NEW ZEALAND

2nd NPT PREPARATORY COMMITTEE

NEW AGENDA STATEMENT MADE ON BEHALF OF BRAZIL, EGYPT, IRELAND, MEXICO, SOUTH AFRICA, SWEDEN AND NEW ZEALAND BY THE HONORABLE MARIAN HOBBS, MINISTER OF DISARMAMENT OF NEW ZEALAND

28 APRIL 2003
NEW AGENDA STATEMENT FOR THE 2003 NPT PREPCOM MADE BY
THE HONOURABLE MARIAN HOBBS
MINISTER OF DISARMAMENT OF NEW ZEALAND ON BEHALF OF
BRAZIL, EGYPT, IRELAND, MEXICO, SOUTH AFRICA, SWEDEN AND
NEW ZEALAND.

1. I am pleased to take the floor on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition and the
Governments of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, South Africa, Sweden and New
Zealand. Let me begin by congratulating you, Ambassador Molnar, on your election to
the Chair of this important meeting. We wish you well as the review process takes a
further step towards the Review Conference in 2005.

2. And we look forward to building on the outcome of the first PrepCom, and its
Factual Summary. Mr Chairman, the very first sentence of that Summary notes that
States Parties reaffirmed that the NPT is the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation
regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. That
commitment should also be seen as a core principle of disarmament and non-
proliferation, with a view to maintaining universal norms and expanding their scope.
We owe it to future generations to honour the obligations laid out in the NPT Treaty.

3. Since the New York session last year there have been some positive
developments and also deeply troubling trends for the NPT regime. On the profit side
of the ledger we welcome the decision of Cuba to become a State Party to both the NPT
and the Tlatelolco Treaty. We recognise also the endeavours of the five central Asian
States to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in that region, as well as those efforts
undertaken within the League of Arab States with the aim of establishing a zone free
from all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

4. On the debit side of the ledger, however, trends have been dismal. Deeply
unsettling events in the Middle East and in Asia surely must serve as a spur to our
efforts to fully implement the NPT regime and to underscore emphatically the
significance for global stability of compliance with international obligations as well as
the universality of the Treaty. In this connection, we renew our support for the
establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons
of mass destruction. We note that all states of the region with the exception of Israel are
States Parties to the NPT and call upon Israel to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible
and to place all of its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards.

5. We also remain concerned at heightened tensions in the Asian region. In this
context, we renew our support for the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones in
Central Asia and South Asia, and we call on India and Pakistan to pull back from their
aspirations to nuclear weapons and to accede to the Treaty without condition.

6. Of particular concern has been the decision of the Democratic People’s Republic
of Korea to withdraw from the NPT and also its declared intention to restart the
Yongbyon nuclear reactor, without IAEA safeguards. Leaving aside the circumstances that led to these decisions, the implications are grave and affect us all. Like the rest of the international community, the New Agenda supports dialogue over confrontation. We hope for an early, peaceful resolution of the situation, leading to the DPRK’s return to full compliance with the Treaty’s terms and we call on the DPRK to reconsider its decisions.

A development over the past year that we take note of is the Moscow Treaty. We acknowledge that the Treaty is a positive step in defining the new relationship between the United States and the Russian Federation. We question however whether the legacy of the Cold War has really been left behind since the number of weapons on each side still amount to thousands. And we question the Treaty’s contribution to nuclear disarmament. The Treaty does not contain verification provisions and it ignores non-operational warheads. Reductions in the numbers of deployed strategic nuclear warheads are not a substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons. We call on the United States and the Russian Federation to make the Treaty of Moscow an irreversible and verifiable instrument of nuclear disarmament.

In general, the New Agenda Coalition’s concerns arise on several levels:

- at the level of international security, we believe that the responsibility of the NWS to lead by example is greater than ever. The fact that evolving security policies and defence doctrines continue to be based on the possession of nuclear weapons, indeed entailing possibly new designs and generations of such weapons as a counter to conventional warfare, can only further destabilise the global security environment and the NPT regime;

- at the level of implementation and fulfilment of the NPT, the Nuclear Weapon States must show strong leadership by fulfilling the obligations of the Treaty and their undertakings at the Review Conference in 2000. This is a vital step in order to preserve the credibility and sustainability of the NPT. We need constructive implementation of the 13 steps – the blueprint for achieving nuclear disarmament, not lip service to them; and

- at the level of this PrepCom, our sense is that this meeting has an acute responsibility to demonstrate to all States, whether or not they are party to the NPT, that the NPT regime remains the central element of international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts and that it is backed by a comprehensive and effective review process.

Immediately following the adoption of the report at the first PrepCom, the New Agenda Coalition made a short statement, which contained these points:

- the 1995 and 2000 Review Conference commitments constitute undertakings binding on all State Parties from which there can be no going back;
given the purposes of the first two sessions of the current review cycle, greater interaction will be required at this second PrepCom to accomplish the objectives of the strengthened review process and to consider principles, objectives and ways as was mandated by the Review Conference;

regular reporting will complement such interaction.

10 To these ends, the New Agenda Coalition will expand our efforts at this PrepCom. As already implied, we will be vigorously pursuing implementation of the 13 steps and Article VI of the Treaty. We will be putting forward concrete ideas to promote the agenda for nuclear disarmament and will be active on the issues of security assurances and tactical or non-strategic nuclear weapons. In addition, we will be promoting an interactive review process, especially through discussion of the contents of reports on the implementation of the NPT, particularly of Article VI of the Treaty.

11 As previously indicated in our statement, the New Agenda Coalition is of the view that the past year has been an auspicious one for the NPT in general and for the issue of nuclear disarmament in particular. The New Agenda addresses these issues in its updated position paper that will be tabled at this PrepCom. In this context we also believe that it has become necessary to provide greater definition to our views on tactical nuclear weapons. The focus of international nuclear arms control and disarmament efforts has traditionally been on strategic nuclear weapons. Non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons have been neglected. The New Agenda considers that the reduction and elimination of non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons in a transparent and irreversible manner constitutes an essential element in the framework of a complete nuclear disarmament process. The possession of non-strategic and tactical nuclear weapons poses real risks, which, we believe, require our collective attention for a number of reasons. For instance, the comparative portability of non-strategic weapons and the ability to station them in close proximity to areas of conflict makes them more susceptible to use in combat or theft.

12 We recall that at the 2000 Review Conference it was agreed that legally binding security assurances by the five nuclear weapon states to the non-nuclear weapon states parties to NPT would strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. That Conference called upon the Preparatory Committee to make recommendations on security assurances to the 2005 Review Conference. In this context, we will present a working paper at this PrepCom as well as a Draft Instrument on the Prohibition of the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons Against Non-Nuclear Weapons States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Pending the conclusion of the negotiations, the Nuclear Weapons States should fully respect their existing commitments in this regard.

13 Efforts were made in the first PrepCom to stimulate discussion, eg, through the NAC position paper, the German proposal on non-strategic weapons, and the Canadian proposal on elaborating the reporting format. However, these were only partially successful in sparking interaction on the floor of the Conference. At this session, we
will be seeking a more intensive debate, focussed mainly on the level of fulfilment of step number 12 on regular reporting and we hope that States Parties will comment upon the substantive contributions - the reports and the working papers - submitted at the first and during this PrepCom.

14 We reaffirm to delegations our attachment to such principles and elements as transparency and accountability, irreversibility, the bringing into force of the CTBT, diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies, overcoming the unacceptable paralysis of the Conference on Disarmament - the failure to establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament and to resume negotiations banning the production of fissile material - and universality of the NPT.

15 We remain gravely concerned by the continued retention of the nuclear weapons option by those three states, India, Israel and Pakistan, that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and have not acceded to the NPT, as well as their failure to renounce that option. In this regard, the international community must intensify its efforts to achieve universal adherence to the NPT without conditions and be vigilant against any steps that would undermine the credibility and sustainability of the Treaty.

16 A powerful symbol for demonstrating to the international public is the reach - and potential reach - of nuclear weapon free zones over the landmasses of the globe. There has been progress in the further development of nuclear-weapon-free zones in some regions, and, in particular, the movement towards freeing the Southern Hemisphere and the adjacent areas from such weapons. Following Cuba's accession to the Treaty of Tlatelolco the demilitarised regime in Latin America and the Caribbean is now complete. The ratification of the Treaties of Rarotonga, Bangkok, and Pelindaba by all States of the region, and all concerned States remains a matter of great importance. We should work together to encourage all relevant States that have not yet done so to sign on to the protocols of the nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties.

17 We believe that the recent international debate in the United Nations Security Council, including statements made by its Permanent Members, on weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, underlined international concerns about the legitimacy, possession and possible use of such weapons. These statements should provide further impetus to international efforts to de-legitimise all nuclear weapons and to hasten international efforts towards nuclear disarmament. These statements moreover underline our basic belief that the only real guarantee against the use of any weapons of mass destruction anywhere, including nuclear weapons, is their complete elimination and the assurance that they will never be used or produced again.

18 Mr Chairman, let me reiterate that the NPT process is the opportunity for States Parties to work together to address the threats posed by nuclear weapons. Multilateralism is the collective will of all countries to act together, and while that will can be undermined by those who choose not to fulfil their non-proliferation obligations it can equally be undermined by those under an obligation to disarm and to demonstrate
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leadership and progress but yet fail to do so and by those States that continue to remain outside the NPT.

19 Mr Chairman, to conclude, I would also like to take this opportunity to raise an issue that is much broader than nuclear disarmament, and one which is also of particular concern to me as Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control – the issue of disarmament education. More than ever, there is a pressing need to harness education to reinforce disarmament and non-proliferation norms and institutions. It is the responsibility of States parties, international organizations, and civil society to work together towards effective progress on this issue.