“DISCONTENT IS THE FIRST NECESSITY OF PROGRESS”

THOMAS A. EDISON
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Reaching Critical Will is a programme of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

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First Committee seems particularly fractious this year, influenced by events in the conference room but also by events in other conference rooms, and of course, in the real world. Inherently different perspectives and approaches to multilateralism divide states, as they always have, but those who wield the most military might out in the world seem even more fortified in their positions on many issues.

Over the past week such differences manifested in increasingly vitriolic exchanges during rights of reply, notably during the cluster on regional disarmament, and in explanations of vote for the nuclear cluster. The rejection of nuclear weapons by the vast majority of countries through the adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is putting nuclear-armed states and their allies the defensive—but also the offensive. It is forcing a long overdue conversation about what constitutes security in the eyes of the majority and an examination about how effectively the instruments we’ve developed can bring about that security.

Not surprisingly, nuclear-armed states are lashing back by refusing to acknowledge any reference to the TPNW in any resolution and re-affirming support for a nonsensical approach to nuclear disarmament that purports to somehow be both progressive and step-by-step. This dynamic was a factor in the controversy around resolution L.35, sparking an unusually high number of explanations of vote from a diversity of states. This is outlined in greater detail on this week’s article on nuclear weapons.

Albeit to a lesser extent, divisions in perspectives on security are also what prevented the most recent Group of Governmental Experts on Information and Communications Technology to agree a consensus report at the end of their deliberations in June, as the Committee heard last week during the “other issues” cluster. In his informal report, the chair of the group stated that by highlighting remaining differences “we do ourselves no favour to paper over divisions”.

Other UN-system events relate to First Committee dynamics. The Russian Federation’s veto on a draft Security Council resolution last week that would have extended the Joint Investigative Mechanism (JIM) of the United Nations and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in Syria has direct implications for the treatment of this issue in First Committee. The veto takes place in a Council context that is already heavily divided on this issue, in which diplomats are not mincing words or hesitating to stymie action. It would not be surprising to see this reflected in explanations of vote or general statements during voting on the Other WMD cluster.

More positively, one issue that may be bringing some states together is the consideration of gender perspectives in disarmament. On Thursday, Canada delivered a cross-regional statement on behalf of 42 other countries focused exclusively on women’s participation in disarmament machinery, the first time that this subject has ever received such significant attention during that cluster (or any other). The statement advocates the inclusion of gender perspectives in all disarmament instruments and supporters commit to work toward balanced representation of men and women in the disarmament machinery, and make gender perspectives an “everyday part of its discussions and documents, so that, what started as a norm, becomes just—the normal.”

Acknowledging the gendered impacts of many weapon types and increasing women’s participation at a leadership level is a subject being referenced by a widening group of states and across more disarmament and security issues—but the challenge for states is to implement their words. “Imbalance at First Committee is evident, delegations need only take a look around this room to see this for themselves,” noted the representative of Ireland. We’ve still a long way to go.

Yet, where to go to? There have been wider divisions before, and there is much common ground. But the way forward cannot look like the landscape of the past. If we want genuinely united action on any part of the disarmament agenda, it will have to take into account shifting attitudes, new evidence, and new realities of the world in which we’re operating. •

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Voting on nuclear weapon related resolutions began last week, with much attention and many explanations of vote (EOVs) on Japan’s controversial L.35, “United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons”.

Voting patterns and EOVs on the nuclear cluster so far indicate a serious splitting of views over what undermines global security. Those supporting the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) strongly hold that this Treaty complements the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and are concerned with the efforts of resolution L.35 to undermine all three agreements.

On the other hand, some of those opposed to the TPNW seem to be using L.35 to promote the concept of nuclear deterrence over their agreed commitments and obligations to nuclear disarmament. Some of these states also objected to any references to the TPNW contained in other resolutions.

The EOVs on nuclear weapon resolutions have not yet concluded; reporting in the final edition of the First Committee Monitor will reflect those interventions. Action on some remaining nuclear related resolutions, including L.18, L.45, and L.57, will also take place this week.

L.1, “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,” was adopted without a vote. Israel, Iran, and the United States issued EOVs.

Israel joined consensus despite reservations about the resolution, reiterating its view that a credible regional security process for a WMD free zone in the Middle East can only be pursued after broader regional challenges are solved.

Iran criticised the US and Israeli nuclear weapon policies regarding the region and highlighted the failures of the NPT process to achieve its goal of WMD free zone in the Middle East.

The United States said it supports the spirit of the resolution but in reference to PP8 rejects the reference to the TPNW, which it does not see as a credible initiative for disarmament. In general statements, France and the United Kingdom also rejected the reference to the TPNW in this resolution.

L.2, “Risk of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East,” was adopted as a whole with a vote of 150-4-19. Canada, Israel, Micronesia, and the United States voted against. Separate votes were held on PPs 5 and 6. In both cases, India, Israel, and Pakistan voted against while Bhutan and DPRK abstained.

India and Pakistan issued their usual EOV that they are not bound by references to the NPT. Iran criticised the US and Israeli nuclear weapon policies regarding the region and highlighted the failures of the NPT process to achieve its goal of WMD free zone in the Middle East.

Switzerland said its previous position on L.2 remains. Last year, it noted that the resolution only refers to one dimension of nuclear proliferation risks in the Middle East in its operative paragraphs but said it voted in favour to show the importance it attaches to full implementation of the NPT.

L.4, “Follow-up to nuclear disarmament obligations agreed to at the 1995, 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” was adopted with a vote of 112-44-15. A separate vote was called on PP6, which was adopted with a vote of 115-5-47. India and Pakistan issued their standard EOVs stating they are not bound by references to the NPT.

L.5, “Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons,” was adopted with a vote of 134-15-25. France, India, Pakistan, United Kingdom, and United States issued EOVs.

France, the UK, and US said the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons “are not new” and that nuclear-armed states haven’t been involved in the conversations. They argued the TPNW is “dangerous” and deepens the divide amongst NPT states parties.

Pakistan said it understands frustration with the slow pace of nuclear disarmament but does not believe the issue can be looked at from solely a humanitarian perspective.

India said it voted in favour because it supported the conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.

Russia applied its EOV on L.6 against L.5 as well.

L.6, “Taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations,” was adopted with a vote of 118-39-11. Those voting against or abstaining included those that did not participate in the negotiation of
the TPWN, though notably some NATO states, which were instructed to boycott prohibition talks by the United States, abstained rather than voted against the resolution. A number of countries issued EOVs or general statements against this resolution, or the TPNW more broadly.

Netherlands said it cannot support the outcome of the negotiations of the TPNW because its provisions are not in line with its NATO obligations and may undermine the NPT.

France, UK, and US said the TPNW is premised on the false assumption that nuclear disarmament can be achieved without looking at the security environment and that solely focusing on the humanitarian impacts has no basis. They reiterated their criticisms of the Treaty and called for an “inclusive” approach to nuclear disarmament.

Russia said the TPNW is a “mistake” that undermines the NPT, arguing that the prohibition of nuclear weapons is about ethics and is detached from reality. Slamming negotiators for ignoring Russia’s national interests, the delegation claimed it has engaged in nuclear disarmament for decades and called for consolidation rather than fragmentation of these efforts.

Israel said it voted against L.6 because of its promotion of the TPNW, noting that it did not participate in negotiations had had “deep reservations regarding this initiative,” which it believes “hinders rather than reinforces global security”.

Pakistan argued that the development of the TPNW was not an inclusive process and therefore did participate in negotiations and abstained on this resolution.

India said it cannot join the TPNW and instead supports the negotiation of a “comprehensive nuclear weapon convention” in the Conference on Disarmament.

Switzerland and Sweden, which voted yes, said they were motivated to participate in TPNW negotiations by the humanitarian concerns posed by nuclear weapons and a desire to overcome the status quo. They indicated that they are conducting national assessments on the Treaty before deciding if they will sign, noting that its complementarity with other treaties is a concern for them.

L.10/Rev.1, “Conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons,” was orally amended by Pakistan to include the phrase “and the desire to create a community of shared future for humankind” to PP1. It was adopted with a vote of 118-0-59.

So far, the Republic of Korea was the only one to an issue an EOV on this resolution, to say that it objects to the reference to the TPNW.

L.17, “Ethical imperatives for a nuclear-weapon-free world,” was adopted with a vote of 122-36-14. A separate vote was held on PP11, which was retained with a vote of 118-37-11.

France, the UK, and US said the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons “are not new” and that nuclear-armed states haven’t been involved in the conversations. They argued the TPNW is “dangerous” and deepens the divide amongst NPT states parties.

Pakistan said it understands frustration with the slow pace of nuclear disarmament but does not believe the issue can be looked at from solely a humanitarian perspective.

India said it agrees with several provisions of this resolution but that achieving the elimination of nuclear weapons will require several steps, including no first use commitments.

Australia argued L.17 is unbalanced between humanitarian and security concerns.

L.19, “Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments,” was adopted with a vote of 127-32-14. Separate votes were held on PP10 (retained with 118-37-10), OP14 (157-4-6), and OP22 (121-37-10). PP10 and OP22 welcome the adoption of the TPNW, while OP14 calls on India, Israel, and Pakistan to join the NPT as non-nuclear-armed states.

Canada, which abstained on the resolution as a whole and against the paragraphs welcoming the TPNW, said it feels this resolution has moved further away from the NPT framework. While it shares the spirit of the TPNW, and agrees nuclear disarmament has been too slow, Canada claimed that the fissile material cut-off treaty is the most effective way forward.

Ukraine, which abstained on the resolution as a whole and against the paragraphs welcoming the TPNW, argued this Treaty undermines the NPT, which is already in a fragile state because of DPRK’s withdrawal and Russia’s violations of it.

Pakistan said it is “dismayed” by the “unrealistic” call for it to accede to the NPT and rejects the reference to the TPNW.
India said urging it to accede to the NPT negates international law and that nuclear weapons are part of its national security.

DPRK said this resolution is “against its supreme interests”.

Russia applied its EOV on L.6 against L.19 as well.

L.22, “Reducing nuclear danger,” was adopted with a vote of 116-49-10. No EOVs have yet been issued.

L.28, “Nuclear-weapon-free southern hemisphere and adjacent areas,” was adopted with a vote of 142-4-29, with France, Russia, UK, and US voting against. PP6, which welcomes the adoption of the TPNW, was retained with a vote of 121-35-11.

France, UK, and US argued it is contradictory to have a nuclear weapon free zone in the high seas and reject the reference to the TPNW.

Pakistan said it supports the resolution but not the TPNW, and therefore abstained on PP6.

Canada said it has reservations on the TPNW and thus voted against PP6.

Australia said it has been a longstanding cosponsor of this resolution but now that it welcomes the TPNW it can no longer support it.

Norway, which said it did not support any resolutions welcoming the TPNW, regrets this made it unable to support L.28.

Republic of Korea said it couldn’t support L.28 because of the reference to the TPNW.

L.35, “United action with renewed determination towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons,” was adopted with a vote of 144-4-27. China, DPRK, Russia, and Syria voted against the resolution.

Separate votes were held on several paragraphs. PP19 was retained with a vote of 147-1-19. South Africa voted against, as the language has been weakened from agreed NPT language on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.

South Africa, together with Russia, also voted against PP20, which was retained with a vote of 155-2-10. This paragraph has similarly weakened language, hence South Africa’s rejection of it; but Russia’s rejection is likely based on the call for the dissemination for information about humanitarian impacts.

OP2 was retained with a vote of 128-7-27. This paragraph weakens language on the unequivocal undertaking of the NPT nuclear-armed states. It was opposed by Austria, Ecuador, Liechtenstein, Myanmar, New Zealand, South Africa, and Switzerland.

OP5, which calls on states not party to the NPT to accede as non-nuclear-armed states, was retained with a vote of 161-4-3. Angola, Bhutan, and Venezuela abstained, while DPRK, India, Israel, and Pakistan voted against.

OP8 also undermines agreed language on humanitarian impacts. It was retained with a vote of 149-2-16, with Russia and South Africa voting against—South Africa because of the weakened text and Russia probably because of the suggestion that these impacts are a “key factor that underpins efforts by all States towards a world free of nuclear weapons”.

OP20, which is about fissile material production moratoriums and a cut-off treaty, was retained with a vote of 155-4-11. China, DPRK, Myanmar, and Pakistan voted against it.

OP21, which is about CTBT entry into force and FMCT negotiation, was retained with a vote of 143-4-22. Austria, Liechtenstein, Myanmar, and Pakistan voted against for very different reasons—due to weakening of the calls or in Pakistan’s case, because of its position on the FMCT. Japan made an oral revision to OP21 before voting began to recall the other annex II states that have yet to ratify the Treaty.

OP28, which deals with IAEA safeguards, was retained with a vote of 155-2-9. DPRK and Myanmar voted against.

A number of countries delivered EOVs on this resolution, and more will come this upcoming week.

Guatemala said it voted in favour of L.35 because of its commitment to nuclear disarmament, but did not cosponsor this year because the text should have referenced the TPNW.

Austria said it could no longer support the Japanese resolution because its new formulation undercuts important tenants of nuclear disarmament, but did not cosponsor this year because the text should have referenced the TPNW.

Austria said it could no longer support the Japanese resolution because its new formulation undercuts important tenants of nuclear disarmament. It argued L.35 is incompatible with agreed NPT commitments and with agreed NPT language on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. The resolution does not reflect the fact that nuclear disarmament agreements are necessary, and postpones disarmament. It also implies that further progress globally should only happen after the tensions on the Korean peninsula.
are resolved—which illustrates that the new narrative is prone to hinder rather than encourage nuclear disarmament. Austria said it would vote against paragraphs that undermine the NPT and the CTBT.

Ecuador described L.35 as “dangerous” in its attempts to rewrite agreed language. It referred to the removal of a reference to nuclear disarmament in PP12; the reinterpretation of the unequivocal undertaking in OP2; the exclusion of a reference to the TPNW; new language that undermines the NPT and CTBT; etc.

Brazil said the lack of ambition of this year’s draft constitutes a step backwards in efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons. Despite the resolution’s title of “renewed determination,” Brazil noted, it does not mention the TPNW, which represents a milestone in the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. Brazil also said it is dismayed at the “illusions” of many provisions in this year’s text, such as OP2’s reinterpretation of the unequivocal commitment; PP12’s reference only to non-proliferation; removal of references to commitments from 1995, 2000, and 2010 NPT outcome documents; lack of commitment to the entry into force of the CTBT; and lack of ambition on the FMCT.

China highlighted the distance between nuclear disarmament and this draft. It also complained that Hiroshima and Nagasaki have been singled out and don’t want this to be used to “distort history”.

South Africa said the changes to L.35 reflect a serious deviation from previous agreements. Expressing concern about the impact of this resolution on the NPT, South Africa noted that any states supportive of the NPT would support the implementation of all of the Treaty’s obligations. Instead, this draft waters down commitments made in 1995, 2000, and 2010.

Egypt said it had to abstain on the resolution because the overall message now implies that nuclear disarmament is the responsibility of non-nuclear-armed states. It highlighted alarming trends in the resolution in regards to the failure to call on annex II states to ratify the CTBT and in regards to the imbalance between disarmament and non-proliferation obligations throughout the text.

Costa Rica said it shares concerns regarding the escalating tensions on the Korean peninsula, but cannot support this resolution because the TPNW cannot go unnoticed and the resolution as a whole is weak. Concerned that the current draft does not call for the destruction of nuclear stockpiles and only refers to “necessary security conditions,” Costa Rica hopes the text can change in future years.

DPRK described L.35 as hypocritical and voted against it, reiterating its need for nuclear weapons as a “self-defensive nuclear deterrent”.

Mexico said it voted in favour of L.35 because it understands Japan’s regional concerns, but is troubled by substantive changes that alter the balance and logic of the text. It said this resolution undermines trust amongst the international community, and goes against the work of the General Assembly. In particular, Mexico is concerned about the reinterpretation of the unequivocal undertaking in OP2; new language on the security environment in OP10; restrictions of negative security assurances in OP14; and the alteration of the concerns about the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons.

New Zealand abstained on L.35 because of its disappointment that this year’s text has departed from its predecessors. It argued this version fractures previous agreements and undermines the integrity of the NPT and the CTBT. It also diverges from agreed language on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.

Venezuela also abstained because it is concerned about the new approach this draft has taken, including changing previously agreed language on the obligation of nuclear-armed states to disarm. It said this resolution undermines the NPT and CTBT.

Algeria said it wishes the Japanese delegation had conducted consultations on this draft due to the substantial changes it made to the draft. This text is far removed from agreed commitments on nuclear disarmament, said Algeria, expressing particular concern that OP2 undermines NPT outcomes.

Nigeria said it is dismayed by the changes to this resolution. Proud to be part of the TPNW process, it said voting in favour of L.35 would go against its principles. In addition to the resolution’s refusal to mention the TNPW, Nigeria also expressed concern about its weakened language on the NPT and CTBT, saying that this version is “prone to deterrence instead of disarmament”.

Mongolia expressed concern about the weakened language on article VI of the NPT and the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.

Switzerland and Sweden jointly explained that they have long supported this resolution, and will vote in favour of it as a whole despite their concerns. They support the inclusion of more affirmative language on the DPRK, but regret that the goal of achieving the elimination of nuclear weapons is now made condi-
ional. They also firmly rejected attempts to rewrite or reinterpret the unequivocal undertaking of the NPT nuclear-armed states. They also abstained from PP19 and OP8 because the language deviates from that agreed at the 2010 NPT review conference.

Pakistan reiterated its objections to language in the resolution that are focused on the NPT and IAEA.

Chile said it voted in favour of this resolution because of its commitment to nuclear disarmament but abstained on paragraphs that suggest there is a security value to nuclear weapons.

India said the text has fallen short this year and thus it abstained on a number of paragraphs, especially those related to the NPT and IAEA.

L.36, “International Day against Nuclear Tests,” was adopted without a vote.

L.37, “African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty,” was adopted without a vote. India said it respects the right of states to establish nuclear weapon free zones and will respect this zone.

L.38, “Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes,” was adopted without a vote.

L.42, “Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty,” was adopted with a vote of 174-1-4. DPRK voted against, while India, Mauritius, Syria, and United States abstained.

Egypt said it supports the resolution but abstained on PP4 because of the reference to UN Security Council resolution 2310, which it abstained from in 2016. Egypt feels this resolution selectively choose countries to focus upon when a more inclusive approach is needed.

Brazil agreed the continued reference to UNSCR 2310 is counterproductive.

Ecuador also complained about the reference to UNSCR 2310, arguing that this interferes with the CTBT and will not expedite its entry into force. It also argued that resolution contains an attempt by nuclear-armed states to create a right to maintain their nuclear arsenals, in contravention with the NPT and the CTBT.

Pakistan said it continues to support this resolution despite its abstention on PP7 in relation to the NPT, to which it is not party.

DPRK said this resolution goes against its “supreme interests”.


France said it rejects the inclusion of a reference to the TPNW in this resolution.

Cuba said it shares the general objective of this resolution, including ending the impasse in the Conference on Disarmament.

Pakistan said it supported again this year with the caveat that negotiations of such a convention are in keeping with SSOD I principles and keep the security of states in mind.

Brazil said that while it has supported this resolution on the past, such a convention has been made redundant by the TPNW, which already prohibits the use of nuclear weapons.

Chile said it voted in favour of this resolution but agreed that the TPNW makes such a convention redundant.

Ecuador said it supports endeavours that pursue the elimination of nuclear weapons, but noted that the TPNW already has 53 signatories and the path forward is through the universalisation of this Treaty.

India complained that some states supporting the humanitarian initiative voted against this resolution.

L.50, “Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices,” was adopted with a vote of 174-1-4. Pakistan voted against, while DPRK, Iran, Israel, and Syria abstained. This was just a decision holding the place of the previous years’ resolution.

Egypt said it voted in favour of the resolution but noted that any future treaty on fissile materials must including existing stockpiles.

Pakistan reiterated its views on the FMCT, arguing that a simple cut-off would only worsen the situation in South Asia and would freeze existing asymmetries. It said it will not accept any outcome from the group of experts currently meeting.

L.55, “Nuclear disarmament verification,” also a draft decision, was adopted without a vote.
References to cyber and/or information and communications technologies (ICTs)—the two tend to be used interchangeably—during thematic debate reflected some of the positions and issues that had been discussed in the course of the most recent Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on ICTs. The GGE did not produce a consensus report at the conclusion of its final meeting in June, something that many states regretted in their remarks.

Karstein Geier of Germany, chair of the 2016–2017 GGE, presented an informal report on the GGE’s activities. He emphasised that while the Group did not agree on a consensus report, the quality of the discussion was very good. Members made practical suggestions, such as better documenting and sharing information about ICT incidents and creating a repository for confidence building mechanisms. Following the June meeting, Mr. Geier had tried to bring about agreement on at least some aspects of the draft report but found this to be impossible. Identifying a way forward is very important, he said, and suggested an open-ended working group, a subcommittee, or consulting in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as possible options for states to consider.

A primary point of division between experts concerned the applicability of international law and the UN Charter to actions in cyberspace. In their statements, the European Union, Switzerland, Brazil, Netherlands, United Kingdom, France, Australia, and Iran re-affirmed their applicability. The European Union, Switzerland, Finland, France, and Australia further noted the applicability of international humanitarian law (IHL). The Russian Federation took the opposite view, stating, “The idea of total and unconditional applicability of the existing international law in the use of ICTs is a double bottomed concept. Its advocates totally ignore the need to solve a whole range of crucial issues related to the specifics of ICTs.”

The European Union, United States, Estonia, and Austria, among others, said they will continue to abide by recommendations made by earlier GGEs, such as those of 2013 and 2015, to guide their behaviour in cyberspace.

The representative of Germany articulated that the use of the term “cyberspace” can be misleading, noting, “If a state agent or someone else whose acts are attributable to a state carries out a cyber operation in another state to stop an electricity plant, to disable machinery, to suppress or forge data stored in electronic governmental archives, to open the gates of a dam or to bring down the financial markets in another State, that does not happen somewhere ‘in cyberspace’. It happens on the territory and in the jurisdiction of those two countries... and these relations between sovereign states are governed by international law as we know it.” He similarly explored the subject of appropriate and legal counter-measures.

There is widening acceptance that the cyber GGE was too exclusive and that any future deliberative body needs to be more open, transparent, and inclusive. In previous years these criticisms came almost exclusively from non-GGE states and civil society, but this time others such as Switzerland, Australia, and Mr. Geier noted it in their statements, too.

France was the only state to apply an arms control lens to the challenges of cyberspace, by encouraging the control of exports of offensive cyber-tools and techniques with a view to limiting their proliferation in cyberspace. The first step taken in 2013 by including “intrusion software” in the dual-use list of the Wassenaar Arrangement should now be taken further, France argued.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), Paraguay, Algeria, China, Zambia, and Iran highlighted the role of ICTs in socioeconomic development and the related sovereign right of states to acquire, use, transfer, or have access to these technologies. They sometimes used language that seems reminiscent of how states refer to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

First Committee will not take any decisions or issue any mandates this session about how to move the issue forward within the UN. Resolution L.44, “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security” introduced by the Russian Federation, makes cyber an agenda item in the 73rd session of the General Assembly in 2018. Switzerland, China, and Austria reaffirmed the central role of the UN in any future discussions about cyber or ICTs. Brazil and Estonia would support the development of a separate legal, or strategic, framework. Pakistan suggested that the CD might be an appropriate venue for this issue.

There was little commentary on the human rights aspects of cyber, but Brazil noted that strengthening multilateral norms and principles cannot take place at the “expense of the free flow of information and the respect for human rights, particularly the right to privacy.” Austria shared that a conference it organised
in the last year was an opportunity to discuss human rights and Internet freedom; the European Union, Switzerland, Germany, Paraguay, and the United Kingdom referenced the importance of online respect for human rights.

During this cluster, India introduced its draft resolution L.52, “Role of science and technology in the context of international security and disarmament,” which is largely motivated by the potential of science and technology to resolve the world’s “most intractable problems” and help make progress on the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The resolution calls for a comprehensive study of science and technology resolution, to be carried out through a panel on Science and Security established by the UN Secretary-General. India is proposing a representative and diverse panel consisting of a maximum of 18 independent experts.

**LANDMINES**

Amelie Chayer | International Campaign to Ban Landmines

All the delegations that spoke about antipersonnel mines during the last part of the debate on conventional weapons expressed their support for the aim of eliminating these weapons.

Botswana spoke about its strong commitment towards the Mine Ban Treaty and the goal of full elimination of antipersonnel landmines. Burkina Faso invited all states to join the Treaty, while Argentina called for an “urgent and unrestricted commitment by all states” to tackle the problem posed by antipersonnel mines.

Cambodia, which is heavily affected by landmines, announced that it adopted an 18th national Sustainable Development Goal on demining. It said that the ASEAN Regional Mine Action Center based in Phnom Penh would contribute to intensifying demining efforts in the region.

Iraq, another heavily affected state, called for sustained international cooperation to mitigate the dire consequences of landmine contamination. Ethiopia requested international assistance to meet its 2020 demining deadline, and Niger spoke about its mine clearance efforts.

Improvised explosive devices that are designed to be activated by the proximity, presence, or contact of a person fit the definition of an antipersonnel mine and fall under the scope of the Mine Ban Treaty. Delegations stating their preoccupation with the risks posed by such devices included Botswana and Brazil. France said improvised explosive devices have caused significant losses of lives in the Sahel region.

Argentina and Brazil mentioned the support they provide to mine action. Brazil said such support was provided through its armed forces in Latin America and Africa, while Argentina said it was mostly “capacity-building and verification”.

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines encourages all states to vote in favour of resolution L.40 on the Mine Ban Treaty. States that have not yet joined the Treaty can use this opportunity to demonstrate their support for its humanitarian aim.

**CLUSTER MUNITIONS**

Amelie Chayer | Cluster Munition Coalition

Three delegations mentioned cluster munitions as the debate on conventional weapons came to a close. Burkina Faso called on all states to join the Convention on Cluster Munitions and deplored that cluster munition remnants hamper access to fertile land in many parts of the world. Iraq, one of the most heavily affected states, shared its concern about the impact of these weapons on the environment and the economy. Niger said that its membership of the Convention shows its political commitment towards disarmament and the protection of civilians.

A full report of the side event on cluster munitions held at the German House is available in this issue of First Committee Monitor.

The Cluster Munition Coalition encourages all states to vote in favor of resolution L.41 on the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Each year, a large number of states that are not yet on board the Convention do vote in favor of the resolution, thus demonstrating their support for the Convention’s aim of ending the suffering caused by cluster munitions.
FULLY AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS
Mary Wareham | Campaign to Stop Killer Robots

During their statements to 72nd session of UNGA First Committee on Disarmament, a total of at least 34 countries and three regional groups have raised fully autonomous weapons. Several of these countries addressed the topic more than once, including France, Germany, India, Ireland, Netherlands, Pakistan, and Switzerland.

Burkina Faso addressed this issue for the first time, stating that “the search for durable solutions to the emergence of new challenges resulting from fully autonomous weapons systems is essential for all.” Myanmar also referred to this topic for the first time, listing lethal autonomous weapons systems as a security issue that in light of technology advancement warrant “serious consideration.”

Pakistan explained the reasons why the matter of lethal autonomous weapon systems has emerged as a major cause of concern for the international community, beginning with the position that “any weapon system that delegates life and death decisions to machines is by nature unethical and cannot fully comply with international law.” Pakistan has consistently called for a pre-emptive prohibition on their development and use. During the thematic debate on other disarmament matters, Pakistan said that it supported last December’s establishment of an open-ended Group of Governmental Experts on lethal autonomous weapons systems at the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), but said “at the same time, we remain open to addressing this issue in other relevant multilateral fora including the Conference on Disarmament.”

The annual resolution on the CCW refers to the matter of lethal autonomous weapons systems, but does not outline an objective or preferred outcome for the CCW’s deliberations on the matter. Instead the resolution focuses on process with and new wording added to the draft during UNGA First Committee regrets that the first Group of Governmental Experts could not take place earlier this yet “owing to lack of adequate funding to hold all meetings.”

The UNGA draft resolution notes the importance of both “addressing issues arising from the outstanding dues of High Contracting Parties and participating States and from the financial and accounting practices recently implemented by the United Nations.” This is a clear reference to the fact that the effect that the Umoja financial management system would have on the humanitarian disarmament treaties including the CCW was entirely overlooked at its inception, which was a massive oversight.

A similar number of 36 states highlighted fully autonomous weapons in their statements to the last UNGA First Committee session in 2016. Before that, 32 states expressed concern over fully autonomous weapons at UNGA First Committee session in 2015, 23 did so in 2014, and 35 in 2013, when the issue was first addressed.

SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS
Rose Welsch | International Action Network on Small Arms

On the final day of thematic discussions on conventional weapons at First Committee, several countries remarked on the long lasting effects of small arms. Small arms are durable goods that can exacerbate social and political inequalities for decades after a conflict has ended, said Canada. Speaking from its own experiences with conflict, Cambodia said it suffered immensely under the Pol Pot regime from torture, mass executions, forced labor, famine, and starvation, all of which was facilitated by the use of unregulated weapons. Today Cambodia actively works to ensure that issues of illicit trade in conventional arms and their diversions are adequately addressed. In December 2017, it will host a regional seminar for Association Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states and Timor-Leste on illicit trafficking and diversion of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and ammunition.

Nigeria also referred to its devastating experiences with small arms, and highlighted its own efforts to stem their proliferation. Its Presidential Committee on Small Arms and Light Weapons has carried out an initial baseline assessment of SALW in Nigeria, including a comprehensive national survey, a national weapons marking programme, the establishment of a database on SALW, and developing a new firearms law in the country.

Gender continued to be a theme for some countries and regions. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) said gender discussions at the sixth Biennial Meeting
Forty-two states made references to the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) during the conventional weapons cluster and other remaining thematic discussions. Argentina, one of the co-authors of the original ATT resolution establishing negotiations for this Treaty, noted that by establishing common criteria, parameters, and standards for all states, the ATT can ensure transparency in arms transfers, “can put an end to irresponsible trade and transfers and to the proliferation of conventional weapons and their use against civilians.”

Burkina Faso, Argentina, Nigeria, and Brazil made reference to the third Conference of States Parties (CSP3) held in Geneva, Switzerland on 11–15 September 2017. Brazil recalled the thematic debate on linkages between the ATT and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at CSP3 and stressed the “important connection between the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, specifically SDG 16, and the ATT and the PoA... Argentina and Burkina Faso also highlighted the linkages between the ATT and the UN Programme of Action (UNPoA) on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW).

Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Niger, and Brazil also took this opportunity to call for the ATT’s universalisation, with Nigeria and Brazil urging producing and exporting states in particular to join the Treaty in order “to avoid the continued detrimental effects of unregulated international arms trade to world peace and stability.” Positively, Mali noted its intention to step up the fight against SALW and for the implementation of the ATT. Calls for the Treaty’s implementation were also made during the thematic discussion on regional development and security. France, in particular, noted that it is assisting the ATT’s implementation in Senegal and the Philippines.

References to the ATT were also made during the thematic debate on other disarmament measures. The awareness of the linkages between the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the UNPoA, and the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) have been growing in recent years. Brazil noted that these are important connections—especially the connection with SDG 16. Later in the week, Trinidad and Tobago and the NGO Control Arms focused on the topic as well through a side event on synergies between instruments. Panelists emphasized that the legally binding ATT and the politically binding UNPoA must be understood as contributing to sustainable development in general. They also pointed out that instruments aimed at greater oversight on both the illicit and legal arms trade improves nations’ abilities to implement their sustainable development procedures. Panelists also discussed how to measure the implementation of the ATT, UNPoA, and the SDGs, and the challenges of this task.

During the week, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs and the Small Arms Survey held two 2-day symposiums with experts from around the world focusing on the UNPoA and preparation for RevCon3. The first symposium covered SALW tracing and stockpile management in conflict and post-conflict situations. The second symposium focused on SALW and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, including SDG 16 and the gender aspects of small arms control. Both symposiums helped to take stock of progress made in these areas in past years, identify remaining gaps and challenges, and identify issues to highlight at RevCon3 and in meetings leading up to it.
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) noted that substantive updates to last year’s resolution on “Women, disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control,” which include references to the ATT and the SDGs, have helped strengthen the resolution and placed gender and disarmament as a cross-cutting issue on the UN agenda. Similar views were shared by Canada, which noted that it will implement high standards for Article 7.4 on gender-based violence and violence against women and children as well as “assess the risk related to such violations for a broader set of exports than those defined within the treaty.”

During the thematic panel on regional disarmament and security, the directors of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC), United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (UNLIREC), and United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (UNRCPD) outlined their efforts to support the Treaty’s universalisation and implementation in their respective regions. Bangladesh recognised the contribution of UNRCPD in helping its government identify legal gaps in its framework and enable it to move closer to ratifying the ATT. Bahamas, on behalf of CARICOM, commended UNLIREC’s assistance in implementing a number of arms control instruments, including the ATT. Paraguay and Belize, also on behalf of CARICOM, made references to the ATT during this thematic debate as well, both noting the role of civil society in disarmament efforts.

GENDER
Madison Goodliffe | Reaching Critical Will of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

A global shift towards gender equality is imperative in the current international context. Several states contributing statements across thematic clusters last week suggested that the ongoing paralysis of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the slow moving pace of the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) could be helped by strengthening the participation of women in disarmament. The unequal gendered impact of arms was another prominent topic covered throughout the week.

In individual statements, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Ecuador, Ireland, Nepal, Paraguay, Russia, and the Chair of the UNDC highlighted the need for women to have increased participation in the discussion on disarmament. Australia explained that achieving gender parity is essential to improving the work of the disarmament machinery. CARICOM’s statement covered the need for gender equality extensively. The statement began with the acknowledgement of the anniversary of United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security, and further explained that there are vital links between women and disarmament. Canada also gave a strong statement concerning the essential role of women to avoid the cycle of stale discussions that have consumed disarmament machinery in the recent years, stating: “If we accept that maintenance of international peace and security is a task that should be shared equally by all states, a basic principle in multilateral disarmament, than we should also recognize that pursuit of that goal should be equally shared when it comes to the representation and participation of women in the disarmament machinery.” Ireland also explained the need to have a higher representation of women in the discussion on disarmament to reinvigorate the forums. Furthermore, Ireland underlined the fact that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons underscores the need for gender inclusivity in discussions surrounding disarmament. Finally, Ireland also touched upon the need for gender equality with regard to expert panels: “On the rare occasion an all-female panel occurs, it is frequently remarked upon with surprise. It is our belief Mr. Chairman, that an all-male panel should invite the same reaction.”

Furthermore, in a joint statement Albania, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belize, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Mexico, Montenegro, Namibia, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, South Africa, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, United Arab Emirates, and Zambia argued that one of the main ways disarmament machinery has fallen short “is in its tepid acceptance of the importance of gender inclusiveness and gendered impacts.” In the first ever joint statement on this subject, these states reaffirmed, “International organizations need to represent society at large, and the way disarmament issues are treated and discussed is affected by who participates in the discussion.” Similarly, they argued, states need to “incorporate and reflect the undeniable body of evidence concerning the differentiated impact” of many weapons. They committed themselves to making gender perspectives an every day part of discussions and documents.
During the First Committee this past week, member states further discussed disarmament and development in relation to the Sustainable Development Goals (in particular SDGs 16 and 18), small arms and light weapons (SALW), landmines, the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), and military expenditures. Numerous states clearly recognise the SDGs as important for disarmament and development. Last week, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Argentina, Brazil, and Mali, as well as the director of UN Regional Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific (UNRCPD) and the Chief of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs Regional Disarmament Branch, all mentioned Goal 16 in reference to its importance to development. SDG 16 is a priority of CARICOM, as gun violence plagues the region and hinders development, creating greater poverty.

Myanmar highlighted that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has socioeconomic consequences, noted that in developing countries, stability and development go hand in hand. The Arab Group also recognised WMDs as a threat to the sustainable development of all. Algeria’s statement focused on the deterioration of the situation in Middle East and the use of conventional weapons in north Africa and the Sahel region, noting the threat it poses to sustainable development in the region.

Cambodia mentioned SDG 18, a goal to reduce the impact of unexploded ordnance (UXO). This is an additional goal separate from the official SDGs, which Lao People’s Democratic Republic established for itself.

Landmines and UXOs also affect Cambodia, harming economic development; thus it has also adopted this additional SDG.

The indiscriminate trade and stockpiling of SALWs is of great concern, said Iraq, as it creates negative consequences contributing to destabilisation and insecurity. The efforts to implement the UN Programme of Action on SALW must continue, it urged. Iraq also highlighted the harm landmines pose for its country and people, naming ISIS as being responsible for the planting of landmines in the country as part of a larger plan to halt development. The spread of the landmines and cluster munitions is of a great concern, Iraq argued, as it affects the environment and the economy.

The Arab Group, Cuba, and Paraguay each referenced military spending. The Arab Group reflected upon disarmament and development in relation to military spending and the SDGs, concerned about the increase in military spending that could instead serve to mitigate poverty. Also studying the impact that military spending has on the implementation of the SDGs, Cuba called for the international community to adopt tangible measures to reassure economic and social development, including the creation of international UN fund in which half of military spending should go to as a way to improve the development of all member states. Paraguay underscored that the reform of disarmament machinery must work hand in hand with the need to achieve sustainable development across the world.
SIDE EVENT: PRACTICAL LINKS BETWEEN THE ATT, UNPOA, AND SDGS

Raluca Muresan | Control Arms

A side event hosted by the Permanent Mission of Trinidad and Tobago, SIPRI, and Control Arms explored areas where the goals and content of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), UN Programme of Action on SALW (UNPoA), and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) overlap. Charlene Roopnarine from the Permanent Mission of Trinidad and Tobago, who chaired this event, stressed the importance that the Caribbean Community, a region disproportionately affected by the illicit trade in arms and ammunition, attaches to the ATT, UNPoA, and the SDGs.

The Conventional Arms Branch Chief of the UN Office of Disarmament Affairs, Daniel Prins, explained how the effective implementation of the ATT and UNPoA can contribute toward meeting the targets set by the SDGs while also stressing how SDGs’ reporting requirements can improve the measurability of these instruments. “There can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without development,” said Maria Paula Mac Loughlin from the Permanent Mission of Argentina, who reminded participants that the responsibility of achieving these goals lies with the states. She provided a list of measures taken by her government towards implementation of SDG Target 16.4, including the adoption of a firearms restriction plan, the development of destruction procedures, and plans to destroy 70,000 weapons.

Cynthia Ebbs of Control Arms, who introduced a new ATT Monitor publication “Goals not Guns: How the SDGs and the ATT are interlinked”, stressed the need to broaden the discussion and increase the awareness of the full range of linkages between the ATT and the SDGs. She highlighted three areas where these processes overlap: 1) commonality of principles, 2) complementarity of processes, and 3) mutually reinforcing activities. She also detailed how targets beyond just 16.4 are connected to the arms control agenda. This includes Target 5.2 which seeks to “eliminate all forms of violence against all women and girls in the public and private spheres” and 17.17 and 17.18 which “aims to strengthen statistics, data gathering, and assessment capacity”.

Glenn McDonald of Small Arms Survey expanded the focus of discussion to include four arms control instruments—the ATT, UNPoA, International Tracing Instrument (ITI) and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition (Firearms Protocol). He also said that that achieving Target 16.4 would depend on effective implementation of these instruments. Echoing Daniel Prins’ views, he noted that reporting under the international arms control instruments can support the gathering of data for indicator 16.4.2 as well as measure progress made in reducing illicit arms flows. He cautioned however that seizure data, the primary source of information on illicit arms, cannot fully describe the illicit trade as not all seized weapons are illicitly trafficked.

Mark Bromley of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) introduced the ATT-relevant Cooperation and Assistance Activities Database, which lists activities from sub-Saharan Africa, Latin American and the Caribbean, as well as South-east and East Asia. He explained that this resource can assist governments, UN agencies, and civil society in addressing national/regional interests and concerns while ensuring long-term sustainability of projects. Particularly, he stressed that this resource can reduce coverage gaps, avoid duplication of efforts, and reduce the stress on existing financial resources.

SIDE EVENT: REPORT FROM THE ATT CSP3 AND PROSPECTS FOR CSP4

Raluca Muresan | Control Arms

Between 11-15 September 2017, representatives from 79 states parties, 23 signatories, four observers, 13 international organisations and 24 civil society organisations, including 80 members of the Control Arms Coalition met in Geneva for the third Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) Conference of States Parties (CSP). The following month on 24 October a side event hosted by the permanent missions of Finland and Japan with Control Arms provided participants an opportunity to review the main decisions made at the CSP3 and to discuss plans and goals for the year ahead.

The panel, chaired by Ms. Rachel Stohl of the Stimson Center and ATT Baseline Assessment Project, brought together the presidents of the third and fourth CSPs, Ambassadors Klaus Korhonen of Finland (CSP3) and
Nobushige Takamizawa of Japan (CSP4), along with Ms. Cynthia Ebbs of Control Arms, Mr. Yuriy Kryvonos, Director of the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament (UNRCPD), and Mr. Dumisani Dladla, Head of the ATT Secretariat.

Ambassador Korhonen reminded participants that “The ATT puts the regulations of arms trade on the international agenda”, noting that states are now moving from procedural to substantive issues. He said that this change was reflected both in the delegates’ statements at the CSP3 as well as in some of the key discussions and decisions, including: the thematic panel on linkages between the ATT and the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development; the establishment of the working groups on implementation, transparency and reporting; and, universalisation; and the adoption of the priority areas for the Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation, particularly the practical implementation of articles 6 & 7.

Cynthia Ebbs highlighted the role of civil society in supporting the Treaty’s universalisation and effective implementation through active participation in ATT meetings, side events, exchanging constructive ideas with states parties, sharing research and analysis, and monitoring Treaty violations. She reminded participants that the CSP as well as the preparatory meetings “are opportunities to draw attention to critical areas where human suffering is fueled by irresponsible arms transfers” and noted civil society’s disappointment with states parties for not addressing actual arms transfers of concern at CSP3. Ebbs also highlighted three priority areas of work in advance of the fourth CSP: support for the Treaty’s universalisation and implementation in the Asia Pacific region; move beyond process and to embrace the Treaty’s purpose: to reduce human suffering; and push for universalisation as a way to ensure high normative standards.

The newly appointed President of CSP4, Ambassador Takamizawa shared his vision for the coming year, highlighting Japan’s experience in ensuring “human security which goes hand in hand with reducing human suffering and ensuring sustainable development”. Japan pledged to continue Ambassador’s Korhonen’s efforts towards the Treaty’s universalisation by working with regional stakeholders and linking the ATT with four key themes: the 2030 Agenda, human security, transparency and capacity. While still at a very early stage of planning, Japan also pledged to support the Treaty’s operationalisation by supporting states in their implementation efforts, with a particular focus on articles 6 and 7, general implementation, diversion, and record keeping.

Yuriy Kryvonos presented an overview of his organisation’s work towards the universalisation and implementation of the ATT and stressed the need to double efforts to support states in the Asia-Pacific region to join the Treaty. Mr. Kryvonos also emphasised the importance of reporting, which can increase confidence building, help states identify assistance needs, measure implementation, and assess progress.

Dumisani Dladla outlined the role and mandate of the ATT Secretariat. This includes providing administrative and substantive support to the CSPs, its presidents, subsidiary bodies and the ATT Bureau, and offering online reporting capabilities to states parties. It also promotes the voluntary trust fund (VTF) through outreach activities and carries out administrative tasks.

SIDE EVENT: DISARMAMENT EDUCATION
Samantha Hussey | NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace, and Security

On 23 October, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and the Rissho Kosei-kai Buddhist organisation held a side event in which practitioners shared their experience in promoting disarmament and non-proliferation through education.

Ms. Izumi Nakamitsu, the UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, and Rev. Takeshi Kawabata, the chair of Rissho Kosei-kai. Ms. Nakamitsu stated that education serves to strengthen international peace and security and that UNODA remains committed to promoting education within disarmament civil society organizations and the general public. She concluded that we can successfully progress toward nuclear disarmament through promoting knowledge among youth. Rev. Kawabata, noting that disarmament is really up to the people, said he was “convinced that human race must end the arms race before the arms race ends the human race.” For this reason, his organization is donating $1 million USD to UNODA to further enhance their efforts to promote disarmament education.

After the opening remarks, a panel discussion among disarmament education experts began. Dr. Kathleen Sullivan, the director of Hibakusha Stories, shared that...
she often brings in atomic bomb survivors to local schools and educates youth on disarmament through various engagement exercises. One example of this is the ball drop exercise, which Dr. Sullivan demonstrated. She proceeded to drop one metal ball in a tin can, which represents the firepower of one war, and then she dropped multiple balls in another tin can, representing the world firepower of all nuclear arsenals. The latter ball drop made much more noise, indicating more destruction. These types of engagement exercises help educate students on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.

Dr. Matthew Bolton, a professor at Pace University, introduced two ways in which he promotes disarmament education: through the model UN programme and through service learning classes. Model UN allows students learn about global diplomacy by offering simulations. Many students are assigned to disarmament-related entities and participate in national model UN conferences. Regarding service learning classes, students can enroll in a variety of disarmament-related classes focusing on peace, justice, and arms control. They also are assigned to work with various social justice issues and organisations throughout the city.

Emilie McGlone, the US representative for Peace Boat, shared that her organization travels the world by ship and visits 20 countries each month. In each country Peace Boat works with local civil society and focuses on disarmament, peace education, and human rights. Peace Boat often invites guest speakers on their voyages to share their stories. Many of these guests have had personal experiences with nuclear bombs or testing. These voyages raise awareness of the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons.

Christian Ciobanu of the Global Security Institute discussed disarmament education initiatives, including a podcast, internships, and the creation of a centre on peace, disarmament, and development in New York where young people can learn about the issues. •

SIDE EVENT: AUTONOMY IN THE MILITARY SPHERE
Mary Wareham | Human Rights Watch

On October 25, Germany’s Ambassador Michael Biontino moderated a side event panel discussion on lethal autonomous weapons systems entitled “Autonomy in the Military Sphere: Need for Regulation?”

The panel opened with a presentation by Dr. Marcel Dickow from the German Institute for International and Security Affairs or “SWP” on the initial report of an International Panel on the Regulation of Autonomous Weapons (iPRAW) that he leads. The report did not directly address whether regulation is needed or what kind (prohibition or restrictions), but iPRAW will address this question in its future meetings.

India’s Ambassador Amandeep Singh Gill described the preparations for the Group of Governmental Experts on lethal autonomous weapons systems that he will chair next month at the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in Geneva. He said that “eminent thought leaders” have been invited to address panel discussions on the state of technology, legal aspects including ethics, and military considerations, which he described as “the heart of the matter.” Ambassador Gill expressed his desire for “high quality discussion” especially from CCW parties. He acknowledged the concerns about future viability of the CCW that have been brought about by financial challenges, but said this it is a problem faced by the entire multilateral system.

Mr. Ryan Gariepy spoke from his experience as chief technology officer at Clearpath Robotics, the Canadian company that in August 2014 became the first private company to endorse the call to ban fully autonomous weapons. He warned that in the civilian sector technological developments are already resulting in unexpected errors, raising diversity and other concerns.

Lt. Col. Alan Schuller from Stockton Center, which he described as a Department of Defense (DoD) think tank, gave remarks in his personal capacity. He acknowledged the need for policy and regulation of fully autonomous weapons, but said he didn’t know exactly what is needed or when. Schuller described the 2012 DoD policy on autonomy in weapons systems as providing “procedural requirements, but not substantive regulation.”

Finally, Ms. Mary Wareham of Human Rights Watch spoke on behalf of the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots and made the case for the regulation of fully autonomous weapons through a new ban treaty. She identified the problem with autonomy over the selection of targets and use of force, lethal or otherwise. Wareham urged states at the CCW to focus on how to retain meaningful human control over these critical functions of weapons systems and to use other mechanisms to address some of the broader artificial intelligence concerns that are on the agenda for the GGE meeting.
Wareham emphasized the campaign’s dismay at the faltering process to address concerns over killer robots at the CCW. She said the campaign has been hoping to give the public confidence that governments are dealing with this issue in a timely and appropriate manner, but developments over the past year has led the global coalition to become increasingly pessimistic about the chances for progress at the CCW.

In his concluding remarks, Ambassador Biontino proposed a political declaration on lethal autonomous weapons systems that Germany is pursuing together with France. He said such a declaration could accomplish two objectives:

1) affirm that humans should make the ultimate decision to use lethal force; and
2) acknowledge that existing international law applies, including for weapons reviews, and develop a code of conduct which can be “a politically binding set of rules” for development and use of lethal autonomous weapons systems.

SIDE EVENT: CHALLENGES TO THE IMPLEMENTATION AND UNIVERSALIZATION OF THE CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS
Jeff Abramson | Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor

On 26 October, the Federal Republic of Germany hosted a lunch side event that provided an opportunity to discuss work recently done to promote the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) and to look ahead. Ambassador Michael Biontino of Germany, who led the seventh meeting of states parties to the convention held in September in Geneva, shared the work done by his country as the past president of the Convention. Included in that effort was the establishment of a “country coalition” approach where an affected state leads a partnership with other supporting states. Germany also reached out to many states not party to the Convention, frequently around a military-to-military dialogue that the ambassador said proved very informative. He ended by encouraging all states to support this year’s resolution on the CCM, L.41.

Ambassador Jaime Hermida Castillo of Nicaragua, speaking on behalf of his country, which currently holds the presidency of the CCM, stressed his region’s promotion of peace and overall humanitarian approach to addressing security issues. He shared the goal of promoting cluster munition free zones, including in Latin America and the Caribbean, as well as in Africa.

Sachi Claringbould of the Netherlands discussed lessons learned from her country’s presidency of the sixth meeting of states parties as well as recent coordination of the committee charged with promoting clearance and land release. She highlighted the goal that states parties have set to complete implementation of the convention’s obligations by 2030 and importance of condemning any use of cluster munitions by any actors. She also shared information about workshop in Lebanon last year that went in-depth into subjects such as land release and clearance methodologies in order to clarify treaty responsibilities. There are plans for a similar workshop in Sarajevo for Balkan countries.

Hugh Watson of Australia, whose country co-chairs the Convention’s working group on cooperation and assistance, offered lessons learned from promoting the country coalition concept. Among other observations, he stressed the need for political will among those involved, building national capacity in affected states, better donor coordination, sharing of detailed information, and the importance of effective communication.

Jeff Abramson, who manages the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor for the International Campaign to Ban Landmines-Cluster Munition Coalition shared findings of the latest Monitor report as a way to discuss challenges and progress. Ongoing use in Syria and Yemen, with nearly 1,000 casualties recorded worldwide in 2016, he said marked some of the most disturbing concerns. Ongoing stockpile destruction, continued efforts at clearance, the cessation of cluster munition production by the last US producer, and generally strong condemnation of cluster munition use were positives. To promote universalisation, he encouraged continued outreach to states not party and urged all states to support this year’s First Committee resolution—noting that more than 30 states not party to the convention typically do so. Mr. Abramson also discussed about the importance of disinvestment work, and recognised the recent adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and Nobel Peace Prize award to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons as providing opportunities for states to support the array of treaties that advance humanitarian disarmament.
This side event was co-organised by the German Foreign Office, Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC), the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA), and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). Mr. Jarmo Sareva, the Director of UNIDIR, moderated this side event and explained its purpose is to share key initiatives in capacity building for small arms and light weapons (SALW) management in Africa through different efforts of frameworks of regional and international organizations. At the end of the event, a film was shown about physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) in Africa.

Mr. Marcus Bleinroth, the Head of Conventional Arms Division of the German Federal Foreign Office, made some opening remarks at the side event expressing the German Federal Foreign Office’s interest in cooperating to aid African countries to combat the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons. These weapons fuel armed conflicts as well as threaten peace and security. He mentioned that Germany has contributed to SALW in Somalia and now calls to scale up initiatives to a continental level. Mr. Bleinroth stated, “Their security is our security.”

Ms. Einas Mohammed, the Acting Head of the Defense and Security Division of the African Union (AU) Commission, discusses the AU initiatives to control the illicit trade of small arms and light weapons. The first is ammunition safety and management. She stressed that assistance is needed for member states to identify the gap and shortcoming in their management. The second initiative is arms and ammunition management by Physical Security Officers (PSOs). The third initiative described by Ms. Mohammed was regarding the AU-Germany PSSM Project. She emphasised the importance of annual meetings between donors, member states, and implementing bodies for its effectiveness and sustainability. The last initiative mentioned is the Continental Programme of Action on Silencing the Guns. This PoA covers five AU regions with an integrated approach to various thematic areas. The common framework is based on sharing analysis between the international, regional, and national community to provide an overarching instrument. Ms. Mohammed stressed “the need to move beyond policy and establish concrete actions.”

Mr. Théoneste Mutsindashyaka, the Executive Secretary of RECSA, underscored the nexus of fragility and SALW, which is why a comprehensive security reform accompanied by capacity building measures need to be implemented. The key initiatives include the establishment of a national institution of SALW and the training for PSSM instructors. PSSM training at the national level improves weapons and ammunition management. It consists of the training of law enforcement to prohibit weapons reappearing on the market.

Mr. Himayu Shiotani, the Conventional Arms Programme Lead of UNIDIR, presented A Comprehensive Examination of Weapons and Ammunition Management Frameworks, Institutions and Processes (WAMI), a research project that assess the role of arms control in conflict-affected and fragile settings. It is composed of three inter-connected components. The first element is a comprehensive baseline study to establish baselines of national institutional abilities to govern arms and ammunition within international and regional norms. Second, an expert meeting series of informal technical consultations to determine particular options for policymakers to effectively implement weapons and ammunition management (WAM). The third element is a feasibility study pertaining to lifting arms embargoes, which builds on the recommendations from the High Level Review Panel of United Nations Sanctions. Mr. Shiotani emphasizes that from recent discussions it has become pertinent that states call for a comprehensive approach on a national level to address threat of the illicit proliferation of arms and ammunition in such settings.

Following the panel, Mr. Wolf-Christian Paes, the Head of Advisory Services of BICC and filmmaker, and Mr. Nikhil Acharya, the Technical Advisor Small Arms/Ammunition of BICC/RECSA, introduced the film. Mr. Paes explained that a major problem occurs after the training programmes have been implemented because there’s little follow up after. With the help of RECSA and the support of the state department, this has changed. Mr. Acharya describes the film as a visual documentation of PSSM: the work and journey. The film not only revealed the current training programme of officers, but the training of future officers.

The panel and the film reveals that there needs to be a policy framework as well as political will, but concrete implementation through capacity building is needed most to manage SALW in conflict-affected and fragile settings.
The First Committee Monitor is a collaborative NGO effort undertaken to make the work of the First Committee more transparent and accessible. The Monitor is compiled, edited, and coordinated by Reaching Critical Will, the disarmament programme of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF).

Contributing organisations and campaigns to this edition:

- Campaign to Stop Killer Robots
- Cluster Munition Coalition
- Control Arms
- Human Rights Watch
- International Action Network on Small Arms
- International Campaign to Ban Landmines
- Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor
- NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security
- Pace University
- Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom

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