The message is clear: The vast majority of countries want to negotiate a legally binding instrument on autonomous weapon systems (AWS) next year. The states of the Non-Aligned Movement and the African Group (as groups and many individually), plus Austria, Brazil, and Mexico all staked out their position firmly during Wednesday’s debate, calling for the next meetings on this subject to contain a negotiating mandate.

But, as it goes in UN disarmament forums that operate by consensus, an overwhelming majority doesn’t mean much. The United States and Russia have said they will reject a mandate to negotiate a legally binding instrument on AWS. Actually, they’ve said they will reject a mandate to do pretty much anything. They’re not just opposed to new law, they’re also opposed to the development of a political declaration or a code of conduct, which have been suggested by France and Germany and supported by a smattering of other mostly European states who feel negotiations on anything legally binding is “premature.”

Ah, where have we heard that before? The governments proposing negotiations, and the campaigners that have been calling for a ban for the past five years, are all too familiar with the word premature. The United States and Russia have said they will reject a mandate to negotiate a legally binding instrument on AWS. Actually, they’ve said they will reject a mandate to do pretty much anything. They’re not just opposed to new law, they’re also opposed to the development of a political declaration or a code of conduct, which have been suggested by France and Germany and supported by a smattering of other mostly European states who feel negotiations on anything legally binding is “premature”.

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Ah, where have we heard that before? The governments proposing negotiations, and the campaigners that have been calling for a ban for the past five years, are all too familiar with the word premature. Banning landmines? Cluster munitions? That was definitely premature. Nuclear weapons? Absolutely—even after more than 70 years of living under the threat of total annihilation and the all too real contamination brought about by nuclear tests, uranium mining, weapon production, and radioactive waste.

Without fail, those playing the premature card have been those who manufacture, use, sell, and profit—in terms of money and/or power—from the weapons that cause devastating humanitarian harm across the globe. In the case of AWS, the strongest opponents to negotiations of a legally binding instrument are those who have ongoing research and development in the field. The US delegation in particular has been increasingly forceful in its defense of AWS throughout this UN process, essentially arguing that these weapons will be magical machines that will much better than human soldiers.

Historically, being told that disarmament or arms control treaties are premature has not stopped those who seek to curb methods and means of violence. It won’t stop us now. But what is particularly incredible about the “it’s premature” argument in this case is that the whole point of negotiating new law now is to prevent these weapons from being developed. So the argument of those opposing negotiations is essentially that we have to wait until these weapons have been developed and deployed. We need to wait for the bodies on the battlefield before we can really understand what limits we might want to put on the autonomous functions of machines designed to kill.

Those opposing new law argue that more discussions are needed. We don’t know what an autonomous weapon is, they argue. We don’t know yet where we might need human control and where autonomy in weapons might actually be helpful. Helpful? Helpful for killing? Helpful for occupying forces to commit genocide more efficiently? Helpful for police to brutalise Black populations? Helpful for whom, and to do what?

These are the key questions for the United States and Russia, but also for those who prefer a political declaration rather than a legally binding treaty. Politically binding agreements and codes of conduct can be useful in some circumstances. The Safe Schools Declaration, through which so far 80 governments have committed to protect students, teachers, schools, and universities “from the worst effects of war,” works to help reduce attacks against schools and to facilitate the continuation of education during conflict.
But they aren’t sufficient when it comes to dealing with specific weapon systems. Agreements on specific weapons—biological, chemical, nuclear, as well as cluster bombs and landmines—are constituted through legally binding treaties. This has proven to be the best way to stigmatise the weapons socially and politically, which helps facilitate elimination and non-proliferation. It is also necessary to ensure that disarmament and decontamination are effectively mandated and monitored, and that related industries are involved to ensure against misuse of relevant materials and technologies. All of this will be essential in the case of AWS.

The argument from those supporting a political declaration—which besides France and Germany seems to include Australia, Belgium, Finland, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, and Switzerland—is that we still don’t have everything worked out in regards to definitions of AWS, of critical functions, or of human control. They see the political declaration as providing a space to reiterate common ground and perhaps to think through contentious areas further. The problem with this approach is that if we don’t have enough agreement for a treaty, we also don’t have enough for a declaration—because at the end of the day, in a consensus-based forum the United States and Russia will reject even something “politically binding” if they don’t agree with it. We have seen this time and again. It’s unclear what those supporting a political declaration think they will achieve with a declaration—that would not be stronger, clearer, and more effective through a legally binding instrument. It’s especially confusing because the concept of a declaration or a code of conduct doesn’t have that much support. Besides those indicated above, the United Kingdom has said it is “open to further discussing a possible political declaration”. Israel and Japan don’t seem too interested, saying they would prefer to just keep a discussion mandate going. This is also what the United States and Russia have indicated they would support. These two countries argue that the only acceptable answer to the risks and challenges of autonomous weapons is “apply and comply”: agree that existing international law applies to AWS, and comply with those existing rules. Yet as noted by Ayman Sorour of the non-governmental organisation Protection, recent conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere have demonstrated clear violations of international humanitarian and human rights law including by those states saying here that “existing law is sufficient”. What then, he asked, is to be expected from their “application” of these principles to AWS?

And so, among these three options—legally binding instrument (majority support), political declaration and/or code of conduct (some support), and just continuing discussions while a handful of states get on with developing AWS (a handful of support)—guess which wins? If you guessed the option supported by the least number of states, you get a gold star. The Chair circulated his draft conclusions and recommendations of the GGE on Wednesday evening, in which it is indicated that the Group recommends its mandate be renewed for ten days in 2019.

So here’s the story. Most governments want to negotiate new law to ensure meaningful human control over the critical functions of weapon systems. Thousands of tech workers, academics, and scientists in the relevant private sector industries have asked them to do so, demanding that their work be kept in the service of humanity rather than of war and repression. The human rights, disarmament, feminist, and humanitarian organisations paying attention to this issue have been calling for a ban on AWS for five years to protect international law and the basic tenants of human morality and dignity. The International Committee of the Red Cross is saying there are major risks associated with these weapons that states must get serious about addressing. And yet, in this consensus-based UN forum, it is not possible to take action to prevent the development of weapons that will kill and destroy without human control, because the United States and Russia don’t want any action taken.

Will states stand up against this in the next two days? Will we get anything more than another ten days of talks over the next year? Will any of the governments who recognise the need for new law take the initiative to make it happen over the objections of the United States and Russia, as they did with the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and the Mine Ban Treaty? Will any of the governments trying to keep the door open to develop AWS have a change of heart and start to act in the interests of humanity? Is this not a common project we could all embark upon together, to keep everyone on an even playing field—a field that does not include killer robots?

We have a chance, right now, to prevent a new technology of violence, a potentially devastating arms race, and unprecedented threats to human life and dignity. This is a rare opportunity. As the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom said in our statement today, we must seize this moment to prevent us from becoming the worst possible version of ourselves.
SIDE EVENT: ETHICAL CONCERNS OVER FULLY AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS
Isabelle Jones | Campaign to Stop Killer Robots

On Tuesday, 28 August, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots organised a side-event to discuss the ethical concerns raised by fully autonomous weapon systems. The panel focused on the relevance of the Martens Clause in filling the gap in international law concerning these systems, and recent advocacy in the private sector. The event was moderated by Ms. Maria Pia Devoto of Asociación para Políticas Públicas/Seguridad Humana en Latinoamérica y el Caribe (SEHLAC).

Nobel Peace Prize-laureate and co-founder of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, Ms. Jody Williams, opened the event by drawing attention to what she described as the “yuck” factor of killer robots—describing the reaction of many in the Campaign and supportive states that to delegate the killing of human beings to machines is “unconscionable” and crosses a clear ethical and moral line.

Ms. Bonnie Docherty is a senior researcher in the Arms Division at Human Rights Watch and Associate Director of Armed Conflict and Civilian Protection at the International Human Rights Clinic at Harvard University. Ms. Docherty’s remarks provided a summary of the recent report she authored, released by Human Rights Watch, “Heed the Call: A Moral and Legal Imperative to Ban Killer Robots”, which argues that fully autonomous weapons run counter to the obligations of the Martens Clause—a key feature of international humanitarian law and a moral and legal test to judge new technology and protect civilians and combatants in the absence of specific treaty law. According to the report, “killer robots” lack the compassion required to empathize and lack the contextual judgment required to react outside of controlled environments and in unforeseen situations.

Mr. Amr Gaber, a Google engineer (who participated on the panel on his own behalf and not that of his employer) and member of the Tech Workers Coalition, described recent employee movements in the tech sector to ensure ethical development of technology. In particular, he told the story of his involvement in writing a letter sent to Google’s CEO opposing Google’s participation in Project Maven, signed by over 4,000 of his coworkers. Mr. Gaber also spoke on the infallibility of programming. He called upon states to take action, saying that, “tech workers are already taking a lead on these issues but we cannot do it alone,” and that they, “are tired of hearing that these issues are too hard to solve.”

Dr. Peter Asaro is a co-founder of the International Committee for Robot Arms Control and Associate Professor in the School of Media Studies at the New School. Dr. Asaro described his involvement in an open letter supporting Google employees and tech workers, signed by over 1,100 academics and researchers. Dr. Asaro also stressed the importance of engaging with the private sector on this issue, noting how the large amounts of personal data that tech companies collect bestows a particular ethical and moral responsibility. In closing, Dr. Asaro shared that he has heard questions at the CCW about what the private sector are doing to keep technology safe, and that it is clear that, “they’re asking you to do something about it.”

Ms. Ariel Conn, Director of Media and Outreach for the Future of Life Institute, closed the panel by sharing that experts in the artificial intelligence (AI) community oppose the development of lethal autonomous weapons. She cited a 2015 open letter against Autonomous Weapons Systems from AI and robotics researchers calling upon the UN for a ban and signed by nearly 40,00 robotics researchers, and over 26,000 people around the world, among other examples.

The panel was followed by a lively and productive general discussion with the audience. Challenging questions were raised about how compassion and empathy are linked to human dignity, the ambiguous language of the Martens Clause, and the panelists’ thoughts on autonomous weapons systems designed to not necessarily target humans. Throughout, their positions remained clear: fully autonomous weapon systems raise a host of ethical concerns and the existing gap in international law must be filled through a legally-binding instrument. •
The following is a summary, not a comprehensive report, of key discussion points.

**Legally binding instrument**
- Austria, Brazil, and Chile (ABC) proposed a mandate to negotiate a legally-binding instrument addressing legal, humanitarian and ethical concerns posed by the emerging technologies in area of autonomous weapon systems (AWS): “The 2018 meeting of the high contracting parties to the CCW decides to establish an open-ended GGE to negotiate a legally binding instrument to ensure meaningful human control over critical functions in LAWS.”
- The African Group, in solidarity with the 26 states that seek to preventively ban AWS reiterated its urgent appeal to negotiate a legally binding instrument explicitly banning AWS without human control and calls upon states to recommend to begin negotiations on an agreed protocol on AWS. It approved of the ABC proposal.
- The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) proposed negotiating a legally binding instrument to prohibit or regulate AWS and to ensure human control.
- Costa Rica and Peru supported the ABC proposal; Pakistan said it appreciates it.
- Iraq supports a legally binding instrument.
- Mexico and Peru endorsed the establishment of new mandate to negotiate a legally binding instrument.
- China wants to continue discussions to reach common understandings and formulate a legally binding protocol modeled on the blinding lasers protocol. It noted that even if a legally binding instrument cannot be achieved immediately, further discussions can strengthen common understandings and inform public opinion.
- Panama agreed protocol IV on blinding laser weapons is a useful model for a protocol on AWS, arguing that it didn’t impede development of laser technologies, and it showed that reventative prohibitions are possible in the CCW.
- Cuba said it seeks a legally binding instrument that prohibits LAWS and regulates semi-autonomous weapons such as drones.
- Eleven non-governmental organisations, all members of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, spoke to the need for urgent political action in the form of a ban on autonomous weapons. The organisations represented multiple global regions as well as scientists, policy specialists, human rights advocates, and technologists.
- Mines Action Canada pointed out that the CCW and the Chemical Weapons Convention have shown us that weapons can be prohibited without risking the development of beneficial technologies and that the weaponisation of technology will make it more difficult to continue with peaceful or civilian uses.
- The Center for International Security Policy warned that discussions on AWS may end up going the way of nuclear weapons (i.e. proliferation) if they are not pre-emptively banned.
- Norway has not yet concluded if a new international instrument is warranted.
- Estonia is not convinced of the need for a new legally binding instrument on AWS.
- While Switzerland expressed preference for other suggested paths, it said that if consensus emerged in favour of an instrument, it would be willing to participate.
- Sweden, Ireland, Poland, Australia, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States (US), and the Republic of Korea believe this approach is premature. Some of these states cited the lack of a definition for AWS as the reason.
- Sweden responded to the example that had been given on Tuesday that outlined how definitions of landmines and cluster munitions were agreed as part of negotiation processes, and not sooner, by pointing out those weapons already existed and their impacts known, unlike AWS.
- UK and Sweden agreed that CCW Protocol IV is not a good model for work on AWS because the weapon that it applies to actually exists.
- Russia is against any legally binding instrument on AWS. It stated that a preventive ban brings the danger of fragmentation of international legal regulations by dividing weapons into “moral” and “immoral” ones.

**Political declaration/code of conduct**
- Germany and France jointly proposed a political declaration to guide future development of the use of autonomy in weapons systems, suggesting that it can create grounds for agreement for all states. It stated that states should preserve a high level of vigilance and if necessary, develop additional measures.
- Belgium supports a political declaration as a first step, together with identifying good practices and elaborating code of conduct. It said these “short-term options” don’t preclude later adoption of other legal or political instruments.

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News in brief, continued

- Spain considers a political declaration and code of conduct as a first step leading to other measures such as restrictions.
- Finland supports the development of political declaration to set out commitments, increase transparency, and encourage sharing best practices.
- Sweden said it will support the political declaration. It would also support setting up a committee or entity of technical and legal experts.
- Colombia considers proposals such as political declarations as a first step to demonstrating commitment on a path towards a legally-binding instrument that ensures meaningful human control over the entire life cycle of weapon systems.
- Switzerland called a political declaration “a promising option” or middle way forward given divergent views, and not as an end point but as a guide forward.
- Norway felt that the political declaration would be a useful step forward, if it could capture the emerging consensus about meaningful human control over critical functions, as a good compromise between all possible options.
- Ireland sees merit in the political declaration.
- The UK would be receptive to more discussion about a political declaration, or establishing a regular/standing body to report on rapidly technological changes in the field.
- Argentina perceives weapons reviews as complimentary to the consideration of measures such as a political declaration or a legally binding instrument.
- Russia maintained that IHL sets limitations on the development of AWS as set out in Article 36. It welcomed an increase in the number of states parties to Protocol I.
- Belgium, Spain, and the Netherlands are ready to exchange or share best practices in this context. Norway sees value in doing so.
- Spain sees utility legal reviews to avoid “collateral damage of non-combatants” and is interested in exchanging best practices.
- Israel noted that it has shared its national experience on legal reviews for new weapons systems in GGE meetings.
- The UK is keen to continue hearing from national perspectives and referenced its view on the role and utility of Article 36 weapons reviews, as already outlined.
- Austria said it is fully committed to the practice of legal reviews and supports all efforts to better implement existing IHL.
- Finland called for universalisation of the protocol relating to national weapons reviews, said that learning more about how to standardize such processes would be welcome.
- The Republic of Korea (ROK) suggested further discussion on reviews to include the human-machine interaction throughout the life cycle, identification of potential accountability gaps, and to acquire a broader picture of applications of autonomous technology.
- Ecuador noted that national review mechanisms do not provide sufficient security to other countries and that confidence-building measures cannot resolve the problem.
- Argentina expressed concern at the lack of specificity contained in such weapons reviews.
- China maintained that reviews may pose a risk of legitimising “undesirable” weapons.
- China also noted that national reviews on the development and use of new weapons systems are of significance for the prevention of misuse and the reduction of civilian casualties but it is difficult for reviews to resolve concerns related to AWS fundamentally, as they are very complex and complicated systems.

Article 36 weapons review

- Australia and New Zealand stated that Article 36 of Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions could determine if a new weapons system would be permitted or not. Australia noted that if there was increased compliance with Article 36, it would present an improvement of IHL, and if a weapon system complies with Article 36, it can be cleared for operational use. New Zealand identified various steps enhancing contributions to the Article 36 review.
- Argentina supported elaborating a compendium of good national practices of procedures of weapons reviews in line with Article 36, and specifically with respect to the acquisition of new weapons systems. Finland supported this.
News in brief, continued

Continued discussions

- The European Union (EU) supported an extension of the mandate to formulate principles for a shared reference point to be reviewed and updated regularly. This could enable substantive progress without closing any future options in the GGE’s work.

- Japan said that the GGE should continue but to focus discussions and mandate on meaningful human control.

- The US fully supports continuing the discussion mandate.

- Sweden could also support continuing work on the issues the GGE has been discussing, in addition to other options.

- Finland suggested the next GGE focus on “trust” between humans and machines and including concrete examples of emerging technology, both good and bad.

- Australia supported continuing the discussion through 2019 in the GGE.

Other or general suggestions on approaches to policy response

- South Africa emphasised the need for a shift toward concrete outcomes and hoped that this view is reflected at the next meeting of high contracting parties, so as to consider options and agree a way forward.

- The US suggested a “stock taking” of existing weapons systems, discussing compliance with existing IHL, and having an exchange about states’ domestic policies, including legal reviews of new weapons systems with autonomous features.

- Pakistan asserted that those states that are actively developing and researching AWS prefer not to have any measures to regulate them, negating any concerns raised.

- Switzerland said that it would be useful if all approaches contain options that are not mutually exclusive as it sees value in avenues that provide sufficient flexibility to work toward results in simultaneous discussions.

- Sweden urged for the use of concrete and less abstract examples in discussions going forward.

- The Netherlands suggested establishing a technical group of experts that keeps track of new developments and deliberations that could serve as interpretative guide to provide guidance under existing international law.

- Australia cautioned against focusing on risks because it believes that the technology does have benefits and can reduce civilian causalities. More information on this angle is needed. It supports an approach that focuses on how technology will be used rather than on the technology itself.

- Israel noted that AWS can have military and humanitarian advantages from operational, legal, and ethical viewpoints. Israel claims that “collateral damage” can be minimised and the risks for combatants and non-combatants reduced.

- The International Committee of the Red Cross said that independent of the approach chosen, states must focus on ensuring human control over critical functions with a view to ensuring compliance with IHL. It suggested taking on a positive, rather than negative, legal obligation to help set limits and identify AWS of concern that are unlawful and unacceptable.

Human-machine interaction, degrees of autonomy, and meaningful human control

- Many statements including from the African Group, Brazil, the Netherlands, and China, agreed that the human factor is at the heart of debate, and China noted that there is the basic commonality that nobody intends to develop AWS entirely free from human control.

- The US maintained that the factor of human control risks obscuring genuine challenges in human-machine interactions.

- Sri Lanka said that human control must be the primary element in a weapon system.

- Bulgaria maintained that the ultimate decision over life and death belongs to humans, and ethical and moral considerations cannot be transferred to machines. It welcomed the Chair’s “sunrise” chart and said that the United Kingdom’s expansion of it is useful.

- Cuba highlighted that machines cannot replace humans’ qualitative judgment that is most important in armed conflict.

- Colombia maintained that meaningful human control over AWS has to be guaranteed, allowing for deactivation at any point.

- Switzerland stated the question is not whether states have a duty to control or supervise the development and deployment of AWS but how that control should be usefully designed.

- Estonia identified three areas for future work: the manner in which existing rules and principles should be applied and interpreted; the unique challenges posed by AWS; and consideration of when in the cycle human control is necessary to ensure IHL compliance.

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Accountability, international humanitarian law (IHL), international human rights law (IHRL)

- The African Group believes that the use of AWS would lead to a violation of international law and would lead to accountability gaps. Chile pointed at the need to identify existing legal gaps with respect to AWS.
- The UK noted that regulation of AWS can and should be based on existing regulatory frameworks that are robust, applicable and already in place. If a weapon system is incompatible with IHL, it will not be developed.
- Bulgaria reiterated that accountability cannot be transferred from humans to machines. It also recommended to train commanders and operators as they bear the responsibility.
- Argentina maintained that compliance with IHL should define the limits of developing AWS.
- Australia stated that an autonomous system could enhance the control of armed force and enhance complying with the rules of armed conflict.
- Sweden strongly welcomed that delegations have identified and confirmed a number of principles such as around IHL, and supports the inclusion of such in the final report.
- Switzerland expressed confidence in the stringent requirements of existing IHL as giving sufficient guidance to states to ensure that we will not see weapon systems that select, target, engage targets without necessary human control.
- Estonia noted that IHL remains a robust regulatory regime that has also been useful in the area of cyber operations.
- Argentina maintained that compliance with IHL should define the limits of developing AWS.
- Australia stated that an autonomous system could enhance the control of armed force and enhance complying with the rules of armed conflict.

Approach to/utility of definitions

- Ireland said it is important to agree on common understandings of AWS’ basic characteristics, noting that less is more before considering new law or measures. It suggested a working definition: “A weapon system which can act autonomously in delivering (lethal) effects to a target and may also act autonomously in detection and target selection prior to engagement of the target. The level of autonomy can vary from basic levels of automation through a spectrum of an increasing number of autonomous functions and decreasing human control up to and including fully autonomous systems which can operate across a range of functions without direct human control.”
- The NAM maintained that there is sufficient common understanding of the aspects of AWS, but that states were not able to resolve ethical, legal and security concerns associated with them.
- Israel noted that differences in opinions of the definition of AWS stem from the “futuristic nature” of the subject, and compared it to discussing the Internet in earlier decades.
- Brazil said that focusing on a common definition of AWS is less promising than focusing on the issue of the human element in AWS.
- The Netherlands said that AWS require further characterisation.
- The US said that developing a common understanding is a prerequisite to moving forward on any instrument, binding or non-binding.
- Poland said that finding a proper definition is a challenging task and all of the policy proposals show that more clarification is needed. It said that two basic questions have not been addressed: do we want to define AWS in order to ban them, or to best to first define them and then determine what level of control is required? It said that common characterisations would be a pre-requisite for future policy options.
- Iraq would like to establish a clear definition from which a clear framework could be developed.
- Seguridad Humana para Latinoamérica y el Caribe (SEHLAC) said that the search for definitions and about other technical aspects and details should be part of a negotiation process.

Gender

- Argentina highlighted the need to include gender perspectives in a specific manner in discussions and analysis of AWS, as it is useful analyse how a gender perspective delineates trends in terms of AWS. Argentina further referred to the UNSG’s call upon the international community to incorporate a gender perspective in all disarmament fora.
- The Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) registered its concern that autonomous weapons could be programmed to include gender or other forms of bias, or be used to commit acts of gender-based violence.
What's Gender Got to Do With It?
Feminist Approaches to Disarmament and LAWS

Meeting of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems

SIDE EVENT BRIEFING

Thursday, 30 August 2018
13:15 - 14:45

Conference Room XXIV
United Nations Geneva

Light refreshments will be provided

Is there a role for gender analysis in the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW)?

This side event says yes. This discussion will contribute to issues considered at the second 2018 meeting of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS). It will chart a path towards stronger consideration of gender in the context of LAWS and in the CCW’s work more broadly. Speakers will address gender diversity and equality in disarmament negotiations and discussions; gender norms and the development and use of weapons; gendered impacts of existing weapon systems; how the issue of gender has been taken up in other disarmament forums; and the importance of feminist foreign policy approaches in relation to disarmament and arms control.

Moderator:
Ambassador Rosemary MacCarnel, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Canada to the United Nations and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva

Speakers:
- Ms. Ray Acheson, Reaching Critical Will
- Ms. Erin Hunt, Mines Action Canada
- Dr. Elke Schwarz, International Committee for Robot Arms Control
- Ms. Sylvie Jacqueline Ndongmo, WILPF Cameroon
- Dr. Branka Marijan, Project Ploughshares

For more information about this briefing event, please contact Erin Hunt, Mines Action Canada, Mobile +1 613 302-3088 or erin@minesactioncanada.org

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