THE HOUSE IS ON FIRE, OR WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE ARCHITECT AND BUILDER PROVES TO BE AN ARSONIST AND THE FIREFIGHTERS ARE MISSING IN ACTION

Ray Acheson | Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

As anticipated, Iran announced on Wednesday that it will now take steps to halt compliance with elements of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in response to the United States’ withdrawal from the agreement, violation of UN Security Council resolution 2231, the imposition of unilateral sanctions, and increasing military pressure against Iran.

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said that rather than stop production altogether Iran “would hold on to stockpiles of excess uranium and heavy water used in its nuclear reactors,” since US actions meant Iran could no longer ship them out of the country, and he “set a 60-day deadline for new terms to the nuclear accord, after which Tehran would resume higher uranium enrichment.” Rouhani indicated that this new posture is intended to spur negotiations not confrontation. “We will not start breaching commitments and waging any war,” he said. “But we will not give in to bullying either.”

At the NPT, initial sentiment expressed by some delegations so far is that the PrepCom cannot demand full compliance of Iran with the JCPOA obligations without also calling on the US to come back to the agreement and end its economic pressure against Iran in violation of UN Security Council resolution 2231. When the Security Council will not enforce its own unanimous non-proliferation agreement resolutions, NPT states parties need to ask what this means for the future of NPT enforcement.

The failure of the other JCPOA parties to uphold the agreement by bypassing or countering US sanctions against Iran is an excellent case of crumbling multilateral disarmament and arms control architecture that many states parties have warned against during this PrepCom. “The value of all legally-binding instruments, including the NPT, lies in the certainty given their Parties as to what their rights are and what their obligations are,” warned Ambassador Dell Higgie of New Zealand on 2 May. “A treaty will come to have little value if its terms are re-interpreted, overlooked, or deferred.” This needs to be the foremost consideration in the minds of those reviewing these recommendations, but also when looking ahead to the 2020 Review Conference, to the implementation of the JCPOA, and when dealing with any other disarmament, arms control, or non-proliferation agreement that is currently at the peril of the flames of non-compliance and the hubris of power.

Next year, the NPT will celebrate its fiftieth anniversary. And while there is much to celebrate in terms of non-proliferation, 2020 also marks 50 years of failure to implement article VI, 25 years of failure to implement the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, 20 years of failure of fulfilling the unequivocal undertaking, and 10 years of failure of most of the 22 disarmament action points in the 2010 action plan. As is the US government’s suspension of the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and indications that it will not extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) with Russia. (Ironically, on Tuesday the United States said in the context of discussion of article X of the NPT that withdrawal from the Treaty should be discouraged...)

All of this, coupled with the decades-long failure all of the nuclear-armed states to comply with their “unequivocal undertaking” to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, is a good indication that the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime is on fire. (But don’t worry. The nuclear-armed states are going to
bring a “glossary of key nuclear terms” to the Review Conference."

The debate over the draft recommendations the past two days highlights this history of failure and the toll it has taken on states parties’ patience with the nuclear-armed states. It also reflects the continued pull away from agreed language and the addition of conditionalities, which some of the nuclear-armed states have been urging.

This pull back from past agreement is reflected in the language on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. Paragraph 13 of the draft text only suggests states parties “further consider the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any intentional or accidental nuclear explosion”. There has already been a lot of investigation and study on this question since 2010, none of which is reflected here even though it has been mentioned repeatedly in NPT meetings, working papers, and side events since then. Furthermore, the vast majority of states parties agree that humanitarian considerations already motivate their work for nuclear disarmament and should be at the forefront of discussions, regardless of their position on specific policies or approaches. Most have urged that the recommendations reaffirm the “deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons” and of the “need for all states at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law,” as expressed in the 2010 outcome. As several delegations suggested on Wednesday, it should also reflect the fact that new information has emerged leading international organisations and governments to confirm that there can be no adequate response to the detonation of a nuclear explosive device.

France, on the other hand, said it regrets the way the humanitarian consequences discussion has been “exploited” and does not support the reference at all in the recommendations. The refusal to engage with, let alone acknowledge, the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, coupled with the non-compliance by nuclear-armed states with their disarmament obligations, is part of what encouraged non-nuclear-armed states to take matters into their own hands and negotiate the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in 2017. The Treaty enjoys the support of the vast majority of the NPT membership.

Yet, the “acknowledgement” of the TPNW in the draft recommendations is minimalist in comparison with an extensive paragraph on the Comprehensive nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In addition to noting its complementarity to the NPT, several delegations urged that the recommendations should encourage all NPT states parties to sign and ratify the Treaty as consistent with their legal obligations under article VI. The majority of governments speaking on Wednesday also encouraged the Chair to add language reflecting the broad support for the TPNW and its importance for establishing an international norm for the prohibition of nuclear weapons. As Brazil said on 2 May, the TPNW “transcends rhetoric and procrastination” and “can serve as a moral compass for NPT’s implementation”.

But in keeping with their rejection of banning nuclear weapons, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—and Poland—objected to referencing the TPNW at all. France and Poland argued that the Treaty creates a norm that is incompatible with the NPT—which as Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association noted on Wednesday, is “unhelpful, untenable and incorrect.” Japan suggested that the recommendations could include language expressing divergent approaches to the TPNW. Austria pointed out that the TPNW is not an approach, it’s a legal instrument. South Africa asked if Japan would also like to introduce language about divergent opinions on all of the other aspects of the draft recommendations.

The fight over the TPNW will continue. But if NPT states parties aren’t concerned about that, they should be concerned that some states are trying to pull further away not just from previously agreed language but from the intention and obligations of the NPT. The chapeau, reflecting some of this language from the nuclear-armed states, for example, reaffirms “commitment to efforts designed to promote the full implementation of the provisions of the Treaty.” It’s a mouthful, especially when really what states parties should be doing is reaffirming the commitment to implement the Treaty, full stop. Similarly, the section on nuclear disarmament reaffirms states parties’ commitment to implement article IV of the Treaty (spreading nuclear energy) but only recalls their commitment to article VI (achieving nuclear disarmament). There’s a lot of these linguist turns that to those not following diplomatic processes might seem trivial but have big implications—including for how we treat international law. Are we using these types of documents to backtrack or to advance the objectives of the Treaty? Hopefully any outcome from this PrepCom moves us forward toward full implementation of the NPT and does not give any further fuel to the firestarters. •
NEWS IN BRIEF
Allison Pytlak and Katrin Geyer, WILPF and Alicia Sanders-Zakre, Arms Control Association

The following is not meant to capture every country’s position on every issue but to give a general sense of positions taken.

Cluster III and Specific issues (Peaceful uses of nuclear energy and other provisions of the Treaty – Improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process)

General
- All delegations affirmed the inalienable right of NPT states parties to develop, research, produce, and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Kazakhstan, Costa Rica, Sweden, Guatemala, Malaysia, and others stressed that all states parties should be given access to nuclear technology and energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. Algeria, Indonesia, Kuwait, Iraq, Syria, and Iran called for the affirmation that there cannot be any restrictions on the transfer or use of nuclear materials, equipment, and technology for peaceful uses. Kazakhstan and China added that this process shouldn’t be politicised.
- The vast majority of delegations reaffirmed their confidence in and the centrality of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Nigeria, Malaysia, Ireland, Guatemala, Thailand, Costa Rica, Turkey, Bulgaria, China, the United Kingdom (UK), Hungary, Kuwait, and Romania, expressed particular appreciation for the technical cooperation programme.
- Various states, including Iran, Japan, Mexico, Hungary, Malaysia, and Algeria called for the provision of sufficient human, technical, and financial resources to ensure the continued work of the IAEA.
- The Czech Republic, China, Japan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Viet Nam, New Zealand, and Turkey, among others, recognised the need to commit to the highest standards of nuclear safety, security, and safeguards.
- Malaysia, Romania, Spain, and Ireland welcomed the Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Science and Technology held in November 2018 as a platform to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and technology.
- Kazakhstan, Ireland, Chile, Romania, and Kuwait asserted the importance of IAEA safeguards and the Additional Protocol for nuclear energy development.
- Many states reported about their national programmes and policies, and international civilian cooperation projects related to the application of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including in the field of nuclear power programmes, medicine, food security, or water management.
- Turkey, Belgium, Japan, Sweden, and Spain noted that peer reviews can contribute to the strengthening of nuclear safety and security and build confidence.
- Some states, including Turkey and New Zealand, affirmed the crucial role of the Nuclear Analytical Laboratories at Seibersdorf in Austria and announced that they have contributed financial resources to the Laboratories’ renovation project.

Accidents
- Algeria drew attention to the risk of cross-border nuclear safety incidents.
- New Zealand called on states to use the highest safety and security standards as “nuclear accidents do not respect national boundaries and these materials can pose significant risks.” It stressed that this would be especially true if an accident occurred during maritime transport of nuclear material.
- Japan reminded that the development of safety infrastructure and human resources is essential, and that there is a need to continue building upon the lessons learned from the Fukushima Daiichi accident.

Nuclear terrorism
- Some states, including Chile, stressed the need to strengthen cooperation to avoid nuclear terrorism. The UAE recognised the threat posed by unsecured nuclear material, radioactive sources or facilities, as well as nuclear terrorism.

Nuclear security
- Ireland observed that there is “an undeniable link between nuclear security and multilateral nuclear disarmament,” and stressed the critical need for progress on nuclear disarmament.
- Ireland urged nuclear-armed states to take measures to increase transparency and confidence in the effectiveness of security for military nuclear materials.
- Guatemala recognised the need for a multilateral instrument that would prohibit the attack or threat of attack on nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes.
- New Zealand urged states to perceive nuclear security not “as a burden or a restriction but rather as an essential element in the responsible use of nuclear technology.” It reminded that the potential humanitarian,
economic, and environmental consequences of a security breach “are grave and cannot be overstated.”

**Nuclear safety**
- The US, Thailand, Viet Nam, and the UAE expressed support to the Convention on Nuclear Safety (CNS). The UAE called on Iran to join the CNS.
- Kuwait expressed concern that Israel’s nuclear facilities are outside of IAEA safeguards given the age of Israel’s age of nuclear reactors.
- Ireland observed that the associated risks from the application of nuclear technologies have “increased dramatically in recent years”. It urged states to use nuclear power safely and securely. Chile shared the concerns about the risks and threats by nuclear material if not properly addressed.
- Ireland is promoting greater communication regarding the maritime transport of radioactive material. New Zealand valued Ireland’s efforts and affirmed its own active promotion of the safe transport of radioactive material.
- Spain noted that the increasing number of states that use nuclear energy carries new challenges for guaranteeing the security (including physical protection and cybersecurity) of nuclear applications. Chile also affirmed the need to ensure both physical protection and to maintain “effective security information.”
- Belgium noted that it maintains its knowledge and expertise “in the responsible management of radioactive waste and spent fuel to guarantee a high level of safety and security and to avoid leaving future generations with undue burdens.”
- Bangladesh urged to “be careful that our own innovation does not become cause to our own peril.”

**Fissile materials**
- Belgium announced that it will fund alternative technologies for the production of radioisotopes that will not use fissile uranium.
- Kazakhstan, the UAE, and Kuwait said it supported the IAEA initiative to establish the LEU Bank.
- Ghana said it has converted nuclear reactors from HEU to LEU.
- Belgium said that it continues “its efforts to minimise the use of HEU for civilian applications, when technically and economically feasible, by reducing its excess stocks of HEU, by converting its installations to LEU and by funding the development of alternative technologies for the production of radioisotopes.”

**Phase-out of nuclear power/energy**
- Ireland and New Zealand informed that neither state uses nuclear power but acknowledged the inalienable right of all states parties to research, produce, and use nuclear energy.
- Belgium reminded of its decision to phase out the use of fission energy to produce electricity.

**Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)**
- Iran said that the US decision to impose sanctions against civil nuclear cooperation projects with Iran is a violation of the US obligation under article IV of the NPT and is a material breach of the decision contained in Security Council resolution 2231 on the JCPOA.
- Iran warned that US actions “will not be left unanswered” and that it will soon “adopt appropriate measures to preserve its supreme national interests”. It stressed that the US will be “responsible for any consequences of its reckless policies against the JCPOA.”
- Mexico and Chile reiterated their support for the JCPOA. Mexico called on states that are part of the agreement to ensure their respect of the agreements therein.

**Gender**
- Ireland raised the “gendered impact of nuclear weapons and the need for measures to improve women’s participation in nuclear disarmament negotiations.” It said as a member of the Group of Friends for Women in Nuclear in Vienna, it shares the Group’s objective to provide support to gender equality in the IAEA Secretariat and to encourage “more opportunities for women in the nuclear sector at the national level.”
- Ireland highlighted the need for a gender perspective in the NPT, including by applying a gender analysis, promoting the diverse participation and the equal participation of women and men, and avoiding discourse that promotes gendered stereotypes of power and security.

**Review process**
- The Netherlands, on behalf of 48 states, called for a working group at the 2020 RevCon to consider how to improve the working methods of the NPT. The US, Switzerland, and Japan supported this idea.
- Japan suggested creating a standard reporting form for states on implementing NPT commitments. Russia argued against a standard reporting form for states.
- Switzerland stated that there should be more continuity between preparatory committees and review conferences.
The UK expressed support for a high-level segment at the 2020 Review Conference.

Iran stated that no proposal should challenge the right of states parties to withdraw from the Treaty, while the US said withdrawal should be discouraged.

Other

- Nigeria, Indonesia, the UK, the UAE, Costa Rica, Turkey, Viet Nam, Ghana, Iraq, and Chile, among others, said that nuclear science and the application of peaceful uses of nuclear energy can make a positive contribution to animal health, agriculture, and power generation, the conservation of the environment or the fight against poverty.

- Kuwait, Spain, Ghana, Ecuador, the UK, Japan, Bulgaria, China, Thailand, Viet Nam, Hungary, Costa Rica, Sweden, Turkey, Guatemala, Bangladesh, the UAE, and Malaysia said that nuclear energy is of benefit to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the 2030 Agenda.

- Nigeria, Costa Rica, Belgium, the UK, China, and Ireland said that the application of peaceful uses of nuclear energy can help address the challenges of climate change.

- Ireland concluded that “gender equality is not a women’s issue” but an “organisational issue”. It noted the importance of continuing gender mainstreaming within the IAEA to support the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including SDG 5 on gender equality.

- Mexico reminded that work under the third pillar seeks to ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of nuclear energy, which only makes sense against the backdrop of concerns about the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.

- Bangladesh recalled the UN Charter for “the least diversion for armaments of the world’s human and economic resources” and encouraged to explore ways and means “to make greater efforts to integrate disarmament, humanitarian and development activities”.

**Draft recommendations**

Many delegations indicated they would circulate suggestions to the Chair in writing, so the following is not a comprehensive overview of all input from states parties. It is what we could cover based on real-time interventions from the floor over the past two days. Discussion on cluster four, regional issues, will continue on Thursday and all interventions on that section will be covered in a subsequent edition.

**Chapeau (paragraphs 1-3)**

**General**

- France suggested that the recommendations could highlight the 50th anniversary of the NPT and its successes. This was supported by Poland, Germany, the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). China took note of it and Hungary said that if the NPT is seen as a success, it should be reflected as such.

- Iran and Cuba cautioned that this this should be handled carefully to reflect that while the NPT has been a success in some areas, this is not true of all of them, notably disarmament. New Zealand and Mexico expressed reservations.

- The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) stressed that the disarmament paragraphs do not focus enough on implementation of previous commitments and that this document could lead to reinterpretation or even a recession from past commitments, rather than building on them to move forward.

- France suggested that this section could refer to the deteriorating international security environment, as referenced by some delegations during this PrepCom. Hungary and the Netherlands agreed. Iran said it would have difficulty accepting this suggestion as it could be interpreted as a pretext to escape from nuclear disarmament obligations. France later clarified that this proposal comes from its understanding that the improvement of the security context has consequences for both disarmament and non-proliferation. The UK supported including such a reference but it would not need to be in the Chapeau section.

- Japan suggested revisiting the Chapeau after finalising other sections.

- France recalled the statements on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) that it has led on developing at the 2017 and 2018 NPT PrepComs, in reference to the list of challenges posed by the...
DPRK in draft paragraph 53. It urged NPT states parties to affirm commitment to ensuring DPRK compliance in line with the principles set out in its statements.

- The Republic of Korea (RoK) requested adding a paragraph that reflects discussion about Treaty withdrawals and that would “recommend that the 2020 RevCon further discuss issues and consider responses pertaining to Article X”.

- Russia proposed moving paragraphs on universalisation higher up in the document to reflect their importance.

- The US suggested that the Chapeau should paint a picture of the treaty’s success and focus on broad themes, such as the success of the NPT in stemming proliferation, as a foundation for reductions and fostering the spread of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Paragraph 1
- The NAC suggested adding language to reaffirm commitment to the NPT in place of reference to its preamble and articles alone. This was supported by others, including New Zealand, which noted it would be a departure from standard review conference language.

Paragraph 2
- The NAM suggested changing the words “plays a crucial role” to “is a key instrument” in paragraph 2, among other proposed textual changes. Kazakhstan supported this suggestion.

- China would like to point out that the NPT serves as an important instrument of global governance.

- The NAC suggested referencing “disarmament” ahead of “non-proliferation” in reference to the role of the NPT in the broader regime. Kazakhstan and Iran supported this. Japan would like to see reference to all the pillars in the context of the NPT as being an essential foundation.

- Japan, Switzerland, and Sweden support including references to the three pillars in this paragraph and highlighting the NPT as the foundation of nuclear disarmament as well as non-proliferation.

- The NAM suggested adding new paragraphs between current paragraphs 2 and 3 that would re-affirm the full implementation of the three pillars is essential, and that total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only way to prevent the use of nuclear weapons.

Paragraph 3
- The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) suggested amendments in paragraph 3 that would emphasise the equal importance of all the three NPT pillars, and highlight the importance of full implementation of the disarmament pillar. Jamaica said it supported any efforts to show balance across pillars.

- The NAC suggested strengthening this paragraph by referring to the recommitting to the full implementation of the NPT itself, rather than recommitting to “...efforts designed to promote the full implementation of the Treaty...”. Costa Rica supported this.

- The NAC suggested adding a sub-paragraph that would express concern over the erosion of treaty-based architecture and reinforce the mutually reinforcing relationship between the NPT and other treaties. Costa Rica and Austria supported this. Iran asked for clarity on what is meant by “mutually reinforcing”. Brazil, who had delivered the NAC contributions, spoke in a national capacity to clarify that the suggestion was intended to show that the NPT does not exist in a vacuum and that other treaties, such as arms control agreements, are relevant.

- In this context Austria referenced its Working Paper 46 which makes the point that the NPT provides a framework that needs to be built upon by other treaties; referencing other agreements would refer to such other arms control agreements.

Nuclear disarmament (paragraphs 4-21)

Paragraph 4
- Indonesia, the NAC, and Uruguay suggested reflecting more urgency.

- Ireland said paragraph 4 should reaffirm nuclear-armed states’ “unequivocal undertaking” to disarm.

- Austria stated that it is important to express that implementation is not only necessary with regard to Article VI but also from outcome documents of previous Review Conferences.

- Mexico expressed concern about the wording of paragraphs 4 and 6.

- China stated that paragraphs 4 and 7 should clearly state the special and primary responsibility for states in possession of the largest arsenals to create conditions of the final goal for nuclear disarmament.

Paragraph 5
- Iran said that paragraph 5 should call for refraining from pursuing policies that are not compatible with the NPT.
News in brief, continued

Paragraph 6
- China suggested including an explicit statement of the principles of nuclear disarmament, including global stability and undiminished security for all.
- NAM said reference to accelerated actions should for “accomplishing” not “implementing” the unequivocal undertaking. Ireland and Cuba supported.
- Mexico said para 6 needs to be in line with para 4 to not undermine commitments. Ireland agreed.
- Finland suggested the inclusion of non-strategic nuclear weapons.

Paragraph 7
- Austria, China, Costa Rica, Germany, Finland, France, Kazakhstan, Mexico, the NAC, and the NAM recommended adding a call for Russia and the US to preserve bilateral arms control agreements, including extending New START.
- Austria suggested adding a 7bis calling on Russia and the US to spare no efforts to resolve compliance concerns and conserve the prohibition on land-based intermediate nuclear forces. Costa Rica and Kazakhstan supported this idea.
- Iran stated that paragraph 7 is not factual.

Paragraph 8
- Japan advocated adding a line about civility in discourse and respect for divergent views.
- Austria, Germany, Mexico, the New Agenda Coalition, the Netherlands and Thailand suggested replacing “maintain” with “contribute to.”
- The Philippines expressed concern that initiatives that reference the security environment seek to condition progress on a conducive environment.
- Kazakhstan recommended moving this paragraph to another section.
- China said it should include wording to support the five nuclear-armed states strengthening exchanges on nuclear strategy to maintain security.
- Cuba and Iran called this paragraph unacceptable and Syria recommended deleting it.
- The African Group stated that nuclear-armed states have a special responsibility to create the environment for disarmament.

Paragraph 9
- Germany, Jamaica, and Japan said it should state that the relationship between disarmament and non-proliferation is mutually reinforcing.
- Austria, Cuba, Germany, the NAC, and the UK suggested replacing the “integral role” of nuclear disarmament with a “significant” or “essential contribution.”

Paragraph 10
- Australia, Japan, and the UK want to broaden the paragraph to include other risk reduction measures.
- Japan and the UK suggested adding a 10bis paragraph about the decision of the P5 to hold a side event at the 2020 Review Conference on their nuclear policies.
- Nigeria suggested adding a phrase stating that risk reduction measures are intended to prevent to the use of nuclear weapons and the NAC suggested adding the phrase “with a view to their total elimination.”
- The Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland suggested that risk reduction measures should be given their own paragraph.
- France stated that it did not think that reducing nuclear alert levels necessarily contributed to risk reduction.
- Iran argued that risk reduction measures deviate from real nuclear disarmament measures.

Paragraph 11
- New Zealand stated that calling on nuclear-armed states to simply agree on a standard reporting form seems to suggest insufficient focus and inadequate transparency for nuclear-armed states, and warned that undue focus on reporting could be a distraction at the next RevCon.
- Australia stated that it supports textual suggestions for paragraph 11 from the NPDI on incorporating additional details on transparency and reporting.
- The NAC suggested a reference to strengthening accountability on reporting in this paragraph.
- Sweden and Switzerland suggested that this paragraph could identify specific elements that could be included in a reporting form.
- France argued that this paragraph could be moved to another section.

Paragraph 12
- The NAM suggested adding a 12bis urging nuclear-armed states to prohibit nuclear weapon research and new types of nuclear weapons.
- The NAC suggested adding “with a view to their total elimination.”
Kazakhstan suggested replacing “call” with “urge.”

China argued that paragraph 12 should include a call to stop the development of low-yield nuclear weapons.

Austria requested the addition of “new missions for nuclear weapons and related facilities”.

**Paragraph 13**

Thailand, the Philippines, Uruguay, South Africa, Jamaica, Indonesia, Costa Rica, Guyana, NAC, Chile, Brazil, and Mexico said this paragraph should be strengthened.

Thailand, South Africa, Costa Rica, Kazakhstan, Cuba, and Guyana, and NAC suggested to at least include the word “deep” ahead of “concern”. Those states suggested strengthening paragraph 13 based on the 2010 RevCon outcome document, or the 2015 RevCon draft outcome document. The NAC, Costa Rica, Cuba, and Austria proposed to include references to the immediate and long-term impacts and the impossibility to adequately address impacts of nuclear weapons use.

The NAC proposed the inclusion to re-affirm the need to conform with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law (IHL), as reiterated in the 2010 RevCon outcome document. Ireland, Indonesia, Costa Rica, Austria, and Switzerland supported this.

The UK and France said this paragraph does not enjoy consensus.

**Paragraph 14**

The UK, France, Jamaica, and Mexico supported this paragraph.

Indonesia and Brazil called for including a call to start negotiations on a Comprehensive Convention on Nuclear Disarmament. Brazil suggested to add this as paragraph 14b.

Kazakhstan proposed to list all eight Annex II states.

Iran noted that special responsibility by nuclear-armed states should be stressed which would be in line with the 2010 Action Plan.

**Paragraph 15**

Norway, Mexico, France, NAM, and UK supported this paragraph.

The NAM called for the inclusion of past production and existing stockpiling to be banned and covered by a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). It referred to Recommendation 21 in its Working Paper 11 for suggested wording.

Japan suggested that all nuclear-armed states immediately declare a moratorium on fissile material.

China noted that a moratorium on the production of fissile material doesn’t have a definition, is unverifiable and would weaken the political motivation to launch the FMCT. It cannot support relevant elements in the outcome document.

China said that the conditions should be specified for launching negotiations of an FMCT.

**Paragraph 16**

The NAM, Syria, Mexico, Iran, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine said it wants to see “discussion” replaced with “negotiation”. Ukraine would also like to see the importance reflected of existing security assurances to non-nuclear armed states.

The NAC and Cuba proposed replacing “effective arrangements” with “commencement of negotiations.”

The NAC, Costa Rica, and Austria proposed to add a sub-paragraph to acknowledge the need for a legally binding norm to prohibit nuclear weapons.

China supported this paragraph.

**Paragraph 17**

The NAM, Jamaica, Uruguay, Iran, Indonesia, Costa Rica, and South Africa supported this paragraph but noted it could be strengthened. Switzerland supported this paragraph.

Jamaica said that it doesn’t support any condition-abilities on the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW).

NAM, Indonesia, Iran, Cuba, Mexico, Guyana, the Philippines, Austria, Brazil, and Thailand argued that the TPNW should be referenced as any other treaty in the recommendations, including by calling for signatures and ratifications.

The Philippines, Costa Rica, Cuba, and South Africa proposed including language reaffirming that the TPNW is in line with Article VI and strengthens the NPT regime.

Austria observed that around 50 delegations spoke positively about the TPNW, and that there were only three negative references, and that this should be duly reflected.

Chile and Uruguay observed that the term “acknowledge” is too weak.
News in brief, continued

- Japan suggested including the concerns that were expressed over the TPNW and to note that there are varying views on the Treaty itself, or to delete references to the TPNW. The UK said this paragraph does not enjoy consensus and does not reflect the balance at this PrepCom. France agreed with Japan and the UK and said that the TPNW undermines the authority of the NPT and makes consensus difficult if not impossible and would create division between states parties. It called for the deletion of the paragraph. Poland supported France.

Paragraph 18
- Norway, France, the Netherlands, and the UK supported this paragraph. The Netherlands said this paragraph could be enhanced.
- NAC, Indonesia, and Switzerland proposed including references to the work of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on verification.
- Iran called for deletion of this paragraph.

Paragraph 19
- Iran called for the inclusion calling on nuclear-armed states to ratify related protocols to Treaties establishing nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs) by all nuclear-armed states.
- Kazakhstan suggested to include a reference to the Conference on NWFZs to be held next year, as well as other initiatives strengthening cooperation between NWFZs.

Paragraph 20
- Norway, France and Mexico supported this paragraph.
- Australia, Austria, Indonesia, Costa Rica, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, and the UK proposed that this paragraph could go elsewhere as it is a cross-cutting issue and applies to all three pillars of the NPT.
- NAC suggested to add at the end of this paragraph “and to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.” Austria proposed in the same place “with a view of achieving a world without nuclear weapons”.
- Iran suggested to include references to the International Day for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons on 26 September. Indonesia also called for this.
- The Netherlands proposed to stress the concept of critical thinking skills.

Paragraph 21
- Norway, Sweden, France, Guyana, Austria, Switzerland, and Mexico supported this paragraph as drafted.
- France suggested reflecting the broader idea of diversity in this paragraph.
- The NAC, Austria, and Ireland proposed to include a phrase on the disproportionate impact of ionising radiation on women and girls. Ireland said this is necessary to reflect the large body of work presented throughout this review cycle.
- Chile affirmed that this paragraph could be strengthened.
- Australia, Switzerland, Costa Rica, Austria, the Netherlands, Kazakhstan, Sweden, Indonesia, and the UK stated that this paragraph could go elsewhere, such as to Section V, as it is a cross-cutting issue and applies to all three pillars of the NPT.

Non-proliferation (paragraphs 22-35)

General
- NAM suggested inserting new recommendations that would call for excluding the use and threat of use from all military and police concepts and doctrines, in line with Recommendation 28 in its Working Paper 11.
- France suggested moving paragraphs 51, 52, 53 (under “Regional Issues”) into this section. Iran disagreed.
- Chile proposed referencing the issue of cyber security within paragraphs 29-31.
- Iran felt that the section is overloaded by several paragraphs on nuclear security and safeguards-related proposals. It noted that there are no references to important questions about ending nuclear weapon sharing and extra-territorial deployment of nuclear weapons. It suggested a new recommendation that would call for terminating the transfer of equipment to any country that does not have a CSA in force.
- Russia said it was surprised that half of the recommendations on non-proliferation deal with physical safety and security and is not strictly related to NPT.
- The US welcomed references to nuclear security.
- Finland and Netherlands welcomed this section as drafted.
- Japan made proposals in relation to export controls across a few paragraphs including UN Security Council resolution 1540 in order to close loopholes.
- Mexico would like that some of what is contained in the disarmament section be reflected in this section.
News in brief, continued

as well and underscore the mutually reinforcing nature of nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.

Paragraph 22
- China proposed, ahead of this paragraph, reiterating that states parties should address non-proliferation issues by political and diplomatic means.
- The NAM proposed amendments to this paragraph in line with Recommendation 52 in its Working Paper 11.
- Cuba would like to propose language to reflect that safeguards are accepted only for purpose of verifying compliance with commitments and would not infringe on rights guaranteed under article IV.

Paragraph 23
- China would like to add “credibility” in the last sentence in reference to the IAEA. This was supported by Iran who agreed that there should be a reference to not just the authority of the IAEA but also its credibility, independence, and impartiality.

Paragraph 26
- Brazil highlighted that this paragraph implies a “stealth amendment” to the NPT as the actual language has no bearing in Treaty text or other agreements. It highlighted that the term “enhanced verification standard” is technically inaccurate and cannot be supported. South Africa agreed and proposed deleting this paragraph as the intention it contains can be represented by paragraph 23. Iran also suggested its deletion, noting it as technically inaccurate and incompatible with agreed language. Syria agreed with deletion.
- Japan proposed changing “enhance” before “standard”. This was supported by Norway and the Netherlands, who also suggested deleting the word “increased” ahead of “assurances”.
- The UK, US, France, and Australia support paragraph 26 as drafted.
- Germany said it would not want to have this paragraph watered down.
- Cuba suggested using language from the safeguards resolution of the IAEA General Conference while Brazil noted that the language on the Additional Protocol from the 2010 outcome document is the best possible compromise in this regard.

Paragraph 33
- Iran suggested deleting the last sentence.

Nuclear energy ( paragraphs 36-49)

General
- The Netherlands said it can fully support the existing text.
- Nigeria observed that there is widespread support in strengthening the third pillar of the NPT.
- Ireland suggested language on the safe transport by sea of nuclear material for peaceful purposes, which is a key enabler for cooperation. Norway and Jamaica supported this.
- South Africa underscored the need for balance between and within different clusters.
- South Africa and Iran did not support any inclusion of language on article X that would go beyond the repetition of the article’s wording.

Paragraph 36
- The NAM suggested to add a paragraph 36bis as suggested in Recommendations 66, 69, 70, and 71 of its Working Paper 11. Cuba reaffirmed to add recommendation 66, 69, 70, 71.
- Nigeria, South Africa, Cuba, and Mexico urged strengthening the paragraph and to start it with the words “affirm” or “stress”.

Paragraph 37
- Nigeria, South Africa, Cuba, and Mexico urged to strengthen the paragraph and to start it with “affirm” or “stress”.

Paragraph 38
- The US suggested adding a paragraph 38bis. “Recognising contributions of peaceful uses of nuclear energy to global peace and prosperity, and that these benefits are inextricably linked to and have followed from full implementation of the NPT by states parties for the past 50 years, states parties commit to the further expansion of peaceful uses of nuclear energy under the framework of the NPT.” Australia found the US suggestion useful.
- Japan, Australia, and Switzerland argued for the inclusion of a referencing to achieving the “highest level of safety and security.”

Paragraph 39
- Mexico, Jamaica, South Africa, and Japan welcomed this para. South Africa suggested the deletion of “Goals” after “Sustainable Development.” South Africa and UK suggested including a reference to the Paris Agreement. Singapore supported references to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.
News in brief, continued

Paragraph 40
• The UK, France and the Netherlands called for the inclusion of cultural heritage as an area where peaceful nuclear applications can make positive contributions.

Paragraph 41
• NAM suggested to add the following paragraphs as suggested in Recommendations 74 and 75 of its Working Paper Working Paper 11.

Paragraph 45
• France said it would be good to include that nuclear energy is carbon-free energy.

Paragraph 46
• Norway welcomed this paragraph and said it would like to include reference to the related reporting mechanism.

Paragraph 48
• Norway suggested adding “and security” after nuclear safety.

Paragraph 49
• The NAM suggested to add a paragraph as suggested in Recommendation 83 of its Working Paper 11. Cuba agreed.

Achieving the Possible: WMD Free Zone in the Middle East
METO Project

On 8 May, the Middle East Treaty Organisation (METO) Project held a side event with the support of the Irish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Achieving the Possible: WMD Freezone in the Middle East. As negotiations at the 2019 NPT PrepCom continue and Iran announces it is suspending some of its obligations of the 2015 Iran Deal, the issue of how the international community can make progress on this issue pivotal to regional and global security becomes increasingly pertinent.

Wael Al Assad, former Representative of the Secretary-General for Disarmament and Regional Security at the League of Arab States and speaking in his personal capacity, highlighted the need to reframe the debate and change perceptions on the WMD free zone in the Middle East. As negotiations at the 2019 NPT PrepCom continue and Iran announces it is suspending some of its obligations of the 2015 Iran Deal, the issue of how the international community can make progress on this issue pivotal to regional and global security becomes increasingly pertinent.

Wael Al Assad, former Representative of the Secretary-General for Disarmament and Regional Security at the League of Arab States and speaking in his personal capacity, highlighted the need to reframe the debate and change perceptions on the WMD free zone in the Middle East. There is a need to construct conversations in a positive manner and deconstruct the narrative that it is an initiative launched by the Arabs to disarm Israel. Instead, states should focus on the benefits of co-operation and how the zone can serve as a platform for regional peace.

Patricia Lewis, Chatham House, discussed states’ different approaches to the negotiations of the zone and where scope for agreement and compromise could be found. She cautioned that, of course, there are disagreements over core issues such the role of the NPT, the responsibilities of depositaries in negotiations, and whether negotiations should be contingent on improvements of regional security or not. Nevertheless, she noted that all approaches to negotiations affirm the 1995 resolution, the need for states to freely arrive at a decision, and consensus. Similarly, she saw possible compromise on building technical capacity and engaging civil society in the region and the role of the UN Secretary-General in the process. She suggested that the UN could establish a regional disarmament centre that could help with the process.

Tariq Rauf, former head of IAEA Safeguards, discussed the dynamics behind the UN resolution calling to convene a conference on the zone in November 2019. In October 2018 at the UN General Assembly, 103 states voted for the resolution that called for the conference, while 71 abstained and three states voted against it. He suggested that the UN route could be helpful in avoiding a repeat of the zone hijacking the NPT Review Conference in 2020. He discussed the importance of the METO Project’s work and hoped the conference can draw inspiration from their Draft Treaty.

Emad Kiyaei of the METO Project outlined its purpose. He agreed that there is a need for new and innovative thinking on this issue, arguing that the creation of a WMDFZME is in the common interest of all. He said that the largest obstacle is the lack of political will and documents for states to work with. Thus, the METO Project has created an evolving, iterative Draft Treaty for consultation. This draws on previous treaties including the other NWFZs, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and the Iran Deal, which successfully link the UN and international support to the agreement. In addition to this, the METO Project is a forum for discussion on the zone in the region. He outlined the importance of discussions being led by people from the region.
Sharon Dolev further outlined the METO Project. She expanded on the need to engage civil society in the region and the particular importance of Israel. She said that there is scope for changing Israeli public perception of nuclear weapons; the main challenge is that Israeli civil society does not focus on this issue currently. Rather than focusing on whether peace in the Middle East needs to come before the zone, conversations in Israel should focus on what is possible. She said that there are good reasons to be worried about a nuclear arms race in the Middle East and called for states to talk with the Middle East, not about the Middle East when approaching the zone. In doing so, she called for increased support for civil society raising awareness on the zone and working to build support for the initiative.

The speeches were followed by a lively Q&A session in which a number of distinguished delegates involved with the November conference praised the initiative. Sima Sami Bahous, the Jordanian Ambassador to the UN in New York and Chair of the November’s conference, emphasised the open nature and cooperative nature of the conference in making progress towards the zone. She stated that Jordan has already begun extensive consultations with a number of states, saying that all decisions will be taken by consensus and with the agreement of all states in the region. Participants praised the importance of having open-ended texts for creating discussions and the positive and constructive manner in which the METO Project is working to achieve the possible and create a WMD free zone in the Middle East.
MAYORS FOR PEACE YOUTH FORUM
Mayors for Peace

Mayors for Peace held its Youth Forum on 2 May as a side event to the NPT PrepCom. Representatives of young generations from around the world came together to share their efforts and wishes for peace.

Mr. Matsui, Mayor of Hiroshima opened the forum, noting many dangerous trends and encouraged the youth present to continue their efforts for peace and disarmament in partnership with Mayors for Peace. Mr. Imanishi from Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasised disarmament education and the many ways that young people can contribute to nuclear disarmament.

The forum began from the Mayors for Peace Youth Delegation, with students from Hiroshima’s Jogakuin, Shudo, and Eishin high schools. The students discussed the damage that schools suffered during the atomic bombing, their meetings with hibakusha, their petition campaigns, and other efforts to raise public awareness. One project, “Rebooting Memories,” displayed striking new colorised photos of day-to-day life near the hypocenter before the bombing.

Students from the Nagasaki Youth Delegation described their role as peace messengers to the NPT meetings, their meetings with hibakusha, their Peace Caravan to link A-bomb history with current times, their visits to parts of the UN that deal with development and children’s issues, and their meetings with diplomats. Their message was that “all human beings are hibakusha”—all are threatened by today’s nuclear risks.

There were also presentations from students from other countries, including Amplify, a global network established after the International Youth Summit for Nuclear Abolition, held in Hiroshima in August 2015. The network has encouraged the participation of young people in several international disarmament events worldwide, including Switzerland, Austria, Thailand, and the Philippines.

Students from Malaysia and New Zealand described the activities of another international youth group, PEAC, which has focused both on nuclear disarmament as well as the tragic effects of uranium mining, radioactive waste dumping, and nuclear testing in the Pacific. Opposition to these developments has led to marches, petitions, public activism, and student mobilisation in the past. New Zealand has outlawed both nuclear tests and port visits by nuclear ships.

Other students from the German Youth Delegation described their activities dating back to 1983. They have organised workshops and lectures on disarmament and non-violence, and opposed the deployment of missiles in Europe.

After the presentations by the youth, Mr. Kido (a hibakusha) asked, “If you had to divide history into two parts, where would you divide it?” He proposed 6 August 1945, with the advent of the power to destroy our earth. He asked, “What is a hibakusha?” and answered, “human beings.” Despite the pain and suffering of the hibakusha, they have kept alive their hopes for a better future, one sustained by feelings of support and active efforts from youth.

Ms. Nakamitsu, UN Under-Secretary-General and High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, said that youth are the ultimate force for change in disarmament and “we count on you”. She noted that there are now 1.8 billion young people and they can be agents for change, but that “you must believe in your power”. Mr. Taue, Mayor of Nagasaki closed the forum, emphasising that we cannot postpone our efforts to pursue a world without nuclear weapons. We must seek to achieve this goal within the lifetime of the hibakusha.
Gender and the NPT: Building Momentum to 2020 and Beyond
Side event at the 2019 Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Thursday, 9 May 2019 from 13h15 to 14h30 in Conference Room B at the United Nations

During the 2020 NPT review cycle, delegations have demonstrated increased awareness on the importance of full, meaningful and diverse participation in the NPT review cycle; the differential gendered impacts of nuclear weapons; and the gendered discourse that perpetuates stereotypes about power and security.

This side event seeks to examine how efforts toward gender equality have developed during the 2020 NPT review cycle and how the complementary strands of these efforts can be harnessed to strengthen the NPT going forward.

Featuring
Dr Patricia Lewis, Research Director for International Security at Chatham House
Ray Acheson, Director of Reaching Critical Will at the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom
Rebecca Hallin, Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Moderated by Ambassador Brian Flynn,
Permanent Mission of Ireland to the United Nations in New York