STATEMENT BY

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ORGANIZATION FOR THE PROHIBITION
OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

74TH UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

FIRST COMMITTEE
THEMATIC DEBATE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS

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Mr. Chairman,

Poland fully aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union. Let me add following remarks in a national capacity.

Let me start by saying that currently among the several important issues in nuclear domain the preparations to the Review Conference of the NPT Treaty and its positive outcome play a leading role in the nuclear domain. Poland has always been attaching key importance to the NPT Treaty, being one of its founding-fathers and taking the responsibility for the number of review processes. The relevance of the NPT goes beyond the current nuclear non-proliferation regime as it constitute a fundamental part of the global collective peace and security architecture.

We are committed to the full implementation of the NPT along all three pillars. At the same time we all bear responsibility to further reinforce and uphold the NPT regime. This conviction was at the heart of our decision to assume the chairmanship of the 2018 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee. Over the last three years we have been doing our utmost to uphold the integrity and credibility of the Treaty; create environment for an inclusive, mutually respectful and transparent dialogue; and deliver practical solutions for the 2020 Review Conference, which will mark the 50th anniversary of the NPT’s entry into force. We hope that our contribution will be positively considered as an input into final stage of the preparations to the 2020 Review Conference and its successful outcome.

Mr. Chairman,

The IAEA’s Comprehensive safeguards system together with the Additional Protocol constitute the strongest norm of international law in curbing the proliferation risks. Therefore, we continue to support the IAEA verification activities with the hope that under its new leadership, the Agency’s crucial role in non-proliferation process will be even strengthened.

We cannot forget about the effective export control regimes like the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee and the counter proliferation initiatives, like Proliferation Security Initiative. All of them, although remaining beyond the UN system are equipped with the regulations able to deliver in countering proliferation activities of states and non-state actors.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

We are convinced that a lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula can only be achieved through peaceful means. We note that there is no progress done so far by the
DPRK to take visible steps necessary towards complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearisation and the abandonment of all other WMD programmes. Denuclearization of the DPRK must remain a top priority for the entire international community. We call upon the DPRK to comply fully with all UN Security Council’s resolutions, return to full compliance with the NPT, including IAEA Safeguards system as well as sign and ratify the CTBT and CWC without further delay. We are ready to provide substantial expert-kind contribution once the verification process of the DPRK’s nuclear installation will be feasible. In a meantime we commend the IAEA for raising its verification effectiveness on the DPRK by using high-technology solutions.

On the same note, we are convinced it is in our common interest to stabilize the situation in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, reduce tensions in the region and, most importantly, to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons. We note with concern the decision of Iran, to diminish its obligations under the JCPOA, as highlighted by recent report of the IAEA. Poland likewise the European Union, supports the JCOPA as an important agreement in the sphere of curbing the nuclear proliferation. However, only full compliance with the accord by Iran can guarantee its comprehensive implementation.

Mr. Chairman,

In the strategic context, the arms control global system has unfortunately continued to deteriorate over last year. It has been exemplified by situation concerning the INF Treaty. Erosion of this significant element of the European security architecture constitutes yet another challenge for our security.

Regardless its diplomatic efforts to show a different narrative, Russian Federation bears sole responsibility for the demise of the Treaty. We regret that authorities in Moscow have shown no willingness and taken no demonstrable steps to ensure implementation of the INF Treaty in an effective, verifiable and transparent manner. In this regard we deplore that trust in Negative Security Assurances have been constantly damaged by the breach of the substantial Budapest Memorandum.

We do however believe that the only remaining element of modern arms control – the New START Treaty will become subject of serious consultations between the US and the Russian Federation with the aim of extension it beyond its year of expiration – 2021.

Mr. Chairman,

Poland deeply believes that progress in disarmament is not possible without creation of appropriate security conditions. Therefore, we welcomed new practical as well as an intellectual US initiative on that matter – namely Creating Environment for
Nuclear Disarmament and our delegation actively participated in the July’s conference in Washington. We are confident that only by addressing both the legitimate security concerns as well as humanitarian dimensions of nuclear weapons we will be able to take the incremental steps in right direction.

Initiatives in the area of nuclear disarmament verification are vital for the advancement of nuclear disarmament and establishing confidence. In this respect we appreciate the progress achieved in the Group of Governmental Experts on verification as well as the ongoing work in the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV). We actively participate in both of those endeavors and look forward towards the commencement of phase in December at the Ottawa’s IPNDV session.

Despite all efforts undertaken over many years, entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) still remains a challenge. This year New York hosted already 10th Article XIV Conference to facilitate getting the Treaty into life. Thanks to diplomatic efforts of two facilitators in Vienna – Germany and Algeria, the Conference adopted its Final Declaration to pave the way for further action to accomplish entering the CTBT into force in the foreseeable future.

We continue to put our trust in the commencement of the negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament on the fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT). We still consider the High-level group report of 2018 as a good basis for future negotiations and hope it will facilitate the process leading to the start of the negotiations of the Treaty.

I would like to highlight the role of the Non-proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (NPDI), in which Poland has been participating since 2010. By focusing – inter alia – on transparency issues, in particular to P5 reporting, the NPDI has a chance to play a role of the bridge-builder, especially in the NPT review process. This is a good example that only through a real engagement of all states in credible initiatives stimulating transparency, reducing risks, building confidence and strengthening verification, we can make real and stable progress toward nuclear disarmament and strengthen non-proliferation.

Mr. Chairman,

To conclude, we are looking forward towards the positive outcome of this year’s deliberation of the First Committee after good results of the IAEA General Conference in September. Consensual and realistic approach will pave the way towards positive results of the NPT 2020 Review Conference, which will resonate on our work in a comprehensive way over the next couple of years.