NGO Reporting on the

General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security

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The Monitor is a weekly report produced by the NGO Working Group on the First Committee, a collaborative effort undertaken by 9 non-governmental organizations to make the work of the UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security more transparent and useful for those not based in New York. The Monitor is compiled, edited and coordinated by Reaching Critical Will, a disarmament project of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom.

RCW, supported by the NGO Working Group on the First Committee, provides several services to activists, diplomats, UN staffers, academicians and others including:

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* Coordinating an array of briefings, workshops and panels designed to educate diplomats and activists on issues of disarmament, peace and security;
* Providing information as requested to individuals by email or phone;
* Distributing to the First Committee the materials of NGOs who are not in New York.

The opinions expressed herein are not necessarily those of the Editors, WILPF, or RCW.

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Amnesty International;
Anglican Consultative Council;
Global Action to Prevent War;
Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy;
NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security;
Quaker United Nations Office;
United Methodist United Nations Office;
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom;
and others.

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Introduction

While a stalemate continues to grip the Conference on Disarmament, the UN Disarmament Commission falls into its own paralysis, and the States Parties to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty fail to make use of the third Preparatory Committee, the international security regime continues to suffer blows from all corners of the world. Hurricanes demolish small Caribbean States as terrorist attacks devastate Russia, Egypt, Israel and Palestine. The world remains gripped with fear as we watch the situation in Iraq devolve into a quagmire of violence. Small arms continue to ravish the globe while the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons remains virtually unchecked.

It is within this overwhelmingly dangerous context that the 59th session of the General Assembly convenes in New York, and the First Committee is charged, once again, with the mandate to make sense of it all, to identify challenges to the security regime and seek to address these challenges through an array of resolutions.

The reform of the First Committee has surfaced as one of the most visible initiatives in this year’s session; the United States has already tabled its draft resolution, 59/L.1, an ambitious and surprisingly detailed proposal that stands in stark contrast with the simple text adopted by consensus last year, A/RES/58/41. And, just as quickly, Member States are making their support and opposition to the draft well-known. The Monitor will be following these developments throughout the five weeks in its First Committee Reform reports.

New developments with the Hague Code of Conduct and Man Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) have sparked new resolutions on these issues, which have sent the sponsors scrambling to ascertain a consensus adoption even at this early date.

Other issues are not quite so new to the Committee, which will be tabling resolutions similar, if not identical to those adopted in years past, such as landmines, fissile materials, biological and chemical weapons, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and regional issues.

The New Agenda, choosing not to revisit their resolution on tactical nuclear weapons reductions, will be tabling only one resolution this year. (See NAC report, page 17).

The First Committee Monitor, a weekly newsletter produced by the NGO Working Group on the First Committee and edited by the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, will be tracking the developments of all resolutions tabled during the Committee’s 59th session. The HTML version of this report also includes hyperlinks to the statements delivered in the Committee, all of which are available on the Reaching Critical Will website, www.reachingcriticalwill.org.

To our NGO colleagues around the world, we hope that the Monitor provides you with an accurate snapshot of the debates taking place in New York. We urge you to send us your materials for distribution to the delegates. With just a few months left before the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, it is urgent that we explore these avenues of communication with those who represent us at the United Nations.

To the delegates charged with negotiating, debating and voting on the resolutions, we offer you our fullest support in a productive session. We hope that the imminent reform measures will allow the opportunity for greater participation and interaction with your constituents, as recommended by the recent Cardoso Report on civil society, and as supported by the Chairman and delegations such as Canada, New Zealand and others. We further hope that you make an effort to ensure that we receive all of your statements, draft resolutions and other papers circulated at the Committee, in order to make your work as transparent as possible.

The challenges that confront us are abundant in number, tortuous in their complexity and global in their scope. It requires, as reiterated by dozens of Member States in the high-level General Debate, global cooperation for truly global solutions. The NGO Working Group on the First Committee hopes to demonstrate, through our efforts, the benefits of working in collaboration with civil society at the local, regional and international levels. We wish all of us the best of luck as we plunge into this crucial GA session.

- Rhianna Tyson
Reaching Critical Will, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom
**Missiles**

The Panel of Governmental Experts established last year by General Assembly resolution 58/37 to explore and report on the issue of missiles failed to reach consensus. According to the Russian Federation, this failure was due to “serious contradictions in the positions of certain States.” Other delegations attributed the stalemate to the complexity of the issue. The Ukraine asserted that the failure “points to the fact that this issue will require our utmost attention in the future.”

Both this panel and its predecessor were established through Iranian-introduced resolutions that only garnered the support of a little over half of the Member States (around 90 votes for and 60 abstentions in each case). Previous abstainers have expressed their disappointment that the resolution did not mention the most widely-accepted missile regime, the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC). There is speculation that this second Panel of Governmental Experts failed to achieve consensus because of disagreements over support for the HCOC.

Chile will table a draft resolution, “Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation”, which aims to prevent and curb the proliferation of ballistic missiles systems by inviting States not party to the HCOC to join. Like the HCOC itself, which now has 115 signatories, it does not aim to reduce missiles, but to “prevent and curb their proliferation”. Chile, like others, believes that the Code is “a political answer to the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles” yet they acknowledge that it is not “the sole possible response: as a political undertaking it can coexist with other initiatives and endeavors aimed at the same purpose.” The HCOC is not legally binding, but many Member States see it as a confidence-building measure and a first step towards non-proliferation. Australia encouraged universal subscription to the Code, while Belarus promoted greater HCOC cooperation with the UN.

Other possible endeavors to curb missile proliferation include the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which has about 1/3 as many members as the HCOC. In its general statement this week, China offered to join the MTCR, but did not mention the HCOC. Kazakhstan announced that it too had applied to join the MTCR.

**Fissile Materials**

On October 8, Stephen Rademaker, US Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, set forth the US position on a Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). Rademaker called for the CD to begin negotiations on an FMCT after it reconvenes in January. But, he stated, ‘the United States has concluded that effective international verification of an FMCT is not realistically achievable.’ He explained: ‘One important advantage of negotiating an FMCT without verification provisions is that it will be possible to conclude such a negotiation far faster … [M]any of the benefits that we all hope to achieve with an FMCT will be lost if we proceed down a path that will delay entry into force for roughly a decade…. [W]e should agree to a normative, legal ban as soon as possible, while such a ban could still have important, practical meaning in curbing the growth of nuclear weapon stockpiles.’

The US position on non-verification reverses the previous US stance on the FMCT; runs contrary to the Shannon Mandate, calling for an ‘effectively verifiable’ treaty, referenced in the 1995 NPT Principles and Objectives; and ignores the principles of verification, irreversibility, and transparency endorsed by the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Other countries commenting on the FMCT continued to insist on a verifiable FMCT, for example Norway, Australia, Turkey, and Sweden speaking on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition.

In an October 5 statement, China’s Ambassador Hu Xiaodi noted the 2003 step China had taken to break years-long deadlock in the CD by accepting the Five Ambassadors’ proposal. That proposal envisions negotiations on an FMCT, and discussions on nuclear disarmament, preventing weaponization of outer space, and negative security assurances. Hu Xiaodi added that ‘China is now studying in a serious manner the proposal of negotiating a FMCT without verification.’ After studying the proposal, China should reject it. The 21st century will not be well served if two nuclear-armed heavyweights, China and the United States, both begin to champion non-verified non-proliferation and disarmament.

- John Burroughs and Michael Spies, Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy

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During the first week of the 59th session of the First Committee, select Member States expressed concerns with the potential weaponization of outer space; the leading proponents of the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) continue to be the Russian Federation and China.

Russia drew attention to the statement of Foreign Minister Lavrov, who noted in his address to the General Assembly that: “a need is arising to elaborate a U.N. convention on international outer space law.” Russia also referred to a recent paper co-authored with China that was submitted to the Conference on Disarmament this past summer. The draft sets forth “fundamental obligations” of a weapons-free outer space, including agreements not to place weapons in orbit, on celestial bodies, nor to resort to the threat or use of force against outer space objects, such as satellites and other peaceful objects. Russia also reminded the Committee that its unilateral moratorium on placing anti-satellite weapons in outer space, originating in 1983, remains in place today.

China’s Ambassador Hu Xiaodi stressed the “unremitting efforts” undertaken by China to “break the current stalemate.” (See Disarmament Machinery report, page 9) a reference to China’s “delinkage” of the PAROS issue from that of a Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty. Nevertheless, Ambassador Hu maintained “the necessity and urgency of preventing the weaponization of an arms race in outer space.”

North America continued to stress the importance of the PAROS initiative and its futility if any State decided to unilaterally place weapons in space. South Africa also expressed disappointment with the failure of the Panel of Governmental Experts and called for Member States to collectively address the issue of missiles at the UN. Morocco, however, held up the large number of subscribing HCOC States as proof of “the commitment of the international community to collectively address issues of international security.”

Chile’s support for PAROS was contextualized in the fight against missile proliferation. In their statement on the Hague Code of Conduct (see Missiles report, page 3), Chile asserted that every State had a right to the benefits of a peaceful outer space. Referencing GA Resolution 51/122 (December 13, 1996), Chile noted “that, in the process of reaping such benefits, they should not contribute to the proliferation of Ballistic Missiles.”

The issue of PAROS is a main concern to other States as well. Kazakhstan reminded the Committee that the “militarization of outer space...could have irreversible consequences,” and that negotiations “should start as soon as possible.” Sri Lanka noted that support for the re-establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee in the CD continues to grow, and that “the annual presentation of the PAROS resolution in the First Committee and the almost universal endorsement of its principles... has had the salutary effect of according to these objectives, the status of customary law.”

Indonesia insisted that the only legitimate and lasting solutions are derived under multilateral auspices. Belarus also voiced tepid support for the PAROS campaign, specifying the need to ban “offensive” weapons in space. Others such as Canada and Venezuela, broached the issue quickly in their laundry lists of urgent concerns.

For more information on PAROS, see: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/paros/parosindex.html.

To read the Russian/Chinese paper on PAROS verification: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/speeches04/PAROSverif.pdf


- Rhianna Tyson and Renee O’Connor, Reaching Critical Will

Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space

- Jennifer Nordstrom,
  Global Action to Prevent War
Terrorism

Against a backdrop of terrorist bombings in Egypt and France, Member States in the General Assembly’s First Committee said that terrorism is a growing threat to global security, and warned of the danger of weapons of mass destruction in the hands of terror groups.

China reflected the views of many in the Committee when it noted that, “from the New York World Trade Center to North Ossetia, the alarm bell of terrorist threats has tolled loud time and again.”

While the Security Council passed a Russian-led resolution on Combating Terrorism, the First Committee spent the week discussing terrorism’s implications on the traditional themes of disarmament, arms control, and particularly non-proliferation. Many delegates urged Member States to implement SC Resolution 1540 on the non-proliferation of WMD, and called for stronger multilateral mechanisms to enforce it and other agreements on weapons of mass destruction.

“Governments and world public opinion realized that terrorism could be devastating to our societies if it is equipped with WMD,” Turkey’s representative said. “The horror of ‘dirty bombs’ [has] started to haunt our governments. This, in turn, has increased our vigilance on the proliferation of WMD and their delivery means.”

Over the past three years, Mexico said, the war on terrorism has increasingly become linked to disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, and thus has a direct impact on the First Committee’s work. It stressed the need for an international strategy, and criticized the paralyzed state of multilateral discussions on disarmament. (See Disarmament Machinery report, page 9.)

Some States offered suggestions on reforming and revitalizing the First Committee so that it could do a better job of keeping WMD out of the hands of terrorists. (See First Committee Reform report, page 16.) China warned that the threat of bio-terrorism is on the rise, and called for negotiations to formulate ways to make the Biological Weapons Convention more effective. (See Chemical and Biological Weapons report, page 7.)

Norway said the Committee should be upgraded, while India suggested strengthening the UN’s multilateral disarmament machinery. India noted that for the third year in a row it will present a resolution on measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

Indonesia pointed out that the international strategy to combat terrorism tends to emphasize non-proliferation at the expense of disarmament, and ignores the obligations of nuclear States. Sweden and Mexico also argued that disarmament and non-proliferation are inextricably linked, and that both are essential to combating terrorism. (See Nuclear Disarmament report, page 6.)

“Current events underline that the only real guarantee against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination, and the assurance that they will never be produced again,” Sweden said, on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition.

Today more than ever, disarmament and non-proliferation should not be viewed as stand-alone issues, the European Union said. It called on the Committee to recognize that the two are essential to resolving other security and stability concerns.

While delegates stressed a variety of priorities, there was broad consensus that today’s threats to security are common problems. Committee members agreed that they had to pursue their objectives through multilateral cooperation in international organizations and through bilateral partnerships.

- Vina Nadjibulla, United Methodist United Nations Office

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In its infancy, the General Assembly passed its first resolution I(I), which dealt with “the problem raised by the discovery of atomic energy.” Almost 60 years and countless resolutions after I(I), the issue of nuclear disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear arsenals remains a priority to the majority of Member States.

Many States agreed with the view held by the United Arab Emirates, which contends that “the progress made in disarmament in the following years of the (cold) war has become much slower in the last few years.” Both Eritrea and Switzerland commented on the lack of “meaningful” reductions, a “very worrying” situation to the Holy See. Malaysia cited the Secretary-General report, asserting that nuclear weapons remain “a threat to mankind.”

In their written statement, the US pointed again to the progress being made under the Moscow Treaty, stating that by 2012 the US will have reduced “about 80%” of the strategic nuclear warheads that had been deployed in 1991. The Russian Federation, too, emphasized that it strictly and consistently implements its obligations and initiatives in nuclear disarmament, particularly within the framework Article VI of the Treaty. The US announced that, in the future, it will offer a joint US-Russian resolution on Article VI progress.

Yet despite these assertions, many States voiced strong dismay at the lack of Article VI progress. Sweden, on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), again pointed out the insufficiencies of the Moscow Treaty, noting its limited scope and lack of irreversible, transparent and verifiable processes.

Mexico expressed concern that, “the international strategy to combat terrorism tends to emphasize non-proliferation in detriment of disarmament objectives and in particular the obligations of the nuclear states in the disarmament field.” Accordingly, Brazil, speaking on behalf of the Rio Group, stressed that “all commitments must be respected - not only nonproliferation, but also concrete disarmament, verification and the inalienable right to the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.”

The NAC also warned against selective compliance, asserting that “the NPT, a legally binding agreement...cannot be complied with à la carte,” a view supported by Canada, China, Guyana, Malaysia, Mongolia, South Africa, New Zealand, Lesotho and others. The United States rejected such accusations of selective compliance, declaring them “both unjust and untrue.” In the same vein, Russia warned against imposing “unrealistic benchmarks” for nuclear abolition.

China maintained its support for the “complete destruction of nuclear weapons” while India declared that the Rajiv Gandhi plan, with incremental measures such as dealerting and de-targeting, remains the basis for Indian nuclear disarmament.

A vast number of States, including Algeria and Sri Lanka, stressed the interdependency of disarmament and nonproliferation. As the NAC stated, “nuclear disarmament and nuclear nonproliferation are mutually reinforcing processes. Without nuclear disarmament, we run the risk of a new nuclear arms race. Non-proliferation is vital but it is not sufficient.”

Mexico insisted that “the success of the strategy in combating terrorism, in particular on the dangerous front of weapons of mass destruction, necessarily hinges on the implementation of the disarmament objectives, only in that way can the objectives in both areas be truly complimentary”. (See Terrorism report, page 5.) Jamaica went one step further in asserting that the elimination of nuclear weapons would obviate the need for ad hoc, plurilateral nonproliferation measures such as Security Council resolution 1540. (See Proliferation report, page 11.)

Meanwhile Australia distanced itself from this interlinkage. “We do not share the view that improvements to the nonproliferation regime should be linked inextricably to movement on nuclear disarmament.”

Japan announced that it will again submit its draft resolution entitled ‘A path to the total elimination of nuclear weapons’ reflecting recent developments and providing practical steps toward the elimination of nuclear weapons. The 2003 version of this resolution garnered 146 votes in favor, 2 against with 16 abstentions.

- Rhianna Tyson and Kerstin Bihlmaier, Reaching Critical Will
Chemical and Biological Weapons

On October 7, the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons), Rogelio Pfirter, addressed the First Committee. He said the OPCW has completed 100,000 inspector days, inspecting more than 750 facilities of various types in 65 States Parties. The OPCW is close to conducting its 2,000th inspection. He said the verification regime set out in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is said to be the most complex and ambitious in the history of multilateral disarmament. 'We inspect former chemical weapons production facilities as well as destruction and storage facilities; but we also monitor the chemical industry, in a gigantic effort that demands a skilled and well-trained inspection force, and of course the close and active collaboration of the chemical industry around the globe. All these factors converge in the successful delivery of our unique program of disarmament, non-proliferation and international cooperation.'

The CWC is not a self-executing treaty and therefore requires States Parties to take a number of steps at the national level to make it operational and enforce its provisions. Many Member States are behind in implementing and enforcing national legislation and customs controls. Countries have agreed to a November, 2005 deadline for stocktaking, and hopefully the destruction of the stockpiles of chemical weapons will be close to achievement by then.

There are now 166 States Parties. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya last December acknowledged that it possessed chemical weapons, has acceded to the Convention and started disarmament under round-the-clock supervision of the OPCW inspectorate. In the Korean peninsula and the Middle East there are countries that remain outside the Convention. Adherence to the Convention would constitute a significant confidence-building gesture in those areas of conflict, he said.

Destruction of chemical weapons is continuing. There are six declared possessor States Parties which have declared more than 71,000 tonnes of chemical agents and nearly 8.7 million munitions and containers. In the US more than 30% of the arsenal has been destroyed. India will soon have destroyed 80% of its chemical weapons stockpile. Russia has the largest arsenal and is now moving ahead after initial delays with the help of the Global Partnership. Albania has declared a small arsenal.

Poland has traditionally submitted a resolution on the CWC and will do so again this year.

Many delegations indicated their support of both the CWC and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). In contrast to the CWC, which has the OPCW as its Technical Secretariat, the BTWC has no Secretariat and no verification provisions. The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention has 161 States Parties, and there are 16 countries awaiting ratification. The seven year effort to develop a Protocol that would provide a monitoring capability failed when the US indicated its lack of support. There have been annual meetings each year addressing specific issues and there will be a review conference in 2006.

Many delegations indicated their support for ‘strengthening’ the BTWC. Ambassador Rezlam Ishar Jenie of Indonesia said on October 4, 'With regard to biological weapons, we note with disappointment that efforts to formulate measures for preventing and controlling deliberate biological or toxin attacks have not been productive. We do hope, however, that the outcome of the annual meetings of States Parties of the Biological Weapons Convention will contribute to promote common understanding and effective action to better implementation of the BWC towards the convening of the 2006 Review Conference.'

Others mentioning the need to strengthen the BTWC included Kazakhstan, Lesotho, Sri Lanka, Singapore, Malaysia, China, India, Mexico, Brazil, Japan and the CARICOM States. Those that specifically emphasized the
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones

Several States expressed support for nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs), with specific mention of an existing NWFZ in their region or with a call for establishment of new zones. Mexico, with the support of the States Parties of the Tlatelolco Treaty, announced that it is offering to host a Conference of States Parties and signatories of NWFZ treaties, "with the aim of fostering a better coordination among those zones and to ensure scrupulous respect for legal regimes created by those zones, as well as to support the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones in other areas of the world."

Bahamas, on behalf of Carribean Community (CARI-COM) States, noted that "[i]t is a source of immense satisfaction to CARICOM States that the Treaty of Tlatelolco commands universal adherence in Latin America and the Caribbean, the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated region. We encourage other States engaged in discussions to create nuclear-weapon-free zones to continue to move those processes forward in pursuit of the important goal of non-proliferation." Brazil, on behalf of the Rio Group and in its own statement, also expressed support for the Treaty of Tlatelolco and cited it as an example to other regions.

The 'one-state NWFZ' of Mongolia recalled that its own nuclear-weapon-free status was declared in 1992 and that it "plans to start in the near future consultations on conclusion of a relevant trilateral treaty with our two immediate neighbors – the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation. We firmly believe that Mongolia's internationally recognized and legally-binding nuclear-weapon-free-status could further contribute towards ensuring peace and stability in the region of Northeast Asia and beyond." As in past years, Mongolia will submit a draft resolution on this topic.

Kazakhstan welcomed efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in all the regions of the world, viewing them as an effective contribution to nuclear non-proliferation. Kazakhstan is actively involved in the negotiations on a treaty to establish an NWFZ in Central Asia. Indonesia observed in this context that it is "gratified" that differences within the States of Central Asia, as well as between them and external powers, for the establishment of an NWFZ are being addressed, adding that "[a]s far as the Bangkok Treaty [NWFZ in Southeast Asia] is concerned, consultations with nuclear-weapon-states are particularly important to seek a mutually satisfactory solution for their accession to [the] Protocol." Similarly, Malaysia supports the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones worldwide, specifically mentioning the Middle East, and works with other ASEAN States towards acceptance of an NWFZ in Southeast Asia.

Algeria, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates also called for a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The United Arab Emirates stated that "the international community is required to take effective measures in order to compel Israel, the sole country in the Middle East which has not yet acceded to the non-proliferation treaty, to do so and to dismantle its dangerous nuclear facilities after being fully subjected to the supervision and the safeguards of the IAEA... We also call upon all states to suspend scientific and financial assistance directed to Israel, which is used in developing its nuclear facilities, in order to avoid their threatening impact on [the] peace process in the Middle East." Sweden on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition mentioned, in the context of the NPT 13 steps, that a WMD free zone in the Middle East is yet to be realized.

- Merav Datan, Reaching Critical Will
Nancy Colton, Anglican Consultative Council
To the grave disappointment of the majority of Member States, this year, the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC) and the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee (NPT PrepCom) joined the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in its tradition of deadlock and inaction, and none were able to produce substantive work. To Indonesia, this paralysis demonstrates “a crisis of unprecedented magnitude,” and to Malaysia, a “disheartening… setback to multilateral disarmament efforts” as a whole. Russia, expressing what many have already voiced repeatedly, attributes the inertia to “the lack of political will in seeking compromises.”

With an eight-year-long stalemate, the CD remains held, as Algeria viewed it, “hostage to certain narrow national interests,” a situation “completely unacceptable,” in the words of Mongolia. Algeria urged Members to “set the CD free” in order to “respond to challenges” as hoped for by the Rio Group. Mexico, Saudi Arabia, Lesotho, Zambia and Jamaica also deplored the situation while Venezuela, Switzerland and Haiti encouraged the CD to make progress as soon as possible.

Some States, including Sri Lanka, noted with satisfaction the progress made through the informal discussions on outer space, fissile materials and nuclear disarmament that were conducted this year. These frank exchanges of views “reveal the willingness of most of its participants in seeing the Conference get down to business at last,” according to Russia’s Ambassador Skotnikov. Morocco, which held the CD Presidency in August of this year, also offered praise for these informal consultations.

While the “moribund” status of the CD should cause alarm, Norway insists that the body could nonetheless still “play a vital role” in addressing disarmament and non-proliferation, if only States would “cut through the Gordian knot with which it has been bound.” Belarus, in an echo of this faint hope, asserted that the CD retains “potential” that has “not yet (been) exhausted.”

Many States, such as Indonesia, China, and Brazil reiterated their support for the Five Ambassadors’ (A5) agenda, what Algeria recognizes as, “a solid, balanced basis” to begin work. Kazakhstan voiced support for an Ad Hoc committee on Nuclear Disarmament, one of the stipulations of the A5 proposal. Without specifying support for the A5, Sri Lanka holds adoption of a program of work as “our highest priority.”

The US, one of the few States which has not yet accepted or rejected the A5 proposal, noted that it had put forth two proposals “ripe” for negotiations, a way by which the CD can break its stalemate. (See Fissile Materials report, page 3.)

“The UNDC,” asserted South Africa, “should not be subjected to the same paralyses as the CD,” and “urges that the (Commission)... be allowed to work in accordance to its mandate.” Once agenda items are agreed upon, the Commission will be able to focus its deliberations on them until 2008, as noted by Peru. The US, which viewed the situation of the UNDC as “decidedly worse” than even that of the CD, suggested that “this year’s UNDC resolution should instruct the UNDC to dedicate its 2005 session solely to identifying ways to improve the effectiveness of its methods of work.”

With so much attention on First Committee reform (see First Committee Reform report, page 16), many supporters of a Fourth Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD IV) such as Jamaica, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), Algeria and Indonesia are renewing their calls for such a GA session. Many believe that First Committee reform, if approached holistically through an SSOD IV, would help to break the impasse at the CD and UNDC.

While the traditional political machinery remains mired in disagreement, some States are turning towards other mechanisms in their pursuit of disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. With growing support for the Proliferation Security Initiative, UN Security Council resolution 1540 and even an institutionalized verification mechanism (see Verification report, page 18), some States perceive traditional mechanisms as being undermined or weakened. Malaysia maintained that international treaty-based mechanisms, such as the International Atomic

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Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) will not enter into force unless ratified by the forty four nuclear capable states listed in Annex II of the treaty. Ziping Gu, Director of the Legal and External Relations Division of the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty Organization, (CTBTO), said that 173 States have signed and 119 States ratified the CTBT, including 33 of the 44 States listed in Annex II. In the last year there have been four additional signatures and 14 additional ratifications, including one of the Annex II States (Democratic Republic of Congo). Ziping Gu said that the CTBT was 'one of the cornerstones of the international regime dedicated to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, that it is an instrument of nuclear disarmament, of the protection of the environment and of international peace and security.'

He and Ambassador Rastam Mohd Isa of Malaysia said the universalization of the treaty is crucial, and the representatives of Sri Lanka, Japan and Mongolia agreed. Venezuela said it has installed antennas of the CTBTO on its territory in 2003. The Bahamas, speaking for CARICOM, applauded the work of the CTBTO in promoting the entry into force of the treaty.

Haiti, Ukraine, Lesotho, Brazil, Mexico, New Zealand, the Holy See, Kenya, Algeria, Morocco, and the European Union also deplored the fact that the CTBT has still not entered into force. Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Mongolia, Kuwait, the Rio Group, the New Agenda Coalition, Russia, Turkey, Switzerland, the Caribbean Community, the United Arab Emirates and Belarus expressly called upon the II Annex II States that haven't ratified yet, to do so. Indonesia said that 'inordinate delay in achieving this goal may well lead to the resumption of testing.'

Mongolia said the entry into force of the CTBT is Mongolia's first priority. Although of tremendous significance, unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing must not be considered as a substitute for a legally binding and fully verifiable commitment made by signing and ratifying the CTBT. Brazil called for a corresponding legal justification for the monitoring system associated with the CTBT.

Kuwait, Russia and the Holy See emphasized that until the CTBT enters into force, the moratorium on nuclear test explosions must be maintained.

China, an Annex II State which has yet to ratify, expressed the wish to see 'the Treaty’s entry into force.' Ambassador Hu Xiaodi said his government was 'actively promoting ratification in its National People’s Congress, in accordance with the due legal procedures.' Other holdout States, including the United States, Egypt and India, did not mention the CTBT. Indonesia 'hopes that the unilateral moratoria will continue with a view to pursuing a permanent and legally binding commitment to end nuclear testing in all its aspects.'

- Laure Abado,
NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security

Disarmament Machinery Continued

Energy Agency and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons must be strengthened “without resorting to... action through the Security Council.” Many other States, including China, voiced support for a strengthened IAEA.

For more information on the CD, see: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/cd/cdindex.html

For more information on the UNDC, see: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/dc/dcindex.html

For more information on other political disarmament machinery, including information on UNSC resolution 1540, see: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/politicalindex.html

-Rhianna Tyson
Reaching Critical Will
Proliferation

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is undoubtedly one of the greatest threats to international peace and security. In this new millennium, the world must not only combat the “traditional” threat of horizontal proliferation, but also that of vertical proliferation as well as the proliferation of WMD by non-state actors.

Many States voiced strong support for Security Council resolution 1540, including Norway, the Netherlands (on behalf of the EU), Japan, Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan, Singapore, Ukraine, Kuwait, India, Belarus, China, Russia and others. Mexico maintained that, while in support of UNSC 1540, “the most effective and lasting manner to face the danger of those weapons would be to proceed to their total elimination, through multilaterally negotiated disarmament agreements.” This view was shared by others, including Egypt, Algeria and Jamaica, which also favors “binding commitments... (to) be negotiated in a more inclusive, open and comprehensive manner.” New Zealand cautioned that UNSC resolution 1540 should not “impede knowledge or technology flows to countries that can demonstrate full treaty compliance.” India echoed this concern: “Measures aimed at expanding or perpetuating the existing regimes of export controls and technology denials will hinder peaceful applications of nuclear technologies and reinforce the existing divide between nuclear and non-nuclear States by creating a new class of haves and have-nots.”

In addition to UNSC 1540, the EU also voiced support for the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) while maintaining that, “as a last resort, coercive measures in accordance with the UN Charter” are also a possible answer to WMD proliferation.

India announced that it would sponsor for the third year its resolution, “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction”, which was adopted by consensus the past two years. Along with increasing attention to possible terrorist proliferation, many States remain concerned with the acquisition of WMD by States.

Many renewed their calls for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to abandon its nuclear weapons program, reconsider its position on the NPT and accede to international safeguards.

Limited but notable attention was also paid to the situation in Iran, with several States urging Iran to comply with the September 2004 resolution of the IAEA.

Others, such as Turkey, called for making the Additional Protocol a condition of supply for highly sensitive nuclear equipment and technology. Kenya, Kazakhstan and Japan also called for Additional Protocol universality, while Ukraine and the US noted their pending ratifications.

States such as Sri Lanka, Lesotho, the United Arab Emirates and Mexico called for a halt to vertical proliferation. Mexico deplored that “nuclear weapons continue to be produced and improved despite the numerous appeals made to halt any kind of new development of nuclear weapons.”

Brazil, too, noted the threat posed by vertical proliferation, and the ways in which proliferation by existing Nuclear Weapon States incites proliferation by others. It stated that “new rationales are sought for the maintenance or development of new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons. The unfortunate consequence of such development is that countries may be led to see nuclear weapons as security enhancers.” The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) concurred, stating that “all States should jointly and effectively raise the guard against the further spread of nuclear weapons – and thus prevent both vertical and horizontal proliferation”.

To many, these challenges of proliferation highlight the need for nuclear abolition. The NAC stated that they “…are more convinced than ever that nuclear disarmament is imperative to international peace and security. Current events underline our basic belief that the only real guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is their total elimination, and the assurance that they will never be produced again.” (See Nuclear Disarmament report, page 6 and the NAC report, page 17.)

For more information on UNSC resolution 1540, see: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/SC/SC.html For more information on vertical proliferation, see the NGO presentation on the issue to the 2004 NPT PrepCom: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prep-com04/NGOpres.html#vertical

- Rhianna Tyson, Reaching Critical Will
- Michael Spies, Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy
Conventional Weapons/
Small Arms and Light Weapons

While most States remain frustrated with the slow progress on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation, the views on progress regarding conventional weapons disarmament, including small arms and light weapons (SALW) were mixed. Although many stressed the massive danger posed by these weapons, just as many were eager to note the progress that has been made in recent years to combat the scourge.

Indonesia regarded SALW as “a menace linked with terrorist, separatist groups, drug trafficking and other forms of violence,” while Australia noted that the distribution, accumulation, spread and misuse of SALW continues to contribute to the breakdown of law and order in many regions. The Netherlands, on behalf of the European Union, asserted that regional conflict has precipitated a huge proliferation of small arms, landmines as well as increased crime.

Turkey, along with India, is of the view that excessive accumulation and uncontrolled spread of SALW poses a significant threat to peace, security and political stability as well as to social and economic development of many communities and countries. (See Disarmament and Development report, page 13.) “It is generally believed that on average half a million people are killed each year with small arms,” stated Ambassador Ilicak, noting that 2/3 of these deaths are not attributed to armed conflicts. Bahamas, speaking on behalf of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), said that “CARICOM States do not produce SALW, nor are we large-scale importers of this category of weapons. Yet despite our best efforts, we continue to face the uncontrolled spread of illicit weapons throughout our territories, most times through the illegal diversion of weapons from the illicit trade”.

Much support was voiced for the various existing legal mechanisms against the proliferation of SALW. The Rio Group, CARICOM, Switzerland and Guatemala, renewed their commitment to the UN Plan of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW in all its aspects (PoA) as well as to the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking of Arms. Kazakhstan and Malaysia urged Member States to supplement implementation of the PoA with broad-based consultations to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering of SALW. Norway argued that, although the PoA is an important multilateral tool which should be fully implemented, States must get serious with the problem of illicit small arms brokering.

CARICOM, like many other States, praised the work of the Open-Ended Working Group on marking and tracing SALW. While participating actively in this working group, China is also preparing to ratify the Firearms Protocol in order to ensure its early entry into force.

Many States recognized the need for regional efforts to combat SALW proliferation. Peru discussed Decision 552 by the Andean community, which establishes a plan for implementation of the PoA. Kenya hosted the Great Lakes and Horn of Africa conference that culminated in the signing of the Nairobi Declaration and the consequent Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of SALW on April 21, 2004.

States were also eager to discuss national efforts to combat SALW. Ukraine, with the assistance of the NATO Partnership for Peace Trust Fund, expects to destroy 1.5 million pieces of SALW and 133 thousand tons of surplus ammunition. Australia noted the SALW workshop it co-sponsored with Japan, held in Fiji in August this year. Belarus, in its advocacy for transparency measures in armaments, stated that it regularly contributes to the UN Register on conventional arms as well as information on the PoA in accordance with resolution 56/24. South Africa announced that, with co-sponsorship by Japan and Colombia, they will again this year submit a resolution to address illicit SALW.

It is worthwhile to note that last year’s resolution on tracing SALW generated one of the most contentious debates throughout the 58th session. With so much support generated through its first successful working group meeting, perhaps the adoption of this year’s resolution will command the consensus hoped for by most of the international community.

- Dan Kuwali,
Amnesty International
Disarmament and Development

The First Committee, as Morocco reminded Member States, is charged not only to handle matters of disarmament, but all matters relating to international security. And for many States, the notion of security is broader than the traditional concept of “national security,” which fails to take into account issues of poverty, HIV/AIDS, development, environment and health.

The concept of “human security” was raised by numerous States throughout the high-level segment of the GA General Debate. China noted that international peace and security are threatened by numerous factors, including the “growing gap between the rich and the poor;” Ambassador Hu advocated for “a new security concept centered on equality, mutual trust, mutual benefit and cooperation” in a push to promote “common security for all countries”.

The Netherlands, on behalf of the European Union, maintained that poverty, disease, and economic failure are often linked to the spread of violent conflict. Correspondingly, they affirmed the EU’s commitment to addressing the root causes of instability including reduction of poverty.

Many link the slow progress of development to the ever-increasing global military expenditures.

The United Arab Emirates noted “the significant human, financial and environment losses caused by huge volumes and types of weapons used in these conflicts and the consequent difficulties of building peace in the post conflict countries. These resources could have been utilized in implementing the development programs and in promoting welfare of our people.” UAE also noted that “global military expenditure on production and stockpiling of ... weapons has increased by 5% in the past year, in contradiction to the commitments and undertaking made by the States in the Millennium Declaration”.

Brazil also noted “arms expenditures divert substantive financial, material and human resources that could otherwise be invested in social programs.” It recalled the “New York Declaration on the Action Against Hunger and Poverty” and suggested that new and innovative financing mechanisms would raise funds needed to meet the Millennium Development Goals.

Zambia echoed this feeling when it stated that the First Committee has the opportunity to contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security by releasing “resources that continue to be spent on armaments in favor of human development.” Zambia also recommended that another Special Session of the GA devoted to disarmament (SSODIV) could address these issues. (See Disarmament Machinery report, page 9.)

The Holy See made a clear link between the growing rate of military expenditures and the growing global fear of terrorism and insecurity, stating “A clear result of such over-spending on the instruments of death is that governments are much less able to meet long-term commitments to education, health care and housing... Security for all is enhanced when disarmament and development steps complement one another. We must point up the economic benefits of disarmament measures.” They also noted that while poverty and terrorism are not explicitly linked, they do share certain conditional relationships.

Some States, including Ukraine, Jamaica and the Rio Group praised the work of the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, established through resolution A/RES/57/65, originally sponsored by Russia. Indonesia also praised the GGE, recognizing the importance of “exercising restraint in military spending with a view to provide resources that can be utilized for social and economic development”.

Read more about the Human Security Network at: http://www.humansecuritynetwork.org
For more information on human security and disarmament, see: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/social/genderdisarm/humansec.pdf

- Susi Snyder,
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom
Regional Issues

Several States mentioned the importance of attention to regional issues, including the need to address conflicts and specific weapons issues – from weapons of mass destruction to small arms, light weapons, and landmines – at a regional level, as well as the need to strengthen regional cooperation and alliances.

The Bahamas on behalf of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and Brazil on behalf of the Rio Group drew attention to regional work on small arms and landmines and to the work of the UN Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean. Brazil, in its national statement, also noted its participation in regional security alliances, none of which incorporated nuclear weapons in their doctrines. Venezuela noted “unwavering support” for regional efforts, and Peru highlighted the Declaration of Presidents that establishes an Andean Peace Zone covering “the territories, the aerial space and the waters under sovereignty and jurisdiction of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela.”

The Netherlands on behalf of the EU called for regional solutions to regional problems. Russia said that regional progress on security and disarmament could have “a positive impact on relevant global efforts” and noted that in July 2004 Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine ratified the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe. Russia called for entry into force of this agreement and said it “should provide a considerable input to the European security.” Kazakhstan mentioned its initiative of a Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building in Asia, “an effective tool designed to strengthen confidence and security in the region,” and also noted multilateral cooperation efforts such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the Eurasian Economic Community. Belarus likewise supports confidence-building measures in the regional context and in 2004 completed agreements setting up a “belt of good-neighborliness” with Latvia and Poland.

Under-Secretary-General Nobuyasu Abe drew attention to the work of the Department for Disarmament Affairs’ three Regional Centers in Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia and the Pacific and “especially the critical situation facing the Regional Center in Lome, Togo.” The Holy See underscored the “extremely concerning” spread of conventional weapons particularly in Africa.

Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya and Eritrea noted the importance of regional cooperation to dealing with small arms and light weapons and/or landmines. Kenya specifically mentioned the Nairobi Declaration, a regional effort they hosted and the only binding instrument on small arms and light weapons in the region.

Egypt described challenges to Middle East and Northeast Asian security. Morocco said that the Mediterranean region needs equitable development in order to be secure.

Algeria stated that it will host a conference of the League of Arab States on small arms and light weapons and that the Mediterranean will be “a lake of peace and cooperation.” Saudi Arabia noted Israel’s lack of IAEA safeguards as a block to Middle East peace.

China, Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand were among other States which stressed the significance of regional efforts and the need for regional cooperation on security matters.

Merav Datan and Rhianna Tyson, Reaching Critical Will
Nancy Colton, Anglican Consultative Council

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Negative Security Assurances

The creation of legally binding and internationally mandated Negative Security Assurances (NSAs) - the promise from Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) to never attack a Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS) with nuclear weapons - has remained an elusive goal. Most NWS, however, have avoided formalizing such commitments, maintaining that the assurances contained within Security Council resolution 984 remain sufficient.

Yet as Sweden, on behalf of New Agenda Coalition (NAC) noted, some States ‘entertain the notion that nuclear weapons may be used preemptively against Non-Nuclear Weapon States, or deem them as a possible defense against conventional weapons.’ Sweden, among others, illustrates that this policy may become increasingly stubborn as the dangers posed by terrorism and the illicit weapons trade grow.

While the threat of regional and international terrorism is clearly of deepening concern, many States reaffirmed the idea of NSAs as a positive and effective way of curbing fear and violence. As the Ukraine emphasized, ‘legally binding security assurances by the Nuclear Weapon States to the Non-Nuclear Weapon States Parties to the NPT (nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) will significantly strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime by eliminating plausible incentives for pursuing nuclear capabilities.’

Mongolia concurred that it ‘stands firmly for early start of negotiations on a multilateral, unconditional, and legally-binding instrument on negative security assurances to the Non Nuclear Weapon States Parties to the NPT.’ Sweden also commented that ‘legally-binding security assurances are yet to be given by the nuclear weapon states to the non-nuclear weapon states of the NPT these and other issues need to be seriously dealt with.’

United Arab Emirates and NAC drew more concrete relations between the failure to ratify negative security assurances and proliferation. Sweden said that ‘if the Nuclear Weapon States continued to treat nuclear weapons as a security enhancer there is a real danger that other states will start pondering whether nuclear weapons would not be a security enhancer also for them.’ The link between trust and security was highlighted by United Arab Emirates: ‘Non Nuclear Weapon States pursuing to acquire similar weapons are urged to reconsider their positions and to resort to self-control. In this context, we call for creating an international binding instrument [that] provides safeguards to the Non Nuclear Weapon States against the threats of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction.’

China, the only recognized NWS to consistently reaffirm its support for NSAs, did so again this first week of general debate: ‘China has undertaken unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear-weapon-free zones. China urges all nuclear-weapon states to make the same commitment and conclude an international legally binding instrument.’

While most calls for NSAs remain in the context of the NPT, India, one of the remaining hold-out States, identified these measures as a concrete step that could be taken towards the larger goal of universal disarmament. As India stated, ‘while pursuing the goal of nuclear disarmament, it is desirable to take immediate steps for reducing nuclear danger [including] legally binding commitments on no-first use of nuclear weapons and non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states.’

It was precisely this contention - the negotiation of NSA in the context of the CD or in the NPT - that prevented the previous resolutions on NSAs to enjoy consensus. Pakistan, a non-NPT State Party, sponsored the 2003 resolution, which called for negotiations to take place in the CD. That draft resolution, A/C.1/58/L.8, garnered 98 affirmative votes with 59 abstentions.

For more on Negative Security Assurances, see: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/issues.html#NSA

- Laura Humphrey,
Reaching Critical Will

Archived First Committee Monitors can be found at:
www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/FCM.html
First Committee Reform

Following the adoption of GA resolution 58/41 on the “revitalization of the working methods of the First Committee,” the issue of First Committee reform has taken center stage at this 59th session.

Chairman de Alba (Mexico) is doing his utmost to catalyze the discussion on reform into action. Intent on maximizing the resources and time allocated to the Committee, he is advocating a plan to incorporate the views from disarmament experts from international organizations such as the IAEA, the OPCW and UNIDIR. He has also voiced strong support for interventions from non-governmental organizations during the thematic debate.

The United States, meanwhile, held several informal consultations in the hopes of commanding consensus on its newest draft resolution, “Improving the effectiveness of the methods of work of the First Committee.” (59/L.1)

Draft resolution 59/L.1 is significantly more ambitious than many expected. With just two preambular and 4 operative paragraphs, the draft proposes to, inter alia:
- limit the number of studies commissioned by the Committee;
- cap the number of draft resolutions and decisions;
- accept consensus-based resolutions on a biennial or triennial basis only;
- institute automatic “sunset” provisions for all UN activities generated by the Committee;
- “instruct the Secretariat” to “improv(e) the accuracy of its (budget) projections and provide advance notice of financial implications of draft resolutions;

Despite the US’s best efforts to achieve consensus on their draft, a large number of delegations are expressing significant opposition.

Some view the US proposal as a piecemeal solution to a problem that pervades the entire UN system.

States such as South Africa and China believe that proposals to revitalize the First Committee “shall proceed in synchronization with reform of the UN as a whole and other disarmament mechanisms,” according to China’s Ambassador Hu Xiaodi. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) also favors this approach, and specifies that “any change in the… disarmament machinery, including the First Committee, will have to be made in the context of the fourth special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.”

Russia contended that First Committee reform must “ensure an interlink with the enhancement of the activities of the General Assembly as a whole.” Côte d’Ivoire urged an interlinkage with the existing proposals to reform the Security Council.

Many support the idea of bi- or triennializing resolutions, but only on a “case by case” basis. Brazil conceded that suggestions to do so “could come from the Chair, but decisions on this regard must be taken with the backing of Member States.” The NAM accepts the bi- or triennialization of resolutions “provided that it is voluntarily initiated and based upon a request by their sponsors.”

With so many disagreements, the NAM is heavily considering tabling their own resolution on First Committee reform.

Most States are in strong favor of reforming the First Committee in some way. As Canada stated, there exists a “need to extract maximum value” of this universal meeting of Member States, and welcomed proposals that would “move us from monologue to dialogue.”

Guatemala warned that “the nature of the First Committee should not be changed, inasmuch as it is the most representative international body for dealing with disarmament and security questions.” The Rio Group reminded States that “the main objective of the process of revitalization… shall be to recover its original political role, as mandated by articles 11 and 13 of the Charter.”

Others, including Australia, Eritrea, Kenya, Kuwait, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Singapore, Morocco and the Caribbean Community also expressed the will to reform the Committee, without delving into further specifications. Argentina, China, Cuba, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sierra Leone, Switzerland, the European Union and the NAM have submitted their views on reform in the Secretary-General’s report (A/59/132).

continued on page 17
A New Agenda

This year the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden) is foregoing the omnibus resolutions and non-strategic nuclear weapons resolutions it has sponsored in the past and putting forward one short resolution. The draft calls for accelerated implementation of the practical steps for nuclear disarmament agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. It also identifies certain priorities: early entry-into-force of the CTBT; reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons and non-development of new types of nuclear weapons; negotiation of an effectively verifiable FMCT; establishment of a CD subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament; and compliance with the principles of irreversibility and transparency and development of verification capabilities.

In Sweden’s October 4 statement on behalf of NAC, UN Permanent Representative Anders Lidèn warned that “if the nuclear-weapon states continue to treat nuclear weapons as a security enhancer there is a real danger that other states will start pondering whether nuclear weapons not be a security enhancer also for them. We also face the risk that terrorists could acquire such weapons.... Nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes. Without nuclear disarmament, we run the risk of a new nuclear arms race. Non-proliferation is vital. But it is not sufficient.” These observations are especially germane this year in light of widespread concern regarding Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the Democratic Republic of Korea’s nuclear weapon program, and the public revelations regarding the A.Q. Khan proliferation network based in Pakistan. (See Terrorism report, page 5.)

The determination of the New Agenda countries to carry on with their pathbreaking mission was highlighted by a September 21 op-ed in the International Herald Tribune signed by the foreign ministers of all seven States. The ministers stated bluntly that ‘the primary tool for controlling nuclear weapons, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, risks falling apart, with further proliferation as a consequence.’ The ministers emphasized that both non-proliferation and disarmament obligations must be met, stating that the ‘nonproliferation treaty cannot be complied with à la carte.’ However, they observed, ‘very little progress has been made’ on the disarmament side of the equation.

First Committee Reform Continued

First noting US withdrawal of support for the CTBT and the delay in China’s ratification, the ministers went on: ‘Instead of eliminating nuclear weapons, some nuclear powers have plans to modernize or develop new kinds of nuclear weapons or new rationales for them. Some even entertain the notion that nuclear weapons may be used pre-emptively against non-nuclear-weapon states. In Russia, nuclear weapons are increasingly seen as a possible defense against conventional weapons. Instead of destroying their nuclear warheads, the United States and Russia store them. The [2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty] is an important step in the right direction, but it does not require the destruction of these weapons, does not include tactical nuclear weapons and does not have any verification provisions. The process is neither irreversible, nor transparent.”

- John Burroughs and Michael Spies, Lawyers’ Committee on Nuclear Policy

To read the Secretary-General’s report on “Improving the effectiveness of the methods of the First Committee,” see: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political lcom 04/docs/132.PDF

NAM’s contribution can be found here: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political lcom 04/docs/132Add4.pdf

To read the Chairman’s proposal on the structure of an interactive debate: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political lcom 04/docs/chairprop.pdf

- Rhianna Tyson, Reaching Critical Will
Transparency and Verification

During this first week of the First Committee, delegations and non-governmental organizations discussed various aspects of verification both inside and outside of the official session.

Canada announced that it will introduce a resolution that would call for the establishment in 2006 of a Panel of government experts to consider and report in the same year concerning the issue of verification, the 16 principles and the appropriate UN role therein. Ambassador Meyer said that legally binding agreements equipped with robust verification provisions remain the preferred means for consolidating advances on the non-proliferation, arms control and disarmament front. Canada hopes the UN panel of government experts will serve to identify practical steps to enhance the role of verification.

Ambassador Rasta Mohd Isa of Malaysia, which chairs the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), said the existing multilateral-treaty-based mechanisms, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) need to be strengthened ‘without resorting to other means, such as calling for action through the Security Council.’

Ambassador Abdulaziz Nasser Al-Shamsi of the United Arab Emirates called for developing specialized mechanisms which are capable of following up and monitoring the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons.

New Zealand’s Caroline McDonald said that any multilateral disarmament treaty- if it is to be effective- must have at its foundation a robust and comprehensive verification mechanism. The purpose of such a mechanism is to focus the efforts of the international community on compliance and reassure all States that independent verification will be carried out. Independent verification is an indispensable element of establishing disarmament and non-proliferation norms.

Stephen G. Rademaker, Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control of the United States, advocated negotiation of a legally binding treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. (See Fissile Materials report, page 3.) While such a treaty, he said, is ‘an important step to reduce nuclear dangers,” he reiterated that “the United States has concluded that effective international verification of an FMCT is not realistically achievable.” He further said ‘One important advantage of negotiating an FMCT without verification provisions is that it will be possible to conclude such a negotiation far faster than would be the case with an FMCT that sought to achieve effective verifiability.’ Ambassador John Dauth of Australia said on October 4 that ‘Australia believes, to be credible and effective, the FMCT should include appropriate verification measures.’

Ambassador Anders Liden of Sweden, on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, noted the lack of verification provisions in the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty between Russia and the United States. Archbishop Celestino Migliore Apostolic Nuncio, the Permanent Observer of the Holy See to the UN, also advocated verification measures for nuclear disarmament.

On October 7, the NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security hosted a panel entitled ‘Should the UN Have a Standing Capability for WMD Investigations?’ Patricia Lewis, the Director of UNIDIR, Ambassador Henrik Salander, the Secretary-General of the WMD Commission, Dr. Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, the Chair of the Scientists Working Group on CBW of the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, and Dr. W. Pal S. Sidhu of the International Peace Academy, addressed the forum. Such a capability could operate as a subsidiary of the Security Council, or of the office of the Secretary-General. Among the questions explored were: whether such a capability should be independent; whether the Security Council and the Secretary-General, as well as States Parties to relevant multilateral treaties, should be able to call upon its services; whether Iraq was an exceptional case; and how this capability might be called upon affirmatively by States wishing to have their declarations verified - such as Libya’s declaration that it was eliminating its WMD programs.

- Ann Hallan Lakhdhir,
NGO Committee on Disarmament, Peace and Security
Disarmament Education

The commitment of Governments to disarmament and nonproliferation education is a commitment to the future security of their own countries, as well as to global peace and stability. In the first of its 34 recommendations, the 2002 United Nations Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education (A/57/124) encouraged Member States to share their experience in this field with other Member States, international organizations, the Department for Disarmament Affairs and civil society.

The first report of the Secretary-General on implementation of those recommendations (A/59/178) was issued this year. It contains valuable information on Governmental action, including promoting translation of materials into national languages, stimulating curriculum work with Ministries of Education, making use of advisory councils, promoting contacts with academic institutions, and supporting quality disarmament educational programs carried out by civil society organizations.

In his statement to the First Committee, Ambassador Enrique Berruga Filloy of Mexico recognized the importance of Disarmament Education in fostering a culture of peace and non-violence and to promote deeper awareness of the costs of an armed world. Ms. Caroline McDonald demonstrated New Zealand’s commitment to disarmament and nonproliferation education by noting that her country has dedicated funds to NGOs to implement the recommendations of the 2002 study.

Japan and Canada indicated that they will be discussing this issue more thoroughly in the thematic debates, and the Holy See re-emphasized their commitment to education efforts.

The Department for Disarmament Affairs and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) will be holding a lunchtime discussion to share and build upon best practices and to promote new disarmament and non-proliferation education initiatives on Tuesday 12 October, where Member States, NGOs and Agencies will have an opportunity to discuss the Secretary-General’s report as well as other efforts which have been taken to implement the 2002 study.

Dr. Kathleen Sullivan of Educators for Social Responsibility is also holding a Disarmament Education course for diplomats every week throughout the First Committee. All delegations are invited to attend. For more information, contact Dr. Sullivan at: edna@best-web.net.

- Susi Snyder,
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom