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CHECK AGAINST DELIVERY

Statement by
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Thematic discussion on Nuclear Weapons

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Mr. Chairperson,

Israel maintains a policy of responsibility and restraint in the nuclear domain consonant with the underlying goals and principles of the non-proliferation regime. Accordingly, and wherever possible, Israel joins and brings itself closer to international norms on nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation.

Israel signed the CTBT in 1996 and is an active contributor to the development of all elements of the Treaty's verification regime. In that vein, Israel transmits data from its certified seismic stations to the International Data Center, an obligation which, unfortunately, some regional states have yet to undertake. Israel was one of the sponsors of UNSC resolution 2310 on the CTBT, a clear manifestation of our support for this Treaty. We had hoped that this resolution would be adopted by consensus in the Security Council, but unfortunately this was not the case.

Israel was an active participant in all of the Nuclear Security Summits (NSS) and has taken many steps, throughout the years, towards the fulfillment of the Summits' goals and purposes. We look forward towards the IAEA's International Conference on Nuclear Security scheduled for December.

Israel shares the concern that radioactive sources might be used to commit acts of terrorism. We firmly believe that such materials must remain under the full control of the competent authorities and be used appropriately. The nuclear security challenge should be addressed, not only on the national level, but also through regional and global cooperation and coordination. In this respect, Israel has repeatedly stated its willingness to cooperate with any state in the Middle East, in strengthening nuclear security and safety.

In connection to this threat, Israel signed the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) and acceded to the Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM), including the 2005 amendment, which entered into force recently. In addition, Israel is a member of the
Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and values its hands-on approach towards implementation of tools to combat nuclear terrorism.

Israel endorses the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources. We are taking part in the IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database and participate in the IAEA's Nuclear Security Guidance Committee (NSGC). Israel's recognizes the importance of combining legal international tools and export control policy and has adopted a policy of adherence to the NSG since 2004, as well as to the other supplier regimes. Items listed in the regimes' control lists are incorporated into the Israeli export control mechanism, as well as amendments made to these lists.

Mr. Chairperson,

Israel values the NPT and recognizes its contribution to the non-proliferation regime. At the same time, it is also clear that the NPT is insufficient to fully address the deliberate advancement of clandestine military nuclear programs by states with little or no regard for international legal obligations they have undertaken.

Nowhere more than in the Middle East is this problem apparent, with four out of five cases of non-compliance with the NPT emanating from the Middle East (Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya), and the fifth case of non-compliance with the Treaty, namely DPRK which is a source of grave concern in itself, is heavily involved with proliferation to the Middle East. Israel has joined the international community in condemning the DPRK's recent nuclear test and in expressing concern regarding the danger posed by the DPRK to regional and global stability.

Unfortunately, and despite its importance, the NPT has not prevented substantial violations of its obligations by these member states, and has been insufficient inremedying these violations once they have been discovered. Iran, which remains the most significant threat to the Middle East and beyond, even after the agreement reached between Iran and the P5+1, is an illuminating case in point. The NPT has been inadequate in preventing the advancement of Iran's nuclear program in light of Iran's acts of concealment and duplicity. When these violations
were ultimately discovered, the NPT lacked the tools to recognize and address them appropriately.

Mr. Chairperson,

While there is no dispute that the 20 year long stalemate in the CD is indeed a long period and every effort should be made to bring back the CD to the path of negotiations, one should at the same time seriously consider the implications and the disadvantages stemming from the usage of independent processes, and in particular the diversion of international attention towards solutions of lesser or weakened efficacy. The most probable price for such processes would be the lack of participation by those who must be part of such negotiations. While a non-inclusive process might forge agreements more quickly, it runs the risk of its outcome being depleted or hollow. Such negotiations also create a more divisive atmosphere rather than adding to the promotion of agreements on disarmament matters.

Mr. Chairperson,

Israel’s approach and policy in the field of regional security and arms control has always endorsed a pragmatic and realistic approach. It is rooted in the belief that the broad range of security concerns of all regional members should be taken into account and realistically addressed within a direct regional dialogue. This engagement must be firmly planted in the regional context if it is to be realistic and meaningful. Peaceful relations, reconciliation, good neighborliness, open borders and trust among the regional parties, cannot be cast aside. They are key milestones en-route to the eventual establishment of a mutually verifiable zone free of all weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery. To think that this goal can be achieved through shortcuts and detours, without attending to the core security challenges our region faces, is misleading.
International experience has shown that such a zone can only emanate from within a region, through direct negotiations and consensus building. The Middle East region, with all its complexities and challenges, can certainly be no exception. This holds especially true at these trying times, when the stability of the region is consistently challenged. Such a process is incremental in its nature, and has to be closely tied to the fundamental circumstances on the ground as well as the security landscape.

Mr. Chairperson,

Regrettably, at present, no regional security dialogue exists in the Middle East, nor is there a forum to develop confidence-building measures and defuse tensions. The Middle East countries have no regional forum in which all can directly communicate with each other and have a dialogue on core issues that affect their individual and collective security. One-sided resolutions in international fora cannot substitute for direct, comprehensive regional security dialogue and cooperation. In fact, these resolutions hinder rather than assist regional progress. They politicize where issues need to be addressed on their merits. They distract focus from the real proliferation challenges and obviate any budding efforts to build trust, harmony and cooperation.

Israel, for its part, has expressed many times its commitment to sincere and open dialogue with its neighboring countries on all regional security related issues. Accordingly, Israel participated, during 2013-2014, at a senior and authoritative diplomatic level, in five rounds of multilateral consultations convened by the former Finnish Under-Secretary Laajava in Switzerland. While Israel demonstrated its sincere commitment to the process of direct dialogue and confidence building in the region, our Arab neighbors have unfortunately preferred to invest their efforts in divisive resolutions like the so called "The Risk of Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East" resolution tabled yearly in this committee. In this vein, Israel was disappointed to see that this draft resolution has been once again submitted this year, and that the only substantial change its authors have introduced to its content has been to delete the concept of "arrangements freely arrived at". This change not only stands in stark contravention to the principle
recognized by 1999 UNDC guidelines on the establishment of nuclear weapons free zones, it also steers regional parties further away from direct engagement or any attempt to forge agreements amongst them.

Israel regrets the Arab group's decision to endorse a path of confrontation rather than conciliation. Such resolutions only serve short-sighted political interests and hamper long-term prospects for a better security environment in the Middle East region. Israel continues to believe that a direct dialogue addressing the broad range of security challenges between the regional parties is essential for any meaningful consensual discussion on this matter. Israel, for its part, will continue to seek such a meaningful regional discussion that could lead to a more peaceful and secure Middle East.

I thank you.