The *First Committee Monitor* is a collaborative NGO effort undertaken to make the work of the First Committee more transparent and accessible. The *Monitor* is compiled, edited, and coordinated by [Reaching Critical Will](http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org) of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.

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- Federation of American Scientists
- Global Action to Prevent War
- Global Security Institute
- International Action Network on Small Arms
- Middle Powers Initiative
- NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security
- Quaker United Nations Office
- Religions for Peace
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**First Committee Monitor**

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**About Reaching Critical Will**

Reaching Critical Will is your primary source for information, documents, and analysis about the United Nations General Assembly First Committee and other multilateral disarmament conferences.

On [www.reachingcriticalwill.org](http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org) you can find:
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- All statements, working papers, resolutions, and voting results from all First Committee meetings since 2001;
- All statements and documents from the Conference on Disarmament, and regular reports on the plenary meetings;
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- Research and analysis of critical issues related to disarmament and arms control.
The second week of First Committee saw the last of the general debate, an exchange of views with high-level representatives from various intergovernmental disarmament bodies, and thematic debate on nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

Throughout it all, especially the thematic debate on nuclear weapons, an increasing number of delegations highlighted the mutually reinforcing relationship between disarmament and non-proliferation, arguing for a balanced pursuit of both. Several states pointed out that the existence of nuclear weapons constitute a source of nuclear proliferation, arguing that the attempt to focus exclusively on non-proliferation undermines those very efforts. Mr. Luvuyo Ndini of South Africa emphasised, “Continuous and irreversible progress in nuclear disarmament and other related arms control measures therefore remain fundamental to the promotion of non-proliferation.”

Rather than accepting the argument of the nuclear powers that their atomic weapons afford them and their allies security, more countries seem to be speaking out against the unacceptable risks posed by their existence.

The US delegation continued to maintain that states “acquired nuclear weapons in order to promote what they saw as their national security” arguing, “If they are to give them up, they must be convinced that doing so will not harm their security and that of their friends and allies.”

However, an increasing number of delegations are critiquing the role and value assigned to nuclear weapons in domestic security and international relations. Swiss Ambassador Streuli said it is time to “reflect on the legitimacy of nuclear weapons and of their roles in military doctrines. The vision of a world free of nuclear weapons must trigger a fundamental revision of nuclear thinking taking global security into account.”

In this spirit, Japan’s Ambassador Suda, reiterating his general debate statement, emphasised “that possessing nuclear weapons per se should not grant states any political advantages in international politics.” Chile’s Ambassador Labbé argued, “Nuclear disarmament will be a reality when States which possess atomic weapons relinquish an instrument of power.”

The nearly universal support for a nuclear weapon free world, while refreshing and welcomed, still remains rhetorical. Some governments, such as those highlighted above, are trying to push the positive rhetoric forward toward concrete changes in policies and actions.

To this end, more delegations than ever before have called specifically for the negotiation of a nuclear weapons convention or relevant framework agreement. Some of the calls have been made before, including those from the Indian and Non-Aligned Movement delegations.

Others have so far included China’s delegation, which suggested the international community should develop “a viable, long-term plan composed of phased actions, including the conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons, so as to attain the ultimate goal of complete and thorough nuclear disarmament under effective international supervision.”

Cameroon’s delegation called for the immediate commencement of negotiations on a convention to prohibit nuclear weapons and Morocco’s called for creation of subsidiary body in CD on nuclear disarmament to study the question of nuclear disarmament and elaborate a Convention on this theme. Austra’s delegation also announced support for the idea of a global nuclear weapons convention, while the Philippines’ delegation announced that it “supports the calls for irreversible and complete elimination of nuclear weapons under international supervision. It is prepared to examine proposals for a phased process leading to the ultimate objective of achieving total nuclear disarmament and to secure the agreements under a nuclear convention.”

There have been several other suggestions for concrete action over the course of debates so far, inter alia, full transparency of nuclear weapon holdings, development, and plans through mandatory reporting; IAEA safeguards and full access by IAEA inspectors to all nuclear facilities in all states; reducing the stockpiles of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and their delivery systems; reducing the role of nuclear weapons in security doctrines; reducing the operational status of remaining deployed nuclear weapon systems; refraining from modernising nuclear arsenals and facilities; and developing a legal framework prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.

In addition, the Canadian delegation has repeatedly proposed enhancing the institutional process of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. This proposal is a good way to turn the call for a nuclear weapon free world into reality by creating the structural and procedural basis necessary for the integrity and viability of the principle Treaty promoting both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

We hope that support for these concrete steps will be demonstrated through positive engagement with this year’s First Committee resolutions and through real policy changes at the national and international levels. •
Nuclear disarmament issues opened the thematic debate in the First Committee on Tuesday. As expected, US/Russian negotiations, the upcoming NPT Review Conference, and UN Security Council Resolution 1887 dominated the discussions. As was the case in the general debate, governments welcomed the renewed optimism since the beginning of the year because of the changes in position of the United States, an improving US/Russian relationship, and renewed confidence in the role of multilateral institutions. But other than references to these current events, there was little indication that the fundamentals of the debate as framed in the First Committee have changed.

Despite an overall improvement in US/Russian relations on arms control, the back-to-back statements by the two delegations on 15 October highlighted the vast differences that remain. Both countries ran down the list of nuclear weapons they had dismantled or retired, and both spoke positively of having a new strategic arms agreement to replace START by the end of the year. The US delegation said negotiators are engaged in “intensive negotiations” on a treaty that “will enhance stability and predictability in our two countries’ strategic relationship while reducing deployed nuclear warheads.” There was no mention of follow-up negotiations once this treaty is completed.

The Russian delegation also highlighted the work towards “a new full-format legally binding arrangement to replace the START Treaty.” However, Mr. Viktor L. Vasiliev ran down a list of conditions for continuing strategic cuts. In order to strengthen “strategic stability” and to be in “strict compliance with the principle of equal security for all,” he outlined a number of measures “to ensure sustainable development of the disarmament process”: Russian-US dialogue must consider bringing in all other nuclear weapon states — both those party to the NPT and outside the regime; conventional arms must not be built up as nuclear arms decrease; cuts in warheads and delivery vehicles must be irreversible; anti-missile defenses “should be avoided; no weaponization of outer space; and all states need to be involved to “ensure a controlled limitation of conventional weapons combined with parallel resolution of other international problems.”

While many delegations welcomed the US/Russian engagement, they also encouraged the nuclear weapon states to go further. For example, the Australian delegation said it wanted “deeper, faster, more transparent and irreversible reductions in nuclear arsenals” and called on all nuclear weapon states “both within and outside the NPT to reduce the number of these weapons, to reassess and limit the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies and to reduce further the operational status of their nuclear weapons.” Switzerland’s Ambassador Streuli said, “We must now move from the stage of encouraging statements to that of the realization of concrete actions.” Norway’s Ambassador Langeland considered the pending treaty “as a first step towards a comprehensive disarmament process involving all categories of nuclear weapons, and bringing in the other nuclear weapon states.”

Speaking for the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the Indonesian delegation said, “Although there have been positive signals and developments, the world is still confronted by unresolved challenges.” While “noting” the US/Russian negotiations, the NAM stressed that “reductions in nuclear deployments and in operational status cannot substitute for irreversible cuts in, and the total elimination of, nuclear weapons.” Sweden’s Ambassador Hellgren, speaking for the European Union, called for “the inclusion of tactical nuclear weapon, by those states which have them, in their general arms control and disarmament processes, with a view to their reduction and elimination.”

Security Council Resolution 1887 on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament was generally welcomed again during thematic debate, but that support usually carried with it a list of needed steps to advance the goals laid out in the resolution. South Africa’s delegate welcomed the resolution as a contribution “to a new, more balanced approach” to non-proliferation and disarmament but argued “that any presumption of the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons will only lead to increasing insecurity and a continuing arms race.”

All this was often linked to the possibility of success at next year’s NPT Review Conference. Canada’s delegation, for example, was “encouraged by the general momentum building towards the adoption of a substantive consensual outcome document” at the Review Conference. Australia’s Ambassador Millar was a bit more specific, saying the Conference “should issue some kind of blueprint for action. With respect to [nuclear disarmament], this could be something along the lines of the 2000 Review Conference’s 13 practical steps.” Chile’s Ambassador Labbe took up the same theme, saying, “We believe it is necessary to review the 13 practical steps for nuclear disarmament … and to formulate, in the light of the present realities and needs, a pragmatic agenda with objective chances of success.”

The key draft resolutions dealing with nuclear disarmament had not been issued by deadline. A review of those drafts will be featured in next week’s report. •
Nuclear Proliferation
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will

The debate on nuclear proliferation continued during the final day of general debate and the thematic debate on nuclear weapons. The European Union continued taking a hard line on proliferation, reiterating its proposals for non-proliferation to be pursued in the context of the 2010 nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference. Some of these include “resolute action in response to proliferation crises, in particular in Iran and the DPRK,” “determination of the consequences of a State Party’s non-compliance with NPT non-proliferation obligations,” and “adoption of national criminal sanctions against acts of proliferation, including proliferation financing.”

Meanwhile, the Non-Aligned Movement expressed its belief that nuclear non-proliferation “should be approached through political and diplomatic means, and that measures and initiatives on this issue should be taken within the framework of international law, relevant conventions, and the UN Charter.”

Several delegations, including that of Switzerland, argued, “advances in nuclear disarmament lead to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime.” Morocco’s delegation described the link between non-proliferation and disarmament as “indissoluble”. The US delegation said they are “two sides of the same coin.”

However, France’s delegation indicated that non-proliferation must come before disarmament. French Ambassador Danon argued that the “crises of proliferation are now the greatest threat to international peace and security” and that their resolution is necessary to create a safe international context in order to pursue nuclear reductions. He called for the international community to be “united and resolute” and “rigorous with those who violate international norms” of non-proliferation.

As in the first week, several delegations highlighted specific cases of nuclear proliferation they find particularly concerning:

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)
The European Union and Japanese delegations again condemned the DPRK’s nuclear and missile tests in the thematic debate on nuclear weapons, as undermining the stability of the Korean peninsula and representing “a threat to international peace and security.” Australia, Canada, the European Union, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Switzerland, and the United States urged the DPRK to renounce its nuclear programme and/or return to Six Party Talks. Several delegations, including those of the European Union, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, also urged the DPRK to comply with relevant UN Security Council resolutions. The EU additionally called on the DPRK to return to the NPT and IAEA safeguards and “not to pursue any sensitive exports”. Further, it described the DPRK’s letter to the UN Security Council on 4 September 2009, “which strives to challenge” resolution 1874, as containing “further provocations to the international community.”

Australia’s Ambassador Millar described the DPRK’s nuclear test as “strikingly at odds with the renewed momentum on nuclear disarmament. The US delegation said resolving both the DPRK and Iranian challenges is “a critical element of the push to realize a world without nuclear weapons.” The French delegation said it will judge both the DPRK and Iran “by acts rather than by intentions,” noting that it is “paying careful attention” to specific results that it expects to see by the end of the year.

In both its general debate and thematic debate statements, the DPRK delegation rejected the statements of those who condemned their activities as “serious provocations,” arguing that its nuclear tests have been the result of US aggression and UN Security Council resolutions.

Iran
In its statement during the thematic debate on nuclear weapons, the European Union continued to emphasise that Iran has the responsibility to restore international confidence about the nature of its nuclear programme. It urged Iran “to follow up the meeting in Geneva on 1 October with concrete measures, including giving full transparency on the Qom project,” as did Australia’s Ambassador Millar. Speaking for the Canadian delegation, Mr. Jonathan Tan suggested that a negotiated settlement, “may include reversible UNSC actions as long as Iran remains in non-compliance with its international obligations.” The Swiss and Norwegian ambassadors expressed hope the ongoing dialogue and consultations will lead to a positive outcome.

The US delegation, which did not comment on Iran last week, simply noted that Iran “has an opportunity to restore international confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear program that we hope the government will seize.”

Israel
During the final day of general debate, Lebanon and Palestine joined calls for the establishment of a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East, noting that Israel is the only state in the region that has not joined the NPT or placed its nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Palestine’s representative argued that anything less than the establishment of such a zone, “will prove devastating and could trigger an arms race in the region.” They also both welcomed the resolutions adopted by the IAEA General Council regarding this topic. In its thematic debate statement, the delegation of Iran highlighted the need for Israel to accede to the NPT.

continued on page 7
International Day for a World Free of Nuclear Weapons
Ray Acheson | Reaching Critical Will

The final declaration of the recent UN Department of Public Information (DPI)-Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Conference in Mexico City declared 27 October as the annual International Day for a World Free of Nuclear Weapons. This call was endorsed by the more than 1000 civil society representatives at the conference and by countless organisations since then. NGOs hope that this Day, which would be held during Disarmament Week, will afford governments, the United Nations, and civil society the opportunity to promote, highlight, and advance the abolition of nuclear weapons.

The government of Kazakhstan has also proposed the establishment of an International Day for a World Free of Nuclear Weapons. As home to the Semipalatinsk test site, Kazakhstan knows too well the perils of nuclear weaponry. Kazakhstan was a leader in the creation of the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone treaty, having made the unilateral decision to renounce the arsenal it possessed as a result of the dissolution of the USSR.

In First Committee, Kazakhstan has tabled resolution A/C.1/64/L.14 entitled, “International Day for a World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” calling for the establishment of this Day on 29 August. The Day would mark the date of its renunciation of nuclear weapons. While welcoming Kazakhstan’s initiative, many civil society organisations have noted that in August, schools and parliaments are not in session and the UN and other intergovernmental and civil society organisations are working at reduced capacity. These groups argue that in October, the Day would have the best opportunities to engage in educational and lobbying activities at schools, universities, parliaments, and other legislative bodies and to engage with prominent civil society advocates, government diplomats, and UN personnel.

Support for 27 October as the International Day for a World Free of Nuclear Weapons does not negate our collective responsibility to officially recognize Kazakhstan for its noble efforts. A win-win situation, whereby Kazakhstan receives the recognition it deserves, while ensuring the most effective International Day for a World Free of Nuclear Weapons, is possible. We encourage delegations to the First Committee to work with Kazakhstan to promote a date during Disarmament Week for this important Day. •

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
Christian Ciobanu | NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security

With renewed commitments from the United States toward ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the First Committee witnessed new optimism from numerous delegations on its entry into force during the thematic debate on nuclear weapons.

On 15 October, the US delegation reaffirmed its intention to work towards ratifying the treaty. Delegations from Australia, the European Union, Japan, MERCOSUR and Associated States, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Zimbabwe urged the remaining non-ratifiers of Annex II of the CTBT to also begin the process of ratifying the treaty.

The Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) expressed his view that the recent Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT was a momentous occasion. Tibor Toth noted that “more than 110 countries attended it and 40 countries were represented at the Ministerial level.” He added that the First Committee has a special responsibility in facilitating dialogue among UN members to implement the CTBT.

Delegates from MERCOSUR, the Non-Aligned Movement, Trinidad and Tobago, and New Zealand described the CTBT as part of the foundation for nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation. MERCOSUR’s representative said that the CTBT will “help to contain vertical and horizontal proliferation.”

To further emphasize the promising prospects of the CTBT, several delegations highlighted specific efforts towards ratifying the CTBT. The Inter-Parliamentary Union stated that delegations from Costa Rica and Austria “are accelerating the ratification process in Latin America and the Caribbean.” Delegates from MERCOSUR, Canada, and Zambia welcomed the decision of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Mozambique, Malawi, Lebanon, and Trinidad and Tobago to ratify the CTBT. The delegation of Australia congratulated China and Indonesia for renewing their support on ratifying the CTBT in their countries.

The European Union and the Inter-Parliamentary Union announced that they will continue to exert pressure onto the nine Annex II states that have not ratified the Treaty and to explore possible avenues with their parliamentary members to ratify the Treaty.

The delegation of Australia announced that it will sponsor the annual CTBT draft resolution. •
During the thematic debate on nuclear weapons, the sponsors of the First Committee resolution on decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapon systems had the opportunity to publicly explain their decision to not table the resolution this year.

New Zealand Ambassador Higgie said the decision, “reflects our recognition of the very positive momentum that exists currently and the genuine willingness of many states to explore concrete steps to achieve the ‘Prague vision.’” Ambassador Labbe of Chile said that this decision will contribute to a better overall outcome and will further constructive engagement with nuclear weapons states.

The Swiss delegation explained that the sponsors are also conscious that nuclear positions are currently being reviewed in several countries, which “correspond fully to the call in the resolution for further practical steps to be taken to decrease the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems.” Ambassador Streuli elaborated that their decision to not table the resolution will help “facilitate these review processes and to find a long-term solution to this complex issue.” He emphasised that the resolution’s sponsors would continue to engage the nuclear weapon states toward concrete progress on the objective of the resolution.

The resolution, sponsored by the governments of Chile, New Zealand, Nigeria, Sweden, Switzerland (joined by Malaysia in 2008) calls on all states possessing nuclear weapons to take further steps to decrease their operational readiness. It was adopted in the General Assembly as 62/36 (2007) and 63/41 (2008), with only France, the United Kingdom, and the United States voting against it both years.

The delegations from Chile and Switzerland also hosted two operational status side events. At the Chilean-sponsored event held on 14 October, speakers highlighted the importance of decreasing operational status by focusing on the dangers of unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, the catastrophic effects of nuclear war on the climate and agriculture, and policy suggestions for decreasing alert status.

The EastWest Institute co-sponsored the Swiss event on 15 October, which took as its starting point, “Reframing Nuclear De-Alert,” a report on topics explored at a conference held earlier this year in Switzerland.

The report, supported by the Swiss and New Zealand governments and prepared by the EastWest Institute, addresses the current operational status of US and Russian arsenals, the relationship between de-alerting and disarmament, and areas of consensus around decreasing operational readiness. W. Pal Sidu from the EastWest Institute outlined the report’s recommendations, including: fostering dialogue on this subject between the United States and Russia; bringing de-alerting back into the arms control dialogue generally; operationalising the US/Russian Joint Data Exchange Centre; strengthening nuclear systems against accidental or unauthorized use, bringing weapons designers into the discussion so that weapons are not designed explicitly for high-alert status; multilateralise the Joint Data Exchange Centre; and revisit the premise of deterrence.

One of the panelists, General (ret.) Eugene Habiger, former Commander in Chief of United States Strategic Command, strongly supported de-alerting, and said that it is feasible from a military point of view; what is required is a political decision. Sergey Rogov, Director of the USA and Canada Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, highlighted the moral dimension of the issue, noting that those who maintain nuclear weapons on high-alert status pretend they are to be used for killing weapons, not people. He welcomed the decision to postpone the operational status resolution in First Committee for one year, saying the international community is in a “race against time” to see tangible progress on de-alerting.

John Burroughs of the Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy contributed to this article.

Nuclear Proliferation (cont.)

**NATO nuclear sharing**

Iran’s delegation highlighted the problem of challenge posed by the stationing of US nuclear weapons in European non-nuclear weapon states. Mr. Reza Najafi argued that deploying these weapons and training pilots of the host countries to handle and deliver the bombs “contravene both the letter and spirit of the NPT,” noting that this has promoted parliamentarians and others in those countries to request their withdrawal.

Pakistan’s Ambassador Akram criticised the double-standard employed by states that offer prescriptions for others regarding non-proliferation but are not themselves “prepared to give up their nuclear security umbrellas nor prohibit the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territories.”

**Resolutions on proliferation**

So far the only resolution on proliferation available is the Arab Group’s annual resolution, entitled “The threat of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East” (A/C.1/64/L.4) The resolution, which deals exclusively with Israel, has received some vocal opposition in recent years for failing to address the full scope of proliferation issues in the region. In 2008, the General Assembly adopted the Arab Group’s text as resolution 63/84, with 169 states voting in favour, 5 against (Israel and the United States, accompanied by the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau), and 6 abstentions. The 2009 version remains unchanged from previous years.
During the final day of general debate and the thematic debate on nuclear weapons, the delegations of Canada, the European Union, Japan, Lebanon, MERCOSUR and Associated States, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Slovenia, and Switzerland welcomed the adoption of a programme of work in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) that includes a mandate for starting negotiations on a fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT). Swiss Ambassador Streuli lamented, however, that the international community has “subsequently had to lower [its] expectations,” since this programme was not implemented by the end of the CD’s 2009 session.

Australian Ambassador Millar also criticized the CD’s failure to implement its own programme of work. She blamed “institutional inertia and, more significantly, a calculation by a very few that stopping the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons may not be in their security interests.” Ambassador Millar noted that if this is the case, “such a calculation would seem to run counter to current international trends and would be deeply worrying.” She advocated for “engagement at political levels outside the CD to convince hold-out states that stopping the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons enhances the security of all.”

The Australian and New Zealand ambassadors both announced that their delegations will co-sponsor the FMCT resolution this year at First Committee and urged all states to “support a strong text.” Slovenia’s Ambassador Tinglic welcomed the resolution tabled by Canada, urging states to adopt it without a vote.

Ambassador Duncan of the United Kingdom acknowledged that some states have concerns about negotiating an FMCT but argued, “these are concerns that are better addressed transparently at a negotiating table, rather than being plunged into the deep freeze.” The Russian delegation also urged the commencement of FMCT negotiations at the CD, saying, “We believe that all required conditions are there.”

Mexico’s Ambassador Macedo, noting that his delegation thinks existing stocks should also be included in FMCT negotiations, emphasized that controversial points will be dealt with as the negotiations progress. He encouraged negotiations to commence with a daring and constructive spirit and urged the “reluctant ones” to come to the table.

Also advocating for the inclusion of existing stocks in FMCT negotiations, Pakistan’s Ambassador Akram argued, that a “cut-off in future production of fissile materials alone will simply freeze and formalize the existing asymmetries in its stock-piles” and “would neither further the cause of nuclear disarmament nor the objective of international and regional stability.” He also argued that for those with large stockpiles, negotiating such a treaty would be “cost free”. “In truth,” he said, “Treaties on banning certain types of weapons, test bans or moratoria on fissile material production have only been negotiated and agreed by certain states once these weapon systems have lost their relevance for these countries or when their national reviews lead to certainty regarding the sufficiency and reliability of existing arsenals for future defence needs.”

Meanwhile, India’s Ambassador Rao simply reiterated, “As a nuclear weapon state and as a responsible member of the world community, India is committed to participating constructively in the FMCT negotiations in the CD.”

The European Union encouraged the international community to promote the commencement and the “early completion” of negotiations on a fissile materials treaty. Pending the entry into force of such a treaty, the EU called on all relevant states “to declare and uphold an immediate moratorium on the production of fissile materials” for weapons purposes and to “dismantle their facilities dedicated to the production” of such materials. France’s Ambassador Danon also called for fissile material production moratoria to be implemented by each country involved as quickly as possible. Norway’s Ambassador Langeland called for preserving and strengthening existing moratoria on production of fissile materials for weapons purposes.

The Inter-Parliamentary Union announced that in April 2009 it adopted a Parliamentary Resolution that serves as a call for action by parliamentarians around the world on a number of fronts, including supporting the commencement of negotiations on a fissile materials treaty.
During the thematic debate on nuclear weapons, the European Union indicated that it continues to support multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle and stated that it had pledged 25 million euro toward the establishment of a nuclear fuel bank under IAEA auspices.

At the end of 2008, the European Union announced its financial support for the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s initiative to establish a nuclear fuel bank. This commitment brought the proposal closer to fruition as it neared the 100 million dollar mark, finally met in March of 2009 with a Kuwaiti pledge of financial support. In his statement to First Committee on behalf of the EU, Ambassador Hellgren of Sweden indicated that the EU contribution would be fulfilled upon the approval of the conditions and modalities by the IAEA Board of Governors. The Board discussed the matter of fuel assurances at its June meeting, but decline to take any action amid continuing concerns from developing states on the legal, political, technical, and economic implications of multilateral arrangements.

The Russian delegation also reported last week on the latest status of the International Uranium Enrichment Plant at Angarsk. The Russian government, in response to the IAEA Director-General’s initiative and at its own expense, had offered to establish a reserve of low-enriched uranium at the site. Russia expressed the intention to continuing promoting this initiative in the IAEA as well as at the NPT Review Conference in 2010.

Developing states continued to voice their concerns. South Africa’s delegation stressed, “what is required is a non-discriminatory approach that would assure a reliable supply of nuclear fuel, whilst fully respecting the choices of States and protecting their inalienable right to pursue peaceful nuclear activities, consistent with their non-proliferation obligations.” Other states, including many of those of the Non-Aligned Movement, cautioned each country’s fuel cycle and energy policies should be respected and should not face “undue restrictions”.

The call for the creation of legally-binding, universal, and unconditional negative security assurances (NSAs) continued during the thematic debate on nuclear weapons. The delegation of Norway expressed the sentiments of many in the First Committee, saying that is is hopeful to see progress on the matter. The representative of Zimbabwe not only called for negotiations regarding NSAs, but also described NSAs as a crucial part of the NPT regime. The European Union agreed with this sentiment, noting that NSAs act as incentive for nations to forgo weapons of mass destruction.

Speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement, the representative of Indonesia recalled the establishment of a 1998 Ad Hoc Committee in the Conference on Disarmament to address NSAs and reiterated its belief in the need for unconditional security assurances to all non-nuclear weapons states. This unconditional nature of NSAs was further stressed by the United Arab Emirates, and by the delegations of Tunisia and South Africa, who emphasized that non-nuclear weapon states have a right to NSAs. Mr. Luvuyo Ndimeni of South Africa went on to say, “NSAs enhance strategic ability, facilitate the process of the elimination of nuclear weapons, and contribute to international confidence and security.” Following suit, Cuba argued that nuclear weapon states should abandon policies of first use as well as grant NSAs to all non-nuclear weapon states.

As it did during the general debate, Kazakhstan’s delegation expressed hope that a Central Asian NWFZ would lead to NSAs between it and the nuclear powers. The delegation of Thailand called for substantive discussions on NSAs as a means to achieving progress on the issue. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea argued that threats of the use of nuclear weapons are illegitimate.
During the First Committee’s general debate and thematic debate on nuclear weapons, numerous delegates continued to discuss nuclear weapon free zones (NWFZs) within the context of nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and regional security. Several delegations also touched upon the recent entry into force of two NWFZs in Africa and Central Asia. Other delegates argued that the international community must implement the NWFZ in South East Asia and help foster the development of one in the Middle East. A few delegates mentioned the importance of the Second Conference of State Parties and Signatories to NWFZ treaties to explain that NWFZs are central in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime.

Representatives from several African delegations, including those of Cameroon, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe, stressed the importance of the Pelindaba Treaty in securing and strengthening regional peace. They also urged other relevant nuclear weapon states that have yet to ratify the Annexes to the Treaty to do so. Several other delegations welcomed the Treaty’s entry into force.

Proclaiming the significance of the recently established Central Asian NWFZ, Kazakhstan’s ambassador announced that the first consultative meetings of state parties to the Semipalatinsk Treaty scheduled to take place on 15 October in Turkmenistan. She further explained that the recently created Central Asian NWFZ would provide both regional and negative security assurances as long as the nuclear weapon states support the NWFZ. The delegations of Kazakhstan, Zimbabwe, Cameroon, and Thailand expressed their support of the Central Asian NWFZ.

As the Chair of the South East Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Commission, Thailand’s delegation affirmed its support of a NWFZ in South East Asia. It also informed the First Committee that it will table its traditional resolution on the SEANWFZ at the current session.

The delegation of MERCOSUR and Associated States expressed its support of Mongolia’s status as a nuclear free weapons state.

Asserting the importance of regional security in the Middle East, the delegation of Palestine expressed its concerns that Israel’s reluctance to support a NWFZ in the Middle East could create a nuclear arms race in the region. In addition, the Non-Aligned Movement urged that the UN must enforce Security Council Resolution 487 and paragraph 14 of Security Council Resolution 687 to create a NWFZ in the Middle East. It further demanded Israel “accede to the NPT and to place promptly all of its nuclear facilities under the comprehensive IAEA safeguards,” pending the implementation of a NWFZ in the Middle East. The representative of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya expressed his dismay that UN Security Council Resolution 1887 did not address the creation of a NWFZ in the Middle East.

The Russian delegation informed delegates that it is willing to engage in discussions with relevant UN member states to establish a NWFZ in the Middle East, as it has previously mentioned in the context of the NPT. Delegates from Zimbabwe, Lebanon, Venezuela, MERCOSUR, Japan, and New Zealand proclaimed their support for the creation of a NWFZ in the Middle East.

As in previous years, Egypt submitted its annual draft resolution entitled, “Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East,” (A/C.1/64/L.3). The resolution proposes the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East, calling on all states in the region to: adhere to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and place all nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards; declare their support for establishing a NWFZ; and not develop, test, produce, acquire, or station nuclear weapons on their territories. The text remains unchanged from last year’s resolution, which was adopted without a vote.

The Chair of the NWFZ Conference, Ambassador Labbe of Chile, announced that the Second Conference of State Parties to NWFZs in 2010 would occur one day before the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The delegations of MERCOSUR, New Zealand, Thailand, and Kazakhstan proclaimed their support for the conference.

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On the last day of general debate in the First Committee, the delegations of Palestine, Lebanon, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), and Pakistan mentioned missile and anti-missile systems. Speaking for Palestine, Mr. Ammar Hijazi stated that disarmament efforts need to be undertaken in a manner that upholds the principles of international humanitarian law. In this context, he argued, the use of conventional weapons that have “indiscriminate and excessive effects,” including flakett missiles, must be addressed. Lebanon’s representative briefly mentioned the issue of missiles, indicating it is in the process of adopting a resolution that will permit the country to join the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC).

Ambassador Sin Son Ho of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea took issue with the international criticism aimed at his country for its satellite launch earlier this year. Ambassador Sin said the DPRK’s satellite launch was in fact conducted in accordance with international procedures, and the United Nations Security Council was “being forced by the United States” to bring the DPRK’s peaceful satellite launch to the Council as an issue, claiming it to be a threat to peace and security in the region. Addressing the issue of anti-satellite systems, he argued that the current nuclear arms race and the modernization of nuclear weapons makes a preemptive nuclear strike possible when combined with “the worldwide missile defense system on the part of the superpower.”

Ambassador Zamir Akram of Pakistan expressed his concern over the growing strategic imbalance in South Asia, including the recent introduction into the region of nuclear submarines and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).

During the thematic debates on nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, some delegations spoke about missiles. Swedish Ambassador Magnus Hellgren, speaking on behalf of the European Union (EU) during the debate on nuclear weapons, promoted the start of consultations on a multilateral treaty banning short- and intermediate-range ground-to-ground missiles. The EU strongly condemned the DPRK’s launch of a long-range missile in April 2009, saying that the launch constituted a clear breach of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1695 (2006). The EU argued that this launch, along with the explosion of a nuclear device by the DPRK in May 2009, represents a threat to international peace and security, and strongly urged the DPRK to refrain from any launch using ballistic missile technology. As for Iran, the EU stated simply that the Iranian nuclear and ballistic missile activities constitute a substantial threat to regional and international security.

During its statement on other weapons of mass destruction, the EU repeated its concern over the risks caused by the proliferation of missiles that could deliver WMD, including “ballistic missiles of increasingly great range and sophisticated technologies.” Ambassador Hellgren reiterated that the HCOC, along with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), represent the best tools to deal with the problem of missile proliferation. The EU called for the universalization of the HCOC and for all subscribing states to uphold all the provisions of the HCOC, including pre-launch notifications. Ambassador Hellgren noted as encouraging both the positive statements made regarding the full implementation of the HCOC at the G-8 Summit in Italy earlier this year and the positive deliberations held in June 2009 by Presidents Obama and Medvedev on the objective of engaging in enhanced data sharing on ballistic missile launches through the creation of a Joint Data Collection Centre located in Moscow.

The Indonesian delegation, speaking on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), stated that the NAM continues to be concerned over the implications of the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defense systems, which negatively impact the promotion of disarmament and the strengthening of international security. NAM expressed concern that national missile defense systems could trigger arms races and contribute to the development of advanced missile systems. NAM singled out the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as creating new challenges to strategic stability and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The US and the Russian delegations both discussed their undertakings regarding missiles. For the United States, this involved retiring over 1,000 strategic ballistic missiles, including 96 Trident SLBMs removed from strategic service. Mr. Viktor L. Vasiliev, speaking for the Russian Federation, pointed out that the implementation of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty has allowed Russia to destroy 1,846 ballistic and land-based cruise missiles (along with their 825 launchers) with a range of 500–5,500 km. He stated that by 2009 they had exceeded START I strategic delivery and warhead limits and eliminated over 1,500 ICBM and SLBM launchers as well as over 3,000 ICBMs and SLBMs. As for the ongoing negotiations for a follow-on treaty to START I, Mr. Vasiliev said that Russia wishes to “substantially lower ... the number of strategic delivery vehicles—ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bombers.” In discussing the path toward zero nuclear weapons, he emphasized that unilateral steps to build up strategic anti-missile defense systems should be avoided, as strategic defensive and offensive arms are “intrinsically linked.”

Several other delegations discussed missile-related

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First Committee Monitor

Biological and Chemical Weapons
Ann Lakhdir and William True | NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security

Biological Weapons

On Friday, 16 October, the Hungarian delegation introduced a draft resolution on the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), A/C.1/64/L.15. The resolution calls on all states to join the Convention and urges all states parties to work closely with the Convention’s Implementation Support Unit (ISU). It also requests the UN Secretary-General to continue to render the necessary assistance and provide such services as may be required by the BTWC Review Conferences.

During the thematic debate on other weapons of mass destruction, the European Union delegation explained that it has adopted a new Joint Action in support of the implementation and universalization of the BTWC. The EU will continue to actively contribute to the current intercessional process, noting that the ISU plays an important role. It also called upon all states to submit their annual confidence-building measures.

Ambassador Marius Grinius of Canada, the Chair of the BTWC meetings in 2009, spoke about the August meeting that had 500 participants from 100 countries and 20 experts from 10 countries. There were four themes: the need for sustainability, an integrated approach, coordinated assistance, and identification of regional needs. From 7–11 December there will be a meeting of States Parties to the BTWC in Geneva. He said there needs to be an action-based outcome, enhancing the participation in confidence-building measures.

Norway’s Ambassador Langeland expressed satisfaction with the implementation of the work program adopted by the BTWC Review Conference in 2006. In June 2008, Norway and Indonesia, with the cooperation of the ISU, organized a regional workshop on biological issues in Jakarta. Ambassador Langeland said that the lead-up to the 2011 Review Conference provides an opportunity to deliberate on ways to further strengthen the BTWC, such as measures to verify compliance with the Convention.

The Non-Aligned Movement emphasized the need for a legally-binding, effective, and verifiable BTWC, implemented in a comprehensive manner. The Cuban and Russian delegations also called for a verification mechanism for the Convention.

Chemical Weapons

The Polish delegation introduced a draft resolution on the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (not yet circulated as an official document). Poland has been the sponsor of this resolution for many years and has consulted around 50 countries on its substance. The Polish delegation asserted that the irreversible destruction of chemical weapons, their non-proliferation, protection for states parties, and provisions for the peaceful uses of biological materials are goals of the Convention.

Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter, the Director-General of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), initiated the discussion of the CWC during the thematic debate. He has been the Director-General of OPCW for ten years and will be retiring in July 2010. The new Director-General will be Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü of Turkey.

Ambassador Pfirter said the CWC is a success story in multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation. Membership of the CWC has grown to 188 states parties. With the accession of the Dominican Republic and the Bahamas, all of Latin America and the Caribbean has joined the CWC. Iraq and Lebanon have also become members. In the last year, India fulfilled its obligations to completely destroy its declared stockpile of chemical weapons. Two other possessor states have completed the destruction of their chemical weapons. Ambassador Pfirter also indicated that Israel and Egypt have engaged in dialogue with the OPCW. Israel has allowed inspections on their territory and Egypt is going to do so soon.

Ambassador Pfirter indicated that the Russian Federation and the United States had destroyed 40.1% and 65.5% of their chemical weapon stockpiles, respectively. The OPCW Executive Council is considering a proposal that requires the Chairman of the Council to “engage in informal consultations with all interested delegations on how, and when, to initiate formal deliberations of the Council about the feasibility of the revised deadlines of 2012 being met by possessor states and to report to the Council at its next session.” The government of Libya has asked for an extension of its deadline for the destruction of its Category 1 chemical weapons stockpile. Albania is the fourth possessor state that is yet to complete the destruction of its stocks. The Swiss delegation said that it had rendered assistance to Albania and Russia in their destruction of chemical weapons. The Non-Aligned Movement expressed concern that more than 47% of chemical weapons stockpiles remain to be destroyed.

Australian MP Paul Neville spoke about the Australia Group, formed in 1985 to consider how to prevent the diversion of otherwise legitimate trade in chemicals and equipment to the production of chemical weapons. It has since expanded to 40 states and the European Commission.

The delegation of MERCOSUR and Associated States emphasized that that export controls on chemical products must not hinder development. The Iranian delegation warned that the “continuation of the non-transparent exclusive export control regimes” has damaged the CWC, emphasizing the importance of removing and preventing “the imposition of any discriminatory restriction on access to materials, equipment and technology.”
WMD Terrorism
Rahma Hussein | Reaching Critical Will

During the thematic debates on nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, many states cited the risk of weapons of mass destruction falling into the hands of terrorists and non-state actors as the most imminent and extreme threat to global security. The delegate from Cuba said that the complete prohibition and ban of nuclear weapons was the only means by which the international community could effectively secure itself from the spectre of nuclear terrorism. Echoing a similar sentiment, Ambassador Natalegawa of Indonesia, who spoke on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), underscored that the “most effective way of preventing terrorists from acquiring WMD is through the total elimination of such weapons.”

While welcoming the recent commitments made by some nuclear weapon states to eliminate nuclear weapons, many delegations expressed fear about the vulnerability of nuclear facilities and the plausible exposure of such sites to terrorist groups in the interim. Given this concern, representatives of Australia, Morocco, the Republic of Korea, Cameroon, and the European Union, among many others, urged the Committee that possible means of ensuring the protection of nuclear sites should further be explored.

As a result, many countries commended US President Obama’s plan to host a Global Nuclear Security Summit in April 2010. The Summit—which aims to develop collaborative steps to secure vulnerable materials, combat smuggling, as well as to deter, detect, and prevent attempts of acquisition by terrorists—may alleviate the concerns of some delegations. Ambassador Im of the Republic of Korea said his delegation hopes that the Nuclear Security Summit “will be an occasion to mobilize the will of global leaders to tackle the threat of nuclear terrorism and proliferation of nuclear materials.” On behalf of Thailand, Mrs. Chaimongkol expressed her country’s hope that the “Summit will lead to concrete outcomes on measures to secure vulnerable stockpiles of nuclear materials from theft and boost global cooperation to combat the trafficking of atomic materials and technologies.”

The possibility that terrorists may acquire other weapons of mass destruction, besides nuclear, added another dimension to issue considering the relative reach of such weapons to non-state groups. India’s Ambassador Rao, while welcoming the initiative by the United States to convene such a Summit, also expressed India’s support to enhance international efforts to address the threat of WMD terrorism. Thus, as in previous years, Ambassador Rao tabled India’s resolution entitled, “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.” Seeking the support of other delegates, Ambassador Rao expressed its hope that “this resolution will be adopted by consensus and receive the co-sponsorship of an increasing group of countries.” The resolution has not yet been circulated as an official document.

The Director-General of the Organization on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter, touched on the work of his organization in promoting the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and illustrated the positive correlation between the Convention and UN Security Council Resolution 1540. He indicated that full implementation of the CWC helps states to fulfill their obligations under 1540.

However, the delegation of the Russian Federation raised the issue that countering terrorist attempts to obtain chemical weapons requires a different and specific set of instruments apart from those established in the Convention, since terrorists and non-state actors are not bound by the same international, and legal obligations that state actors are to adhere to.

France has tabled a draft decision entitled, “Preventing the acquisition by terrorists of radioactive materials and sources,” (A/C.1/64/L.17). The draft decision simply puts the issue on next year’s agenda. A text by this title was last tabled in 2007, as draft resolution that was subsequently adopted by the General Assembly without a vote as resolution 62/46. It was intended to maintain support for the International Atomic Energy Agency as a central player in securing sources of radiological materials, to sustain the universalization of existing international instruments, and to promote the expansion of bilateral and multilateral cooperation aimed at enforcing the security of radioactive sources. While it was adopted with a vote, CARICOM tabled amendments (A/C.1/62/L.53) to the draft resolution that extend the focus on the cessation of the transport of radioactive materials through the regions of small island developing states. It eventually withdrew these amendments, though it issued an explanation of vote emphasising the importance of this element.

Missiles and Anti-Missile Systems (cont.)

issues. France’s Ambassador Eric Danon restated the EU’s call for the start of consultations for the negotiation of a treaty banning ground-to-ground missiles of short- and intermediate-ranges. Norway’s Ambassador Langeland mentioned that Norway firmly supports the HCOC. Turkey’s delegation stated that proliferation of the means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction needs to be addressed by the international community, and expressed its concern over the increasing range and accuracy of ballistic missiles. It also said that Turkey considers the HCOC a practical step toward an international legal framework on the issue of missiles.
In a dramatic policy reversal, the United States released a statement on 14 October that it will support an Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Secretary Clinton affirmed that the United States is “committed to actively pursuing a strong and robust treaty that contains the highest possible, legally binding standards for the international transfer of conventional weapons.”

As the world’s biggest exporter of arms, a positive shift in the US position is seen as a major breakthrough towards launching formal negotiations at the UN. Many civil society organizations, especially those in Africa, are hopeful that strong US leadership will help ensure that a robust treaty is eventually adopted. IANSA Africa coordinator Joseph Dube stated, “we hope the US will show positive leadership and push for a strong treaty, to help break the cycle of violence that is keeping Africa poor.” Jasmin Nario-Galace of the Philippine Action Network on Small Arms also hailed the announcement, saying, “I see rays of hope in this statement.”

While praising the administration’s support for the treaty, some NGOs voiced concerns that US engagement came at a high price. Secretary Clinton’s statement made clear US willingness to work towards an international standard during the 2012 negotiating conference under the rules of consensus decision-making. She emphasised, “consensus is needed to ensure the widest possible support for the Treaty and to avoid loopholes in the Treaty that can be exploited by those wishing to export arms irresponsibly.” Thus this year’s draft resolution on the ATT specifies that the negotiating conference “will take decision on the basis of consensus to ensure a strong and robust treaty.”

Oxfam and Amnesty International issued statements warning that negotiations on the treaty made on the basis of consensus “could fatally weaken a final deal.” Oxfam International’s policy adviser stated that “governments must resist any US demands to give any single state the power to veto the treaty as this could hold the process hostage during the course of negotiations.” Amnesty expressed concern that a single state could “scupper” a process that in principal has overwhelming support in the UN.

Numerous delegations to the First Committee continued to show their commitment and support for the development of a legally-binding Arms Trade Treaty, including Trinidad and Tobago, whose representative emphasized that action on an Arms Trade Treaty was a “moral responsibility” and “must not be relegated to a mere footnote in our continued deliberations on disarmament.” This call will be crucial with the commencement of thematic discussions on conventional weapons on Monday, 19 October, opened by the chairman of the Open Ended Working Group towards an Arms Trade Treaty. It will also be crucial for continued engagement in the Arms Trade Treaty draft resolution tabled by the United Kingdom and co-authored by Argentina, Australia, Costa Rica, Finland, Japan, and Kenya.

Civil society engagement on critical issues related to the development of an ATT also took place during the week. On 13 October, Oxfam International, SIPRI, and Transparency International hosted an event titled “Corruption, Transparency and the ATT”, urging Member States to include rigorous and detailed anti-corruption provisions in the heart of an ATT.

This week, ATT-related side events include “Peace-building at the ATT” on Monday, 19 October at 1:15 in Room A; “Promoting Discussion on an ATT: Results of the EU-UNIDIR Regional Seminars” on Tuesday, 20 October at 1:15 in Room 4; and “Women, peace, and security: The role of an ATT” on Thursday, 22 October at 1:15 in Room A.

Mark Marge of the International Action Network on Small Arms contributed to this article.
## Calendar of Upcoming Side Events

www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com09/calendar.html

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| 19 October 1:15-2:30 PM | Peacebuilding and the ATT  
Sponsored by Control Arms                                        | Conference Room A                  |
| 20 October 1:15-2:45 PM | Promoting Discussion on an Arms Trade Treaty: Results of EU-UNIDIR Regional Seminars  
Sponsored by UN Institute for Disarmament Research                   | Conference Room 4                  |
| 20 October 11:00 AM-2:30 PM | “The Silent Army” - movie screening and panel discussion on child soldiers and small arms  
Sponsored by UN Office for Disarmament Affairs                          | Conference Room 6                  |
| 20 October 10:00 AM-1:00 PM | Open-ended consultations on the IV Biennial Meeting of States (BMS IV) on the programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons  
Sponsored by the Permanent Mission of Mexico to the United Nations     | Conference Room 7                  |
| 21 October 1:15-2:45 PM | Special Event on the Convention on Cluster Munitions  
Sponsored by the Cluster Munition Coalition and the UN Development Programme | Conference Room 4                  |
| 21 October 1:15-2:45 PM | Towards BMS4: Issues and Approaches  
Sponsored by UN Institute for Disarmament Research                      | Conference Room 7                  |
| 22 October 1:15-2:45 PM | Women, peace, and security: The role of an ATT  
Sponsored by Control Arms                                               | Conference Room A                  |
| 22 October 1:15-2:30 PM | Launch of the 2009 Small Arms Survey to the United Nations Mission Community  
Sponsored by the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations | Conference Room 7                  |
| 22 October 1:15-2:30 PM | United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs-European Union joint project to promote universal adherence to CCW and its Protocols  
Sponsored by the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs and the European Union | Conference Room 4                  |
| 23 October 1:15-2:45 PM | Briefing on the Mine Ban Treaty  
Sponsored by the Government of Switzerland and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, in cooperation with the Governments of Norway and Colombia | Conference Room 4                  |
| 23 October 1:15-2:45 PM | Space and the Private Sector  
Sponsored by the Secure World Foundation                               | Conference Room 7                  |
| 26 October 1:15-2:45 PM | Screening of Documentary Film Featuring Atomic Bomb Survivors: “Flashes of Hope: Hibakusha Travelling the World”  
Sponsored by Peace Boat US                                               | Conference Room 4                  |
| 27 October 1:15-2:45 PM | Hiroshima: A Reminder  
Sponsored by Mayors for Peace                                            | Conference Room 4                  |
| 28 October 1:15-2:45 PM | Global Fissile Material Report 2009: Fissile-Materials and Nuclear Disarmament  
Sponsored by the International Panel on Fissile Materials                | Conference Room 4                  |
| 28 October 3:00-5:00 PM | “Getting to Zero?”  
Sponsored by the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security       | CCUN, 2nd floor                    |
| 30 October 1:15-2:45 PM | Celebrating the Entry-into-Force of the Treaty of Pelindaba  
Sponsored by the Institute for Security Studies                           | Conference Room 4                  |