance of the IAEA Code of Conduct on radiological protection.

28. The EU is actively engaged in the ongoing discussions on the multilateralization of fuel cycle activities and fuel supply guarantee mechanisms under the auspices of IAEA. As EU member States witnessed 50 years ago, transparency, coordination and control of key substances or sensitive technologies can lead to more confidence and trust among participating States. The EU thus stands ready to participate in the discussion which aims to develop mechanisms for access to nuclear fuel services or to fuel itself for those countries that have chosen the nuclear power option, with the aim of strengthening the NPT.

29. The European Union hopes that this first session of the Preparatory Committee will help to lay the foundations for a successful 2005-2010 review cycle. We must pay due consideration to all aspects of the implementation of the Treaty: disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful use. Such consideration will allow us to emerge from this preparatory process and move forward to the Review Conference 2010 in order to effectively uphold and strengthen the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.