Mr. Chairman,

Long before its accession to the NPT, Brazil had decided that its national security, as well as international peace and security, should not be predicated on the acquisition of nuclear armament. In the sixties, Brazil was at the inception of the idea that would later come to life in the Tlatelolco Treaty, one year before the NPT, to make the Latin American and the Caribbean Region a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone. The new Constitution adopted in 1988 states that all nuclear activities shall only be admitted for peaceful purposes. In the early nineties, Brazil entered into a Quadripartite agreement with Argentina, the Brazil-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Material (ABACC) and the IAEA and placed all its nuclear facilities under comprehensive safeguards. Brazil decided to adhere to the NPT to act more effectively in favor of nuclear disarmament, and to join other Parties in their efforts to correct the Treaty’s imbalances.

Over the past few years, the international community has noticed a striking - and worrisome - development as regards disarmament and non-proliferation affairs. While a renewed emphasis has been put on
non-proliferation, less and less attention is paid to nuclear disarmament. And the achievements made in nuclear disarmament are not the result of multilaterally negotiated, irreversible and verifiable agreements, and thus can easily be rolled back. Verification exclusively by the involved parties themselves is not enough to establish international confidence. External verification based on multilaterally agreed mechanisms is also necessary.

The successful outcome of the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences generated the expectation of progress in the implementation of all aspects of the Treaty's obligations. In 1995, the NPT was extended indefinitely and decisions were adopted to strengthen the review process and to set principles and objectives for non-proliferation and disarmament. Five years later, the "unequivocal undertaking" made by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals and implement the "13 agreed steps" toward this end was hailed as an important outcome.

The fulfillment of the 13 steps on nuclear disarmament agreed during the 2000 Review Conference has been significantly challenged by action and omission, and various reservations and selective interpretation by nuclear weapon States. Disregard for the provisions of Article VI may ultimately affect the fundamental bargain on which the Treaty's legitimacy rests.

The whole edifice of disarmament and non-proliferation has been undermined by the emergence of new strategic and military doctrines based on the development of new nuclear weapons and on the possibility of the use of such weapons on a pre-emptive basis, even against non-nuclear-weapon states. These strategic and military
doctrines have the practical effect of giving nuclear weapons a lifespan well into any foreseeable future. This in our view is in stark contradiction with the letter and spirit of the NPT.

The international community should resist attempts to downgrade the degree of commitment to the 13 steps. This preparatory process for the 2010 Review Conference provides the Parties with the opportunity to test the willingness and good faith of all States Parties to live up to their commitments and to the fulfillment of the expectations they have generated.

Having listened to the interventions of nuclear-weapon States during this PrepCom, Brazil considers it would be useful if the Secretariat, based on the information available, put together a comparative table of the measures undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States to comply with obligations under article VI. This would provide States Parties with the means for a better evaluation of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament. Such a table, or comparative chart, could then be used at the NPT Review Conference in 2010.

Brazil is encouraged by having listened to several NPT Member States, including some nuclear-weapon States, refer to the importance of the entering into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Brazil hopes this almost unanimous perception will encourage countries that have not ratified the CTBT to do so as soon as possible.