Creating the Environment for “New Thinking”

Ray Acheson | Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

On Thursday, the Canadian delegation began its statement quoting the manifesto published by Bertrand Russell and Albert Einstein about the risks of nuclear war. Back in 1955, Russell and Einstein called on folks to think in new ways about nuclear weapons, which the Canadians echoed at the end of their statement. But what does it look like, this “new thinking”? What makes it new? And most importantly, what would make it seem “credible” to those whom we are told that we have to engage/change/convince? Plenty of thinking about nuclear weapons is rooted in analytical frameworks and approaches that might be considered “new” by the nuclear-armed states and some of their allies, but that is rejected by them as “radical or ridiculous” when measured against their own worldviews. Thus the question isn’t so much about how we think or what we think about nuclear weapons. It’s about who articulates this thinking, and how seriously they are taken by those who have dominated the discourse for so many decades.

In the land of the NPT, or of pretty much any nuclear weapons related forum in which representatives of the nuclear-armed states actively participate, only the voices of the nuclear-armed or their closest allies are treated as credible. Their thinking is all that matters. The room is quieter when they speak. When the ambassadors of the United States or Russia take the floor, you can hear a pin drop. When a representative of Equatorial Guinea is speaking, it sounds like a mosh pit on the conference room floor. The representative of Lebanon had to stop her own intervention last week to ask the Chair to bring the room to order because she was being talked over even though she had the microphone. This might just sound like typical, albeit rude, conference room behaviour. But it is not. It has meaningful implications—about who is listened to, who is respected, who is taken seriously on these issues. Whose perspective, voice, and engagement matters.

Those who participated in the negotiations of the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) had a different experience in this regard. While not a perfect process, there was legitimate, respectful exchange amongst all states in the room. Everyone was heard, everyone listened. Debates were serious and extensive. Formal exchanges with civil society experts opened up space for voices and perspectives that added value to these discussions. Survivors didn’t just give testimony, they offered policy. Young diplomats from the global south led their delegations and even their regions; women, including women of colour, chaired working groups.

Yet this process is shamed as being “not inclusive”—because the nuclear-armed states boycotted it and ordered their allies to boycott, too. The negotiations are ridiculed for only including “not really serious states”. Every time a small island developing state or an African nation signs or ratifies the TPNW, jokes erupt on Twitter about how much safer the world is now that such-and-such insignificant country has renounced nuclear weapons. The same happens when certain civil society groups speak to or write about traditional nuclear weapon forums and processes. Certain groups and individuals are acceptable—mostly those who are accustomed to operating within the corridors of power in Washington, DC or other capitals and keep their requests as minimalist as possible; preferably those who formerly held high-ranking government or military positions. People within these positions tend to come from similar backgrounds, identities, and experiences, and those who do not tend to toe the line so as to be granted or maintain their privileged positions, as reports like the Consensual Strait-jacket show. The thinking of these actors is normalised within the empowered discourse and the rest of us are “terminally unserious,” dismissed as radical, irrational, emotional, or silly.
Editorial, continued

In this context, “new” ideas are whatever the empowered discourse says they are. The US delegation is positing its Creating the Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND) initiative as new thinking. On Thursday, the US ambassador explained that CEND “grew out of an effort to think creatively but realistically about how to move forward on nuclear disarmament.” He argued that the “traditional, numerically-focused ‘step-by-step’ approach to arms control has gone as far as it can under today’s conditions.” Reductions have run their course, he said, and now the security environment is too unfavourable to go any further.

The idea that the nuclear-armed states have done what they can is of course not actually a new idea. They have been saying this in various ways since at least the 2010 NPT Review Conference. The idea of looking at what motivates the acquisition and retention of nuclear weapons, as the US is calling for, is also not new. There are endless studies, theories, and articulations of this—many of which have found that what motivates states to possess nuclear weapons is power. “States keep nuclear weapons because political leaders in nuclear cultures want to, not because the ‘international security environment’ demands it,” argues British academic Nick Ritchie. “Displacing agency for change to abstract structures that somehow ‘impose’ nuclear choices on reluctant leaders is a diversion.”

The nuclear-armed states, of course, don’t agree with answers like this. They say it’s about security—but they only have in mind their own narrow version of what that means, lacking imagination or will to understand why the vast majority of governments in the world, and their own citizens, demand nuclear disarmament. The nuclear-armed want our answer to be the same as theirs—that they are justified in their retention of nuclear weapons. They want the world to understand that they have to have nuclear weapons, to protect themselves and to keep the rest of us from starting another world war. Like an abusive partner, they want us to understand that their violence is for our own good. They know best, they are in control, and we are at their mercy. If we disagree with their approach, or challenge their analysis about why they do what they do, we are ridiculed, dismissed, ignored; intimidated and berated until we become more accommodating and understanding.

The idea that the “security environment” is not doing so well is also not new. In some places in the world you only have to look outside your window to know this—if you are fortunate enough to have a window, or a house. But this is precisely why nuclear disarmament is such an urgent matter. “The current security environment allows no room for further procrastination,” warned South Africa’s representative. “Humanity cannot afford to wait for the ‘right time’ to come to do away with nuclear weapons.” Similarly, Sweden’s delegation said that disarmament should not be reduced “to playing the role of a passive observer awaiting the arrival of better times,” while Ireland noted that a “utopia of a perfect security environment” does not exist.

Mexico and Ireland both pointed out that the NPT was negotiated amidst a difficult international security environment precisely to create conditions to free the world from nuclear weapons. As Ireland said, the NPT shows “what is possible through effective multilateralism” and “recognises that increased security for one state does not have to come at the cost of security of others.” Likewise, seeking to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons in today’s “security environment” is not about ignoring that environment—it’s about recognising how fraught it is and trying to make the situation a bit less intense. It seems to many of us that dialing down the capacity for mass murder by getting rid of nuclear weapons should help improve the security environment.

As it stands, this current “security environment” has been massively profitable for the most powerful arms producers in the world, as Daniel Högsa of the International Campaign to Nuclear Weapons noted in reference to a new study on nuclear weapon producers and the economics of mass destruction. US withdrawal from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty has been lucrative to companies such as Lockheed Martin and Raytheon; its threats of nuclear war with North Korea sent weapon producer stocks soaring.

Perhaps this is why the nuclear-armed states are back at each other’s throats, provoking each other and some new “foes” back to the Cold War arms race—it’s more profitable that way. This would explain the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran—which no other government in the world (other than Israel) thinks was a good move. Virtually every single delegation taking the floor at the NPT last week, including all of the United States’ allies, expressed grave concern with the US withdrawal from the Iran Deal and re-imposition of unilateral sanctions. If the US is really trying to create a better international security environment, it’s definitely going about it the wrong way—its actions seem geared toward inciting nuclear weapon proliferation and starting new wars.

The US is not alone amongst the nuclear-armed states in bad behaviour, of course—one needs only to take a
glance through our most recent update on nuclear weapon modernisation programmes to see the extent to which all of the nuclear-armed states are investing in death and destruction. But the point is that it is the nuclear-armed states themselves that are damaging international security by refusing to disarm while walking away from multilateral agreements that actually accomplished a great deal in terms of “strategic stability”—which this whole mainstream approach to the “security environment” is supposed to be about.

The problem is not the countries without nuclear weapons. The problem is the ones wielding their capacity for massive nuclear violence at each other, and over all of us.

“Nuclear weapon states feed on each other’s threat perceptions,” wrote Alexander Kmentt five years ago when he was an Austrian ambassador helping drive the humanitarian impact on nuclear weapons process. The nuclear-armed states “provide the rationale for one another to retain nuclear weapons,” and “have proven themselves to be unable to make this mental switch in the 25 years since the end of the Cold War.” This inability to operative constructively in the modern age helps explain the French ambassador’s comments, for example, including his assertion that the TPNW sets up norms that are contrary to the NPT and his demand that those who have joined the TPNW “must explain how they are going to preserve stability and security without a nuclear deterrent, in the face of resurgence of threats, without risking high scale conventional warfare.”

The answer from many of us living outside of the nuclear-armed state cyclical thinking on nuclear weapons goes something like this:

First of all, the NPT does not establish a “right” to a “nuclear deterrent”. It actually includes a legally binding obligation to which France and four of the other nuclear-armed states have signed up, stipulating that they must disarm. Furthermore, the UN Charter also does not contain a “right” to nuclear deterrence. France insisted its nuclear deterrence doctrine is in accordance with the right to self-defence in the UN Charter. But the Charter does not give the right to possess or use nuclear weapons. Its goal “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war” speaks directly against nuclear weapons, which have catastrophic humanitarian and environmental consequences.

Second of all, a “nuclear deterrent” is not an object. Nuclear weapons are weapons. Genocidal weapons. City- and even world-destroying weapons. We should

not talk about them in abstract terms. Nuclear weapons do not bring security, they make us all less safe. They do not diminish threats, they make them worse.

Third of all, most of the world does not believe in nuclear deterrence, as is said clearly by most governments at every NPT meeting and through the negotiation of the TPNW. Nuclear deterrence is a theory purported by certain political, military, and academic folks within nuclear-armed and nuclear-enabling states. It’s a theory that can be and is constantly disputed, debated, and dismantled. As Patricia Lewis and others wrote ahead of the 2010 Review Conference, nuclear deterrence is a faith-based theory: it “works as a construct in which simply the belief in the power of nuclear weapons to deter is—in fact—the deterrence.”

In the spirit of new thinking, we should also step outside our sector to think about the concepts we debate here. One of the best articulations I’ve read against nuclear deterrence comes from Gwen Benaway, an Anishinabe/Métis trans woman writing about traumatic childhood abuse and what it revealed to her about the concept of “deterrence”:

I know a knife can sometimes stop violence from happening through the threat of further violence. There are moments in life where a knife is all you have. A sharp edge can mean the difference between suffering immense harm or walking away alive. Of course, the trouble with a knife is that once you pick it up, you can never put it down without fearing retaliation from the other party. You look for bigger knives and sooner or later, someone’s blood is on your hands.

But this brings us right back to who gets to be heard in those debates. Whose perspectives and arguments are listened to by the orthodoxy. Who gets to change discourse. Who gets to have any kind of influence over normative thinking. When the Austrian ambassador suggests deterrence theory is a “chimera” that “takes a big risk with the future of all humankind,” is he taken seriously? When a feminist scholar like Carol Cohn writes about the power dimensions inherent in the technostrategic discourse of the self-described nuclear priesthood, is she listened to? When Benaway speaks about her experience with violence, is her perspective even allowed in the door of nuclear weapon discussions?

As nuclear anthropologist Martin Pfieffer noted last week, the “security environment” is one of those things that we collectively make—though not equally.” He urged that nuclear disarmament “needs to be tied to a
larger rethinking and restructuring of power, violence, and human relational obligations.”

Is this the kind of thinking that countries like Canada and others that have invested good faith efforts into nuclear disarmament, only to see it be thrown in their faces by the nuclear-armed states over and over again, could get behind? It is not necessarily new, at least not to those who have been thinking, writing, and acting outside of the dominant discourse, but it is new in spaces like NPT meetings. Engaging with ideas about power, violence, and privilege is as important for the nuclear weapon debate as it is for any social, political, or economic issue we face in the world today. Given the massive backsliding from the nuclear-armed states on past commitments, rising investments in the weapons for nuclear war, and mounting disparagement of multilateralism, it seems like a good time for the purported “bridge builders” to start rethinking their positions and working to normalise some of the ideas and actors who have so far been kept out of the landscape.

Notes

4. See https://twitter.com/UK Trident/status/1123983874915209216.
5. See https://twitter.com/dhogsta/status/1123981425231966208.
14. See https://twitter.com/NuclearAnthro/status/1124056026817363974.
The following is not meant to capture every country’s position on every issue but to give a general sense of positions taken during the general debate of this Preparatory Committee.

Cluster one: nuclear disarmament

Nuclear disarmament

- Numerous delegations, including the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Arab Group, Austria, Mexico, Chile, and Viet Nam, expressed concern over the slow pace of nuclear disarmament vis-à-vis the other NPT pillars.
- Russia said it is time for the “multilateralisation” of the process of nuclear disarmament but that it does not intend to impose anything on anyone.
- The United States (US) highlighted its “Creating the Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND)” initiative, which is intended to examine and address challenges to the global security environment. The US said that the “step-by-step approach” has run its course. The United Kingdom (UK), Hungary, and Australia indicated that they support and see merit in this approach; Japan said that it provides opportunities for constructive dialogue.
- Iran urged states parties to reject CEND at the 2020 Review Conference (RevCon) as it creates conditionali­ties and reinterprets positions.
- Switzerland said it sees value in discussion about the global environment but for this to be productive it must be inclusive and contribute to existing NPT commitments.
- The Philippines said it joins the concerns of other state parties “initiatives that seek to reframe or review these [disarmament] commitments with the effect of justifying delays in implementing them.”
- South Africa said the current security environment does not allow for further procrastination and that humanity cannot wait for the “right time” for nuclear disarmament.
- Sweden and Ireland also cautioned against waiting for the right environment for nuclear disarmament.
- New Zealand said the NPT will come to have little value if its terms are reevaluated, overlooked, or deferred. Pragmatism is fine for pathways to an objective but has no place in attempting to rewrite a treaty’s obligations.
- Canada urged non-nuclear-armed states to advocate for efforts that will spur nuclear disarmament and offer credible alternative solutions. It urged China, the UK and France to consider actions to impart fresh momentum to arms control processes.
- Some state, like Bulgaria and Italy, referenced their support for the “progressive approach” to nuclear disarmament. Sweden is advocating the step-by-step approach.
- Brazil noted that nuclear-armed states outside of the NPT have yet to make any internationally legally-binding commitments to nuclear disarmament.
- China urged all nuclear-armed states to commit to the effective implementation of article VI, abide by the outcomes of previous NPT Review Conferences, and openly declare that they have no intention to seek permanent possession of nuclear weapons. It said that relevant nuclear-armed states should put an end to the policy and practice of nuclear umbrella and nuclear sharing and withdraw all nuclear weapons that are deployed in other countries.

Arsenal reductions

- Austria was among the states parties that took note of how the pace of reductions has slowed and how key bilateral agreements are coming apart, while no multilateral reduction agreement has been adopted.
- Viet Nam suggested that, as a meaningful contribution to the review process, the nuclear-armed states should resume negotiations on nuclear disarmament, cutting down the number of existing nuclear weapons and fulfilling their obligations under article VI of the NPT and other commitments under the NPT reviews, including the 2010 Action Plan.
- Chile welcomed arsenal reductions but stated that it is not the same as achieving disarmament, and is undermined by modernisation.
- Russia explained that through implementing different commitments, its nuclear arsenal has been reduced by more than 85 per cent compared to the peak of the Cold War. It believes that the process of reducing and limiting nuclear weapons should be based on a step-by-step approach and not in “isolation from reality”.
- Russia asserted that the presence of the US’ non-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe and nuclear sharing practices hinder further nuclear disarmament. France rejected this statement and said that the nuclear sharing arrangement was an “integral part of the NPT negotiations and was accepted by the Soviet Union.”
France said it has fully complied with its disarmament obligations. It highlighted several of its unilateral initiatives which, it said, have been undertaken as part of a progressive and realistic approach.

The UK stressed its track record in reducing its stockpiles and that it is the only country to have reduced its “deterrent capability” to one warhead. It argued that to abandon its nuclear weapon programme entirely would undermine its security and not make anyone safer.

The Philippines appealed to nuclear-armed states to intensify dialogue amongst themselves on meeting NPT disarmament commitments. It felt that nuclear umbrella states could play a useful role in this.

Modernisation and arms racing

The NAM, the Arab Group, South Africa, Brazil, Bangladesh, Chile, Guatemala, Nigeria, Algeria, Kuwait, Cuba, Ukraine, Switzerland, Costa Rica, and Kazakhstan were among states expressing concern over modernisation programmes and activities. The Arab League and Brazil highlighted in particular that this contravenes the text and spirit of the NPT.

South Africa, Nigeria, Guatemala, and the NAM spoke of the significant cost of nuclear weapon modernisation, with Nigeria describing it as “outrageous and inexcusable”.

The NAM noted with grave concern the “current extensive investment, by the nuclear-weapon States, on modernisation of their nuclear forces and developing more effective and newer, including low-yield nuclear warheads,” which, by increasing the role of these inhumane weapons in their military doctrines, lowers the threshold for the actual use of nuclear weapons.

Kazakhstan recommended halting any production or modernisation of nuclear weapons and creating an obligatory database on all types and status of such weapons.

Brazil stated that the net result of modernisation programmes will be a “substantially elevated risk of accidental, unintended, miscalculated or even deliberate use of nuclear weapons.”

China said it has never participated in an arms race.

Doctrine, use, and threat of use

The Arab League said that nuclear doctrines violate the NPT and international law more broadly.

France asserted that its nuclear doctrine is in accordance with the UN Charter.

China urged diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in national security doctrines and abandoning the policies of nuclear deterrence based on the first-use of nuclear weapons. In urging states to codify their commitment, China suggested to conclude an international legal instrument in this regard, referencing the success of banning biological and chemical weapons as examples that agreeing to “no first use is the most practical, feasible and valuable means of nuclear disarmament.”

Ukraine believes that nuclear-armed states have to commit themselves to reducing the role of nuclear weapons in their national security strategies.

Japan suggested that efforts to increase transparency and accountability through reporting on nuclear doctrines of nuclear-armed states, and on the number of nuclear warheads each state possesses, will lead to strengthening the NPT review process.

Switzerland said the prominence of nuclear weapons in defence policies raise questions about compliance with disarmament obligations.

Germany urged that challenges such as the security environment must not prevent reducing the role of nuclear weapons in doctrines, strategies, and policies.

Spain supports discussing doctrine in the context of risk reduction to avoid unintended disasters.

Operational status/risk reduction

Argentina, Australia, Belgium, China, Finland, Germany Japan, Norway, and the Republic of Korea were among the states calling for nuclear risk reduction measures.

Bangladesh, Belgium, Chile, and Sweden called on nuclear-armed states to reduce the operational status of their nuclear arsenals.

The De-Alerting Group, in a working paper, urged states to take concrete steps to address the risks posed by arsenals on high alert, reduce their operational readiness and report on these actions during the 2020-2025 review cycle.

Finland observed that concepts such as “credible deterrence,” “strategic stability,” or “nuclear ambiguity” are interpreted in many different ways and urged a more comprehensive approach to nuclear risk reduction. It suggested a higher degree of precision and systematisation in discussions on risk reduction to get states parties on the same page regarding existing ideas and proposals.
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• France said the effort to reduce strategic risks associated with nuclear weapons must continue, as based on the transparency of nuclear doctrines, dialogue between political and military leaders of the possessor states, crisis communication instruments, and reassurance measures. To reduce risks, strategic dialogue must be reactivated.

• Japan urged that in light of the impact of “recent scientific and technological developments such as [artificial intelligence] and cyber” more concrete measures should be pursued to reduce nuclear risk.

• Norway urged the pursuit of measures to reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons and stated that the “fact-based approach to the humanitarian consequences of nuclear detonations could inspire this work.”

Negative security assurances

• The NAM, the Arab Group, Brazil, Cuba, the Czech Republic, Italy, Iran, Malaysia, Algeria, South Africa, and Syria were among those to call for states to negotiate a legally-binding instrument providing negative security assurances to non-nuclear-armed states.

• The African Group, Argentina, Bangladesh, Germany, Guatemala, Iraq, Japan, Kuwait, Nigeria, Norway, and the Philippine emphasised the importance of granting negative security assurances to non-nuclear-armed states.

• China and France stated that they remain committed to the negative security assurances they had issued.

• The United States stated that it was not prepared to offer or negotiate universal, unconditional legally-binding negative security assurances.

Verification

• Bulgaria, France, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the UK (on behalf of Norway, Sweden and the United States), and the US emphasised the need for effective verification procedures for nuclear disarmament.

• Bulgaria, France, Germany, Japan, Poland, the UK (on behalf of Norway, Sweden and the United States), and the US highlighted the role of the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV).

• Algeria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Japan, Norway, Poland, Switzerland, and Turkey welcomed the report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification, adopted in April 2019.

• Russia argued that it is “premature” to talk about multilateral disarmament verification.

• Brazil mentioned that during the Group of Governmental Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification, it proposed the creation of a Group of Scientific and Technical Experts on Nuclear Disarmament Verification (GSTE-NDV).

Transparency and reporting

• Australia, Belgium, Chile, Finland, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the Republic of Korea, Spain, and Switzerland highlighted the importance of maintaining and/or increasing transparency about nuclear weapon arsenals and policies.

• The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) in a working paper emphasised the importance of transparency and particularly national reporting.

• China, France, and the United Kingdom stated that they maintain transparency about their nuclear-weapon arsenals and policies.

Nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs)

• The EU, Cuba, South Africa, Norway, China, Brazil, Japan, Malaysia, and the African Group stressed the importance of NWFZs towards achieving nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. The EU and the Czech Republic reminded that these should be established on the basis of arrangements among the states of the region concerned.

• The EU, Malaysia, and the Philippines encouraged relevant states to sign and ratify relevant protocols of the Treaties establishing NWFZs.

• China and France stated that they remain committed to negative security assurances they had issued.

• The United States stated that it was not prepared to offer or negotiate universal, unconditional legally-binding negative security assurances.

• Some states stressed the need for nuclear-armed states to provide negative security assurances for states that are member of NWFZs.

• China encouraged nuclear-armed states to actively support the efforts by non-nuclear-weapon states to build nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of consultations among themselves and voluntary agreements.

Middle East

• Among its recommendations for the 2020 RevCon, the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) reiterated “the urgent need to fully implement the 1995 resolution on the Middle East for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction and urge all States,
particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to actively support this goal and relevant efforts to meet it; and to acknowledge the decision of the General Assembly 73/546 that entrusts the Secretary General to convene a Conference to elaborate a treaty on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region.”

- The African Group, Spain, Cuba, and Norway, among others, expressed frustration at the lack of progress on establishing a zone in the Middle East.

- Norway suggested that the states parties agree for the 2020 RevCon to establish nuclear-weapons-free zones that are freely agreed on by the countries concerned, which it highlighted as essential, including in the Middle East.

- Turkey called on relevant states to take a constructive approach and exert “genuine effort” toward seeing progress on the pending commitment from the 1995 RevCon of convening a conference toward establishing a WMDFZ in the Middle East.

- Several states indicated support for the conference to be held later this year established by the UNGA.

**Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)**

- The NAM, NAC, African Group, Thailand, the Arab Group, Cuba, the Philippines, Algeria, South Africa, Nigeria, Malaysia, Austria, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Peru, Cuba, and Guatemala, among others, positively noted the adoption of the TPNW.

- The African Group, NAC, South Africa, Guatemala, and Indonesia, among others, asserted that the TPNW does not undermine but contributes to the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. The NAC, Bangladesh, Austria, Malaysia, the Arab Group, Brazil, Ireland, Cuba, Peru, the Philippines, Costa Rica, Austria on behalf of the initial sponsors of UNGA resolution 73/48, and the African Group noted the TPNW’s full compatibility and complementarity with the NPT. Many of those states asserted that the TPNW is an effective measure in contributing to the implementation of the NPT, and particular article VI.

- Austria on behalf of the initial sponsors of UNGA resolution 73/48 underscored that the TPNW strengthens the IAEA safeguards systems based on the NPT, and that it strengthens the international nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime, including the CTBT and NWFZ treaties.

- Guatemala informed it expects to ratify the TPNW “in short order”. Kazakhstan stated that it was in the process of ratifying the TPNW.

- Thailand observed that the TPNW’s provisions on victim assistance and environmental remediation, take “forward nuclear disarmament in an even more progressive and relevant manner.” It also reminded that the TPNW reflects “the collective will of two-thirds of the international community to undertake to achieve unequivocally and unabashedly the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.”

- The Czech Republic argued that the TPNW will not be effective as it will not engage “any state actually possessing nuclear weapons, will not reduce nuclear arsenals and will not enhance international peace and stability.”

- Russia said that it does not support the TPNW. It stated that it understands its motivations but considers the Treaty “to be a mistake” as it “does not contribute to nuclear disarmament, undermines the NPT and provokes growing contradictions among its parties.”

- France explained that it is opposed to the Treaty and called on the Treaty’s supporters to explain “how to preserve security and stability...in the absence of nuclear deterrence... without risking high-scale conventional warfare”.

- The UK informed it will not “support, sign or ratify” the Treaty.

- The African Group recalled the 2017 award of the Nobel Peace Prize to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) for its work in relation to the TPNW.

**Humanitarian consequences**

- The NAM, NAC, African Group, Guatemala, Vietnam, Kuwait, Algeria, Mexico, Nigeria, South Africa, Canada, Thailand, Iraq, Switzerland, Spain, Austria, Brazil, Ireland, Equatorial Guinea, Costa Rica, Peru, Austria on behalf of the initial sponsors of UNGA resolution 73/48, reaffirmed their deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons.

- The African Group, Ireland, Costa Rica, Peru, and others expressed particular concern at the catastrophic impact on human health, the environment, sustainable development, and economic resources.

- NAM, Nigeria, Cuba, Peru, Iran, and Mexico reminded that any use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is a crime against humanity and a violation of the UN
News in brief, continued

Charter, international law and in particular international humanitarian law (IHL). Many of those referenced the 1996 advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice in this regard.

- Japan on behalf of 53 states in their statement on disarmament education reminded delegations to raise awareness amongst the young generation of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons.
- The NAM, Nigeria, and Malaysia referenced the relationship between the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, and international law including IHL. The NAM said it believes that possession of nuclear weapons is inconsistent with IHL.

Fissile materials/FMCT
- Many delegations, including the EU, the Arab Group, Poland, Belgium, Algeria, the Republic of Korea, the US, Australia, Malaysia, Kuwait, the Czech Republic, China, Japan, Netherlands, Germany, Spain, the Philippines, Chile, Bulgaria, France, the UK, Bangladesh, Hungary, Turkey, Ireland, Costa Rica, Italy, and Cuba stressed the need for the commencement of negotiations of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices (FMCT) as a matter of priority. Many of those emphasised the treaty must be inclusive and non-discriminatory.
- Poland, Norway, Germany, Belgium, Hungary, Turkey, Sweden, Italy, and China, among others, acknowledged the important role of the High-Level FMCT Expert Preparatory Group to facilitate the process of negotiations in the CD.
- The EU, Japan, Italy, and the US called on all states possessing nuclear weapons that have not yet done so to declare a moratorium on their production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The EU welcomed France’s and the United Kingdom’s declaration in relevant moratoria and their dismantling or converting of these facilities.

Thursday, May 9th
1:15 PM - 2:45 PM
Conference Rm C

Why and How Outside Movements in the U.S. are Encouraging Fulfillment of the NPT

Martha Hennessy
Defendant, Kings Bay Plowshares 7 (Granddaughter of Dorothy Day)

Professor Jeannine Hill Fletcher
Dept. of Theology, Fordham University, (Author of “The Sin of White Supremacy”, Expert Witness for the Kings Bay Plowshares 7)

Maura Keany
First Vice President, Commercial and Non Profit Banking, Amalgamated Bank
(First NY Bank to adopt policies of not lending to companies dealing with nuclear weapons)

William Hartung
Director, Arms Security Project, Center for International Policy (Expert on militarism and the nuclear weapons industry)

Reverend Timothy Graff
Director, Social Concerns Office, Archdiocese of Newark, Cardinal Joseph Tobin’s Liaison to Labor, Director of Government Relations (Including the message from Pope Francis on nuclear weapons)

Brendan Fay
Founder, St. Pats For All, Recipient of the NYC Comptrollers Commendation 2019
(Liaison of NYC Divest group to New York City Council for the Divestment campaign)

Introduction: Mary T. Yelenick, Pax Christi International NGO Representative to the United Nations in NY

Moderator: Anthony Donovan, Member of Pax Christi Metro NY; Author, documentarian
Fifty Years of the NPT
Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Materials, Nuclear Energy

Opening Remarks: Ambassador Dell Higginson
Ambassador for Disarmament, New Zealand

Speakers: Zia Mian, Moritz Kütt, Alex Glaser,
Pavel Podvig, Mycle Schneider

Closing Remarks: Rebecca Johnson
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND)
International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN)

Tuesday, May 7, 1:15–2:45 p.m.
Conference Room C, United Nations, New York
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)/nuclear testing
- The EU, Mexico, the Netherlands, Algeria, Iraq, Malaysia, China, Belgium, Australia, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Nigeria, Bulgaria, Spain, Norway, Czech Republic, Poland, South Africa, Japan, France, the United Kingdom, Bangladesh, Austria, Hungary, Niger, Turkey, Sweden, Ireland, Costa Rica, Kazakhstan, and the African Group urged the entry into force of the CTBT.
- The EU, Japan, Norway, NAM, Chile, Spain, the Netherlands, Poland, Philippines, Iraq, Bangladesh, Hungary, Turkey, Sweden, Costa Rica, and the African Group urged all states to sign and ratify the CTBT.
- The NAM called for the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests.
- The EU, the Czech Republic, Japan, Spain, Kazakhstan, and South Africa called on all states to abide by a moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions pending the CTBT’s entry into force.
- Belgium observed that the “continued suspension of nuclear tests by the DPRK provides a glimmer of hope for progress on the entry into force of the [CTBT]”. Germany said that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation’s (CTBTO) role in detecting the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) nuclear missile tests “cannot be overrated.” Austria reaffirmed the important role that the CTBTO can play in the DPRK context.
- China informed that it is making “steady progress in domestic preparation for the implementation of the Treaty.”

New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)
- Brazil, Bulgaria, France, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey urged the United States and Russia to extend New START.
- The European Union underscored the importance of New START.
- Austria, Kazakhstan, and the NAC mentioned that New START is under threat.
- Russia stated that it supported extending New START but that the United States would first have to address a problem with its implementation of the Treaty.

Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
- Bulgaria, Canada, France, and Sweden called on Russia return to compliance with the INF Treaty.
- Austria, Malaysia, Spain, and Switzerland encouraged the United States and Russia to preserve the INF Treaty.
- Austria Kazakhstan, and Turkey were among those to express concern about the fate of the INF Treaty.
- Germany and Poland stated that Russian non-compliance with the INF Treaty impacts European security.
- Russia stated that the US is withdrawing from the INF Treaty under false pretexts.

Gender
- Japan, on behalf of 53 states, reiterated that “special attention to diversity, including gender perspectives,” is crucial in the path towards a world free of nuclear weapons.
- Thailand called for inclusivity and the engagement of women, amongst other stakeholders, in efforts to reach a world free of nuclear weapons.
- The NAC urged the 2020 RevCon to recommend a recognition of “the disproportionate impact of ionising radiation on women and girls”.
- Ireland observed that the TPNW stressed the “ground-breaking” inclusion of the disproportionate effects of ionising radiation on women and girls in the INF Treaty. It reminded that the Treaty recognises the need for equal representation of women and men in nuclear disarmament efforts. It called for better mainstreaming of this consideration into the NPT process.

Other
- The NAC called for recognition of the UN Secretary-General’s Agenda for Disarmament as a recommendation of the 2020 RevCon. Thailand reiterated the importance accorded to disarmament in the agenda. Bangladesh expressed that the Agenda has “rightfully put adequate focus on building partnership, involving youth and women.”
- Bangladesh talked about public opinion against nuclear weapons, which is an “undervalued aspect about nuclear disarmament,” and observed that training, capacity building, and awareness building initiatives by various UN disarmament bodies have been instrumental in this regard.

Cluster two: nuclear non-proliferation

Safeguards
- The NAM, the Czech Republic, Malaysia, Brazil, Indonesia, Australia, South Africa, Argentina, the Re-
public of Korea (RoK), Sweden, the African Group, Ukraine, Japan, and the Philippines acknowledged that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is the appropriate entity to address verification and safeguards issues.

- The African Group emphasised that the IAEA’s work has to be conducted in accordance with the provisions of its statute and safeguards agreements.

- EU, Italy, Switzerland, Sweden, New Zealand, the UK, France, Turkey, Japan, Hungary, Belgium, Spain, and the US affirmed that the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements complemented by Additional Protocols (AP) are the current IAEA safeguard verification standard, which some also called “verification benchmark” or the “gold standard”. Many of those states called for their universalisation, and some underscored particularly the need for AP universalisation, including the EU, Poland, the US, China, Italy, New Zealand, Romania, Belgium, Canada, the Philippines, Kazakhstan, and the RoK. South Africa asserted that APs were extremely important confidence building measures.

- Brazil expressed opposition to attempts to establish the AP as the standard for non-proliferation verification under the NPT, “which would accentuate the imbalance among the pillars of the Treaty beyond its breaking point.” It reaffirmed that the AP is voluntary in nature. Cuba also asserted that it does not consider CSAs and APs as verification standard.

- EU welcomed entry into force of four APs in 2018.

- The EU, US, UK, Italy, the Czech Republic, Ukraine, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and South Africa supported the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system. Some of those states, including Germany, Netherlands, Ukraine, and the UK stressed their support for standardising internal processes through the “state-level concept”. The US called on states to ensure the IAEA has sufficient resources and political support to carry out its work and to “keep pace with advancing technology and proliferation challenges.”

- The UK informed that after its decision to leave the EU, it has “the arrangements to set up a domestic safeguards regime, and new international agreements,” which will have the same coverage and effectiveness.

- NAM called nuclear sharing a violation of the NPT.

- Belgium stated that NATO’s nuclear sharing agreements are in line with the NPT.

**Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)**

- The African Group, Ghana, and Nigeria hoped that universal adherence to the CTBT could halt further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

- Switzerland, New Zealand, Russia, Thailand, Ghana, Turkey, the Netherlands, and Australia called on remaining states to sign and ratify the CTBT.

- Ghana acknowledged the essential contribution of the CTBT’s robust verification mechanism to the nuclear non-proliferation regime.

**Arms racing and proliferation**

- The NAM, Malaysia, Cuba, Qatar, Nigeria, Austria, and the African Group expressed concern at the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. The majority of those states noted that this was a violation of the NPT and called for the cessation of such modernisation efforts.

- Austria observed that “the current arms race combined with large-scale modernisation and upgrading of existing arsenals create strong proliferation pressure.” It called on states to strengthen efforts to implement the non-proliferation pillar not only “via additional legal instruments but also through a change in mentality and doctrine.”

**Relationship between non-proliferation and disarmament**

- Belgium maintained that “disappointment at the lack of progress in the first pillar of the NPT does not warrant a reduction of … attention to the persistent challenge of proliferation.”

- Qatar noted that nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are “two sides of the same coin”. Ireland, Thailand, and Malaysia noted that all pillars of the NPT are mutually reinforcing.

- Ireland observed that “the continued significance of nuclear weapons in security policies incentivises proliferation.”

- Thailand asserted that the “most effective means to prevent nuclear proliferation is the total elimination of nuclear weapons”.

- Austria noted that in light of the growing risks inherent to nuclear weapons, “it is only logical that we must … exert all efforts to prevent these weapons from proliferating.”

**Nuclear sharing**

- The African Group, Nigeria, the NAM, and Russia called for an end to nuclear sharing arrangements.
News in brief, continued

**Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)**
- The vast majority of delegations reiterated their support for the JCPOA and called on Iran and other members of the agreement to continue to comply with the agreement.
- The EU, Spain, France, and Belgium expressed concern about Iran’s missile activity. The EU called on Iran to refrain from these activities and to fully respect all relevant UN Security Council resolutions. Sweden observed that Iran’s missile activities are “a distinct matter of considerable concern,” and should be addressed separately from the JCPOA.
- EU and Belgium acknowledged Iran’s provisional application of the AP. EU, Sweden, Germany, Belgium, and Romania encouraged its early ratification.
- Many states acknowledged IAEA’s work in verifying and monitoring Iran’s nuclear-related commitments.
- Switzerland, Russia, Sweden, Romania, and Austria expressed regret about the US withdrawal from the JCPOA. China urged the US to “fulfill its obligations, abandon unconstructive practice such as ‘maximum pressure,’ unilateral sanctions, and long-arm jurisdiction, and respond to the concerns of the international community in a responsible manner.”
- Canada informed that it is the single largest contributor to the IAEA’s verification efforts. New Zealand announced its contribution to the IAEA’s verification work in Iran.

**Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)**
- The EU, Sweden, the Philippines, Argentina, Hungary, Japan, Ireland, Switzerland, Belgium, Thailand, Turkey, Canada, Romania, Malaysia, and China welcomed or encouraged recent diplomatic efforts by the parties involved.
- The EU, Argentina, Austria, the Netherlands, Japan, Czech Republic, Switzerland, China, Canada, Poland, Germany, France, Romania, Brazil, Ireland, and the RoK called on the DPRK to work toward complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation.
- RoK hopes for continued support from the international community for diplomatic efforts to denuclearise and establish a permanent peace on the Korean peninsula.
- Japan urged the international community to support the US-DPRK talks.
- Malaysia encouraged efforts towards seeking a long-term peace in the Korean peninsula as complementary to denuclearisation.
- China suggested drafting a general roadmap in which specific and mutually reinforcing steps can be based.
- France drew attention to its joint declaration on the DPRK and hoped for support by states parties.
- Switzerland and the EU called on the DPRK to maintain its moratorium on nuclear and ballistic missile testing. Canada urged for the DPRK to turn its voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing into a legally binding obligation.
- The EU, Austria, Belgium, Sweden, Turkey, Ireland, Romania, Hungary, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Canada, and Argentina called on the DPRK to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Belgium and Austria stressed the important role of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation (CTBTO) in the verification of North Korean statements.
- The EU, Belgium, Hungary, France, Germany, Spain, Poland, Japan, and Australia expressed their commitment to uphold pressure until the DPRK has taken concrete actions towards denuclearisation.
- Australia, Ireland, the EU, Hungary, Russia, and Belgium underscored the IAEA’s essential role in verifying any concrete steps towards denuclearisation by the DPRK.
- Switzerland, Brazil, Russia, the EU, Romania, Ireland, Hungary, France, the Netherlands, Austria, and Canada affirmed the importance of the DPRK’s return to the NPT as non-nuclear armed state.

**Syria**
- The EU, the Czech Republic, France, the Netherlands, Australia, Canada, Germany, the UK, and the RoK urged Syria to cooperate with the IAEA to address the resolution by the IAEA Board of Governors that confirmed Syria’s non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreements.
- The EU, the Czech Republic, and Germany called on Syria to conclude and bring into force the AP as soon as possible.

**Nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs) and other regional issues**
- The African Group, the Arab Group, Argentina, Austria, Ghana, Guatemala, Indonesia, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey, and Qatar emphasised the important role of NWFZs in preventing proliferation and contributing to disarmament.
News in brief, continued

• The NAM and Qatar called on nuclear-armed states to sign and ratify the protocols to the NWFZ treaties.

• Singapore said it looks forward to the nuclear-armed states signing and ratifying the protocol to the Bangkok Treaty. Thailand said that it looked forward to positive developments with nuclear-armed states on the Bangkok Treaty and Indonesia and Malaysia stressed the importance of consultations on the early accession of nuclear-armed states to Bangkok Treaty protocols.

• Russia called on the US to sign the relevant protocols to NWFZ treaties.

• Kazakhstan said it looks forward to the US ratification of the protocol on negative security assurances for states in the Semipalatinsk Treaty.

• Ireland said that the “range of coverage of nuclear weapon free zones is a powerful demonstration of the determination of the majority of states to eliminate nuclear weapons entirely,” and New Zealand stated that NWFZs demonstrate a collective regional will to achieve nuclear disarmament.

• Ukraine recognised the authority of the IAEA in applying safeguards for nuclear-weapon free zone treaties.

Fissile materials

• South Africa regretted that there has been little progress in developing legally binding verification agreements to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material that nuclear-armed states designate not to be required any longer for military purposes.

• South Africa also observed that there hasn’t been any progress on additional declarations of stockpiles of fissile material that could be used in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

• The Philippines called on nuclear-armed states to maintain a moratorium on fissile material production.

Nuclear security and nuclear terrorism

• The Czech Republic, the EU, France, Japan, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, and Ukraine recognised the importance of nuclear security.

• France, Germany, Italy, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and Ukraine mentioned the threat of nuclear terrorism.

• Italy, Japan, Romania, Singapore, and Spain encouraged others to join international nuclear security instruments including the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its 2005 amendment. Austria, Cuba, Italy, Romania, and Singapore referenced their adherence to these instruments.


• France, Italy, Japan, Spain, Turkey, and Thailand recognised the importance of UN Security Council Resolution 1540.

• Thailand and Romania praised the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

• The EU announced that it contributed nearly 50 million euros to the IAEA Nuclear Security Fund from 2009-2019.

• Ukraine stated that it was ready to share its experience enhancing its national nuclear security system under the circumstances of any ongoing armed conflict.

Middle East

• The vast majority of delegations expressed support for the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

• The NAM, Nigeria, Romania, Indonesia, and Poland affirmed that the 1995 NPT resolution on the Middle East remains valid.

• Disappointment was expressed, including by the NAM and Indonesia, at the lack of progress in implementing the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.

• NAM, Lebanon, Kuwait, Guatemala, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, and Argentina welcomed the 2018 General Assembly resolution 73/546 and urged all concerned states to participate in good faith. Many of those expressed hope that the topic is a priority for this PrepCom. Jordan announced it will chair the first session of the conference and informed that it will hold unofficial consultations with all states in the region.

• NAM and Kuwait called for Israel to join the NPT as a non-nuclear armed state.
News in brief, continued

- Japan announced that it would strengthen its efforts to combat nuclear terrorism in the 2020 Olympic Games.
- Sweden stated that it is involved in the work of the Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction.

Withdrawal

- The Netherlands called on states parties to agree on recommendations with respect to the consequences of when a state exercises its right in Article X. It emphasised that “states remain internationally liable for violations of the treaty committed prior to withdrawal”; and that “withdrawal does not affect any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created through the execution of the treaty prior to its termination.”

Humanitarian consequences

- The African Group, the Arab Group, Brazil, Austria, Ireland, and Thailand recalled the humanitarian consequences that would arise from the use of nuclear weapons.
- Ireland reminded that women and girls would be twice as likely as men and boys to develop cancer as a result of ionising radiation which reinforces the need to continue progress under the non-proliferation pillar.

Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW)

- The African Group said that it supports all efforts, including the TPNW, that strengthen the delegitimization of nuclear weapons.
- Thailand believes that the TPNW can help to “reinvigorate existing efforts on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.”
- Nigeria and Ghana stressed that the TPNW will complement and strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime, including obligations under the NPT. Nigeria and Ghana urged all states to ratify and sign the Treaty.
- Nigeria recalled the 2017 Nobel Peace Prize that was awarded to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) for its contribution towards the conclusion of the TPNW.
- Brazil, that has signed and ratified the TPNW, argued that it constitutes the “highest legally-binding standards for nuclear non-proliferation.”

RECOMMENDATIONS REVIEW

Ray Acheson  | Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

On Friday evening, the Chair distributed draft recommendations to the 2020 NPT Review Conference (RevCon). These could form the basis for an outcome document in 2020 but are not meant to prejudice its work. The following is not a comprehensive assessment or overview of the recommendations but provides analysis on a few key points.

Chapeau

The draft reaffirms the importance of the NPT and all previous commitments. It highlights the Treaty’s role as the “cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime” and as “an essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament”.

While it’s very important that the draft reflects the importance of the NPT not just for non-proliferation but also disarmament, the language here could be stronger—as the International Court of Justice advisory opinion stressed, article VI of the NPT is a legally binding commitment not just to pursue but to achieve nuclear disarmament.

It’s imperative that this Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) recommends reaffirmation of and renewed commitment to previous outcomes of NPT review conferences, including 1995, 2000, and 2010. It also should recommend the 2020 RevCon decide on timelines and benchmarks to fully implement those commitments, so end the habit of continuously kicking the can down the road.

Nuclear disarmament

1.4 reaffirms states parties commitment to implement article VI, but only "recalls" the commitments by nuclear-armed states “to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate their nuclear arsenals”. 1.6 calls for “accelerated actions” by the nuclear-armed states to implement the unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, in an irreversible, transparent and verifiable manner. These two paras are related, and the language in both is somewhat troublesome. The draft does not seem to be recommending that the nuclear-armed states reaf-
firm their commitment to the unequivocal undertaking, as the 2010 outcome does (para 79; para I.A.ii). It’s important the RevCon doesn’t just call on the nuclear-armed states or reflect past commitments, but that the nuclear-armed states themselves acknowledge this commitment and take actual efforts to implement it. Fifty years after the entry into force of the NPT, language from the 2010 action plan. Based on the numerous criticisms made by states parties during this PrepCom about nuclear weapon modernisation programmes and the continued or enhanced role of nuclear weapons in military or security doctrines, these could be added as specific policies that need to change. The call on nuclear-armed states in I.12 to refrain from qualitative developments of their nuclear arsenals and to minimise the role of nuclear weapons in doctrines is important.

I.8 reaffirms the responsibility of all states parties to maintain an international environment conducive to the full implementation of the NPT. However, previous RevCon outcome documents have only spoken about the environment in this way in reference to IAEA safeguards. In the 2010 outcome, para 11 says safeguards “help create an environment conducive to nuclear cooperation”. It is thus unclear what states parties are reaffirming here. The “international environment” has not been a condition before for the implementation of the NPT and while dialogue on this environment is fine, the language agreed here must be careful not impose anything as a prerequisite for compliance with legal obligations and previous commitments. It should also reflect that the vast majority of states parties reject any conditionality on implementation of the NPT, as has been clear through interventions at this PrepCom.

The call in I.10 for “concrete and measurable steps” to reduce the alert status of nuclear weapon systems and prevent their use takes forward the 2010 action plan in a positive direction. This should be elaborated with concrete measures at the RevCon.

One of the most glaring omissions from the recommendations is the reaffirmation of the “deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons” and of the “need for all states at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law,” as expressed in the 2010 outcome. I.13 of the draft recommenda-


tions only suggests states parties “further consider the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any intentional or accidental nuclear explosion”. There has already been a lot of investigation and study on this question since 2010, none of which is reflected here even though it has been mentioned repeatedly in NPT meetings, working papers, and side events since then. Furthermore, the vast majority of states parties agree that humanitarian considerations already motivate their work for nuclear disarmament and should be at the forefront of discussions, regardless of their position on specific policies or approaches. The 2020 RevCon cannot afford to backslide on acknowledgment and recognition of this serious issue and the legal implications that follow.

The “acknowledgement” of the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in I.17 is minimalist in comparison with an extensive paragraph on the Comprehensive nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in I.14. In addition to noting its complementarity to the NPT, the paragraph could also encourage all NPT states parties to sign and ratify the Treaty as consistent with their legal obligations under article VI, and as the recommendations do for other agreements such as the CTBT.

The support for nuclear weapon free zones in I.19 should also call on nuclear-armed states to remove their reservations or interpretations on specific protocols.

It is good to have support for disarmament education in I.21 and “endorsement” of the “full and effective participation and leadership of both women and men” in the field. This latter point would be stronger if it did not reinforce a binary and reflected the broader gender spectrum. It should also carry forward the language from the 2017 and 2018 Chair’s summaries calling for states to support sponsorship programmes and other means to ensure women’s participation in relevant meetings. The 2020 RevCon could also go further, to encourage states parties to incorporate gender analysis into their work, including by supporting work on the gendered nature of nuclear weapon discourse and theory as has been suggested by relevant working papers to this PrepCom. Finally, it needs to carry forward language from 2017 and 2018 Chair’s summaries on the gendered impact of nuclear weapons.

Nuclear non-proliferation

The recommendations should reaffirm that nuclear disarmament is the most effective means to facilitate non-proliferation, which was expressed by the majority of states parties at this PrepCom and all other NPT meetings.
Recommendations review, continued

It should also urge states parties to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the Treaty, as the nuclear disarmament section does, and to maintain and implement bilateral, multilateral, and other agreements to this end. This would reflect the challenges posed by states parties withdrawing from and undermining non-proliferation instruments such as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and reaffirm NPT states’ commitment to upholding these agreements.

The recommendations should also reflect concerns by some states parties that have expressed concern with the security and safety risks posed by nuclear waste transshipments through their regions.

II.24 encourages all states parties to adopt the IAEA additional protocol (AP), and II.26 asserts that together with safeguards it is the “enhanced verification standard”. In 2010, states parties acknowledged that adopting the AP is the sovereign decision of any state. While it remains a voluntary instrument, the 2020 outcome can encourage all states to join. But it must also stress, as did the outcomes of 2000 and 2010, that “comprehensive safeguards and additional protocols should be universally applied once the complete elimination of nuclear weapons has been achieved.”

Nuclear energy

III.39 and 40 talk about the purported benefits of nuclear science and technology and nuclear energy for development, health, and well-being, without reference to the catastrophic consequences that can arise from such technology. The recommendations should reflect the disasters that have resulted from nuclear energy, such as Chernobyl or Fukushima. They should reflect that there are inherent risks to nuclear technology, materials, and facilities, regardless of their intended use. They should also note that many governments and independent experts refute the claims that nuclear energy contributes positively to development or countering climate change.

The recommendations should also reflect that nuclear safety cannot be dealt with in isolation from nuclear security, non-proliferation, and disarmament, and that nuclear safety efforts should be complementary to efforts to promote a world free of nuclear weapons. It should also reflect, perhaps in III.45, the position of several states parties that the “right” to nuclear energy also includes a right not to use or promote nuclear energy.

The 2020 RevCon should also reflect interest in creating a global nuclear liability regime that addresses the concerns of all states that might be affected by a nuclear accident, as suggested by several states parties over the past few review cycles. It should also reflect, perhaps in III.48, the position of many governments that nuclear regulatory and promotional bodies should be separated.

In encouraging states parties to continue efforts to minimise highly enriched uranium in civilian applications, III.46 could also urge states to sign up to and implement INFCRIC/912, a joint statement submitted to the IAEA by Norway on behalf of several governments in 2017.

Regional issues

IV.50 should reaffirm the validity of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, as well as support the continuation of efforts for its full implementation. The recommendations should also urge states parties to support, not just “take into account,” the conference to be held in 2019. It should also encourage the participation of civil society in this meeting.

Support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in IV.51 is vital, and reflects that a clear majority of NPT states parties support the agreement and its maintenance. The recommendations need to go beyond this, however, since the JCPOA was endorsed unanimously by the UN Security Council (UNSC) on 20 July 2015 in resolution 2231. Furthermore, while Iran has been in compliance with its obligations it has been subject nonetheless to additional US sanctions and measures. The recommendations should encourage all NPT states parties to act in full support of the implementation of the JCPOA and refrain from actions that undermine implementation as required by UNSCR 2231, including by opposing and countering the imposition of sanctions and other actions that undermine the JCPOA.

IV.53 on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) should also note that securing a sustainable peace on the Korean peninsula is mutually reinforcing with denuclearisation and should be pursued as complementary measures. It should reflect the understanding of the vast majority of states parties that the only solution to this issue is a diplomatic and welcome ongoing talks to end the war, establish peace, and pursue denuclearisation not just of DPRK but also of nuclear threats in the region, including the United States and “extended nuclear deterrence” arrangements. It should also reflect that the DPRK nuclear issue cannot be resolved by sanctions and pressure only and that current sanctions being imposed are having a grave humanitarian impact on the people of the DPRK and are creating obstacles to implementation of the inter-Korean agreements.

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Achieving the possible
WMD Free Zone in the Middle East
Where: Conference Room 12
When: Wednesday, May 8th, 1:15pm to 2:30pm

Previous processes to begin negotiations on a WMD Free Zone Treaty for the Middle East have come to little, despite the future of the WMD non-proliferation regimes depending upon its progress.

The METO Project is comprised of a network of civil society organizations that have produced a living and adaptive text of a draft Treaty for establishing the Zone. This evolving text, shaped through ongoing engagement with a broad spectrum of stakeholders, demonstrates what may be possible. It also aims to create a constructive, inclusive and principled discussion of the features of any future arrangements.

Speakers

*Introduction from the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade*

**Wael Al-Assad**, Former Ambassador of League of Arab States

**Patricia Lewis**, Head of International Security at Chatham House

**Tariq Rauf**, Former Head of Verification and Security Policy at IAEA

**Emad Kiyaei**, Principal at IGD Group & METO Project

**Sharon Dolev**, Israeli Disarmament Movement & METO Project

**Chair: Paul Ingram**, Executive Director at BASIC & METO Project

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