Statement by Mr. Febrian A. Ruddyard
Representative of the Indonesian Delegation
at the First Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review
Conference of the States Parties to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

on Cluster 2 issues

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Mr. Chairman,

My delegation would like to associate itself with the statement made by the Ambassador of Indonesia, on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement.

Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (NWFZ)

Mr. Chairman,

It is widely recognized that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free-zones (NWFZ) contributes to strengthening global disarmament and non-proliferation regime. NWFZ can also play an important role by fostering broader regional cooperation and promoting confidence building among states in the region. Therefore, we welcome the signing of the Central Asian NWFZ in Semipalatinsk last year as a positive step to achieving the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons. We also welcome the outcome of the Conference of States parties to NWFZ in Tlatelolco in 2005 as a basis for enhancing cooperation and coordination among the existing NWFZ.

In our region: Southeast Asia, the Bangkok Treaty, which establishes the Southeast Asia NWFZ (SEANWFZ), has not yet been supported by the NWS, since none of them have signed the Protocols pledging to respect the zone. This is largely the result of a dispute over the zone of application of the Treaty. We hope that countries in the region will continue their efforts to work with NWS to resolve pending issues to enable the SEANWFZ to be implemented as soon as possible.

Since the inception of the NPT, five NWFZs covering more than 100 countries have been established. However, regions where NWS exists or regions that borders NWS, such as South Asia, Northeast Asia, the Middle East, North America and Europe, have not concluded such zones. Among those regions, the Middle East requires the greatest and most immediate attention, taking into account the fact that ideas and measures have been put forward by countries of the region since more than 3 decades ago.
Members of existing NWFZ should be more active in promoting the establishment of new zones in the southern hemisphere, taking into account that NWFZ serve as an effective tool to fence off entire regions of the world from nuclear weapons. They also provide an effective means for preventing nuclear tests from being conducted in a region.

**Safeguards**

Mr. Chairman,

The Additional Protocol (AP) is an important tool to strengthen the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) as part of measures to monitor and verify compliance with the NPT. State's commitment to implementation of the CSA and AP would lead to transparency of their nuclear activities, which would contribute to regional peace and security, strengthen global nuclear non-proliferation regime and facilitate cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

We believe that these instruments constitute the centre-piece of the Agency's response in strengthening the safeguards system as a contribution to global non-proliferation objectives. They are especially needed to derive credible assurance regarding the non-diversion of nuclear materials and the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities. We strongly welcome the increasing application of Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, and in this regard calls upon States that have not yet done so, to conclude the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the Agency.

For our part, Indonesia has concluded the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA and is among the few states parties that have already put in place the IAEA integrated safeguards.

Mr. Chairman,

The Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference reaffirms that implementing the AP in combination with CSA provides 'a credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities'. Therefore, IAEA and states should consider ways to facilitate agreements and promote the universalization of the AP.

According to the data provided by the Agency, there are about 30 NNWS out of 188 states parties to the NPT that have not yet brought into force the CSA. Almost ten years after the adoption of the AP, 111 states have signed the Protocol, but only 78 have ratified it. In other words, less than half of the NPT States Parties who have committed themselves to the strengthened safeguards system have not brought the AP into force, including the two largest NWS.
Based on these facts, the rate of conclusion of the AP is rather slow, only about 7-8 states annually. Therefore, efforts should also be taken to promote the universalization of the AP, while in parallel pursuing the universalization of the CSA.

We note a number of proposals to promote universalization of the AP. Some countries propose to make the Protocol a mandatory component of Article III of NPT (Canada, Germany, UK and Australia). Some others are trying to make the Protocol a condition of supply for nuclear exports (NZ, Japan, Belgium, Netherlands, Norway and Austria).

We believe, that since the AP is voluntary in nature, international efforts towards achieving universality of the AP should not burden NNWS with more restrictions and should be undertaken not at the expense of IAEA’s work to promote international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Promoting universalization of the AP requires ‘leading by example’. Since the two largest NWS have not yet brought into force the Protocol, our efforts to further encourage states parties to the NPT to conclude and bring into force the AP would be limited. Building a stronger verification regime through the universalization of the AP, more importantly, should be applied equally, to both NWS and NNWS.

One practical measures to promote universalization of the AP is by making use of the informal mechanism of “Friends of the Additional Protocol”. Such mechanism could garner support to the AP through targeted consultations or submissions of proposals in relevant multilateral disarmament forums such as the First Committee of the UNGA and the NPT meetings to bring the issue to the forefront of international discourse.

Furthermore, States that shares the objectives of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation could work together in organizing outreach activities (such as seminars, workshops, and training courses), in coordination with the IAEA and in cooperation with the relevant regional organizations, to promote the Protocol at the bilateral and regional levels.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman