New Agenda Coalition substantive recommendations to the
third session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2005 NPT
Review Conference

The 2000 Final Document of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons mandated the third session of the Preparatory Committee of the 2005 Review Conference to take into account the deliberations and results of its previous sessions and made every effort to produce a consensus report containing recommendations to the Review Conference. In this regard, building upon the working papers presented during the first and second sessions of the Preparatory Committee, namely:

- NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/9
- NPT/CONF.2005/PC.I/11
- NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/16

the New Agenda Coalition presents its substantive inputs to be considered by the Preparatory Committee as recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference.

1. To reaffirm that any possibility that nuclear weapons could be used represents a continued risk for humanity.

2. To agree that the full and effective implementation of the Treaty has a vital role in promoting international peace and security.

3. To recall that each article of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is binding on the States Parties at all times and in all circumstances and that it is imperative that all States be held fully accountable with respect to the strict compliance with their obligations under the Treaty.

4. To reaffirm that every effort should be made to implement the Treaty in all its aspects and to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, without hampering the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by States Parties to the Treaty.

5. To agree to pursue, with determination, the full and effective implementation of the agreements reached in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, the outcome of which provides the requisite plan
to achieve nuclear disarmament, and of the 1995 Decision on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.

6. To call on all States to refrain from any action that could lead to a new nuclear arms race or that could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

7. To agree that the fundamental principles of transparency, verification and irreversibility be applied to all nuclear disarmament measures.

8. To call on all States Parties to work actively towards the universal adherence to the Treaty and not to take any action that would undermine in any way the determination to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

9. To call upon those three States, India, Israel and Pakistan, which are not yet parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and which operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear weapon States promptly and without condition, to bring into force the required comprehensive safeguards agreements, together with additional protocols, consistent with the Model Protocol Additional to the Agreement(s) between States and the IAEA for the Application of Safeguards approved by the Board of Governors of the IAEA on 15 May 1997, for ensuring nuclear non-proliferation and to reverse clearly and urgently any policies to pursue any nuclear weapons development or deployment, and to refrain from any action that could undermine regional and international peace and security and the efforts of the international community towards nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation.

10. To agree that universal adherence to the Treaty, and full compliance of all Parties with all its articles, are the best way to prevent the proliferation in all its aspects of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices.

11. To stress the importance of reversing the announcement by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's of its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to call on it to return to full compliance with the Treaty, and in this connection to support all diplomatic efforts for an early resolution of the situation and for the establishment of a nuclear weapons free Korean peninsula.

12. To recall the importance of universal adherence to the full-scope safeguards agreements with the IAEA and to call upon those States that have not yet done so to conclude such agreements; to stress the importance of the Model Additional Protocol aimed at strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system.

13. To stress that the IAEA must be able to verify and ensure that nuclear facilities of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are being used for peaceful purposes only, and call on States to co-operate fully and immediately with the Agency in resolving issues arising from the implementation of their respective obligations towards it.

14. To call upon the nuclear-weapon States to implement the commitments made in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as in other nuclear disarmament or reductions agreements or initiatives, and in this context uphold to their commitments to irreversibility by destroying their nuclear warheads and avoid keeping them in a state that lends itself to their possible redeployment, and by closing and dismantling their nuclear test sites.
15. To recall the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination leading to nuclear disarmament.

16. To reiterate that all States Parties must pursue, with determination, the full and effective implementation of the practical steps agreed at the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

17. To affirm that a nuclear-weapon-free world will ultimately require the underpinning of a universal and multilaterally negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually reinforcing set of instruments.

18. To agree on the importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications required to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as an essential element of Nuclear Disarmament and the Non-Proliferation regime.

19. To call for the upholding and maintenance of the moratorium on nuclear weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

20. To welcome the important contribution to maintaining the momentum towards early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty through the work carried out by the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in building the verification regime.

21. To recall that the Conference on Disarmament is the sole multilateral negotiating body on disarmament.

22. To agree that the Conference on Disarmament should establish, without delay, an appropriate subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament. Such a body could inter alia deal with the practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament.

23. To agree that the Conference on Disarmament would resume negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives.

24. Pending the conclusions of such negotiations, to call for the upholding and maintenance of a moratorium on fissile material production for military purposes, and the establishment of a regime for transparency and accountability and an appropriate experts group.

25. To agree that the Conference on Disarmament should establish a subsidiary body to deal with the prevention of an arms race in outer space that could identify and examine without limitation any specific topics of proposals, including the possibility of negotiating a relevant international legal instrument.

26. To express concern that the development of missile defences could impact negatively on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation and lead to a new arms race on earth and in outer space.

27. To call upon all States to fulfil their obligations under international treaties and international law in the field of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.
28. To call upon the Russian Federation and the United States of America to approach the IAEA to carry out promptly the verification requirements for the implementation of the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement.

29. To reiterate the continued need and importance for further efforts by nuclear-weapon States:
   • to effectively reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally, and
   • to formalize their unilateral declarations into legal instruments including provisions ensuring transparency, verification and irreversibility.

30. To acknowledge that the reductions in the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads envisaged by the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions ("the Moscow Treaty") represent a positive first step, and call on the United States of America and the Russian Federation to make the Treaty transparent, verifiable and irreversible and to address non-operational warheads, thus making it an effective nuclear disarmament measure.

31. To agree that nuclear-weapon States take further action towards increasing their transparency and accountability with regard to their nuclear weapons arsenals and their implementation of disarmament measures and in this context to recall the obligation to report as agreed in step 12.

32. To agree that the further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be accorded a higher priority as an important step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons and be carried out in a comprehensive manner, including:

   (a) Further reductions in and elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear-arms reduction and disarmament process;

   (b) The implementation of reductions in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner;

   (c) The preservation, reaffirmation and implementation of the 1991 and 1992 presidential nuclear initiatives of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics/Russian Federation on non-strategic nuclear weapons;

   (d) The formalization by the Russian Federation and the United States of America of their presidential nuclear initiatives into legal instruments and the initiation of negotiations on further reductions of such weapons;

   (e) The enhancement of special security and physical protection measures for the transport and storage of non-strategic nuclear weapons, their components and related materials through, inter alia, the placing of such weapons in physically secure central storage sites with a view to their removal and subsequent elimination by the nuclear-weapon States as a part of the nuclear disarmament process in which they are committed under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as well as the necessary steps to be taken by all nuclear-weapon States in possession of such weapons in this regard;

   (f) The achievement of further confidence-building and transparency measures to reduce the threats posed by non-strategic nuclear weapons;

   (g) The achievement of concrete agreed measures to reduce further the operational status of non-strategic nuclear weapons systems so as to reduce the risk of use of non-strategic nuclear weapons;

   (h) The undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States that possess these weapons not to increase the number of types of weapons deployed and not to develop new types of these weapons or refinements for their use;
The prohibition of those types of non-strategic nuclear weapons that have already been removed from the arsenals of some nuclear-weapon States and the development of transparency mechanisms for the verification of the elimination of these weapons.

33. To agree that the nuclear-weapon States take further measures to deactivate and dis-activate nuclear weapons systems, to remove nuclear warheads from delivery vehicles, and to withdraw nuclear forces from active deployment pending the total elimination of these weapons.

34. To agree that the nuclear-weapon States diminish the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies, reduce the number of nuclear weapons deployed, and not develop new types of nuclear weapons or rationalizations for their use.

35. To underline that nuclear-weapon States must undertake the necessary steps towards the seamless integration of at least five nuclear-weapon States into a process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

36. To stress the need for all five nuclear-weapon States to make arrangements for the placing of their hostile material on long-term storage for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and to make arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes in order to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.

37. To stress the importance of regular reporting in promoting confidence in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

38. To agree that regular reports by all States Parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 decision be presented to each session of the Preparatory Committee and to the Review Conference and to address policies, intentions and developments. These reports should cover issues and principles addressed by the thirteen steps and include specific and complete information on each of these steps.

39. To call upon the nuclear-weapon States to respect fully their existing commitments with regard to security assurances pending the conclusion of multilaterally negotiated legally binding security assurances for all non-nuclear-weapon States Parties, which could either be in the format of a separate agreement reached in the context of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or as a protocol to the Treaty.

40. To reaffirm that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones enhances global and regional peace and security, strengthens the nuclear non-proliferation regime and contributes towards the objective of nuclear disarmament, and that in this context urges all concerned States to complete the necessary signatures and ratifications for the entry into force of the Treaties establishing Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones and their Protocols without conditions.

41. To recall the resolution on the Middle East as an integral part of the outcomes of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to renew its support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, and in this regard, to note that all States of the region with the exception of Israel are States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to call upon Israel to accede to the Treaty promptly and unconditionally and to place all of its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.
42. To welcome Iran's signing of the Additional Protocol and to urge it to promptly complete the process of ratification, and to call upon it to resolve the outstanding questions regarding its nuclear programme.

43. To welcome Libya's voluntary decision to abandon its programmes for developing weapons of mass destruction and cooperate fully with the IAEA and other relevant international organizations. Recognizing this as a step forward, while remaining concerned at the development of such programmes.

44. To renew also its support for the establishment of nuclear weapons free zones in Central Asia and South Asia and in this context, urgently to call on India and Pakistan to pull back from their aspirations to nuclear weapons and to accede to the Treaty promptly and without conditions.