While the States Parties board themselves up behind the closed doors of Conference Room IV to negotiate consensus-based recommendations on procedure for the 2005 Review Conference, NGOs offer their own substantive recommendations for States to consider as they formulate their positions and goals for next year and beyond.

During the NGO presentations that took place last Tuesday, the presentation on compiled NGO recommendations was cut out due to time constraints. We would therefore like to republish excerpts from those recommendations here as food-for-thought during these last few hours of the PrepCom.

This presentation would have originally been delivered by John Loretz of International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War.

Frederick Douglass stated “Those who profess to favor freedom, and yet deprecate agitation, are men who want crops without plowing up the ground. They want rain without thunder and lightning. ...Power concedes nothing without a demand.”

We would like to conclude this body of presentations by reiterating our demand for a nuclear free world and making some specific recommendations for how to get there. States Parties have two sets of recommendations to make to the Review Conference next year— one on procedural issues, and one on the more substantive issues. Since substance and procedure are often inextricably related, there are elements of both in many of the following recommendations.

Recommendation 1: Disarm

We have heard from policy makers in the Nuclear Weapon States that the NGOs put too much emphasis on nuclear disarmament at the expense of reining in proliferation. We uncategorically reject this assessment and demand that the Nuclear Weapon States stop trying to change the subject. Disarmament is the foundation of all non-proliferation efforts and of the spirit of the NPT. Non-nuclear weapon states should discard policies that make them dependent upon the nuclear weapons of others for their security. The States Parties to the NPT should place unrelenting pressure on States that have not yet ratified the CTBT -- particularly the Annex B states and the two nuclear weapon states who have not yet ratified. [3] All forms of nuclear testing, including sub-critical testing, must be prohibited. As citizens of many of these

The following specific actions should be taken without further delay:

A) A clear timeframe for the total abolition of all nuclear weapons should be established- no later than 2020, and negotiations should commence as of the 2005 NPT Review on a phased program of incremental steps leading to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within that timeframe. A specific course of milestones to reach in verification technology, in storage capability, in disposal plans, and in other aspects of dismantling and destroying existing nuclear arsenals would serve as a plan of action by which to measure progress. While attempts were made to do this with the 13 Steps of the 2000 Final Document, time bound targets were not attached to any of the goals and incessant backsliding has been the result. We recommend that the United Nations convene a Summit meeting on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation as a prelude to the opening of negotiations on a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention. A deadline of no later than the 2010 NPT Review should be set for completion of those negotiations and submission of the Convention for signature and ratification. Within this framework, an International Nuclear Disarmament Organization should be created, with the authority and resources to facilitate the elimination of all nuclear weapons from the world's arsenals by no later than 2020 and to monitor this nuclear-free status for the foreseeable future. [1]

B) As a good faith step, the world's nuclear weapon states, acknowledged or unacknowledged in this Treaty, must end the design and development of new nuclear weapons and cease deployment programs. [2] This body should explicitly condemn policies that seek to justify preemptive nuclear strikes. It should also condemn the creation of new generations of nuclear weapons, as well as new justifications for them, which contradict the letter and spirit of the NPT. Non-nuclear weapon states should discard policies that make them dependent upon the nuclear weapons of others for their security. The States Parties to the NPT should place unrelenting pressure on States that have not yet ratified the CTBT -- particularly the Annex B states and the two nuclear weapon states who have not yet ratified. [3] All forms of nuclear testing, including sub-critical testing, must be prohibited. As citizens of many of these

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THE SO-CALLED "U.S. RECORD OF COMPLIANCE": WHY THE U.S. NUMBERS GAME IS NOT DISARMAMENT

- Andrew Lichterman and Jacqueline Cabasso, Western States Legal Foundation

"Article VI: The U.S. Record of Compliance," a statement circulated to the participants in the 2004 NPT PrepCom on April 29 by the United States government asserts that:

The United States is in full compliance with all its NPT obligations, including Article VI. Large numbers of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems have been, and continue to be, eliminated. A gradual, step-by-step process toward nuclear disarmament is the proper and most effective course to pursue. The United States is on that course, and is making real achievements towards that end.

The approach taken by the United States towards its own disarmament obligations looks only backward, towards immense Cold War stockpiles. It expects us to accept the possession and constant modernization of thousands of nuclear weapons for many decades to come as meaningful progress towards disarmament. But this backward looking approach fails to address the nuclear dangers we are facing in the 21st century, including:

-- the normalization of still objectively very large nuclear arsenals, with the largest nuclear weapons states preparing to keep thousands of nuclear weapons deployed indefinitely.

--efforts to make nuclear weapons more useable in ordinary warfare, indicative of a shift, especially on the part of the U.S. away from a policy emphasizing diplomatic efforts to restrain nuclear weapons proliferation, and towards a counterproliferation policy mainly based on the threat of overwhelming force.

--the continued existence of Nuclear Weapons States outside the NPT, with nuclear-armed militaries engaged in confrontations in the most volatile regions on earth.

-- the integration of nuclear weapons, including eventually more useable nuclear weapons, into global warfighting systems that are taking a quantum leap in complexity, with more types of weapons that can strike halfway across the planet in hours or minutes, and more dependence on electronic systems that operate at speeds beyond human comprehension and that themselves will be the targets of new forms of deception and attack.

By the late 1980's, there were approximately 70,000 nuclear weapons on earth, with more than 24,000 in the U.S. arsenal. The United States also possessed the most powerful and technologically advanced conventional forces.

The United States asks us only to look at the numbers, and to measure progress mainly by a partial descent from the heights of insanity that the Cold War arsenals represented. They ask us to accept as adequate the "achievements" of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, (SORT), which requires only that the United States and Russia reduce deployed strategic nuclear arsenals to between 1700 and 2200 warheads and bombs by 2012. Thousands more will be kept in various states of storage and readiness. There is no requirement that a single bomb, warhead, or delivery system be destroyed. There are no transparency or verification mechanisms and no milestones for reductions prior to 2012, when the treaty expires. There will also be unspecified numbers of non-strategic nuclear weapons, which are likely to grow more diverse in capabilities and intended missions. There are no negotiations underway for further reductions in nuclear arsenals.

It is important to think about what these numbers really mean. A 1990 U.S. Congressional Budget Office study estimated that a total of 500 deliverable U.S. retaliatory warheads, for instance, could destroy "most [Russian] petrochemical, metallurgical, and heavy-machinery industry; all major [CIS] storage sites for ammunition, fuel, and other military supplies; all major tactical airfields; some troop concentrations; and all major [Russian] transportation nodes and choke points en route to the European and Far Eastern theaters;" all garrisons for mobile strategic missiles; all primary strategic bomber bases and submarine pens; most strategic bomber dispersal bases; and most major fixed and mobile command posts.

The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) elevated the research and development infrastructure to one leg of a "new" strategic triad, intended to support both offensive strike capabilities (nuclear and non-nuclear) and "defenses" (active and passive). The United States continues to modernize its nuclear weapons research and production capabilities, to enable it to respond to "unanticipated events or emerging threats," which could "could call for new or modified warhead development, or for providing additional warheads for force augmentation." To assure its ability to "augment" its nuclear forces, the U.S. plans to build a new factory to produce as many as 450 plutonium pits per year in normal single shift operation, and considerably more if the government chose to operate a second shift.

U.S. goals include the capability to modify existing weapons within eighteen months, and to develop new designs within three to four years. Research already is proceeding on modification of nuclear weapons to provide additional capabilities. The U.S. claims in its statement that this work is "entirely conceptual," but the U.S. in the recent past modified an existing nuclear weapon, the B61-11 bomb, to give it some earth penetrating capabilities, deploying it in the late 1990's. Research is proceeding on a more effective, earth penetrator, the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator.

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Numbers Game continued from page 2

After presenting a litany of purported, "Hard Evidence" to support its record of compliance on Article VI, the April 29, 2004 U.S. statement concludes: "Arguments that the United States is not proceeding to fulfill its Article VI commitments have no factual basis." We disagree. What the U.S. has done is to selectively manipulate "facts" of its choosing, making inappropriate comparisons, and situating them in a distorted historical and geopolitical context.

Nuclear Weapons: The U.S. states that it is now in the process of drawing down its operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to the level of 1,700-2,200, about one-third of the 2002 level.

Fact: At present, the U.S. stockpile contains approximately 7,000 operational nuclear warheads, including 5,886 strategic and 1,120 non-strategic warheads. Some 3,000 additional warheads are held in reserve, with a few hundred, under current plans, slated for dismantlement. The Bush administration continues to implement provisions of its 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), including phasing out weapons previously earmarked for retirement, developing new ballistic missiles, researching bombs and warheads with new capabilities, building new production facilities to manufacture them, and modernizing the nuclear command and control system. None of these activities are banned or limited by the 2002 Moscow Treaty. (U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2004, NRDC Nuclear Notebook, www.thebulletin.org/issues/nukenotes/mj04nukenote.html)

Launchers and Delivery Systems: The U.S. states that since 1999 it has deactivated 28 Peacekeeper ICBMs, with the remaining 22 scheduled for deactivation by October 2005.

Fact: According to the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR): "The elimination of the Peacekeeper ICBM will be phased to correspond with the introduction of the Trident II (D-5) missile in the Pacific. As they are eliminated, those Peacekeeper missiles remaining during the elimination process will be kept on alert to provide a necessary contribution to the U.S. portfolio of capabilities." (p. 54) (Resources on the Nuclear Posture Review, Western States Legal Foundation, www.wslfweb.org/nukes/npr.htm)

"De-Alerting": The U.S. states that it does not target any country with nuclear weapons.

Fact: The NPR, in setting forth requirements for U.S. nuclear strike capabilities, anticipated "immediate, potential or unexpected" contingencies involving Iraq, North Korea, China, Iran, Syria and Libya. It also identified Russia, though no longer an enemy, as a potential nuclear target. (p. 16) (www.wslfweb.org/nukes/npr.htm)

Fact: More than 2,000 U.S. strategic nuclear warheads remain on hair-trigger alert, ready to instantly target locations around the globe upon receiving a few short computer signals. Land based nuclear missiles are ready to launch their deadly payloads within two minutes. U.S. Trident submarines continue to patrol the seas at Cold War levels, ready to fire hundreds of the most destructive...continued on page 6

In addition, there will be continued modernization of delivery systems, including more accurate strategic missiles. In the near term, for example, work is proceeding to provide "dramatically improved accuracy" for Trident submarine launched ballistic missiles, in order to provide "increased capabilities articulated in the NPR [nuclear posture review], such as prompt accurate strike, defeat of critical targets and selective nuclear options."[7] The program "is intended to demonstrate a near-term capability to steer a SLBM warhead to Global Positioning Satellite (GPS)-like accuracy," culminating in flight tests by 2007.[8] In the long term, the United States is analyzing alternatives for replacement of its land-based nuclear missiles, asking contractors to consider approaches that will provide greater accuracy and perhaps other new capabilities as well, with the goal of maintaining US qualitative superiority in nuclear warfighting capabilities in the 2020-2040 time frame."[9]

Work also is going forward on a variety of technology upgrades intended to increase U.S. capabilities to plan and execute nuclear strikes, ranging from research on nuclear weapons effects on underground bunkers and chemical and biological warfare facilities to extensive upgrades in the computer software and hardware used to plan and execute nuclear strikes, including software to assess likely "collateral damage."[10]

There is no way to reconcile this resurgence of nuclear weapons development with disarmament. The U.S. position that Cold War stockpile numbers should be the yardstick for disarmament also makes little sense. By this logic, if the stockpiles had been twice as excessive, twice as insane, if the scenario spinners and the war planners and the arms industry lobbyists had been twice as successful in their efforts to accumulate more and more and more, we should be willing to wait twice as long for disarmament. The second nuclear arms race may not look like the first. Sheer numbers of nuclear weapons are less the goal than a new kind of military dominance that combines computing, aerospace technologies, and nearly unlimited capacities for raw destruction in devastating new ways. But it is an arms race nonetheless, and the world must end it, before it ends the world.

References in footnotes are available upon request
countries, we are embarrassed and angry that their governments are so invested in cold-war era concepts of nuclear defense that they would not ratify a treaty whose objective is to prevent the widespread harm of nuclear testing. We must remember the faces of the hibakusha, of the atomic veterans, of the downwinders, of the indigenous peoples throughout the world who have suffered because of nuclear testing, and we must make every effort to prevent this from happening again.

C) Disarmament of the delivery systems for nuclear weapons must go hand-in-hand with disarmament of the warheads themselves. Testing of both missiles and missile defense systems must stop. Negotiations should commence for an international treaty banning testing and deployment of ballistic missiles and of missile defense systems. Research, development, testing, building, and deployment of weapons for use in space should be prohibited. [4]

Recommendation 2: No New Nuclear Reactors

We urge a moratorium on the building of new nuclear reactors as old ones are closed down. Funds from Export Credit Agencies and government subsidies for new nuclear power plants should be transferred to an International Sustainable Energy Fund. [5]

Recommendation 3: Implement and Strengthen the NPT in a Non-Discriminatory Manner That Demands Accountability

States Parties to the NPT -- particularly the nuclear weapon states but also non-nuclear states that are the focus of breakout concerns -- must be held to a higher standard of reporting on their Treaty compliance than presently exists. Substantive reporting should be viewed as part of the infrastructure of monitoring, verification, and enforcement of the NPT and its disarmament and non-proliferation goals.

In particular:

A) Step 12 of the 13 Steps obliges all states to provide regular reports on implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.” The number of States submitting these reports must increase, as must the quality and frequency of reporting, so that they can fulfill their potential as an important transparency tool. [6]

B) Treaty-based, multilateral mechanisms to address disarmament and non-proliferation goals must be strengthened, so that reliance on unilateral or plurilateral measures for enforcement and verification will not become the norm. In particular, concerns regarding suspected or documented horizontal proliferation such as those seen most recently in Iraq, North Korea, Iran, and Libya must be handled within the context of the NPT and the IAEA. Where necessary, the capacity to address those concerns within the Treaty framework must be reinforced. Similarly, the capabilities for addressing and halting vertical proliferation and for enforcing progress toward the elimination of all nuclear arsenals must be built up.

Mechanisms that should be considered include a permanent NPT body, and a UN-based inspectorate, drawing on UNMOVIC capabilities. [7]

C) NPT Member States should make common cause with those responsible for implementing the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, in pursuit of effective and mutually reinforcing systems for verification and enforcement. [8]

D) As one of its responsibilities, a new NPT Secretariat (see Recommendation 7, below) should formally consider the findings of civil-society-based teams of "citizen inspectors" to assist it in the task of global fact finding with regard to NPT compliance. Citizen inspectors should be recognized as legitimate gatherers of information in nuclear weapon states and in non-nuclear weapon states allegedly conducting clandestine nuclear weapons programs, regarding the locations of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems; targets and suspected targets; policies governing their intended uses; and the fulfillment of disarmament commitments. [9]

Recommendation 4: Insist That International Means International

We have discussed our growing concern today that binding international agreements that serve the goals of common global security are being replaced by unilateral and plurilateral strategies of counterproliferation that primarily serve the interests of the most powerful states. The goal of the NPT is to achieve global disarmament under "strict and effective international control," and no one Member State or group of Member States acting as a "coalition of the willing" should be allowed to dominate the discussion about how and when to implement the Treaty, or to exempt themselves from its provisions.

Specifically:

A) In order to accomplish the Article VI goal of nuclear disarmament, irreversible steps to reduce nuclear weapons holdings are essential. In this regard, the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) between the US and Russia should be brought into conformance with the principles of transparency and irreversibility reflected in the 13 Steps. NPT Member States should incorporate the measures enacted by the G8 in the Global Partnership Program into a broader, well funded multilateral verification framework under IAEA controls. [10]

B) As part of the effort to achieve the universality of the NPT, as well as to promote the goal of nuclear weapon free zones in the Middle East and elsewhere, the NPT Member States should send formal invitations for official observers from Israel, India, and Pakistan at the NPT PrepComs and Reviews, and develop mechanisms for giving them greater access to NPT deliberations. [11]

C) Negotiations should commence immediately on a multilateral treaty banning the shipment of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Any
stabilizing of the right to intercept shipments, which affects both sovereignty and use of force issues, should proceed through legitimate multilateral lawmaking, and within an accountable and equitable multilateral framework.

D) Excess weapons-grade fissile materials of the nuclear weapon states must be brought under IAEA safeguards, consistent with Article III of the NPT as affirmed in the 2000 Final Document. [12] We support the recommendations of Mr. ElBaradei that parts of the nuclear fuel cycle should be brought under multinational control and that export controls should be universalized. Tough, on-site inspections must be universally accepted. So long as States maintain the foolhardy claim to nuclear power, dangerous fissile materials should not be in the hands of a few States, but should be internationalized and monitored heavily by an international agency such as the IAEA. [13]

E) The withdrawal clause of the NPT should be revised. A method should be established to convene the Member States to begin negotiations with any State threatening to withdraw from the Treaty, with the goal of settling any differences or disputes that may be the root cause of a State’s desire to withdraw. Regrettably, there was no such a dispute settlement mechanism when the DPRK took steps to withdraw from the NPT in 2003. We urge the United States and the DPRK to engage in sincere bilateral negotiations in addition to the six-party talks in Beijing, and to resolve the nuclear issue in a peaceful manner.

F) The role of the IAEA in verification of peaceful nuclear activities must be supported through both financial and political commitments to the safeguard and verification regime. Member States should create a permanent monitoring and verification unit under the UN umbrella and based on the expertise of UNMOVIC. [14]

Recommendation 5: Enhance NGO Access

As the cornerstone of accountability, transparency with regard to the implementation of NPT obligations is called for in the 13 Steps. Closed door meetings, however, represent the antithesis to this. An essential element of transparency is NGO participation in the NPT Review Process, which has the secondary effect of allowing states to benefit from the considerable expertise within civil society. To this end, we urge this meeting to recommend to the 2005 Review Conference that NGO participants be granted increased access to the proceedings, including fewer closed sessions allowing NGO observers to attend cluster discussions, and timely access to documentation.

Recommendation 6: Strengthen Member State Reporting

In the 2000 Review Conference Final Document, states agreed to submit regular reports on their progress toward disarmament. We note that there have been more reports submitted at each of the three PrepComs since 2000, and urge states to continue strengthening this important transparency tool. While a standardized reporting mechanism might increase ease of reporting, and the NGO Shadow Report prepared by Reaching Critical Will (WILPF) provides one such model, we would encourage increased participation before negotiations of a standard format. Substantive statements on the part of the nuclear weapon states about nuclear holdings and fissile material stocks, operational status and doctrine, would be an important confidence building measure and encourage others to report as well. Translation and distribution of these reports will be an important contribution to the institutional memory of the NPT -- but the question remains, who is the custodian of institutional memory?

Recommendation 7: Create an NPT Secretariat

In the absence of an NPT Secretariat, many functions and responsibilities either fall by the wayside, or are dealt with ineffectively in an ad-hoc way. To whom are reports submitted and archived? Who is monitoring this crucial function? To whom do States lodge complaints or suspicions of non-compliance? An NPT Secretariat is necessary at this time. Such an institution could be modeled on the OPCW, and would serve as an interim body until there is a Nuclear Weapons Convention, nuclear weapons have been eliminated at long last, and we have no more need for the NPT at all.

To create such an institution, States Parties of the NPT must contribute adequate personnel and financial resources. They must identify a host country and develop the terms of reference for the institution, including its relationship with the IAEA. We have confidence that these tasks could be done with the assistance of the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs, and encourage Member States to recommend this procedural modification to the NPT.

Another function that an NPT Secretariat could play would be to conduct meetings with states outside of the NPT to encourage their participation, in much the same way that the CTBT provisional secretariat meets with states that have not yet ratified that treaty.

The only meaningful measure to gauge the effectiveness of the NPT is the progress and the pace of efforts by the Nuclear Weapon States to rid themselves of nuclear weapons. If the Nuclear Weapon States comply with their NPT obligations under Article VI, non-proliferation will be easier to ensure. If they do not and the nuclear double standard articulated most explicitly by the United States continues to dominate this forum, proliferation will be impossible to stop and nuclear war itself will become unpreventable. Therefore, every substantive recommendation of the NGO community made in this summation serves one, underlying purpose: to challenge the States Parties to the NPT to summon the political will required to put global nuclear disarmament on a strict, short, and unambiguous timetable. As representatives of civil society - as those who have entrusted you with the job of eliminating these genocidal weapons from the world’s arsenals- we expect action, not a proliferation of excuses for inaction.

Thank you.

*References in footnotes are available upon request
and precise weapons ever conceived, on fifteen minutes notice.
(Bruce Blair, Center for Defense Information, www.cdi.org)

**U.S. Budgeting for Nuclear Weapons:** The U.S. states that defense spending on strategic nuclear forces has declined from 7% of the Defense Department's budget during the last years of the Cold War to less than 3% today.

**Fact:** The U.S. statement cites only the Department of Defense (DOD) budget, which covers delivery systems and command and control. The fact that some delivery systems now under consideration may be dual-use, suggests that DOD funding may be underestimated. In any case, nuclear warhead and bomb research, development, testing and production is funded by the Department of Energy (DOE). The DOE budget request for nuclear weapons activities in fiscal year (FY) 2005 is $6.6 billion, an increase of 5.4% over the 2004 appropriation. The 2005 request continues a steady decade long rise in nuclear weapons funding. The request is 130% higher than spending in 1995 for comparable activities. Accounting for inflation (constant dollars) the nuclear weapons budget has grown by 84% since 1995, when the NPT was indefinitely extended. (Dr. Robert Civiak, for Tri-Valley CAREs, www.trivalleycares.org)

**So-Called "New" Nuclear Weapons: What We're Not Doing:** The U.S. states that it is not developing any new nuclear weapons.

**Fact:** The 2005 budget provides for upgrades to every nuclear weapon in the U.S. stockpile, requests $336 million to manufacture and certify new plutonium pits, the first stage in a nuclear weapon, requests $28 million for 2005 and $485 million over five years to design a "Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator," and requests $30 for Enhanced Test Readiness to reduce the time needed to prepare for and conduct a full-scale underground nuclear test to 18 months. (Dr. Robert Civiak, www.trivalleycares.org)

**So-Called "New" Nuclear Weapons: The NPT Context:** The U.S. states that the NPT does not prohibit the nuclear weapons states from modernizing their nuclear forces while they possess nuclear weapons, and that it would be a novel interpretation of the NPT to assert that conceptual work on a "Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator" or other new weapons designs in problematic under the NPT.

**Fact:** Article VI of the NPT has two distinct but related nuclear disarmament provisions. In 1970, the United States promised to negotiate in good faith for both the early cessation of the arms race, and the elimination of its nuclear arsenal. In 1995, in anticipation of the 1995 NPT Extension Conference, the United States, France, Russia and the United Kingdom declared that "the nuclear arms race has ceased" (CD/1308 1995.). Modernization of existing nuclear weapons types and research and development of new weapons fuels and perpetuates the arms race, contrary to the 2000 commitment to a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policy and to the intent of Article VI.

-- Jacqueline Cabasso, Western States Legal Foundation

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**Today at the PrepCom**

8 AM: Abolition 2000 daily **Strategy Session** on the 8th floor of the UNCC

9 AM: **The French delegation briefs** the NGOs in Conf. Room A.


Noon: **OPANAL**, the Secretariat of the Tlatelolco Treaty, will be hosting a briefing in Conference Room A.

1:15- 3 PM: Educators for Social Responsibility Workshop on Disarmament Education: "Learning and Demonstrating Techniques to Raise Nuclear Awareness in a Younger Generation"

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PREVENTING WAR: MAKING CONNECTIONS

- Jennifer Nordstrom, Global Action to Prevent War

Whatever happened to that little phrase following the "cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament" obligation of Article VI? Has the little phrase after that fateful comma been forgotten? South Africa continues to insist on walking the path to general and complete disarmament, both at this preparatory committee and in the First Committee of the General Assembly. But as the Monday May 3, 2004 issue of the News in Review said, we cannot expect South Africa to do all the work. Civil Society has a suggestion for "a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control."

We have been talking all last week, and much, much longer about eliminating nuclear weapons. We have talked reasons, strategies and details. We heard about high-level weapons contracts and government connections, many delivery systems, new nuclear weapons, and different strategies to mobilize for abolition. All the NGOs at the Preparatory Committee, and many of the governments, are focusing on specific issues of the NPT, and are sharing their expert knowledge during these two weeks. Global Action to Prevent War, a member of the Abolition 2000 network, is putting these specific components of nuclear weapons in a larger picture that includes general and complete disarmament.

In the last week, both NGOs and Governments have called nuclear weapons the ultimate symbol of violence and aggression, the crown jewel of the war system. Global Action to Prevent War is a program and an organization that draws out the connection between nuclear weapons, weapons systems and war, and proposes how to get rid of all three.

Global Action is two things. First, it is a vision and a practical plan to achieve general and complete disarmament and abolish war. The plan is a comprehensive program integrating disarmament, conflict prevention, and peacekeeping to be implemented in phases over the next 3 to 4 decades. Second, Global Action is an international network of people around the world working on these issues, bringing the three areas together in a network for disarmament and lasting peace.

A Word on Political Will
The Global Action Program covers many components of achieving general and complete disarmament without great elaboration on any one point. This comes from piecing together and summarizing work people have been doing in the field for years and putting it in a larger framework. There is strength in this modality for two reasons. First, Global Action to Prevent War is bringing knowledge and work together to show that the elimination of nuclear weapons, general and complete disarmament, and the abolition of war are possible, practical and secure. Second, it allows for the self-determination of various organizations and states to implement the theory of the program as need be. This leaves space for all people working for nuclear abolition, general and complete disarmament, and the abolition of war to connect with each other and work in concert and on the issue of their choosing. With such a broad and international network, the political will is sure to come from below.
For background information on issues being discussed at the 2004 NPT PrepCom

www.vertic.org

VERTIC Briefs

no. 1  ‘Verification of a nuclear weapon-free world’
      by Trevor Findlay (May 2003)
no. 2  ’93 + 10: strengthened nuclear safeguards a decade on’
      by Kenneth Boutin (May 2004)
no. 3  ‘The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: virtually verifiable now’
      by Ben Mines (May 2004)

Verification Yearbook 2003

•  ‘Introduction: multilateral verification in flux’
  by Trevor Findlay
•  ‘Integrated nuclear safeguards: genesis and evolution’
  by Jill N. Cooley
•  ‘North Korea: the challenge of verifying a moving target’
  by Kenneth Boutin
•  ‘The radiological threat: verification at the source’
  by Klaas van der Meer
•  ‘CTBT radionuclide verification and the British Laboratory’
  by Christine Comley and Owen Price

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Building trust through verification