Explanation of Vote on the Draft Resolution L.24
by Delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran

In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Consistent with its principled position on nuclear disarmament, the Islamic Republic of Iran voted in favor of draft resolution L.24 entitled “Humanitarian pledge for the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons”. However, my delegation would like to register its reservation regarding an incorrect phrase in PP 5 of the draft:

The phrase “the lowering of the technical threshold for nuclear weapon capability” in pp 5 lacks clarity and is completely irrelevant to the context and purpose of the paragraph and the resolution as well. Such a phrase does not exist in any consensually agreed documents of the NPT Review Conferences or even the IAEA. Such ambiguous phrase and related concepts have been used to justify unlawful actions and measures aimed at constraining the inalienable right of the NPT non-nuclear-weapon States party to develop and use nuclear energy and technology, including a full national nuclear fuel cycle for peaceful purposes. The content of PP 5 is about the risks of the use of nuclear weapons and what it needs to address is the risks of lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons in recent years as a result of the design and development of new types of such weapons, a living example of which is the development of B-61-12 nuclear bombs which was tested by the United States on 1st July 2015. These new types of nuclear weapons are designed to have enhanced precision coupled with a new technology which enables the adjustment of the explosive force of the bomb before its use from an estimated high of 50,000 tons of TNT equivalent force to a low of 300 tons, and thereby would lead to greater likelihood that such nuclear weapons would be used. In the informal consultations on this resolution, we proposed last year and this year minor adjustments to this phrase in order to make it relevant to the PP 5. We urge the sponsor to accommodate this point in the resolution next time.

I would also like to stress that the use of the phrase “States possessing nuclear weapons” in PP5 and OP 6 of L.24 should not be interpreted as recognizing nuclear weapon States status for any of the non-NPT parties.

Finally, it appears that a noteworthy fluctuation and inconsistency exists in the voting pattern of the lead sponsor of this draft resolution on other nuclear disarmament resolutions of the First Committee. We sincerely hope that such an inconsistency be abandoned when it comes to supporting the goal of nuclear disarmament under all other resolutions of this Committee.