STATEMENT

by the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons on Article VI of the Treaty

Practical Steps Taken by the Russian Federation in the Field of Nuclear Disarmament

Vienna, May 2007
Mr. Chairman,

To date, the Soviet Union and then the Russian Federation concluded over treaties and agreements which have formed the policy in the field of nuclear disarmament and strengthened strategic stability that emerged in the 1970s.

The Treaty between the USSR and the US on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (the INF Treaty) that entered into force on June 1, 1988, was a major step forward in this direction. This virtually unprecedented Treaty completely eliminated two classes of land-based missiles -- intermediate-range (1000 to 5500 km) and shorter-range ones (500 to 1000 km) and banned future production and testing of such missiles. The Russian Federation fully meets its obligations under the INF Treaty.

The next step was the conclusion of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START 1) which entered into force on December 5, 1994.

Under that Treaty the Parties assumed the obligation to reduce, in seven years after its entry into force, the number of their deployed strategic delivery vehicles to 1600 and the number of nuclear weapons attributed to them to 6000 for each side. Russia completely fulfilled its obligations with respect to those reductions and, as of the target date of December 5, 2001, reduced the actual aggregate number of its deployed strategic delivery vehicles (intercontinental ballistic missiles, sea-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers) to 1136 and the number of weapons attributed to them to 5518.

The Russian Federation continues to reduce its strategic offensive arms. As of January 1, 2007, the Russian side has eliminated 1422 intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles launchers, 2900 intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, 46 strategic nuclear submarines and 66 heavy bombers. As of January 1, 2007, Russia possessed no more than 900 deployed strategic offensive delivery vehicles and 4200 warheads accountable under the START 1 Treaty. Even an at-a-glance comparison of these figures with the data provided in our report at the 2005 Review Conference reflects the Russian Federation's growing contribution to the fulfillment of its obligations under the NPT.

The Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Strategic Offensive Reductions that entered into force on June 1, 2003 (the Moscow Treaty) also constitutes a significant step towards nuclear disarmament and is of great importance to strengthening international security system. This Treaty basically ensures continuity of the arms control and disarmament process in a situation where the 1972 ABM Treaty has expired, and the START 2 Treaty has not and is not likely to ever enter into force.

We believe that the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions promote-
strengthening the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime. This Treaty reaffirms the obligations assumed by both sides under Article VI of the NPT.

Pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty, Russia and the US are to reduce their respective strategic nuclear weapons to the aggregate number of **1700-2200**, that is approximately threefold against the threshold level envisaged under the START I Treaty.

I would like to stress that we have already started to fulfill our obligations under the Treaty.

However, it should noted, that the experience of implementing the START Treaty has shown that reduction of strategic offensive weapons is a complicated painstaking process which requires a lot of time, and resources.

President Putin has repeatedly expressed our country’s willingness to reduce our nuclear arsenal to a much lower level that would fit into the notion of minimum sufficiency that has been much talked about recently. This could certainly be carried out only under conditions of sustained strategic stability.

As we are considering the implementation of Article VI of the NPT, I would also like to address the issue of non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons reduction. Russia has reduced its non-strategic nuclear weapon arsenals by **three quarters** against the ones handed down to us by the Soviet Union. By now, all Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons have been withdrawn from the territory of the former USSR into Russia and concentrated in the central storage facilities within our national territory alone. We ensure due technical safety and reliable protection.

This shows that the Russian Federation is pursuing consistent nuclear disarmament. At the same time Russia does not fail to consistently and scrupulously abide by its Treaty obligations concerning elimination and reduction of conventional weapons and elimination of its chemical weapons stockpiles.

As for the Russian nuclear weapons in possession, they are kept under reliable control. Enhanced effectiveness of this control is achieved through organizational and technical measures. In particular, from 1991 the number of nuclear weapons storage facilities has been cut down **by four**. All non-strategic nuclear weapons had been moved to central storage facilities of the Russian Ministry of Defense. All of the above has made it possible to relocate financial resources to ensure safety and reliable protection of the reduced number of nuclear munitions storage facilities using state-of-the-art technical means of security and physical protection. The total amount of nuclear weapons stockpiles has been reduced more than **fivefold** over the same period.

Russia has developed and introduced a set of measures to counter terrorist actions, which envisages regular comprehensive checks of all facilities that pose nuclear and radiation risks in terms of security and readiness to prevent terrorist actions.
March 2007 saw the completion of exercise initiated by the Russian Federation and intended to demonstrate to many countries of the world what the situation is in securing storage and transportation of nuclear weapons in the Russian Federation. The exercise confirmed high readiness of emergency units for immediate action in case of unforeseen nuclear weapons incidents.

I would also like to make the following points.

In addition to treaties on the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons, we attach special importance to a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

The Russian Federation who ratified CTBT as early as in 2000, is pursuing a principled course toward ensuring the earliest possible entry into force of that Treaty, one of the most important instruments in the area of nuclear weapons non-proliferation and limitation.

We are alarmed by the situation with the CTBT’s entry into force. To date, not all of the countries whose accession to the Treaty is key to its entry into force have ratified it. To date, not all of the countries whose instruments of ratification are key to its entry into force have acceded to it.

Mr. Chairman,

It should be noted as well, that our steps toward nuclear disarmament are accompanied by relevant structural changes in the Russian Federation’s nuclear weapons sector.

We have reduced by one half our production capacity that is excessive for defensive purposes. The Russian Federation is working toward shutting down industrial uranium-graphite reactors for the weapon-grade plutonium production. The material produced by those facilities is not used for military purposes. Moreover, the production of uranium in Russia for manufacturing nuclear weapons was terminated long ago.

We attach great importance to the earliest possible start of disposition by Russia and the United States of 34 tons of weapon-grade plutonium for each side that is no longer required for defensive purposes. This would ensure the start of the process of irreversible transformation of excessive amounts of weapon-grade plutonium into forms unusable for manufacturing nuclear weapons.

The Russian Federation has consistently opposed placing any types of weapons in outer space. The emergence of weapons in space would not only expand the spheres of military competition, but bring it to a quantitatively new level, which is fraught with unpredictable consequences for the entire arms control process, strategic stability and international security as a whole. As a result, a new spiral of arms race will become possible in the space, as well as on the Earth, in both the nuclear and missile sphere and other spheres, that would give new momentum to the weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means proliferation process.
Mr. Chairman,

While we note the progress made in the nuclear disarmament and, accordingly, in the fulfillment of the obligations under Article VI of the Treaty, the Russian side believes that complete elimination of nuclear weapons can only be achieved through a gradual phased movement towards the ultimate goal on the basis of a comprehensive approach and with the participation of all nuclear powers and, certainly, in conditions of sustained strategic stability.