Editorial: The only peaceful use is no use
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

Wednesday’s plenary focused on the so-called “peaceful uses” of nuclear energy. Most delegations espoused the alleged virtues of nuclear power, arguing that it is necessary for combating climate change, meeting rising energy demands, and even achieving the Millennium Development Goals. A surprisingly few number of delegations referenced the disaster at the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station, even though it occurred only a little over a year ago. Most states called for increased safety, security, and non-proliferation measures around nuclear power programmes, but only a few delegations highlighted the risks of the nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear power generation.

Some delegations were dismissive of increasing concerns over nuclear safety. The US delegation acknowledged that Fukushima “affected public perceptions of the safety of nuclear power,” but argued that “the basic factors that led to an increased interest in nuclear power before that incident have not changed.” Likewise, the Japanese delegation said that the disaster at Fukushima “has dealt a serious blow to the Japanese perception regarding nuclear safety,” but reassured the room that the government of Japan “is determined to raise the safety standards of its nuclear power facilities to the highest level worldwide, and is reinforcing its nuclear safety regulations in a fundamental manner.”

However, as the delegation of Austria argued, “nuclear power can never be 100% safe.” In a civil society study on the implications of the Fukushima disaster published by Reaching Critical Will in September 2011, Costs, risks, and myths of nuclear power, M.V. Ramana of the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University argues that the key question about nuclear power “is not whether it can be safe, but whether it will be safe—across countries, across many facilities operated by a variety of organizations with multiple priorities, including cost-cutting and profit-making, and using multiple technologies, each with its own vulnerabilities.” He concludes that the answer is negative and that “catastrophic accidents are inevitable with nuclear power.”

Even many countries that acknowledged the safety risks of nuclear power argued that it is a necessary response to climate change and to facilitate development. However, as the delegation of Austria argued, “given the long-term effects and responsibilities connected to the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear power does not contribute to sustainable development. Indeed, it poses an additional risk in times of natural or man-made crises. And finally, given the combination of safety, security and proliferation concerns, nuclear power is not a viable avenue to confront other global challenges such as climate change.”

Jürgen Scheffran, head of the research group on climate change and security at the KlimaCampus of Hamburg University argues in Costs, risks, and myths of nuclear power that nuclear energy is not carbon-free if the whole lifecycle of electricity production is taken into consideration; and that nuclear energy cannot replace in a reasonable timeframe the large amounts of fossil fuel currently consumed. He argues, “Even a drastic increase in nuclear energy could not compensate for the current growth in energy consumption; it would come too late for preventing climate change and lead to an enormous increase in plutonium stocks.”

Countries truly seeking to invest in the prevention of climate change, argue energy experts Antony Froggatt and Mycle Schneider in Costs, risks, and myths, should spend their money on the options “that provide the largest emission reductions the fastest. Nuclear power is not only one of the most expensive but also the slowest option.”

This has been increasingly recognized, with several governments such as Germany and Switzerland announcing phase-outs of nuclear power in the aftermath of the Fukushima disaster. In May 2011, Austria, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, and Portugal issued a declaration arguing that nuclear power is not compatible with the concept of sustainable development and called for energy conservation and a switch to renewable sources of
energy worldwide. A few additional countries reiterated during the cluster three segment their decision not to use nuclear energy for power generation, including New Zealand and Norway.

None of these countries dispute the right to nuclear energy enshrined in the NPT but instead emphasize that choosing to NOT develop nuclear power programmes is one way to exercise this right. While the “right” to nuclear energy is part of the core bargain of the NPT, however, it is actually at odds with the other objectives of the Treaty. A treaty aimed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons should have prohibited the research of nuclear weapon technology, outlawed the production and stockpiling of enriched uranium, and established a programme for the phase-out, rather than promotion, of nuclear power. Indeed, the proliferation risks of nuclear power are high. China, France, Israel, India, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom built their nuclear weapons programmes on an infrastructure developed supposedly for nuclear energy.

The authors of Costs, risks, and myths argue that nuclear power “is the most expensive and dangerous way to boil water to turn a turbine. Nuclear power contains the inherent potential for catastrophe. There is no such thing as a safe nuclear reactor. All aspects of the nuclear fuel chain, from mining uranium ore to dropping an atomic bomb to storing radioactive waste, are devastating for the earth and all species living upon it.” As Japanese novelist Haruki Murakami argued in June 2011, “Nuclear power plants, which were supposed to be efficient, instead offer us a vision of hell.”

**Right to nuclear energy**

- NAM argued that any measure to hamper the inalienable right would jeopardize the balance of the NPT and widen the gap between states.
- France argued that the right to nuclear energy is not unconditional and requires an additional protocol and adherence to all international agreements.
- Australia and Norway argued that the right to peaceful uses is a qualified right and argued that NPT parties need to fully comply with their non-proliferation and verification obligations.
- Canada believed that the development of nuclear energy must go hand in hand with the strengthening of existing frameworks to ensure that growth is secure, safe, and does not contribute to proliferation.
- Austria highlighted that the rights under the NPT allows for the option not to use nuclear power and drew attention to the risks and costs associated with nuclear energy.
- The US and Spain stated that compliance with UNSCR 1540 is essential for the right to develop nuclear energy.

**Technical Cooperation (TC) and Peaceful Uses Initiative**

- NAM and Zimbabwe rejected any attempts to politicize the work of the IAEA, including the TC programme, and argued that any pressure or political interference could jeopardize its efficiency.
- Iran argued that many donations to the TC programme are conditioned by donors and therefore can’t be used by certain developing countries for political reasons.
- NAM, South Africa, Iran, Zimbabwe, and Switzerland believed that the funding for the TC programme should be included in the regular budget of the IAEA.
- Canada encouraged further strengthening of the TC programme to make it more transparent, accountable and results-oriented.
- South Africa, Republic of Korea, Kenya and Philippines supported the Peaceful Uses Initiative.
- The US, Hungary, and New Zealand announced pledges to IAEA projects under the Peaceful Uses Initiative and commended the other countries that have joined this initiative.

**Multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle**

- NAM believed that any decisions on multilateral approaches to the fuel cycle should be made with consensus and without prejudice to the right to develop a full national fuel cycle.
- The UK believed that multilateral mechanisms for the fuel cycle should reduce potential costs, provide assurance of supply, and reinforce standards of safety and security.
- The UK, the US, Republic of Korea, and UAE voiced support for the nuclear fuel reserve in Russia, the IAEA LEU bank, and the recent UK proposal.
Australia pointed out that it is neither necessary nor desirable for every state to develop a complete fuel cycle and therefore supported the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.

UAE noted it has pledged 10 million USD to the establishment of an IAEA LEU bank.

While supporting the establishment of a multilateral fuel cycle, Switzerland and Ukraine expressed concerns over maintaining market diversification.

Export controls
- NAM and Cuba raised concerns about existing export restrictions and argued such restrictions are inconsistent with the NPT.
- Iran argued that the application of export control regimes has hampered the access of nuclear technologies by developing countries and called for “undue restrictions” on the transfer of nuclear material to be removed.

Non-NPT states
- NAM, Iran, and Syria raised concerns about the ability of non-NPT states to obtain nuclear materials, technology, and know-how to develop nuclear weapons and called for a complete prohibition for the transfer of nuclear-related equipment to non-parties of the Treaty.
- Switzerland expressed concerns over increased nuclear cooperation with nuclear-armed states not party to the NPT “undermines the credibility of the NPT”.
- Spain called to all remaining countries to accede to the NPT and allow the IAEA to monitor all nuclear activities in these countries.

Nuclear safety
- NAM argued that the primary responsibility for nuclear safety and security lies within the state and emphasized that measures and initiatives to strengthen nuclear safety and security should not be used to restrict the right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
- France, Japan, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, Norway, United Arab Emirates, Canada, New Zealand, and Philippines welcomed the adoption of IAEA nuclear safety action plan and called for its implementation.
- Japan stated it was determined to raise safety standards to the highest level worldwide and that it is reinforcing its nuclear safety regulations in a fundamental manner.

Reactions to Fukushima
- China stated that after the Fukushima disaster, it immediately carried out investigations on safety and imposed a moratorium on initiating new nuclear power projects until a safety assessment has been made.
- France explained that it submitted its nuclear facilities to additional assessments after Fukushima and reported that all facilities met the required safety levels to continue operating.
- The EU and Hungary noted that they have performed stress tests on nuclear power facilities and encouraged others to do the same and make any conclusions public.
- Japan noted that currently no Japanese nuclear reactors are in operation as they are undergoing significant inspection.
- The Republic of Korea argued that the accident had catalyzed serious efforts to strengthen nuclear safety and security, and welcomed the central role by IAEA to respond to the lessons learned.
- Switzerland noted that the actions in the 2010 NPT Action Plan regarding nuclear safety has increased in significance since the Fukushima accident.
- Thailand stated that it has postponed the decision to embark on a national nuclear energy programme after Fukushima.
- Philippines stated that the disaster in Fukushima compelled many countries to rethink their positions on nuclear power, but admitted that as oil prices continues to soar, interest in nuclear power remains.

Nuclear security
- The EU, the UK, the US, Republic of Korea, Norway, and New Zealand expressed support of the Nuclear Security Summit process and its outcomes.
- Thailand and the Philippines announced they were making progress to become part of the relevant nuclear security instruments.
- Philippines called for states to use best practices from the IAEA nuclear security guidelines.
- Kyrgyzstan announced that it would submit a draft resolution on the subject of mitigating radiation threats in Central Asia at the next session of the UN General Assembly.
On Wednesday afternoon, the Nuclear Abolition Forum sponsored an event entitled “Beyond Nuclear Deterrence towards a Nuclear Weapons Free World.” The Nuclear Abolition Forum ultimately focuses on how to achieve a world without nuclear weapons, as opposed to why such a policy should in fact be pursued. The event was divided into two panels: “Testing the validity and utility of nuclear deterrence” and “Security without nuclear deterrence.” The event provided a forum to discuss the current dynamics of nuclear “deterrence” in addition to the necessary political conditions and security mechanisms that might be required to “phase-out” nuclear “deterrence” in order to achieve a nuclear weapons free world. The panels were composed mainly of theoretical discussions of what nuclear “deterrence” actually is as well as how relevant, or irrelevant, it is to international security. The panelists represented a wide array of opinions and perspectives on the validity, legality, and effectiveness of nuclear weapons in security policy.

The first panel, chaired by Alyn Ware of the Nuclear Abolition Forum, featured a stark division in the opinions surrounding nuclear “deterrence” as a current policy. Chris Ford of the Hudson Institute Center for Technology and Global Security, participating via video-conference, expressed support for the position that nuclear “deterrence” is not an obsolete, “quaint illusion from which we should free ourselves,” but rather, it represents the best, although difficult, policy for preventing full-scale power struggles among “opponents.” In contrast, Ward Wilson provided historical examples of how nuclear “deterrence” has ultimately failed. Mr. Wilson cited the Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1973 invasion of the Occupied Territories by Egypt and Syria as examples of this failure. Mr. Wilson noted that nuclear “deterrence” suffers from the “perfection problem” insofar as it must be absolutely perfect to effectively function otherwise its consequences would obviously be catastrophic and its proportionality indefensible.

John Burroughs of the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy spoke strongly against nuclear “deterrence” from an international law perspective. Dr. Burroughs noted that nuclear “deterrence” as an international security mechanism for prevention of major war is extremely far removed from the spirit and law of the UN Charter that it essentially identifies force as the exception and not the rule. Moreover, he explained that International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and its principle of individual responsibility are contrary to ongoing reliance on nuclear deterrence. Professor Erika Simpson of the University of Western Ontario presented a study she is currently undertaking to explore the reasons why the NATO countries have continued to rely on nuclear “deterrence” for the Alliance’s security policy. Professor Simpson noted the innate contradiction that exists between NPT obligations and NATO “deterrence” policies.

The second panel, chaired by Jackie Cabasso of the Western States Legal Foundation, featured another diverse group of speakers including: Nikolai Sokov of the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, Jean Pascal Zanders of the EU Institute for Security Studies, Hiromichi Umebayashi of the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition in Nagasaki, and Susi Snyder of the Dutch group IKV Pax Christi. All the panelists addressed various components of nuclear “deterrence,” but agreed that it is no longer an appropriate framework for international security. Ms. Cabasso opened the discussion supporting the view that “deterrence” is discriminatory and anti-democratic. Likewise, Mr. Sokov expressed skepticism of nuclear “deterrence” as a valid security policy noting that nuclear weapons ultimately make the world safe only for conventional warfare. In the final presentation of the event, Susi Snyder spoke about the shift of European security policy from a nuclear to a non-nuclear one. She was quite hopeful in her assessment, indicating that progress has been made and continues. She explained that in a bloc in which the free and unhindered movement of goods, services, people, and money makes up a basic component of its unity, the idea of nuclear weapons is passé and unthinkable.

Although there were opposing views, the majority of speakers and participants agreed that it is a faulty claim to say that nuclear “deterrence” has no valid substitute in contemporary security policies. The majority of attendees seemed to call for a framework for a world without nuclear weapons to be pursued with urgency. The inclusion of such weapons as an intrinsic component of security is antiquated at best and appalling at worst.
Disarming the nuclear powers through Iraq’s WMD inspection regime
Dr Dan Plesch and David Franco | Centre for International Studies and Diplomacy

Most of the world is trying to pressure the nations with nuclear weapons to get rid of them in UN talks now underway once more in Vienna. But rather in the manner of a group of hardened old-timers in a bar denouncing teenage drinking, the nuclear club in the UN Security Council (UNSC) continue to preach a message of do as we say not do as we do. So how can the majority in the world get some new energy to pressure the nuclear haves? After all, much as we would like to ban the bomb, it’s impossible, right?

The noted communitarian Amitai Etzioni, endorsed this approach in a recent message referring his supporters to a denunciation of ‘nuclear utopianism’ by one Keith Payne. Though readers might be interested that the same Payne wrote back in the days of Ronald Reagan that ‘Victory is Possible’ in an all out nuclear war between the US and the Soviet Union.

The ‘ban the bomb’ majority in the world can use a forgotten but tried and tested means of eliminating a nation’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). This is the system of inspections conducted in Iraq from 1991-2003, led by Rolf Ekeus, Hans Blix and Mohamed El Baradei. This effort did its job and there were no WMD in Iraq, despite the slurs of Dick Cheney and the Neo-Cons that legitimated the whole invasion of Iraq on the basis that the inspectors were merely naive UN folk – easy pawns for the evil and sophisticated Saddam.

The one silver lining in the storm of disasters that unfolded in Iraq is that despite everything, Iraq was disarmed of its WMD by a UN sponsored system of inspections. So, why not put on the same negotiating tables at the UN that debated Iraq’s WMD the idea that the nuclear powers – all of them – be subjected to the same type of inspections that were so effective in Iraq? We do not need a new nuclear weapons convention – or treaty, all the hard work was done in creating this inspection regime. It came under various committees and operational structures from the IAEA and the UNSC, and included acronyms that briefly became household names a decade ago: UNSCOM and UNMOVIC.

The Vienna discussions on the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty have seen many states including the especially vocal Argentina denounce the failure of the major nuclear powers to disarm. But they and like minded states can make a bigger stir by demanding that the tools used by the UNSC to disarm Iraq should now be applied to the permanent members of the Security Council (China, France, Russia, UK and USA), along with India, Israel and Pakistan and to any other state with nuclear aspirations. Here at SOAS we have developed this notion into a concrete negotiating text to help discussions on world disarmament. It is called the SCRAP concept and you can read it here.

The nuclear haves always argue that disarmament is a fine ideal but not practical as well as unenforceable and unverifiable. Faced with the idea of applying the stringent processes that disarmed Saddam Hussein to themselves, officials from these countries have made the opposite argument to me-- that the Iraq processes are too strong! Arguing to apply the Iraq inspections would not just be practical but presents a delicious irony that can perhaps further mobilise opinion. We may even get rid of the idea that disarmament must be a slow, step by step process.

More info on SCRAP can be found at http://www.cisd.soas.ac.uk/Editor/assets/scrap%20v1.1.pdf.

Nuclear wordsearch
Puzzles by Lily Gardener

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Nuclear umbrellas: Mostly broken and increasingly outmoded?
Jonathan Frerichs | World Council of Churches

There is fresh evidence at this PrepCom to support an assessment that nuclear umbrellas not only bind nuclear-free states into the dilemmas of deterrence and disarmament, but also are out-dated, unwieldy, require lots of money and don’t really work. The latter description comes out of an international seminar of church-related organizations last year. The evidence here links NATO, Russia and the Middle East.

Out-dated? It was heartening when the US-Russia side event May 4 reported that the first year of implementing New START has worked well. The collaboration, competence and results so far are an example of two nuclear-weapon states doing arms control. But images of smiling snap inspection teams had hardly left the screen when ghosts of deterrence seemed to join the seasoned negotiators on the podium. The wildcard visitors were nuclear umbrellas, missile defense and unresolved challenges in the Middle East.

The old ghosts were quick to show their Cold War credentials. Despite protests to the contrary, it still appears that NATO’s nuclear umbrella harbours suspicions about the other aging umbrella on its eastern border. In a throwback to earlier habits, the NATO umbrella is adding missile defense there, a destabilizing and discredited option. However, the stated reason is to deter a threat from the Middle East. This says a lot of things including that Cold War umbrellas don’t work very well in multi-polar winds.

More generally, NATO’s new-but-not-very-new strategic doctrine insists the alliance will be keeping its nuclear umbrella for as long as nuclear weapons exist. The umbrella comes with old tactical weapons bereft of military rationale, still not under a treaty and mostly dedicated to binding a 62-year-old alliance together.

Unwieldy? The NATO nuclear umbrella is also at pains to be sure that the parties beneath it help hold it up. Reasons include Cold War habits, sharing the heavy moral burdens and political responsibilities of deploying nuclear weapons, and an apparent inability to ensure alliance cohesion with something less dangerous to the neighbours. Holding the umbrella up together is also clumsy and complicated.

Missile defense against Iran makes the umbrella even clumsier. It explains little about Iran—not the strategic logic, capability or cost-benefit calculations behind the alleged threat—and little about the negative consequences this move causes with Russia.

Lots of money? Propping up nuclear umbrellas is part of the reason for the trillion-dollar-decade ahead as nuclear-weapon states stave off retirement for their 20th century arsenals. “Fewer but newer,” many at the PrepCom have noted, involves massive financial outlays. Yet there are less-expensive and more collegial instruments to use in the search for collective security. Nuclear umbrellas do not have a role in any of them.

Another side event noted that the B61-12 upgrades for the NATO nuclear umbrella will increase the bombs’ accuracy and fine-tune their yield. The aging warplanes that carry the bombs also need to be replaced. It is as if the weapons system is getting a costly second career, instead of a cost-saving retirement, despite the debt crises in NATO states, their low or falling defense budgets and the financial woes affecting the Euro zone.

Doesn’t even work. If the NATO nuclear umbrella upsets one neighbour, the ‘umbrella of one’ in the Middle East upsets two dozen neighbours. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s “infectious doctrine of deterrence” has festered for decades in the region and is now running its course. The NATO response seems to be more protection since no one can be sure how bad this infection will get in the Middle East. Never mind that the missile defense program threatens to derail follow-up negotiations to New START, or that this year—17 years late by the Doomsday Clock—there is finally a start toward a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. What is more, the heavy involvements of big powers in the Middle East offer scope for constructive influence, now, while only one state there has nuclear weapons and before the nuclear contagion spreads.
To describe the situation in this way is not to be blind to the potential of the US, Russia and the other nuclear-weapons possessors to move forward with the task of nuclear disarmament. NATO’s ballistic missile defense is a phased, adaptive system, US Under Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller made clear last Friday. The “adaptive” indicates the US and presumably NATO are willing to change their plans if circumstances improve. Will the status-quo-oriented NATO Summit in Chicago signal the will to make positive changes happen?

One much-improved circumstance would be a successful 2012 Middle East conference. We see the P5 + 1 focusing their unmatched power on one symptom of the nuclear disease that has weakened the Middle East for decades. Are the same six states doing anywhere near as much to maximize prospects for success at the Middle East conference? At the PrepCom, Mr. Jaako Laajava called for more and intensified efforts from the conveners. Indeed, they need to work with the region so that all states participate with a modicum of good faith, no acts of violence or belligerence undermine the process, and the Helsinki conference launches time-bound negotiations.

NWFZs are like shared anti-nuclear umbrellas. They are peaceful, multilateral deterrent zones fashioned not from fear but from the rule of law. The Middle East is in desperate need to be such a zone. To free it from WMDs would not only save the NPT, it would be an essential multilateral investment in advance of any Middle East peace worthy of the name. NATO members are among those lending a hand. Relaxing their grip on a broken umbrella would free up their hands to do more for peace—there as well as closer to home. •
Side event report: Nuclear energy in the future
Lily Gardener | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF

The 11 March 2011 nuclear accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Station in Japan raised significant concerns around the world about the safety of nuclear energy. However, none of the speakers at the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office event on “Nuclear Energy in the Future” spoke in any detail about the how “nuclear safety” would be achieved in the future. At best, the three speakers—Professor Richard Clegg (Loyds Register), Mr. Ashutosh Sharma, (National Skills Academy, Nuclear, UK) and Mr. John Molyneux (Rolls Royce)—discussed promoting a “behavioral and safety culture”.

The speakers presented industry perspectives on the nuclear skills agenda in the global emerging market and let the room know that the industry is “well-placed to work in partnership with you to help develop your nuclear programmes.” All three speakers discussed the aging workforce and expressed concern at resourcing the industry. Mr. Sharma devoted a large proportion of his presentation to explaining how “nuclear professionalism” would be achieved. Mr. Molyneux explained that trust to deliver excellence is paramount in the nuclear energy and discussed opportunities for industry to undertake research with universities with government’s assistance. This of course raises various questions about links between universities and industry, and in particular whether industry funding for university research compromises academic integrity—the session did not elaborate on this.

All speakers conversed on “safety”. Mr. Molyneux’s statement that the UK has had 50 years of “safe delivery of nuclear energy” was perhaps the most interesting but seemed to indicate that the UK’s own industry is unaware of the nuclear incident reports from the Office of Nuclear Regulation. Just between 2010 to 2011, the Office of Nuclear Regulations reported nine incidents at nuclear installations in Britain, including including unplanned shutdowns, leaks, and defective pumps of the cooling system.

Professor Clegg spoke excitedly about the “renaissance” of nuclear power, hence the need for manufacturing and technical expertise. Yet, despite the fact that most governments around the world are struggling with the financial crisis, the spiraling costs and interminable delays inherent in building new nuclear power stations were not addressed. Furthermore, the issue of vast and increasing radioactive waste (both legacy and new waste) was not dealt with either—not in regards to staff learning and development, or in regards to the health risks, intergenerational risks, or terrorist risks that nuclear waste entails.

The chair, Mr. Peter Carter, ended the session by posing a question about attracting “young, upwardly mobile” people to the industry. The panelists spoke about creating an inspirational vision, where “young” people can work on “exciting” technology to develop a clean energy for the future. Education on nuclear technology is important, however, this kind of rhetoric is offensive to both “young people” and survivors of nuclear technology. Nuclear is not a cure for the climate crisis; it is not carbon-free and new nuclear capacity is one of the least effective investments both in terms of cost and timeline for reducing greenhouse emissions. The atomic age is characterized by catastrophic events, resulting in the release of radioactivity into the environment, exposing populations and resulting in many additional cancers, more leukemia, birth defects, and barriers to reproduction. Regardless of opinion, none of these consequences were addressed in the session. •
On Wednesday, IKV Pax Christi held a panel discussion on NATO’s obligations under the NPT. Susi Snyder and Wilbert van der Zeijden, both from IKV Pax Christi, provided participants with background information on the US tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) deployed in five European NATO states: Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey.

Mr. van der Zeijden outlined the history of TNW in Europe. They had been deployed in Europe as part of NATO’s Cold War strategy and their original purpose was to bomb USSR troops entering NATO territory.

In recent years, the discussion about the removal of TNW from European soil has gained some traction. In 2009, the newly formed government of Germany called for the removal of TNW in its coalition agreement. However, the following year, only a few months after adoption of the NPT 2010 Action Plan, the new NATO strategic concept reaffirmed reliance on nuclear weapons.

In her introduction, Ms. Snyder spoke about ways forward and important developments. With regard to compliance with the NPT she suggested that non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) of the NPT should bring up the issue during the 2014 NPT Preparatory Committee, when nuclear weapon states are asked to report on their progress. She further highlighted the lack of transparency in the NATO policy-making process and the need to increase knowledge amongst the public.

Ms. Snyder suggested several ways to move forwards, such as getting parliaments involved, getting non-NATO NNWS to raise the issue of compliance, and using Norway and Denmark’s participation in the 16-country initiative emphasizing the humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament as an example. Ms. Snyder highlighted that even though this statement contravened NATO’s nuclear policy, it didn’t stop these two countries from signing up. She further noted that NATO is an alliance of democratic states, and hoped that it would soon reflect the democratic wish of the people in its member states.

The discussion afterwards focused mostly on possible ways for civil society to influence the discussion and work towards the removal of the TNW from European soil. It was emphasized that the nuclear weapons hosting states themselves need to become more actively involved and not rely on nuclear weapons for their security, and several opportunities for change, such as the recent French election and upcoming change of government in the Netherlands. Participants also discussed possible implications of Scottish independence for the future of nuclear sharing.

It was also raised that all reductions of TNW in Europe so far have not been the result of negotiations within NATO, but rather due to unilateral efforts. In addition, the question of how nuclear sharing policy affects compliance with the NPT was elaborated upon.

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**Side event report: NATO and its NPT obligations**

*Mia Gandenberger | Reaching Critical Will of WILPF*

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We talk about the P5. What about the TNW5?

Belgium | Germany | Italy | Netherlands | Turkey

Nuclear sharing is against the NPT.
Calendar of side events for Thursday, 10 May 2012
See www.reachingcriticalwill.org for a complete listing of events and regular updates

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<td>13:15–14:45</td>
<td>Climate-smart agriculture through the use of nuclear techniques</td>
<td>CR M5</td>
<td>International Atomic Energy Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13:15–14:45</td>
<td>Russian initiatives on strengthening international law mechanisms in the sphere of nuclear safety</td>
<td>CR M3</td>
<td>Russian Federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15:00–18:00</td>
<td>The one nuclear weapons test story</td>
<td>CR M2</td>
<td>CND Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18:00</td>
<td>How Scientists Helped End the Cold War: Approaches to Pugwash History</td>
<td>Kappellenraum Albert-Schweitzer-Haus Garnisongasse 14-16 Schwarzspanierstraße 13 1090 Wien</td>
<td>Pugwash</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Disarmed bomb of the day