Implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty

Report submitted by Canada

Article I:

1. Canada continues to call upon nuclear-weapon States not to provide assistance or encouragement to States who may seek to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Canada is also concerned about the proliferation of, inter alia, nuclear weapons to non-state actors. Canada worked with its G8 partners to develop and promote the Principles to prevent terrorists, or those that harbour them, from gaining access to weapons or materials of mass destruction, which were issued as part of the Global Partnership initiative at the June 2002 Kananaskis Summit. In December 2002, Canada, acting on behalf of the G8, formally disseminated these Principles through Permanent Missions to the United Nations in New York.

Article II:

2. Canada continues to abide by its NPT commitment not to receive the transfer of, receive control over, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or a nuclear explosive capability. This commitment is implemented domestically through Canada’s 1997 Nuclear Safety and Control Act.

Article III:

3. Pursuant to Article III, Canada has in place a safeguards agreement with the IAEA for the application of safeguards in connection with the NPT. The IAEA has provided annually a positive assessment of safeguards implementation in Canada pursuant to this agreement. In support of IAEA efforts to strengthen safeguards and recognizing the “symbiotic relationship” between NPT safeguards agreements and the model Additional Protocol to those agreements, Canada concluded a Protocol additional to its safeguards agreement. The Protocol entered into force on 8 September 2000. Canada continues to cooperate with the IAEA with regards to the Protocol’s implementation. Canada participated in the IAEA regional meeting on the implementation of the Additional Protocol in Tokyo in December 2002. Canada continues to urge states which have yet to bring into force comprehensive safeguards agreements to do so and continues to call upon states to bring into force protocols additional to their safeguards agreements.
4. Consonant with its obligation not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes unless the source or special fissionable material is subject to IAEA safeguards, and with Decision 2, Paragraph 12 of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, Canada will only authorize nuclear cooperation with those non-nuclear-weapon States which have made an internationally legally-binding commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and have accepted IAEA safeguards on the full scope of their nuclear activities. This policy has been in place since 1976. With a view to effectively implementing the requirements of paragraph 2 of this Article, Canada maintains a national system for controlling, inter alia, the export of source or special fissionable material and equipment or material especially or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material. In this regard, Canada amended in April 2002 its Export Control List to include new catch-all provisions. Canada’s national system also reflects multilaterally agreed lists of nuclear items and nuclear-related dual-use items. All these measures serve to facilitate Canada’s peaceful nuclear commerce and international cooperation without contributing to proliferation.

Article IV:

5. Canada continues to support strongly the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this regard, Canada maintains a robust nuclear power program and uranium industry and is a world leader in the production of radioisotopes for medical and industrial applications. Canada has Nuclear Cooperation Agreements in force covering 38 countries, both developed and developing, to provide a framework for the fullest possible exchange of nuclear and other material, equipment and technology.

Article V:

6. The Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference affirms that provisions of this article are to be interpreted in the light of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Canada signed the CTBT on 24 September 1996 when it opened for signature and deposited its instrument of ratification on 18 December 1998. Canada continues to encourage all states that have not yet done so to ratify the CTBT, particularly the states listed in Annex 2. Canada was a co-signatory of the Joint Ministerial Statement of Support for the CTBT, initiated by Australia, Japan and the Netherlands, at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2002. Canada is actively involved in preparations for the 3-5 September 2003 Third Conference to Facilitate the Entry into Force of the CTBT, and on 3 April 2003 sponsored a presentation for all delegations based in Vienna intended to stimulate thinking about the Treaty in advance of the Conference. Canada continues to call on nuclear-weapon States that have not ratified the CTBT to continue their testing moratoria. Canada places a priority on the establishment of the Treaty’s verification system and, as such, is a leader among member states in contributing resources, equipment and expertise to the development of the CTBT’s international monitoring system (IMS). Most recently, two primary seismic monitoring facilities, in Lac du Bonnet (PS08) and Shefferville (PS10) were formally certified by the PTS in February 2003, and the construction of a radionuclide station (RN16) in Yellowknife was completed in March 2003.

Article VI:
7. Canada’s objective has been and remains the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Canada expects the nuclear-weapon States to engage actively on this issue and to make further progress to reduce and to eliminate nuclear weapons. All members of the international community have a deep and abiding stake in this process. Canada believes that every State Party to the NPT has an interest and a responsibility to encourage the fulfilment of Article VI and it supports the 13 Practical Steps towards Nuclear Disarmament that were agreed to at the 2000 Review Conference. Canada has formally welcomed the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, or “Treaty of Moscow”, signed by the Russian Federation and the United States in May 2002, and looks forward to the Treaty’s ratification by the Russian Federation and entry into force. Canada continues to believe that codification, verifiability, transparency and irreversibility are necessary to mark progress in the reduction of nuclear arsenals.

8. Canada believes that progress in reducing strategic nuclear weapons alone is not sufficient. At the 57th session of the United Nations General Assembly Canada voted in favour of Resolution 57/59 (Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda), which included its comprehensive approach the subject of non-strategic nuclear weapons. Canada considers it most productive, however, to focus on detailed technical aspects of this issue for the present, in the fora currently appropriate for such discussions. For this reason, Canada abstained on Resolution 57/58 (Reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons).

9. Canada supports the reduced salience of nuclear weapons and the significant reduction of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces, both conventional and nuclear, that has taken place since the end of the Cold War. Canada, as a member of NATO, continues to advocate that the Alliance play a positive role in advancing disarmament objectives, through a continuous step-by-step approach.

10. During the 57th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, Canada again tabled a resolution calling for negotiations within the CD on a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT); this resolution received a larger number of co-sponsors, from all groups, and was again adopted by consensus. Pending conclusion of an FMCT, Canada has urged nuclear-weapon States to affirm or reaffirm, as the case may be, their commitment to forever cease production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

11. G8 leadership relating to the management and disposition of weapon-grade plutonium designated as no longer required for defence purposes began at the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit in 1996. Coupled with the signature by the United States and Russia, in 2000, of a bilateral agreement in which each country undertook to dispose of 34 metric tonnes of such plutonium, this has brought the initiative to a point where it is nearing implementation. Canada strongly supports Russia’s plutonium disposition program and intends to make a significant financial contribution to the initiative. At the G8 Foreign Ministers Meeting in Whistler, an ambitious goal of 2003 was set for the completion of negotiations for a multilateral framework for Russia’s plutonium disposition program. Canada is committed to working with others to conclude the agreement expeditiously. A key priority under the G8 Global Partnership launched in Kananaskis, this important nuclear disarmament activity will contribute significantly to international security and strategic stability and also reduce the risk of thefts of plutonium by terrorists.

12. In the interests of general and complete disarmament, Canada is also a State Party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Ottawa Convention banning anti-personnel mines, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, Open
Skies, the Treaty on Certain Conventional Weapons and the Treaty on Outer Space. Canada has provided financial support to mine clearance and related activities in over 25 states, as well as to small arms and light weapons disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, collection and destruction in Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe, Africa and Asia. In November 2002, it signed the Canada-Russian Federation Agreement on Chemical Weapons Destruction to provide $5 million to aid Russia in destroying its stockpile of chemical weapons. Furthermore, under the scope of the G8 Global Partnership, Canada will contribute up to $1 billion over the next ten years to non-proliferation, disarmament, counter terrorism and nuclear safety cooperation projects in Russia and certain other newly-independent states. The priority projects specifically identified within this auspices include: destruction of chemical weapons, dismantlement of nuclear submarines, disposition of fissile materials and employment of former weapon scientists.

**Article VII:**

13. While not itself a member of a nuclear weapon free zone, Canada welcomes and encourages progress to develop and implement nuclear weapon free zone agreements consistent with international law and internationally-agreed criteria. At the 57th session of the United Nations General Assembly, Canada supported resolutions establishing or consolidating nuclear weapon free zones.

**Article VIII:**

14. The NPT indefinite extension and accompanying decisions, adopted in 1995, included a commitment to a Strengthened Treaty Review Process. In this regard, Canadian priorities for the NPT in both the short and the long term focus on enhancing the permanence and the accountability of the Treaty. In this spirit, Canada delivered at the First Preparatory Committee meeting of the 2005 review cycle its first report on its implementation of the Treaty. As well, it presented a working paper exploring factors that could be taken into consideration in developing a common understanding of the reporting requirements agreed at the NPT 2000 Review Conference. Canada held open-ended informal consultations on the issue of reporting over the past year and will submit to the Second Preparatory Committee meeting a working paper on the results. Canada continues to encourage States Parties to explore the issue with the goal of a decision being reached at the 2005 Review Conference.

**Article IX:**

15. Canada has formally welcomed Cuba’s accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state, as well as to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. At the 57th session of the United Nations General Assembly, Canada called on India, Israel and Pakistan, still outside the NPT, to join as non-nuclear-weapon States. Canada condemned the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in May 1998, and has formally expressed its regret over ballistic missile tests carried out by each country. Canada regards Indian and Pakistani nuclear proliferation, and their claims to be nuclear-weapon States, as new and significant threats to international peace and security. Canada therefore supports Security Council resolution 1172 and its requirement that India and Pakistan renounce their nuclear weapons programmes. Canada recalls and supports fully the May 2000 Review Conference Final Document declaration that the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests “do not in any way confer a nuclear-weapon State status or any special status whatsoever.” In an effort to diminish tensions in South Asia and hence reduce the risk of the
use of nuclear weapons, Canada supports initiatives aimed at fostering confidence building measures in the region.

16. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been in chronic non-compliance with its NPT Safeguards Agreement. Canada has introduced resolutions at the annual IAEA General Conference seeking to promote the implementation of safeguards in the DPRK, and played a prominent role in the November 2002 and January 2003 resolutions of the IAEA Board of Governors on this subject, which were adopted without a vote.

**Article X:**

17. On 10 January, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT. Canada has deplored this development and urged Pyongyang to reverse its decision and comply fully with all its nuclear non-proliferation obligations, including its safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

18. Canada welcomed the 1995 indefinite extension of this Treaty, adopted without a vote in 1995 by 175 countries. Negative security assurances provided in 1995 by the five nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT, in United Nations Security Council resolution 984, furnished part of the basis for this indefinite extension, as paragraph 8 of the “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”. Canada continues to underline the need to preserve and respect the negative security assurances provided by nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to this Treaty.

**Article XI: N/A**

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