DEFINING SUCCESS

A test ban.
The ABM treaty.
Irreversible disarmament.
A fissban.
An unequivocal undertaking to disarm.

Four years after the 13 steps were drafted, haggled and adopted, the promises of the 2000 Final Document remain unfulfilled, leaving the international security regime in tatters. While the 13 steps may seem nothing more than a pallid piece of paper disintegrating in the dearth of political will to implement it, the promises contained therein are not forgotten.

This year, NGOs, together with progressive and bold governments, will be putting forth new ideas and strategies for strengthening the international disarmament regime. The New Agenda Coalition will reinforce its calls for tactical weapons reductions. Canada will continue to lead the States Parties in the campaign to create a culture of reporting, accountability and transparency. The Non-Aligned countries will be hardening their resolve to finally solicit the long overdue codified security assurances from the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS).

Over the next two weeks, we will witness what will probably not be "a successful" conference, as defined by some. The "with us or against us" rhetoric of the few will not cower the majority into acquiescence. Some States will be attempting to use this PrepCom as another tool to bury the calls for nuclear disarmament under the foolhardy concept of "counterproliferation." The PrepCom must not be another forum through which the dangerous de-linkage of disarmament from non-proliferation gains more ground.

The recently proposed Security Council resolution on non-proliferation is a primary example of the way in which disarmament is systematically displaced by an aggressive, non-egalitarian and ultimately ineffective counterproliferation strategy. Fifty States - over a quarter of all UN Member States-addressed the Council in an open debate on the resolution last week, a vast majority of them expressing their concern with any measure which fails to reaffirm the intrinsic link between disarmament and nonproliferation.

The NWS have correctly been leading the world in the campaign against the spread of nuclear weapons. If they want to maintain their momentum and truly build effective, long-lasting, and powerful solutions to this horrific problem, they will learn, over these next two weeks, that any struggle against nuclear proliferation starts with nuclear disarmament.

If States Parties are not able to produce an agreed set of recommendations for the next Review, we should not deplore this PrepCom as a "failure." Rather, a true failure would result in a watered down, lowest-common-denominator document that fails to adequately address the serious problems contaminating the international disarmament regime.

We shall measure success of this PrepCom, then, by the way in which the Non Nuclear Weapon States and civil society present a unified front calling for complete, irreversible and verifiable disarmament. We shall measure it by the formation of new alliances, by the strengthening of existing networks, and by a demonstrated conviction that the stupidity and violence of the nuclear age has finally run its course. The people of the world have already demonstrated a clear political will to abolish nuclear weapons; now it is up to their representatives to make it happen.

- Rhianna Tyson and Susi Snyder
The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

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## Panels and Briefings and Workshops, oh my!

**The NGO Calendar of Events:**
*Monday, April 26 - Wednesday, April 28*

### Monday, April 26

8 - 8:50 AM  
**Abolition 2000 Strategy Session**  
777 UN Plaza, 10th floor

9- 10 AM  
**Abolition 2000 and NGO Committee Morning Briefing**  
Conference Room A

1-2:45 PM  
Middle Powers Initiative Forum: "Ensuring Full Implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty"  
Conference Room V

3- 6 PM  
**WILPF and Hidankyo Present: "Stories of Survivors, Hibakusha Speak Out"**  
Conference Room A

### Tuesday, April 27

8 - 8:50 AM  
**Abolition 2000 Strategy Session**  
777 UN Plaza, 10th floor

9- 10 AM  
**Abolition 2000 and NGO Committee Morning Briefing**  
Conference Room A

10 AM- 12:30 PM  
Open Session of PrepCom  
Conference Room IV

1- 2:15 PM  
**Abolition 2000 panel: "Toxic Legacy of the Nuclear Age: Waste, Health, Sustainable Energy"**  
Conference Room A

2:30- 3 PM  
**Abolition 2000 Press Briefing**  
UNCA club

1:15- 3 PM  
**Religions for Peace/Standing Commission on Disarmament and Security Presentation: "Religion and Disarmament"**  
777 UN Plaza, 2nd floor

### Wednesday, April 28

8 - 8:50 AM  
**Abolition 2000 Strategy Session**  
777 UN Plaza, 10th floor

9- 10 AM  
**Abolition 2000 and NGO Committee Morning Briefing**  
Conference Room A

10 AM- 12:30 PM  
**WILPF US Panel: "Mil-Corp ConneXion and Nuclear Proliferation"**  
Conference Room A

1- 2:30 PM  
**Abolition 2000 UK, Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament, Stop Essais, and Mouvement de la Paix workshop: "What could be a European Initiative for nuclear disarmament?"**  
Conference Room A

1:15- 3 PM  
**PSR Panel: "Counterproliferation and the Future of the Nonproliferation Treaty"**  
Conference Room V

3- 6 PM  
**Peace Depot and Civil Network for a Peaceful Korea Workshop: "Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone"**  
Conference Room A

3- 4 PM  
**Nuclear Age Peace Foundation panel: "Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation & the Quest for Security"**  
Conference Room X

6:30- 8 PM  
**WILPF 89th Anniversary Party Reception**  
777 UN Plaza, 2nd floor
1. Can you explain a bit about the International Monitoring System and the International Data Centre? How are they developing? What obstacles to full development remain?

The establishment of the global verification regime is one of the primary tasks of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, and, as you are aware, the International Monitoring System and the International Data Centre are important components in this regime. The IMS is a global network of monitoring facilities, which will, when complete, consist of 321 monitoring stations and 16 radionuclide laboratories. The IMS uses four complementary technologies: seismic; hydroacoustic; infrasound; and radionuclide. I'm happy to say that our progress is very good.

To date significant advances were made in work on the IMS. 81 stations had been certified as fully meeting the requirements of the system...

...In 2004, we will be continuing to place emphasis on work in the hydroacoustic, infrasound and radionuclide technologies (including noble gas). We are also implementing a new training policy to better meet the needs of States Signatories...

In the build-up of this unique global verification regime we face a series of technological, climatic and geographic challenges. With the full dedication of the PTS staff and the technical, financial and political support of States Signatories we will overcome these obstacles.

2. Do you think the establishment of a permanent secretariat for the NPT would be beneficial? How would the CTBT best interact with that organization?

Despite recent discoveries of suspected programs the NPT has been a very effective and efficient international non-proliferation instrument. The responsibility of the implementation of the treaty resides with states and the IAEA was assigned a key role in helping states in the discharge of their obligations. The UN-DDA assumes the secretariat functions for the NPT conferences. Before creating a new organization one has to ask what such secretariat should do that existing structures could not accomplish.

3. What is the best thing that NGOs can do to help facilitate the CTBT's entry-into-force?

The NGO community plays a very important role in informing the general public about our work, and in keeping the Treaty at the forefront of popular discussion. The NGO community is a two-way link to civil society for us, and I make a particular effort to maintain good contacts with the disarmament and non-proliferation NGOs in Vienna, Geneva and New York. These groups are active and committed, and collaborate extensively with each other. At last year's Conference on facilitating the Entry into Force of the Treaty, over 100 NGOs from around the world attached their names to the NGO statement delivered on the last day of the conference. I should also add that the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission has been participating in the United Nations Expert Group on Disarmament and Education. Education-orientated NGOs are deeply involved with this Expert Group, and we have learned a great deal from them.

4. At this PrepCom, while so many promises that were made in 2000 seem to be slipping away, what hopes or expectations do you have?

As I said before, the NPT is a successful treaty. The indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 was an important achievement and all NPT states made important commitments for the future, including the passing of the CTBT. In 2000 these commitments were specified and updated. Further progress towards entry into force of the CTBT would send a strong signal to the international community that all parties to the NPT take their commitments seriously. This would be a morale booster for the 2005 Review Conference and would create a good basis for further improvements in the international non-proliferation and disarmament regime.

5. If you had one message that you could deliver to the States Parties at this Third PrepCom, what would that be?

We are dealing with a very precious international treaty in a field which tries to balance national security interests. We should be careful not to undermine the NPT because the alternatives to a rules-based nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime are appalling.
The NPT in 2004: Testing the Limits

- REBECCA JOHNSON, ACRONYM INSTITUTE

In 2004, the third Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has to do what its name implies: it has to prepare for 2005.

While the Chairs of the first and second PrepComs developed summaries of the debate under the own auspices, not requiring consensus, the Chair of the third PrepCom, Ambassador Sudjadnan Parnohadinigrat of Indonesia, does not have that option: he must aim for a consensus document. In view of the significant political differences, consensus on substance will not be easy. Most believe it will not be possible, as few states will want to compromise on seriously-held positions before they have to, i.e. before the endgame stages of negotiations on the final document in 2005. Similarly, while it would be useful to have discussion in 2004 about what ‘products’ (documents and agreements) states would like to see in 2005 and the issues for which they are most interested in getting subsidiary bodies or special time, it is highly unlikely that agreement will be achieved on these now. Nor, from past experience, are such decisions necessary or particularly important to nail down before 2005.

Much could change in the intervening year, so it is more useful to have states lay out their proposals and expectations in 2004, but without hardening positions by forcing premature negotiations. The positions can be considered at this PrepCom, but it will be most productive if the President designate (expected to be Ambassador Sergio Duarte of Brazil) then carries out consultations over the coming year, which will improve the chances of getting such substance-related procedures and mechanisms agreed so that the Review Conference can move forward effectively.

While providing a mechanism for airing and discussing the priorities and challenges facing the Review Conference, the 2004 PrepCom should principally aim to get the procedural arrangements for the Review Conference agreed. That is the practical and necessary task. All else is rehearsal. States parties and civil society have to consider what they want to happen in the world and what they want to achieve in the 2005 Review Conference, and then build towards these objectives, using the PrepCom as a stepping stone.

In view of recent worrying developments, it is important to keep pushing for full implementation of the 13 steps and for the Article VI obligation to be taken as seriously as the treaty’s other provisions. At the very least, in 2004 and 2005, we must reject any attempts to let these important undertakings be ignored or dropped, and we must refuse to allow them to be rolled back under the pretext of being updated. There is no longer a question of working out or agreeing what the disarmament obligations mean. The review conferences of 1995 and 2000 addressed such questions. We all know what ought to be done, but key states lack the political will to implement their undertakings. The NPT is too convenient for the nuclear weapon states, and the treaty’s history teaches us that diplomacy and reviews, though helpful, are too limited to bring about the political changes necessary for nuclear disarmament to be achieved.

Therefore we must pursue nuclear disarmament through the NPT and also in parallel with it, in our capitals and defence ministries as well as in the international treaty meetings. Not just because Article VI was part of the Treaty’s grand bargain or because nuclear disarmament is an end in itself, but because international security requires nuclear nonproliferation, and nonproliferation is inherently unachievable, unstable and unsustainable without the elimination of nuclear weapons from all the world’s arsenals. This requires of course that the existing regime be strengthened and adapted, but it necessitates far more direct engagement and action by civil society and the non-nuclear nations as well, including those still clinging doctrinally to the outdated nuclear umbrella, when it undermines their arguments that nuclear weapons are weapons of terror that should be banned.

Adapting the Regime to Work Better
Faced with these serious challenges, the NPT’s focus is narrowing at the very time it needs to grow. To retain respect and utility as an important tool of nonproliferation and disarmament, a serious overhaul, in four fundamental areas, is now required:

Reduce incentives to acquire nuclear technology and weapons: The NWS must stop treating nuclear weapons as a security enhancer, which means that nuclear disarmament must be restored at the heart of the nonproliferation regime; and the problematic contradiction of Article IV’s promotion of nuclear fuel will finally have to be dealt with.

Address the security concerns of potential proliferators and their neighbours: Giving rather different meaning to pre-emption and preventive action than the military strikes envisaged in neo-conservative doctrine, this should be done proactively, as a matter of course, not just in reaction to nuclear threat or blackmail (which tends to reinforce proliferation incentives).

Restore the credibility and effectiveness of arms control and the international rule: of law. When powerful governments engage in negotiations and then cherry pick the bits they like, they undermine the regime as a whole and steal security from everyone.

Increase verification and enforcement powers: Start by making the Additional Protocol (INFCIRC 540) mandatory. Provide a mechanism for NPT States Parties and not only the IAEA Board of Governors to deliberate on questions of noncompliance and enforcement.

he strengths as well as the limitations of the 2003 PrepCom, as with its predecessor, are making it ever clearer that the NPT review process is inadequate to the task of dealing with the kinds of proliferation challenges now threatening international security.

The Treaty does not now need an enhanced review process; it needs a structure and mechanism for states parties to take responsibility for compliance, implementation and enforcement of its obligations on a continuing and annual basis, with provision for ‘emergency meetings’ in the event
of particular threats to the nonproliferation regime, such as happened when North Korea announced its withdrawal or could happen if any of the nuclear weapon states revoked their signatures on the CTBT or resumed nuclear testing.

Thoughts to Ponder at the 2004 PrepCom
If NPT parties are not willing to take responsibility for adapting and strengthening the treaty regime further, they must expect civil society to lose patience and demand more far-reaching and concerted action to bring about a safer, nuclear weapon free world, such as the Mayors for Peace and others will be advocating in New York. We need to convert the NPT to a prohibition regime by ensuring full implementation, including the 13-step plan of action agreed by NPT parties in May 2000. Alternatively, we could construct a purpose-built prohibition regime by negotiating a protocol to the treaty or reviving calls for a nuclear weapons convention.

Perhaps such initiatives are some way into the future, but if we really care about making this world safe from the terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction we need to take nuclear as well as biological and chemical weapons out of the security doctrines of all governments and commit to a multi-layered, multi-tiered mix of national and multilateral measures, underpinned by taboo, better intelligence and legal and institutional tools to ensure prevention, detection, disarmament and verification.

A longer version of this article originally appeared in Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 76, March/April 2004

18 YEARS AGO ON THIS DAY, a core meltdown at Reactor 4 of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant created explosions and a fireball which blew off the reactor's steel and concrete lid. Nearly 200 tons of highly radioactive materials poisoned more than 1 kilometer of the earth's atmosphere.

The effects of the Chernobyl disaster continue to plague the people of Ukraine and beyond, its radiological legacy serving as a haunting reminder to all peoples that the nuclear age must be relegated to the pages of our history books.

For more information, see the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, www.wagingpeace.org.
You are invited to attend a panel discussion on

Nuclear Weapons, Non-Proliferation & the Quest for Security

Wednesday April 28, 2004
3:00pm - 4:30pm
Conference Room 10, United Nations

Panelists Include:

Senator Douglas Roche, O.C. of Canada

David Krieger, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

Kate Hudson, Chair of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament

Jacqueline Cabasso, Executive Director of the Western State Legal Foundation

Justine Wang, Research and Advocacy Coordinator, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation

The 2004 NPT Prep Com provides a critical opportunity to respond to the growing dangers of nuclear proliferation. These dangers include proliferation to states and non-state groups that currently do not possess nuclear weapons, as well as the increased efforts by existing nuclear weapons states to upgrade and improve their nuclear arsenals, despite obligations to pursue nuclear disarmament. The Prep Com also provides an opportunity to consider proposals within the context of the NPT goals that promote both short-term and long-term security for the world.

Please join us for this important panel discussion that will identify current proliferation trends and offer recommendations to strengthen the NPT as well as the overall non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament regimes.

To receive more information on this event, please contact Carah Ong at the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation:

PMB 121, 1187 Coast Village Road, Suite 1, Santa Barbara, California 93108-2794, USA
Tel (805) 965-3443 | Fax (805) 568-0466 | www.wagingpeace.org | www.nuclearfiles.org.