
Check against delivery

• Norway's understanding of autonomous weapons systems is closely tied to a consideration of the human element in the use of lethal force. We have not yet concluded on a specific legal definition of the term ‘fully autonomous weapons systems’. But generally speaking, when using the term, we refer to weapons systems that are able to select and attack targets without adequate, meaningful or necessary human judgement and control. These are systems with autonomy, or at least elements of autonomy, in their 'critical functions'.

• These systems must be distinguished from weapons systems already in use that are highly automatic, but which operate within such tightly constrained spatial and temporal limits that they fall outside the category of 'fully autonomous weapons systems'. It is our understanding that this would apply to several of the weapons systems presented during the course of this GGE, including the weapon system presented by the Swedish delegation this morning.

• What would in a specific instance constitute adequate, meaningful or necessary human control is a key question for further discussion. We appreciate the many views and perspectives brought forward by states and other stakeholders in the course of our discussions, including the views contained in the working paper on human machine touchpoints, submitted by the United Kingdom, as well as the useful matrix presented by Dr. Kostopoulos during the expert panel yesterday.

Mr. Chairperson

• Many of the core rules of international humanitarian law presume the application of human judgement in, and human control over, the decision-making process.

• Consequently, in our view, the concepts of human judgement and human control can, if further elaborated, provide a useful demarcation between, on the one hand, weapons systems that can be used within the limitations set by international humanitarian law and, on the other hand, systems that cannot.