The nuclear-armed states have been busy since the last NPT Preparatory Committee. But not in a good way.

The US government has withdrawn from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran and announced its suspension of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty with Russia. It also threatened to use nuclear weapons against the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)—and while there has been some subsequent progress in relations between the two countries, both have also been testing missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. In addition, they and the other nuclear-armed countries have been actively investing billions of dollars into further developing or “modernising” their nuclear arsenals. They have also been continuing to conduct military preparations and exercises to use nuclear weapons.

The commitments that the NPT nuclear-armed states have made to nuclear disarmament over the past decades of meetings have languished, resigned to being words on paper. Now, it appears that some of the nuclear-armed countries are backing away from even these unimplemented commitments. In October 2018, the United States described the agreements made since 1995 as being from “a different time and a different security environment than we currently face.” The US ambassador told the UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security that “to make progress we need to look forward, not backwards—we must not fixate on historical language that is out of date and out of step with the current prevailing security environment.”

Since about this time last year, the US government has been peddling the various versions of its concept known as “Creating the Environment for Nuclear Disarmament” (CEND). This approach pulls away from past NPT and other nuclear weapon governance agreements. It demands that the international community should focus on “the underlying security concerns that led to their [nuclear weapons’] production in the first place”—as if nuclear weapons were created by some higher being and bestowed upon certain chosen governments, rather than having been created by the United States first and foremost to incinerate civilians during World War II.

Implementation of the NPT, including article VI, has never been predicated on first establishing conditions or an environment deemed appropriate by the nuclear-armed states. The leap backwards from decades of agreed commitments is an affront to all of the efforts made over the years in the NPT, and to the United States’ own allies that support the step-by-step approach.

Amidst all this negativity, the one bright light has been the adoption on 7 July 2017 of the UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The vast majority of NPT states parties engaged constructively in the process to ban nuclear weapons—in part as a means of compliance with their article VI obligations. All NPT states parties should use this PrepCom as a chance to redirect from the last year. Whether or not all governments yet support the TPNW, it has created positive energy and momentum in favour of eliminating nuclear weapons. Cities around the world are urging national governments to join while banks, pension funds, and other financial institutions are pledging to divest from nuclear weapons. All governments that claim to support nuclear disarmament, regardless of whatever particular process they support towards that end, need to stand up to the nuclear-armed states who are right now being incredibly proactive in ensuring that they remain nuclear-armed forever. This is in violation of international law and upends all of the work that the international community has put in over the past 25 years and more to creating a safer world. Let’s not have this be the legacy of the NPT.
HIROSHIMA PREFECTURE

**Operationalizing Nuclear Disarmament**

Date and Time: 13:05 - 14:00 (55 min.) on April 29 (Mon.), 2019
Venue: United Nations Headquarters, Conference Room 11 * Lunch will be served

**Speakers**

Nobumasa Akiyama (Moderator), Professor, Hitotsubashi University
* Dr. Akiyama is a member of Hiroshima Prefecture’s “Hiroshima for Global Peace” Plan Promotion Committee

Hidehiko Yuzaki, Governor, Hiroshima Prefecture

Patricia Lewis, Research Director of International Security, CHATHAM HOUSE

Tytti Erästö, Researcher, SIPRI

Lynn Rusten, Vice President of Global Nuclear Policy Program, NTI

John Borrie, Research Coordinator & Programme Lead, UNIDIR

*More speakers may be added.*

After the presentation of new CHATHAM HOUSE and SIPRI research, there will be discussion with respondents and the audience.

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**New publication**

**Hiroshima Report 2019: Evaluation of Achievement in Nuclear Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security in 2018**


For the “Hiroshima for Global Peace” Plan, please visit: [http://www.pref.hiroshima.lg.jp/site/peace-en](http://www.pref.hiroshima.lg.jp/site/peace-en)
RETHINKING NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL
Zia Mian | Program on Science and Global Security of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University

The United States and Russia recently began their withdrawals from their Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, ending their thirty-year-old commitments to cut from their arsenals nuclear weapons intended to fight nuclear war in Europe. Both countries also are working on new nuclear weapons, modernising existing ones, and stress with renewed determination their willingness to use them. There is grave concern about a breakdown of arms control, but this should not be a surprise.

Arms control emerged in the 1960s as the US-Soviet “superpower” nuclear arms race began spawning fearful crises and proving ever more costly, and inspiring resistance at home and around the world. Arms control aimed to keep nuclear forces in place but to offer evidence of responsibility, restraint, and economic prudence—trust us, the superpowers said, we are not reckless. One promise, codified in the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, was to move step-by-step toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The past 20 years show arms control as a short-lived and failed effort to manage the nuclear problem, offering no prospect of a solution. Left to themselves, the nine nuclear-armed states have shown they cannot agree on reducing the nuclear threat they pose to each other and to everyone else. What they do agree on is keeping their nuclear weapons.

At the end of 2001, a decade after the end of the Cold War, the United States quit the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty it had signed with the Soviet Union in 1972. There was also an effort to pursue new low-yield nuclear weapons, with one-third of the power of the Hiroshima bomb. Work on such weapons had been stopped by Congress in 1994. President George Bush explained the shifts, saying it was now “a much different time, in a vastly different world.”

It seemed that without the Soviet Union, which had collapsed seemingly overnight, there was no superpower challenger to worry about. The public had moved on from the dangers of nuclear war. Other countries were quiet. There was no need for restraint.

President Trump’s decision to leave the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty and to build new low-yield weapons is also chalked up to changed circumstances. The problem now is US decline, the withering of a “superpower” unable now to exert proper power and authority over the world. For Trump and his people, nuclear weapons can make America great again. This dream may kill the one remaining major US-Russian nuclear weapons reduction treaty. Trump sees this New START agreement, set to expire in 2021, as a “one-sided deal” and a “bad deal”.

For his part, President Putin of Russia sees his new weapons as proof of Russia’s return as a power to be reckoned with, and as a counter to America’s pursuit of military advantage since the end of the Cold War. In his speech on the Russian Federal Assembly on 20 February, Putin explained the problem was that in the United States, “within the elite, there are also many people who have excessive faith in their exceptionalism and supremacy over the rest of the world.”

The full measure of the undoing of nuclear arms control goes beyond the ruins of US-Russian bilateral agreements. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, banning nuclear weapon tests, was signed by President Clinton in 1996 but has not been ratified by the US Senate. Israel also has not ratified. India, Pakistan, and North Korea have not even signed. It may never enter into force.

Other measures have suffered a more dismal fate. After 25 years of effort, talks have yet to start on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty banning production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium, the key ingredients of nuclear weapons. They are being blocked by Pakistan. Likewise, there has been no progress on a Treaty on the No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapons, despite a 1994 draft China shared with the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, and France.

If history teaches war is too important to be left to generals, then the nuclear age teaches that ending the nuclear threat is too important to be left to the nuclear-armed states. The more than 180 countries without nuclear weapons need to step up in the effort to make the world safe from nuclear war and nuclear threats. Many of them have taken the first step.

In 2017, despite opposition from the nuclear-armed states, 122 countries agreed the United Nations Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. More countries need to join this effort and to reach out to others, including the nuclear-armed states—under Article 12, “each State Party shall encourage States not party to this Treaty to ratify, accept, approve or accede to the Treaty, with the goal of universal adherence of all States to the Treaty.” This offers a path to make common cause with those most likely to be targets of nuclear weapons—the people of the nuclear-armed states—to hold nuclear governments to account, and to free the world of nuclear weapons.
Hiroshima – ICAN Academy on Nuclear Weapons and Global Security 2019

Hiroshima Prefecture and International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), jointly launch the “Hiroshima-ICAN Academy on Nuclear Weapons and Global Security” to nurture future leaders who could make concrete contributions towards realizing a peaceful world.

Jul. 31st - Aug. 8th, 2019
RIJYO KAIKAN HOTEL
(1-5-3 Otemachi Nakaku Hiroshima 730-0051Japan)
Application Deadline: May 10, 2019

Program Overview
- Program fee: Free
  - Meals and accommodations during the program will be covered by the organizer
  - Participants are responsible for arranging and covering their own travel expenses from/to their home to/from the venue in Hiroshima, visa fees, travel insurance, and other personal expenses associated with their participations
- Participants: 14 students and young professionals (25 years of age or younger)
  - 7 participants who have a nationality of nuclear-weapons states defined in the NPT (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States)
  - 7 participants who have a nationality other than nuclear-weapons states

Program Features
- Understand the reality of the atomic bombing, such as the inhumanity of nuclear weapons and health effects of radiation, through testimonies and participation in the Peace Memorial Ceremony.
- Learn about global trends on nuclear weapons and global security, through exchange with UN officials, diplomats, and NGO members.
- Acquire necessary skills and innovative visions for concretely contributing, in the global arena, towards realizing a peaceful world.
- Engage with and learn from UN officials, diplomats, and NGO members.

Application Requirements
- Applicants should have a strong interest in issues related to nuclear weapons and security, and also be keen to work for global peace.
- To be eligible for the travel scholarship, applicants must have a nationality of Nuclear-Weapons States and be approximately 20 years old or younger. The successful candidates will be provided with round-trip travel expenses from the resident country to Japan.
- Applicants should be able to participate in discussions in English.
- For other requirements, please visit our website in the below.

For detailed information, please visit our website at https://www.pref.hiroshima.lg.jp/site/peace/icanacademy-eng.html
China

There are various estimates on the size of China’s nuclear arsenal. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) estimates that China has a total stockpile of approximately 280 nuclear warheads for delivery by about 120-130 land-based ballistic missiles, 48 sea-based ballistic missiles, and bombers. As of its 2015 defence white paper, China has maintained a no-first-use doctrine for nuclear weapons. However, its modernisation programme “is adding significant new capabilities” to its nuclear forces. Since 2016, the country has continued fielding a new version of an existing nuclear medium-range mobile ballistic missile, a new dual-capable intermediate-range mobile ballistic missile, and an improved road-mobile launcher for an existing intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). It has also continued development of a road-mobile ICBM and might be developing an air-launched dual-capable ballistic missile. It is difficult to estimate the cost of China’s nuclear weapon force; however, assuming that China consistently maintains 5 percent of its 7 overall military expenditure for its nuclear weapons programme.
France

Like all of the other nuclear-armed states, France is in the middle of a broad modernisation of its nuclear forces involving submarines, aircraft, missiles, warheads, and production facilities. France is upgrading its M51.1 sea-launched ballistic missile that was first deployed on its missile submarines in 2010 with the new M51.2. The new missile has longer range and carries a new nuclear and more powerful 150-kilotons warhead known as the Tête Nucléaire Océanique. France is also working on a third upgrade of the M51, known as M51.3, with improved accuracy and penetration capability against advanced missile defence systems, that is scheduled to become operational in the mid-2020s. It has begun design development of a stealthier, extended-range replacement for the ASMP-A, which will be called the ASN4G (air-sol nucléaire 4ème génération) and enter into service around 2035. Estimates vary as to how much France spends on its nuclear weapons.

India

In November 2018, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi announced that an Indian nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered submarine had successfully completed its “first deterrence patrol”. A fleet of four nuclear-powered submarines to be armed with ballistic missiles carrying nuclear warheads is planned, with the third and fourth vessels intended for launch by 2020 and 2022. Final “final design work” has started on the follow-on generation of ballistic missiles submarines. India’s production capability for the highly enriched uranium that will be used as nuclear reactor fuel for the submarine fleet is also being increased.

Israel

Israel’s general practice of opacity means there is no publicly accessible national doctrine on nuclear weapons. Experts and analysts outside of Israel estimate that Israel’s current nuclear force ranges from 60–80 weapons at the low end to over 400 at the high end. It is estimated that, Israel could have produced approximately 840kg of weapons-grade plutonium. Israel has been developing a new ballistic missile, the Jericho-III, which is believed to have a maximum range of 4,000–6,500km. Foreign sources reported a test of the missile in 2013. More
Assuring destruction forever, continued

recent information is difficult to find though some media reports have suggested the Jericho III is operational. It seems that Israel is continuing to “enhance” its triad of delivery systems.

Pakistan

While Pakistan’s navy does not have any nuclear-powered submarines, it has started preparing to put nuclear-armed cruise missiles on conventional submarines and may seek a nuclear-powered submarine capability of its own. In 2016, Pakistan signed a deal with China for buying eight Yuan class diesel-electric attack submarines. It is reported that China will build four of the submarines at Karachi Shipyard, and that China will also transfer submarine construction technology to Pakistan. These submarines will include the air independent propulsion system. The submarines are expected to be completed between 2023 and 2028 at an estimated cost of up to US $5 billion. In 2018, Pakistan announced the successful underwater test launch of the Babur, a 450km range cruise missile, which had its first test in 2017. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISP R) described this result as “the successful attainment of a second-strike capability.”

Russia

Russia’s nuclear modernisation programme includes a range of projects that aim to maintain its strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces. This includes continued deployment of multiple warhead SS-27 Mod 2 (RS-24 Yars) ICBMs, in silos as well as on road-mobile launchers, that are replacing older missiles that are reaching the end of their service lives. In 2018 Russia began tests of the Sarmat heavy ICBM that is being developed as a replacement for silo-based SS-18 (R-36M2) missiles that carry ten warheads. By 2027 the Russian strategic navy will receive at least eight submarines of the Project 955 Borey class that carry Bulava strategic long-range ballistic missiles (SLBMs). After the key components of the strategic modernisation programme are completed, Russia would probably have a force of 600-700 deployed strategic launchers and the capability to deploy about 3000 nuclear warheads. Russia’s non-strategic nuclear forces are also undergoing modernisation and upgrade. A number of old and new non-strategic ballistic and cruise missiles are believed to be nuclear-capable, although most are deployed with conventional warheads. Development of new long-range cruise missiles became a subject of controversy when the United States accused Russia of testing and deploying a ground-launched cruise missile that violates the terms of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, a charge that Russia denied.

United Kingdom

Following votes in 2007 and 2016, the UK continues to drive forward its Defence Nuclear Enterprise (DNE) programme to replace its Vanguard class submarines with new Dreadnought-class vessels. It is also proposed that from 2020, all of the UK’s submarine fleet will be based at the upgraded Faslane naval base, located in Scotland. The first new nuclear-armed submarine was scheduled to enter service by 2030. In addition to falling behind on the service dates, the programme has been dogged by escalating costs, unforeseen technical difficulties, shortages of skilled personnel, and inadequate management. While some information is in the public domain there are major gaps in the UK’s transparency. The Mk4A warhead modernisation programme has been largely concealed from the public and parliament, and the upgrade of nuclear warhead facilities was presented as if unrelated to UK Trident replacement. The Ministry of Defence does not release figures for the total cost of the nuclear weapons programme but estimates that Defence Nuclear Enterprise DNE spending over the next 10 years will £50.9bn.

United States

As far as can be discerned given classification barriers, US nuclear weapon modernisation is largely proceeding as planned, with what appear to be minor delays so far. The first visible exception may come in the Columbia-class submarine program; congressional auditors now see the $115 billion budget for this program as “overly optimistic”. Tests of two intermediate-range missiles—a ground-launched cruise missile and an intermediate range ballistic missile—are expected in August and November 2019. The warhead labs, test facilities, and warhead production sites now have parallel operations underway, often in aging legacy facilities some of which are undergoing extensive modernization. Thousands of new technicians are being hired across the complex. New scope has been added to existing programmes, notably in nuclear command, control, and communication; the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent programme; plutonium warhead core (“pit”) production; maintenance of existing warheads; and for strategic bombers. The expected 30-year cost of US nuclear weapons now exceeds US $2 trillion and counts could be larger. This year’s budget request for nuclear warheads is 12 per cent greater than FY2019’s in constant dollars—making it the 7th year of cost escalation in this work and another all-time US warhead spending record. •
Check out the latest edition of WILPF’s publication on nuclear weapon modernisation: 
Assuring destruction forever: 2019 edition

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