Implementation of Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and of paragraph 4(c) of the 1995 Decision on the “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” as well as on the 13 practical steps of the 2000 Final Document

Report submitted by Belgium

Step 1: the CTBT

1. Belgium ratified the CTBT on 29 June 1999 and actively supports the work of the CTBTO Prepcom in Vienna in implementing the Treaty’s verification mechanism. Belgium believes that the practical setting up of this mechanism will enhance the credibility of the Treaty. Belgium considers the early entry into force of the CTBT of the utmost importance and calls on all States that have not yet done so to sign and/or ratify the Treaty. Belgium, both in its national capacity as in the framework of the European Union, has undertaken multiple diplomatic demarches in non-signatory and non-ratifying countries. Belgium also participates in the article XIV Conferences. It encourages all States to maximize the effects of these conferences.

Step 2: Moratorium on tests

2. Belgium calls on all Nuclear Weapon States to abide by a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosion and to refrain from any actions, which are contrary to the obligations and provisions of the CTBT. Pending the entry into force of the CTBT, this test moratorium offers an important contribution to international peace and security. While the ultimate goal is and should be the entry into force of the CTBT, the maintenance and possible reinforcement of a test moratorium is advocated by Belgium in the context of the general promotion of the CTBT.

Step 3: FMCT-negotiations

3. Belgium reiterates that the immediate commencement of negotiations and the conclusion of a FMCT was the only topic at the 2000 NPT Review Conference that was given a specific timeframe, thereby indicating that the States parties to the NPT attach great importance to this issue. FMCT constitutes the next logical step in multilateral nuclear non-proliferation. Further delay in commencing its negotiation would run counter the agenda that we have set ourselves and risks undermining the credibility of the NPT States parties. Belgium believes that it is
possible to break the deadlock at the Conference on Disarmament and is actively exploring every possible avenue. Together with other interested States, Belgium has launched the Initiative of the Five Ambassadors, which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices.

Step 4: Nuclear disarmament in the CD

4. Belgium has worked actively with partners in the CD on a work programme that would also include the establishment, without further delay, of an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Initiative of the Five Ambassadors, introduced by Belgium together with other interested States, recognizes that this issue should be dealt with as a matter of urgency.

Step 5: Irreversibility

5. Belgium strongly believes that irreversibility adds a vital element to any arms control agreement by enhancing predictability and thus promoting international stability. It is crucial that the arms control achievements are firmly upheld so that they can become building blocks in a general process of mutually reinforcing agreements. Belgium encourages all Nuclear Weapon States to adequately reflect the principle of irreversibility in their bilateral nuclear arms reduction agreements. Belgium particularly welcomes those agreements that are laid down in legally binding documents, thereby underscoring the irreversibility of the agreed reductions.

Step 6: Nuclear Disarmament

6. Belgium, as a Non Nuclear Weapon State, continues to encourage all Nuclear Weapon States to make further progress in their systematic and progressive efforts towards nuclear disarmament and remains fully committed to the implementation of Art VI of the NPT and of the 1995 decisions and the 2000 Final Document.

Step 7: START and ABM

7. Since Belgium considers irreversibility and predictability to be vital elements of any arms control agreement, we strongly encourage the Russian Federation and the United States of America to further develop their bilateral strategic nuclear reductions and strategic relations in ways that are most conducive to international stability. In this context, Belgium also promotes adequate verification and transparency measures.

Step 9: Steps by the Nuclear Weapon States

8. Belgium, as a Non Nuclear Weapon State, would like to comment on two elements that it deems to be of special relevance: transparency and Non Strategic Nuclear Weapons. At the 2000 NPT Review Conference, Belgium, together with Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway, introduced proposals to increase transparency with regard to nuclear arsenals. Belgium would welcome a commitment by all Nuclear Weapon States to provide periodically the aggregate number of warheads, delivery systems, stocks of fissile material for military purposes in their possession and their nuclear policies. While some Nuclear Weapon States
already allow for a good degree of transparency, others are encouraged to become more transparent on their nuclear arsenals. Also Non Nuclear Weapon States can contribute to transparency at their level by concluding Additional Safeguards with the IAEA. Belgium ratified its Additional Protocol in December 2002.

9. Belgium considers the further reduction and ultimate elimination of Non Strategic Nuclear Weapons, as called for in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process. Belgium would like to recall that NATO has significantly reduced the numbers as well as the degree of readiness of Non Strategic Nuclear Weapons, whose purpose is fundamentally political, in its arsenal since the end of the Cold War. Belgium continues to attach special attention to the process of reductions of Non Strategic Nuclear Weapons, which should be based on transparency and irreversibility.

**Step 11: General and complete disarmament**

10. Belgium actively contributes to the multilateral negotiations on disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation. Special attention is given to the ban on antipersonnel mines: Belgium assumed the presidency of the fourth States parties Conference of the Ottawa Convention. Belgium also follows the issues of chemical weapons, biological weapons, certain conventional weapons, ballistic missiles and small arms and light weapons.

**Step 12: Reporting**

11. Belgium believes that regular reporting by all States on the implementation of Art. VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament” can contribute to mutual understanding. Belgium encourages all States to actively use the meetings of the NPT process to exchange such reports.

**Step 13: Further development of verification**

12. Belgium has repeatedly underlined the importance of full compliance with the NPT provisions. This implies that effective verification capabilities would be developed which could give credible assurances that all States respect the commitments freely entered into under the NPT. Verification is a condition sine qua non for lasting credibility of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.