Preservation of the integrity of the NPT-regime

The States Parties to the NPT reaffirm the vital role the treaty has to play in promoting international peace and security and underline the importance of full compliance with all its terms. Every effort should be made to implement the treaty in all its aspects.

Recent challenges to the treaty and the non-proliferation regime have underlined the importance of actively working towards universal adherence and full compliance with the treaty’s provisions. A strong commitment by all parties to the goals set out in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference can contribute to ensuring the continued vitality of the treaty.

Universal adherence to the NPT is a core objective. Our countries stress the importance of the request by the States Parties to the President of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, to convey formally the views of the States Parties on the necessity of universal adherence to the treaty to all non-States Parties, and to report their responses to the States Parties. We deem such efforts to be a valuable contribution to enhancing the universal adherence to the treaty.

Strengthened Safeguards

We stress the obligation for the non-nuclear weapon states to conclude safeguards agreements in accordance with article II of the Treaty. In this context, we would like to emphasize that we consider the Comprehensive Safeguard Agreements (INFCIRC/153) combined with the Additional Protocols (INFCIRC/548), to be the new verification standard. We strongly urge all States Parties to conclude and implement such a protocol without delay, thereby enhancing confidence in compliance.

Accountability and transparency

We confirm the importance of measures aimed at increasing accountability and transparency with regard to nuclear arsenals. In addition to the transparency measures already agreed to in the 2000 Final Document, we urge the nuclear-weapon States to commit themselves to provide periodically the aggregated number of warheads, delivery
system, and stocks of fissile materials for explosive purposes in their possession. The nuclear-weapon States should provide this information in the form of regular reports under step 12 (Article VI, paragraph 15) of the 2000 Final Document.

To enhance regular reporting by all States Parties on the implementation of article VI and paragraph 1 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”, we emphasize the necessity for States Parties to report to each session of the Preparatory Committee and to the Review Conference.

**Fissile material**

A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) constitutes the next logical step on the multilateral nuclear arms control agenda. Having recognized the necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices (FMCT), we call upon the immediate commencement of these negotiations, without any further delay and with a view to their conclusion within five years.

Pending the entry-into-force of such a treaty, we call upon all nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so, to declare a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices and to take transparency measures related to production and stocks. Such steps could include verification activities at less sensitive facilities to gain verification experience, to ease the implementation of the treaty and to confirm production moratoria. These steps would undoubtedly be conducive to preparing the ground for expedient negotiations on an FMCT and would, in its own right, be a useful interim contribution to nuclear non-proliferation.

We furthermore urge all nuclear-weapon States to conclude and to implement arrangements to place their fissile material, designated as no longer required for military purposes, under the IAEA verification regime. In particular, we call upon the early completion of the Triilateral Initiative between the Russian Federation, the United States and the IAEA. We furthermore encourage other nuclear-weapon capable States to enter into such arrangements, as an important step in the direction of international control of excessive stocks of fissile materials and deeper multilateral reductions of nuclear arsenals.

To ensure that excess stocks of fissile material remain outside the military nuclear cycle, the principle of irreversibility should prevail. In this respect, we consider IAEA monitoring a necessary and practical implementation of this advancing and highly important principle in nuclear arms control. Trial visits and inspections could be considered as confidence building measures.

Co-operative threat reduction programs have proven to be an effective tool for reducing post-Cold War nuclear threats and pre-empting new ones. We encourage the exploration of ways to expand such co-operation for the secure handling and control of nuclear material with a wider international participation.
Strict compliance with non-proliferation obligations will also help to prevent possible terrorist use of fissile material. Noting the IAEA Plan of Action, we urge States Parties to support the additional measures proposed therein. In this respect, we particularly underline the importance of:

- strengthening, effective implementation and consequent enforcement of national export controls, and the application of the principle of full-scope safeguards as a condition of supply, when considering exporting sensitive nuclear-related materials, equipment and technologies;
- international coordination of national export policies and the need for all States parties to follow the understandings of the Zangger Committee and guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, when considering exporting sensitive nuclear related materials, equipment and technologies;
- the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the review aimed at the strengthening thereof and we call upon all states that have not yet done so to accede to the convention.

**Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)**

Our countries consider the early entry-into-force of the CTBT of the utmost importance. We therefore urge all States Parties that have not yet done so, to sign and ratify this treaty, without delay and without conditions. A special responsibility in this endeavor lies in the nuclear-weapon States. Pending the entry-into-force of the CTBT, we call upon all States with nuclear capabilities to abide by a moratorium on nuclear-weapons-test explosions or any other nuclear explosion, of which the importance is confirmed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference.

**Negative security assurances**

We are convinced that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to non-nuclear-weapon States would strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Our countries stress the continuing value of the existing regime of security assurances. Welcoming the reconfirmation by the nuclear-weapon States of their security assurances, we call upon the nuclear-weapon States to abide by these security assurances pending legally binding assurances. Furthermore, as agreed in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, our countries call upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference on this issue.

**Non-strategic nuclear weapons**

The further reduction and ultimate elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons, as called for in the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, constitutes an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process. We call upon all nuclear-weapon States to include the reduction and ultimate elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons in the overall nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process. In this regard we recall that since the end of the Cold War, NATO has significantly reduced the numbers of non-strategic nuclear weapons in its arsenals.

We furthermore encourage the Russian Federation and the United States to fully implement the unilateral reductions already announced in the Presidential Initiatives of
1991/1992 in a transparent, accountable, verifiable and irreversible manner. We call upon the Russian Federation and the United States to report regularly on the implementation of these Presidential Initiatives and to gradually and timely codify these Presidential Initiatives, including appropriate verification measures.

Nuclear Disarmament

We consider the unequivocal undertaking by the Nuclear Weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States Parties are committed under Article VI, as one of the major achievements of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. In this respect irreversibility is a core principle.

While welcoming the steps the Nuclear Weapon States have taken so far to reduce their nuclear arsenals (both by dismantling nuclear weapons as by destruction of fissile material and closing down production facilities), we encourage the Nuclear weapon States to continue their efforts in this respect.

We also encourage the establishment, without further delay, of an ad hoc committee in the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament.