Statement
by
U Kyaw Tin
Member of the Myanmar Delegation
on
Cluster I
Security Assurances

Third Session of the Preparatory Committee
for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons

New York: April 30, 2004
Mr. Chairman,

I would like to focus my intervention on the important issue of security assurances for non-nuclear weapon states -- an issue widely recognized as a key to strengthening the NPT.

It is our firm belief that the most effective guarantee against the use or threat of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament under effective international control. However, due to lack of progress in implementation of the obligations and commitments on the part of nuclear weapon States towards nuclear disarmament, we are still very far from reaching this ultimate goal of total elimination of nuclear weapons.

In view of this and also in light of recent developments, the negative security assurance has assumed greater importance and more urgency than ever before. Had there been political will, the goal of security assurance, in our view, is attainable.

At this current session, it is regrettable that this importance issue of security assurances has not been given enough attention it deserves, and the proposal made by the Non-Aligned Movement to allocate specific time for this issue at this Session was not taken on board. My delegation takes the position that this in no way compromise the importance of the question of security assurances and should not prejudice on this PrepCom's decision on the proposal for establishment of a subsidiary body under Main Committee I at the 2005 Review Conference.

Mr. Chairman,

It is the legitimate common concern of all the NNWS that in conjunction with their adherence to the NPT, further appropriate measures should be undertaken to safeguard their security. To address this concern, further
concrete steps should be taken urgently for the non-nuclear weapon States party to the Treaty to obtain assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

In this regard, we are strongly in favour of the evolvement of a legally-binding international instrument on security assurances. We are, however, open to other forms of security assurances such as a political declaration or declarations by the nuclear weapons states (NWS).

The Preparatory Committee already has before it a number of working papers, which my delegation hopes will serve as useful resource papers for further discussions on formulation of a legally-binding international instrument.

Mr. Chairman,

In our efforts for arriving at a common formula for legally binding security assurances by the NWS, we strongly favour the "unconditional negative security assurances". To-date, the only nuclear weapon state that has provided unconditional negative security assurances is the People's Republic of China. We urge other nuclear weapon States to follow suit and to provide unconditional negative security assurances to the NNWS.

Mr. Chairman

We have also noted the positions of some nuclear weapon States that favour using nuclear weapons to deter attacks with biological and chemical weapons. We do not believe that this kind of cross deterrence will work.

However, we recognize that there is a certain interrelationship among weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and that bans on biological and chemical weapons and the restrictions on the use of nuclear weapons can be mutually reinforcing.

In this context, we believe that the reaffirmation of the commitment by the States Parties not to develop, produce, stockpile and use biological and chemical weapons can serve as a confidence-building measure and could be helpful in our endeavours to arrive at some form of security assurances by nuclear weapon States not to use or threat to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States. It may, therefore, be useful to reflect somehow such a reaffirmation of the commitment by the States Parties in an Instrument on security assurances.