Statement

by

Ambassador Zamir Akram
Permanent Representative of Pakistan
to the United Nations, Geneva

at the

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(67th Session of the UNGA)

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Mr. Chairman,

It is a great pleasure to see you presiding over this important Committee. I congratulate you on your election. We are confident that your experience and skills will guide this Committee towards optimum results. You can count on our support and cooperation.

We associate ourselves with the statement of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) made by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Mr. Chairman,

Since the end of the Cold War, the global security environment has increasingly deteriorated. Even as old regional conflicts fester, new ones have flared up. Global level tensions and confrontations are also increasing. There are dangerous trends on the horizon- we may well be on the verge of a new Cold War if ambitions for world domination are not contained and search for global supremacy is not replaced by accommodation and engagement as the basis of a rules based cooperative multi-polar world.

These developments have had a severely negative fall-out on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. Regardless of the professed zeal for a world without nuclear weapons, disarmament efforts remain stagnant and under great threat.

New weapons systems- both strategic and conventional- are being developed and deployed e.g. ABM systems in several parts of the world as well as indiscriminate use of drones. There are worrying trends such as the growing weaponization of outer space and the hostile use of cyber technologies. The production of conventional weapons with destructive capacity equal to nuclear weapons would be dangerously destabilizing as their use would not be constrained by the same limits applicable to nuclear weapons. Even worse, given the massive destruction caused by such weapons, it would increase the temptation to respond by use of nuclear weapons.

Mr. Chairman,

It is in such a grim context that Pakistan has consistently called for evolving a renewed consensus on disarmament and non-proliferation in an attempt to halt, if not reverse, some of the negative trends. While recognizing that consensus building will be a difficult task, we take this opportunity to put forward some ideas that we feel are essential to promote greater global security through arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament.

First, In evolving a new approach, we must start from a basic premise i.e. recognition of the right to equal security for all States. The SSOD-I adopted the principle of "equal security" for all States, both in the non-conventional and conventional fields and at regional as well as international levels. This is a critical prerequisite for progress in areas of arms control and disarmament.

Two, we must address the motives which drive States to acquire weapons to defend themselves. These motives include perceived threats from superior conventional or non-conventional forces;
the existence of disputes and conflicts with more powerful States; and discrimination in the application of international norms and laws.

**Three**, the Nuclear Weapon States must demonstrate a renewed commitment to achieve nuclear disarmament within a reasonable timeframe. Without this commitment, the "bargain" of the non-proliferation regime will continue to erode. In any case, with large inventories of conventional weapons and no disputes between them, the possession of large arsenals of nuclear weapons is not essential for the major powers. The eventual objective must be the total elimination of nuclear weapons within the context of an reenergized collective security system.

**Four**, an agreed, criteria-based and non-discriminatory approach must be evolved for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under appropriate international safeguards, in accordance with the international obligations of States. The advances in technology as well as an improved IAEA inspections regime have made it possible to promote "proliferation resistant" nuclear energy. However, in building a new inspections regime, it would be vital to ensure that it is applied equitably, both to nuclear and non-nuclear weapons states, in accordance with their obligations.

**Five**, until nuclear disarmament is achieved, non-nuclear weapon states should be given assurances that they will not be threatened with the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The security assurances offered by nuclear weapons states need to be translated into a universal, unconditional and legally binding treaty.

**Six**, we must evolve a universal and non-discriminatory agreement for addressing concerns arising from development, deployment and proliferation of Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems, which are inherently destabilizing, while being of dubious reliability.

**Seven**, we must recognize the need for strengthening the international legal regime in order to prevent the militarization of outer space; and

**Eight**, as a pragmatic step towards disarmament, the NWS need to halt future production and eliminate all stocks of fissile materials through a Fissile Material Treaty.

Mr. Chairman,

In the area of conventional weapons, there is an urgent need for negotiations on the balanced reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. As laid down in the Final Document of SSOD-I, these negotiations should be conducted with particular emphasis on militarily significant states. The disturbing trend of escalation in the number and sophistication of conventional weapons has to be arrested as it has a causal relationship with the continuing reliance on nuclear weapons.

The recent break down of the Arms Trade Treaty negotiations reflects the failure of a partial and selective approach in pursuing the disarmament agenda. We must therefore adhere to the cardinal principle of SSOD-I, i.e. "The adoption of disarmament measures should take place in such an equitable and balanced manner as to ensure the right of each State to security and to ensure that no individual State or group of States may obtain advantages over others at any stage."
Mr. Chairman,

In the last three years, we have heard the contrived lament over the failure of the disarmament machinery. In our view, the description of the state of this machinery and the diagnosis of its ailment are partial and focus almost exclusively on symptoms rather than the causes. Even worse, the solutions put forward are selective, discriminatory and inconsistent.

In order to objectively evaluate the causes underlying the impasse at the CD, it is important to acknowledge the following basic facts:

a) The CD’s work or inactivity is a reflection of prevailing political realities as it does not operate in a vacuum.
b) No treaty can be negotiated in the CD which is contrary to the security interests of any of its member states. The consensus rule was designed precisely to ensure this point. Any forward movement in the CD is only possible by addressing the security concerns of all the CD members.
c) The CD’s lack of progress cannot be attributed to its Rules of Procedure since landmark instruments like the CWC and the CTBT were negotiated successfully with the same rules.
d) The CD is not a body to negotiate only one item on its agenda: FMCT. It has four core issues on its agenda. If there is no consensus on negotiating FMCT, there is also no consensus on negotiating Nuclear Disarmament, Negative Security Assurances or PAROS. This lack of consensus cannot be due to the position of one state, as claimed by some distinguished delegations.

It is clear that the problems encountered by the CD are not of an organizational or procedural nature. These challenges relate to the “external political environment”, signified by the discriminatory nuclear cooperation policies, double standards and selectivity, guided by power and politics.

Mr. Chairman,

The challenges facing the international disarmament agenda and the machinery are not exclusive to the CD. The UNDC and the First Committee confront similar difficulties. The UNDC has not been able to evolve an agreed document for more than a decade and half. The resolutions adopted by this Committee are adopted almost mechanically without any progress towards their implementation. Why blame then the CD alone for its inaction?

A comprehensive revitalization effort is therefore required. A new bargain for the 21st century is needed. Pakistan reiterates its support for the long-standing call of NAM countries, which comprise almost two-third of the UN membership, to convene the Fourth Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD-IV). This session should aim at an integrated and holistic approach towards achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner as well as keeping in view the security interests of all states.

Thank you.