“Treaty violations are not to be tolerated as inconvenient facts,” declared the US delegation on Friday. “We should recognize for what they are: challenges to the integrity of an international regime that has served us so well over many decades, and deal with them accordingly.”

The US delegation was referring to alleged violations of NPT safeguards obligations. Yet as the Brazilian delegation noted, “43 years after the entry into force of the Treaty, no non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT has developed a nuclear weapon,” while the “other main purpose of the Treaty—disarmament—is still elusive”. Likewise, the Swiss delegation emphasized that while progress has been made in implementing non-proliferation measures, the same cannot be said for disarmament.

The failure of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) to comply with their disarmament obligations is widely recognized as the key challenge to the NPT’s credibility. Most NPT states parties believe that the NWS have the primary responsibility to ensure the legitimacy of the Treaty by fulfilling their commitments. While some NWS, such as France, argue that proliferation slows down disarmament, the New Agenda Coalition and others have argued for years that proliferation is driven by the lack of disarmament.

The Austrian delegation argued that non-proliferation efforts “would be significantly aided” if the main proponents of non-proliferation “would not rely on nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantors of security for themselves.” Despite some reports of the efforts they have made to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines, the NWS, and their nuclear allies and protectorates, all claim that nuclear weapons are necessary for deterrence and that they will keep them until they are eliminated—a catch-22 of epic proportions.

In its cluster one statement, the US delegation said that the “fundamental role” of US nuclear weapons is deterring attacks on the United States and its allies. Yet in a Tweet the day before, the delegation claimed that nuclear terrorism is the “greatest nuclear threat today” and then acknowledged that traditional deterrence “does not apply” to terrorism:

Greatest nuclear threat today is nuclear weapons falling into hands of terrorists. Traditional deterrence does not apply. #NPT #Prepcom

Even from this perspective of state-centric security, nuclear weapons are increasingly irrelevant to contemporary threats. Yet the NWS are intent to retain these weapons for the indefinite future, investing billions in their modernization and maintenance.

These two perspectives of the value and role of nuclear weapons is pushing an ever greater wedge between those who possess, rely on, and use these weapons and those who do not have them, do not want them, and want the world to be rid of them.

As the US delegation believes that treaty violations should be seen as challenges to the integrity of the NPT and dealt with accordingly, the question for non-nuclear weapon states is how to deal with non-compliance of disarmament obligations.

Should NNWS sanction the NWS and their nuclear-reliant allies, and then establish a framework for negotiations as the NWS have done with DPRK and Iran? Should they disinvest from corporations involved in the manufacture and maintenance of nuclear weapons and delivery systems and make it a crime for their citizens to deal with these companies? Should they take the initiative to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons through a treaty banning these weapons of terror?

The demand for disarmament is clear. It’s time to get serious about undertaking actions to realize this demand.
Ecological consequences of war: depleted uranium and other toxic remnants
Wilbert van der Zeijden | IKV Pax Christi

The International Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons (ICBUW), together with the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA), organised this side event on toxic remnants of war as a new concept. Chaired by International Peace Bureau Secretary General Colin Archer, three experts from ICBUW talked the audience through a set of very rich slides on the approach, cases, limitations, plans, and opportunities of the Toxic Remants of War project.

Doug Weir of ICBUW explained that one of the lessons drawn from work on depleted uranium (DU) has been that DU is a symptom of a much larger problem: the use of toxic substances and components in warfare. There has been growing attention in the past years on the effects of toxics in consumer goods and industries, but the effect of toxics in war is often overlooked. Mr. Weir raised a number of important questions that the project currently looks at: How are substances and materials tested for toxicity prior to use in warfare? What are regulations and restrictions of use? And in what settings? Is the expertise available to monitor, assess, clear, and treat victims? The wars in Iraq serve as a painful reminder of the importance of many of those questions for civilians in and after war.

The project hopes to achieve recognition of potential harm from toxic remnants of war; improved regulation of testing for toxicity of all materials used; better clarification of state responsibility; constraints on use of certain weapons; and better defined obligations for post-conflict assistance and responsibilities for dealing with effects of toxic legacies from wars.

Dr. Mohamed Ghalaieny, also of ICBUW, focused on the scientific side of this issue. He defines toxic remnants as “Any toxic and radiological substances used in or resulting from military activities that form a hazard to human and environmental health.” Within this definition, the project identifies activities, substances, affected populations, and areas. It looks at the use of munitions in conflict, training, and on military sites and across the whole range of deployed, used, demilitarized, abandoned, and stockpiled weapons.

Besides DU, the project looks at a long list of toxic substances, including for example RDX, which is dispersed by explosions of certain conventional weapons, can contaminate water and air, can lead to acute seizures, and is thought to cause cancer. It also looks at lead, which is found in bullets and explosive devices and can neurological and developmental effects even at quite a low doses. The project also investigates toxic trichloroethylene, which is often found on and around US military bases.

Dr. Ghalaieny elaborated on the difficulties involved in the research. It is often difficult to get reliable data on the chemicals involved; and the causal relationship between substance and illness is often hard to prove and positive identification of victims is often hard to establish.

Finally, Manfred Mohr of IALANA and ICBUW spoke on legal aspects of this issue. Existing international humanitarian law, environmental law, and human rights law, both on national levels and on an international level, already offers a lot of opportunities for building a legal framework that allows for better regulation of the use of toxic weapons or even the prohibition of the use of certain weapons. ICBUW promotes the application of the precautionary principle in this respect: if there is uncertainty about the toxic effects of weapon or their use, the rule should be not to use them. The French army recently not using DU in Mali and the US deciding not to use DU in Libya seem to be indications that in some cases, this principle is being applied.

From the audience, French campaigners shared experiences with trying to stop the testing and manufacturing of DU and Dutch campaigners spoke on field research done in Iraq. More information on toxic remnants of war can be found on the website www.toxicremnantsofwar.info.
On Scotland
Wilbert van der Zeijden | IKV Pax Christi

Next year, the people of Scotland will decide in a referendum whether or not Scotland will continue as an independent sovereign state or stay as a part of the United Kingdom. An independent Scotland will have consequences that are of direct relevance for the NPT. All UK nuclear weapons are on Scottish territory. Deployment of nuclear weapons in an independent Scotland could lead to the violation of Articles I and II of the NPT. Now is the time for states parties to stress in statements that such an act is unacceptable. Not to threaten the nascent Scottish nation, but to help build their case against the British deployments. And to prevent the UK government, perhaps aided by NATO states, from cooking up some subjective interpretation of the Treaty. Better to prevent an extra blow to the NPT regime than to try to fix it afterwards.

The Scottish people will get the chance to vote on the future of their country on 18 September 2014. Whether or not they vote YES remains to be seen. Only one third of citizens recently polled favour independence. Many are still on the fence. What is much clearer, and transcends the dependency debate, is the outright dislike by the Scottish of nuclear weapons in their country. A recent poll shows an 80% majority in favour of evicting Trident from Scotland. For this reason, the independence referendum is regarded by many as a great chance to get rid of the nuclear weapons.

The NPT has a lot to offer for the Scottish demand. Article II states that “Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any state whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly.” The Article leaves little room for interpretation. Scotland, as a non-nuclear weapon state, shall not have nuclear weapons on its territory.

NATO, however, has throughout the existence of the NPT, been deploying American nuclear weapons in European countries. Currently these weapons are in Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. There is every chance that the UK will argue that the deployment of Trident in Scotland is no different. NATO has always defended its practice with two arguments. One, the bombs remain in custody of the US in “peace time” and as such are not transferred to a non-nuclear weapon state. The second argument has been that the deployments predate the NPT. Or, in other words, the NPT was signed taking into account an existing practice of forward deployment. This would not apply to the Scottish situation. In this case, a new situation would emerge. In this case, a state, already party to the NPT would decide to enter into an arrangement that involves the deployment of nuclear weapons in a non-nuclear weapon state territory, knowing full well that it is not in compliance with Article II.

In fact, a comparison with the break-up of the Soviet Union is more appropriate. In the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, when the Soviet Union collapsed and gave birth to a number of independent states, several of these new states had Soviet weapons on their territory. For all the right reasons, the international community expressed concern about the fact that this created problematic situations in relation to NPT requirements. Money and political capital was invested to achieve a situation in which Russia was recognised as the only post-Soviet nuclear weapon state. The other states dismantled their weapons or arranged relocation to Russia. The independence of Scotland will, for international treaties, be regarded as a split of the United Kingdom. Scotland will not have to renegotiate every treaty of which it is part now. Like Ukraine or Kazakhstan, Scotland will find itself in the peculiar position of having nuclear weapons on its territory, to which it could in theory have just as much ownership rights as the remainder of the UK. But it does not want to take over the UK’s role as a nuclear weapon state and it does not want bombs on its territory.

At a seminar in the Scottish Parliament this April, Scottish International Development Minister Humza Yusaf very eloquently laid out why and how an independent Scotland may achieve the status of being nuclear weapons free. He ended with a call on the international community to keep up the pressure. Clear statements by NPT states parties, groups of states, and by representatives of civil society will help the Scottish government in its case to demand rapid removal of the Trident missiles. But, he also hinted, pressure could safeguard against possible tendencies within the government to backtrack on its demands if the pressure gets higher.

State parties to the NPT, who believe that continued deployment of UK Trident missiles in an independent non-NWS Scotland would be a further blow to the Treaty, need to speak out now, in their country statements and joint statements. In addition, they could use it as an entry point for discussions with the UK, about the viability of its nuclear weapon arsenal. It is the UK after all that maintains that the Trident weapons have nowhere to go but Clyde Naval Base in Scotland. So if Scotland exercises its sovereign right and ends the deployments ... where does that leave Trident? •
Disarmament

- WP.3 from the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI) calls for further reduction of the number and types of non-strategic nuclear weapons and urges the inclusion of these weapons in all future disarmament processes. It also calls for nuclear weapons states to review the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons and to provide information through a standard reporting form.

- WP.14 from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) states parties to the NPT notes the commitment of these states to pursue negotiations for a nuclear weapons convention in the 2015 review process.

- WP.15 from NAM states parties notes that the indefinite extension of the NPT does not imply the indefinite possession by the nuclear-weapon states of their nuclear arsenals.

- WP.18 from NAM states parties calls for the conclusion of an agreement through the IAEA for verifying the fulfillment of the nuclear weapons states’ obligations under the NPT.

- WP.19 from NAM states parties calls for the establishment by the Review Conference of a standing committee to monitor and verify the nuclear disarmament steps undertaken unilaterally or through bilateral agreement by the nuclear-weapon states.

- WP.26 from the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) notes that no institutional mechanism exists to monitor the nuclear-weapon states on the implementation of their disarmament obligations.

- WP.27 from the NAC calls for the 2015 Review Conference to work towards the construction of a comprehensive framework of mutually reinforcing instruments for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons.

- WP.29 from China calls on all nuclear weapon states to commit to the complete prohibition and total elimination of their nuclear weapons and to not seek the permanent possession of these weapons. It suggests a step-by-step approach starting reductions by those with the largest arsenals; commitments to not develop anti-missile systems; and eventually a convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.

- WP.32 from Switzerland calls on the 2015 Review Conference to: result in a commitment by the nuclear weapon states to submit regular, accurate, and comprehensive information on their nuclear arsenals including delivery vehicles and deployed and non-deployed warheads, as well as stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and plutonium; assess the implementation of action 30 of the 2010 action plan, which calls for the wider application of safeguards to peaceful nuclear activities in nuclear weapon states, and, if necessary, agree on stronger and more ambitious measures in this area; agree on the need to develop strengthened safeguards and enhanced verification arrangements within the context of IAEA that would ensure the application of permanent safeguards on material irreversibly removed from nuclear weapons programmes; and consider the application of the principle of irreversibility to nuclear disarmament issues other than the quantitative reduction of nuclear-weapon arsenals.

- WP.37 also calls on the nuclear weapon states to engage in good faith in the implementation of article VI and disarmament obligations undertaken in 1995, 2000, and 2010 and suggests the 2015 RevCon adopt a clear timeframe of 2025 for the implementation of article VI. It simultaneously calls for negotiations of a nuclear weapons convention in the CD.

Modernization

- WP.4 from NPDI recommends that nuclear weapon states make a political commitment to refrain from developing new nuclear warheads.

- WP.17 from NAM states parties calls for nuclear weapon states to refrain from conducting any type of nuclear tests for the modernization, development or further improvement of nuclear weapons and emphasizes that the modernization or development of new types of nuclear weapons is contrary to the assurances given at the time of the conclusion of the CTBT.

- WP.32 from Switzerland calls on the 2015 RevCon to consider the application of the principle of irreversibility to nuclear forces modernization.

- WP.37 and WP.38 from Iran criticize the billions of dollars spent on modernization of nuclear arsenals and construction of new related facilities.

- WP.37 from Iran calls on the PrepCom and 2015 RevCon to consider a decision on the prohibition of the development, the modernization and the production of any new nuclear weapons, particularly continued on next page
mini-nuclear weapons, as well as a ban on the construction of any new facility for the development, deployment and production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery at home and in foreign countries.

**Negative Security Assurances (NSAs)**
- WP.4 from NPDI recommends that nuclear weapon states reiterate their commitment to NSAs.
- WP.15 from NAM states parties calls for a universal, legally-binding instrument on NSAs. It also calls for the establishment of a subsidiary body on security assurances for further work “to consider legally binding, unconditional, irrevocable and non-discriminatory negative security assurances by the five nuclear-weapon States to all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.”
- WP.20 from NAM states parties says that pending the total elimination of nuclear weapons, legally-binding, non-discriminatory, universal, and unconditional NSAs against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons must be negotiated.
- WP.24 from NPDI calls on the 2015 RevCon to continue discussion on effective NSAs.
- WP.29 and WP.30 from China call on nuclear weapon states to give unconditional and legally-binding NSAs.
- WP.38 from Iran rejects arguments that existing declarations on NSAs are sufficient and calls on the 2015 RevCon to establish an ad hoc committee to work on a draft of a legally-binding instrument on the illegality of nuclear weapons on NSAs.

**Nuclear doctrines**
- WP.4 from NPDI offers specific recommendations for the 2015 Review Conference with regards to reducing the role of nuclear weapons in military doctrines, including actions to make the use of nuclear weapons a “remote” possibility.
- WP.15 from NAM states parties deplores the strategic doctrines of the nuclear-weapon states and the strategic concept for the security of the members of NATO. It also calls upon the nuclear weapon states to exclude completely the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons from their military and security doctrines.
- WP.27 from the NAC notes that the commitment to further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines, and policies has not been realized.
- WP.29 from China calls on nuclear weapon states to abandon nuclear deterrence policies based on first use; to honour their commitments to not target countries; and to abandon “nuclear umbrella” and “nuclear sharing” policies.
- WP.32 from Switzerland calls on the 2015 RevCon to consider the application of the principle of irreversibility to nuclear doctrines.
- WP.37 from Iran calls on the nuclear weapon states to refrain from nuclear sharing under any pretext.

**De-alerting**
- WP.29 from China calls on nuclear weapon states to take all steps necessary to avoid accidental or unauthorized launches of nuclear weapons.

**Disarmament education**
- WP.4 from NPDI recommends that all states parties promote nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament education.
- WP.12 from NPDI recalls the 2012 Nagasaki Declaration and the visit of a delegation of hibakusha to Mexico in 2010 along with a corresponding seminar entitled “Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation: voices of survivors.”

**Middle East**
- WP.20 from NAM states parties called for full implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East, which was an essential and integral part of the package of decisions reached without a vote that led to the indefinite extension of the NPT.
- WP.22 from Mongolia on NWFZs notes the essential role that all regional states must play in the Middle East process.
- WP.27 from the NAC states that the convening of a conference on a Middle East NWFZ would be a “significant” step toward a successful 2015 Review Conference process. It calls on all states parties to report on the steps taken to implement the 1995 resolution, through the Secretariat, to the President of the 2015 Review Conference, as well as to the Chair of the Preparatory Committee.
- WP.30 from China calls for support for proposals and efforts to establish a WMD free zone in the Middle East. It calls for the convening of a conference on this subject in 2013 as soon as possible.
- WP.30 also calls on Israel to accede to the NPT and IAEA safeguards and for a peaceful solution to the Iranian situation through diplomatic negotiations.
• WP.34 by Arab League states parties calls on the PrepCom to condemn the unilateral postponement of the conference as a shirking of responsibility by the conference organizers; to hold these organizers responsible for any negative impacts of this postponement; affirm that the conference must be held in 2013 and to consider continued postponement to be a violation of the review process and to have implications for the success of the 2015 RevCon; and support the convening of a preparatory meeting for the conference, to be held under UN auspices, provided there are assurances the conference will be held as soon as possible in 2013.

• WP.38 from Iran calls on Israel to accede to the NPT and IAEA safeguards.

Nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs)
• WP.20 from NAM states parties notes that although NWFZs are not a substitute for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, they represent an important step towards complete disarmament.

• WP.22 from Mongolia outlines the non-binding, political commitment, rather than a legally-binding security assurance, provided by the nuclear weapon states to Mongolia as a single-state NWFZ.

• WP.24 from NPDI calls upon all nuclear weapon states to withdraw any reservations or interpretative declarations made to the NWFZ treaties and their protocols contrary to the object and purpose of such treaties.

• WP.29 and WP.30 from China call on nuclear weapon states to support NWFZs in accordance with regional conditions.

• WP.38 from Iran says establishment of NWFZs are positive for strengthening disarmament and non-proliferation and should be complimented with NSAs.

Nuclear testing
• WP.1 and WP.6 from NAM states parties and the Vienna Group of 10, respectively, both refer to the CTBT as an essential component of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

• WP.1 outlines recommendations for the 2015 Review Conference including to: urge all states to ratify the CTBT; reiterate that nuclear weapon states have a particular responsibility to encourage CTBT ratification; uphold and maintain voluntary moratoriums pending entry-into-force of the CTBT; encourage all states to support the work of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO.

• WP.6 regrets the recent nuclear tests performed by the DPRK, encourages the use of data from the International Monitoring System, and encourages the continued development of the Treaty’s verification regime with appropriate financing and resourcing of the Technical Secretariat.

• WP.17 from NAM states parties calls for immediate and unconditional cessation of all nuclear weapon tests and the closure of all nuclear weapon test sites.

• WP.29 from China describes the CTBT as an important step in the nuclear disarmament process and calls for its ratification and entry into force, as well as continued moratoriums on testing.

• WP.37 from Iran says the US is trying to reduce to 18 months the time necessary to resume nuclear testing.

Non-proliferation
• WP.11 from Morocco, the Netherlands, and Spain recognizes the threat of nuclear terrorism and asymmetric threats to peace and security as challenges to the non-proliferation regime. It highlights the importance of combating illicit trafficking.

• WP.11 offers specific recommendations such as: to promote synergies among national capacities for detection, response and mitigation; promote information-sharing pertaining to the suppression of acts of nuclear terrorism; work to enhance international partnerships and capacity-building programmes to establish and enforce effective domestic controls to prevent nuclear proliferation among non-state actors; foster compliance with Security Council resolution 1540 (2004).

• WP.13 from Canada and Spain highlights the importance of addressing the final provisions in a future fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) such as the duration of the treaty, a mechanism for its entry-into-force (EIF), and clauses for withdrawal. The paper calls for an EIF formulation that balances between qualitative and quantitative considerations and the longest possible period for withdrawal notification.

• WP.28 from China says the underlying determinants of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism should be eradicated by addressing both the symptoms and the root causes in a comprehensive manner. It says double standards must be eschewed and calls for peaceful and diplomatic resolution to

continued on next page
proliferation concerns, emphasizing that sanctions are not effective.

- WP.29 from China calls for negotiations on an FMCT to begin in the CD as soon as possible.
- WP.33 from Switzerland describes the evolution of safeguards implementation, through which the IAEA is using a "smarter," state-level approach of integrated safeguards. It suggests avenues for strengthened cooperation between states and the IAEA.
- WP.37 from Iran calls on the RevCon to reaffirm the total and complete prohibition of transfer of any nuclear-related equipment, information, material and facilities, resources or devices and the extension of assistance in the nuclear, scientific or technological fields to non-parties to the Treaty, without exception and with particular regard to Israel.

Nuclear energy

- WP.10 by the Vienna Group of 10 notes that adherence to and compliance with the non-proliferation and verification regime of the NPT is a pre-condition for cooperation in nuclear energy.
- WP.16 from NAM states parties reiterates the principle of the inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
- WP.31 from China calls for a “rational perspective” on nuclear energy, saying states should not “give up eating for fear of choking”. It calls for balance between nuclear energy and non-proliferation measures and adequate resources for IAEA technical cooperation activities.

Nuclear safety and security

- WP.2 from NPDI and WP.7 from the Vienna Group of 10 both address export controls and the need for robust systems that allow for nuclear trade for peaceful uses and does not, instead, contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or explosive devices.
- WP.2 provides recommendations for actions to build on at the 2015 Review Conference, namely, encouraging states to share best practices and lessons learned; requiring compliance with IAEA safeguards as a pre-condition for supply of nuclear equipment, technology, and material by states parties; reaffirming the principle of that conclusion and implementation of the Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol as a condition for new supply agreements with non-nuclear weapon states; calling on states parties to adhere to the agreed guidelines and understandings of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger Committee in developing their domestic export control systems.
- WP.5 from the Vienna Group of 10 underscores actions to be taken for the non-diversion of nuclear materials including comprehensive safeguard agreements and an Additional Protocol.
- WP.9 from the Vienna Group of 10 calls for the acceleration of development of a global security framework with the IAEA playing a central role. It recommends improving existing control mechanisms such as the Incident and Trafficking Database to curb illicit trafficking and encourages states to further minimize highly enriched uranium stocks and their use.
- WP.25 from the Zangger Committee proposes language for the 2015 Review Conference related to implementation of article III (2) on the supply of nuclear material and equipment taking into account the two previously agreed Zangger Committee Memorandums, information sharing, and a list of items triggering IAEA safeguards.
- WP.23 from NPDI reviews the relevant action items of the 2010 Action Plan related to wider application of IAEA safeguards in the nuclear weapon states. It encourages wider application of safeguards under voluntary-offer safeguard agreements and additional protocols, safeguarding of excess nuclear material (or material generated from the disarmament process), and independently financing these additional safeguard procedures.
- WP.28 and WP.31 from China call for universality of the international instruments on nuclear safety and security.
- WP.31 also calls on states to apply the highest nuclear safety standards and share best practices.

Universalization

- WP.5 from the Vienna Group of 10 and WP.28 and WP.29 from China note the importance of the universalization of the NPT regime and encourages all states that have not yet done so to accede to the Treaty.

Transparency

- WP.21 from the EU welcomes the P5 initiative to implement the commitments made at the 2010 Review Conference, including those on transparency.

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and confidence-building. The paper also welcomes the “increased transparency shown by some nuclear-weapon States, in particular the two European Union Member States” and encourages continued transparency measures from the US and Russia.

- WP.26 from the NAC underscores the importance of transparency on the part of nuclear weapons states to support further progress towards nuclear disarmament. It also notes that transparency contributes to confidence-building and facilitation of next steps.

- WP.26 also notes that the status of transparency measures across the nuclear armed states varies greatly and that information on stockpiles of tactical nuclear weapons is unavailable. It also acknowledges that no standard reporting form exists. The paper also notes that it is not yet clear whether the P5 meetings have been productive in enhancing confidence among the five nuclear weapon states and how this will contribute to generating confidence between the nuclear weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon States.

- WP.26 also notes that the 2014 Preparatory Committee presents a good opportunity to harmonize the differences in information reporting among the nuclear weapon states and recommends that when reporting on the implementation of action 5 of the 2010 Action Plan that the 2014 reports from the nuclear-weapon states should include, among other things, the total size of their nuclear stockpile and delivery systems; how the role of nuclear weapons has diminished in military and security doctrines since 2010; measures and policies discussed to prevent the use of these weapons and lead to their elimination; measures taken to reduce the operational status of their warheads; actions taken to increase transparency. It calls for the nuclear weapon states, at the 2015 Review Conference, to commit to annually submit comprehensive reports on their nuclear arsenals, weapons-grade highly enriched uranium and plutonium stockpiles and production histories, in addition to material irreversibly removed from nuclear weapons programmes.

### Humanitarian consequences

- WP.4 from NPDI highlights that the humanitarian consequences stresses that the more than 65 year record of nuclear non-use be extended forever.

- WP.27 from the NAC states that humanitarian concerns should inform actions and decisions during the 2015 Review Conference and beyond.

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Side event report: Beyond verification, definition, and scope of the FMCT

Benedetta Cavagna di Gualdana | Reaching Critical Will

This side event was organized by the government of Canada and United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). Speakers included Pavel Podvig of UNIDIR, Mr. Ignacio Cartagena of the Permanent Mission of Spain, and Mark Veersteden of the Permanent Mission of the Netherlands.

Pavel Podvig spoke about the future of a potential fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) and argued that it must be part of a broader framework that will contribute to building trust amongst nuclear weapon states. This should in particular relate to the existing stockpiles of fissile material in the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom. Mr. Podvig argued that transparency is key for the FMCT, since it is needed to develop a clearer picture of all existing fissile materials in the world. Mr. Podvig believed that the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is crucial for enhancing transparency and for making sure that existing fissile material is safe and protected.

Ignacio Cartagena analysed the text of various draft FMCT that have been submitted throughout the years, including the 2003 proposal by Thomas Shea at the IAEA, the 2004 proposal by Greenpeace International, the 2006 proposal by the United States, and the 2009 draft written by the International Panel on Fissile Material (IPFM). Mr Cartagena noted that the entry into force provision varied, with the 2006 US draft requiring ratification by all five members of the Security Council, while the 2004 Greenpeace draft requires 30 ratifications. The drafts also differ around the issue of withdrawal, where the 2009 IPFM draft allows for states parties to leave the treaty 12 months after notification, while the US draft suggests three months, and the 2003 draft by Thomas Shea doesn’t allow withdrawal at all. In addition, the US draft is the only draft that has a limited time period; it suggests that the treaty is only for 15 years, while the others are indefinite.

Mark Versteden examined some practical issues around the FMCT. He argued that it is an important step to achieve disarmament and believed that all states should be more transparent about their fissile materials holdings in order to achieve a treaty that is realistic. Moreover, he argued that one important issue is who will pay for inspectors to verify the stocks.

After the presentations, the audience asked many questions about the conditions for the withdrawal, if they should be strict or not, and about the duration of the treaty.
The Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (NAPF) organized a side event on boldness in campaigning. The panel was very diverse and the presentations showed different approaches to how civil society can be bolder in initiatives to achieve the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Mayra Castro from Ban All Nukes generation (BANg) opened the panel. In her opinion, “time for boldness” means that there should be less borders for how civil society organizes itself. She pointed out that BANg has turned an uncoordinated youth movement into empowerment for young people, and highlighted that one should always try to transform failure into opportunity. She argued that it is important to remember that youth are special stakeholders in the issue of nuclear weapons, and called upon all to be open-minded, respecting of diversity, and flexible.

Kimiaki Kawai, Program Director of Soka Gakkai International (SGI), explained that the elimination of nuclear weapons can be seen as a global enterprise. He argued that there is a movement emerging from non-nuclear weapons states to put nuclear weapons under the scrutiny of international humanitarian law by shedding light on their humanitarian impact. Mr. Kawai proposed holding an international Nuclear Abolition Summit in 2015 in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Mr. Kawai further introduced a survey on youth attitudes toward nuclear weapons and their humanitarian consequences. Youth members of SGI have collected 2,840 responses in nine countries (Japan, US, UK, Italy, Australia, South Korea, Brazil, Malaysia, and Mexico), where only 72% believed that the US is a state possessing nuclear weapons and no more than 20% believed the UK, France, Pakistan, Israel, or India to have these weapons. However, the survey showed that no less than 91.2% of respondents feel nuclear weapons are inhumane and in addition 80.6% think that there should be a comprehensive treaty banning these weapons. Mr. Kawai believed these results clearly showed the need to raise awareness about which states possess these weapons and about the devastating effects of radiation. He argued that it is necessary to educate youth about the catastrophic humanitarian effects of nuclear weapons.

Alice Slater from Abolition 2000 argued that a new period is emerging, and highlighted the fact that 127 countries attended the conference in Oslo as a mark of a new momentum. While there is massive media coverage about the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Ms. Slater expressed concern about the United States. She believed the war games that are carried out by the US, such as simulating a nuclear attack on the DPRK, or the advances in developing a missile “defence” system, are clear signs of problems with the step-by-step approach to nuclear disarmament.

Jean-Marie Matagne, ACDN Action des Citoyens pour le Désarmement Nucléaire reported on a 42-day hunger strike held in France to draw attention to the lack of dialogue on this topic. He also proposed a referendum in France that could ask if the government should participate with other concerned states in the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

David Krieger from the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation closed the panel and stressed the fact that civil society need to achieve a shift from the framework that nuclear weapons provide security to the understanding that they have the capacity to destroy everything we love in this world.

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HAPPY BIRTHDAY WILPF!

28 April 2013 was WILPF’s 98th birthday!
98 years ago, 1136 women from neutral and belligerent countries met during war time, crossing dangerous borders and seas to meet and talk peace.

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www.wilpfinternational.org
News in Brief
Mia Gandenberger, Gabriella Irsten, and Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

Cluster one specific issue

Negative security assurances

• Iran, Bangladesh, and Ukraine expressed that current NSAs are insufficient and a legally-binding regime is needed.

• Ukraine specified some of the elements of an NSA agreement, including commitments to not threaten or use force against territorial integrity or political independence of NNWS; to refrain from political and economic pressure on NNWS; to assist countries that are victims of acts or threats of aggression using nuclear weapons; and to develop provisions for determining liability for violating these obligations and outline responses by the international community.

Cluster two

Disarmament

• NAM called for establishment of an IAEA standing committee to verify nuclear disarmament.

• Iran argued that all NNWS aligned with NATO and under the nuclear umbrella are supporting the maintaining and modernization of nuclear weapons. It also stated that the modernization and development of the US, UK, and French nuclear weapon programmes, and the US’ “naming non-nuclear-weapon States as targets,” are violations of article 2(4) of the UN Charter and article VI of the NPT.

Nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZs)

• NPDI introduced WP.24 on NWFZs and NSAs, which makes proposals to the 2015 RevCon.

• NAM and Indonesia called on NWS to ratify SEAN-WFZ protocol.

• New Zealand called for increased cooperation among NWFZs.

• UK and US underlined the importance of NWFZ for the non-proliferation regime and expressed that they are continually working towards adhering all the relevant NWFZ protocols.

• Japan hoped that all NWS will make every effort to sign and ratify the protocols of existing NWFZ.

Middle East WMD free zone (MEWMDFZ)

• EU, NAM, New Zealand, and UK hoped the conference on the MEWMDFZ will convene as soon as possible this year.

• NAM rejected reasons for postponement of conference on the MEWMDFZ and said failure to convene the conference is a violation of the 1995 resolution.

• NAM stated that while the MEWMDFZ is pending Israel should give up its NW and adhere to IAEA safeguards.

Non-proliferation

• Switzerland said nearly all states parties have been in full compliance with their non-proliferation obligations.

• Switzerland highlighted that civil society reports on implementation of the action plan indicate that in contrast to disarmament, real progress has been made on non-proliferation measures.

• France said proliferation is likely to slow down efforts on disarmament.

DPRK

• EU, France, New Zealand, ROK, Russia, Switzerland, UK, and US expressed concern with situation in DPRK. Most condemned the latest nuclear test by the DPRK and called on the DPRK to re-join the NPT.

• EU deplored DPRK’s nuclear weapon test, threats of nuclear war, and intention to reopen facilities at Yongbyon.

• China called for a peaceful dialogue by all parties under the framework of the six party talks.

Iran

• EU, China, France, New Zealand, UK, and US all expressed concern about Iran’s nuclear activities and called on it to resolve all outstanding issues and/or implement its international obligations.

• Switzerland called on Iran to cooperate fully with the IAEA.

• EU said Iran must suspend its enrichment and heavy water related projects and implement Modified Code 3.1 and finalize agreement on structured approach with the E3+3.

• Russia recognized Iran’s right to enrich uranium if all facilities are under IAEA inspections and argued that sanctions against Iran are counterproductive and threats of military action are absolutely unacceptable.

Syria

• EU, France, New Zealand, and US called on Syria to fully cooperate with the IAEA.
News in Brief, continued

- New Zealand called on Syria to remedy its safeguards violations and said the conflict there cannot be used as an excuse for delay.

IAEA safeguards

- Japan and Switzerland called for universalization of the comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) and additional protocol (AP).
- EU, France, Japan, UK, and US referred to the CSA and AP as the standard verification norm.
- NAM and Russia emphasized the voluntary nature of the AP.
- Malaysia cautioned that the information and access provided to the IAEA by the AP should be held in the highest confidence by the Agency.
- China called for strengthening the CSA and the AP.
- Japan and New Zealand said the AP should be condition of supply.
- Switzerland argued more progress on disarmament would help make CSA and AP the standard for safeguards.
- NAM called on all NWS to conclude full scope safeguards with IAEA.
- Japan said it supports the application of IAEA safeguards to facilities in the NWS to ensure irreversible and verifiable removal of nuclear material designated by them as no longer necessary for military purposes.
- Switzerland encouraged the IAEA to focus efforts on making the safeguards system relevant to particularities of each country, highlighting its WP.32.
- Japan highlighted NPDI’s WP.23 on the wider application on safeguards in the NWS.

Nuclear security

- Switzerland highlighted the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear terrorism and suggested the IAEA ministerial conference on nuclear security in July 2013 should include discussion on military fissile materials and cyber risks.

Export controls

- EU, France, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, ROK, Russia, and China addressed the issue of export controls.
- EU, France, Japan, Switzerland, and the UK highlighted the importance of UNSCR 1540 and its committee.
- Japan argued that utilizing existing export control guidelines helps enhance export transparency and competitiveness.
- Japan discussed WP.2 submitted by the NPDI on the strengthening of export controls in that connection.
- New Zealand welcomed growing adherence to Nuclear Supplier Group guidelines.

Side event: NWs and human survival

Sandra Wippel and Beatrice Fihn | Reaching Critical Will

This event was held on Friday afternoon and featured a panel of four speakers: John Hallam and Peter King from the Human Survival Project, David Krieger from Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, and Aaron Tovish from Mayors for Peace.

The speakers focused in particular on two specific angles of nuclear weapons: nuclear famine and the concept of deterrence.

The discussion centered around studies that demonstrate that even a regional nuclear war could disrupt the global climate. Due to such climate change, agricultural production could decline severely and seriously affect those people around the world that are already lacking adequate food supplies. The panel noted that nuclear disarmament deliberations haven’t really elaborated on the true dangers for humanity and environment that these weapons pose.

The event also touched upon the concept of deterrence. Speakers highlighted that engaging in or starting a nuclear war cannot be thought of in classical deterrence concept as the use of nuclear weapons would inevitably cause your own “suicide”, no matter if the state decides to strike first or second. It was highlighted that the consequences from nuclear exchange will affect the attacking state and its citizens itself.

The panelists made a strong case for re-thinking the concept of deterrence, and argued that such policies cannot justify the possession of nuclear weapons.
Side event
Tuesday, 30 April • Room XI • 13:15–14:45

Unspeakable suffering: the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons

Sponsored by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
Co-sponsored by Reaching Critical Will and Article 36

Chair: Ambassador Benno Laggner, Switzerland
Speakers: Ms. Beatrice Fihn, Reaching Critical Will
Ms. Sara Sekkenes, United Nations Development Program
Mr. Thomas Nash, Article 36

Hard copies of Reaching Critical Will’s publication, Unspeakable suffering: the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, and Article 36’s publication, Banning nuclear weapons, will be available at the event.

A sandwich lunch will be provided.

## CALENDAR OF EVENTS

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<tr>
<th>When</th>
<th>What</th>
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<th>Who</th>
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<tr>
<td>7:45</td>
<td>Interfaith prayer vigil</td>
<td>Pregny Gate</td>
<td>Christian CND</td>
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<td>8:00-8:50</td>
<td>Abolition 2000</td>
<td>Room XVI</td>
<td>Abolition 2000</td>
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<td>9:00-9:50</td>
<td>Government briefing for civil society: South Africa</td>
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<td>10:00-13:00</td>
<td>Plenary: Cluster two</td>
<td>Assembly Hall</td>
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<td>10:15-12:45</td>
<td>Simulating negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention</td>
<td>Room XI</td>
<td>Regina Hagen</td>
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<tr>
<td>13:15-14:45</td>
<td>Engaging Legislators in Building the Framework for a Nuclear Weapons Free World</td>
<td>Room XVI</td>
<td>Parliamentarians for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament</td>
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<td>13:15-14:45</td>
<td>Looking toward 2015: Options for strengthening the review process</td>
<td>Room XI</td>
<td>Canada</td>
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<td>15:00-18:00</td>
<td>Plenary: Cluster two specific issue (regional issues, including the Middle East)</td>
<td>Assembly Hall</td>
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