Mr. Chairman,

My delegation shares the concerns that terrorists and non-State actors may potentially acquire and use WMD. We therefore support the objectives of the resolution although we continue to believe that its language could have been improved to convey a more objective reflection of reality.

The fear of acquisition and use of WMD materials by terrorists and non-State actors needs to be evaluated and viewed in perspective. Terrorist organizations, or non-State actors, are more likely to acquire and use CW and BW materials and capabilities.

The acquisition and use of nuclear weapons by terrorists and non-State actors is much less likely. The international community must however, not lower its guard to prevent the possibility of development and use of “dirty bombs”. Increased international cooperation including initiation of negotiations on a Radiological Weapons Convention should be given serious consideration. These concerns should however not become an excuse for pursuing a policy of discrimination against ‘selected’ countries.

As regards denial of means to terrorists to acquire, possess and use of WMDs, States have enacted and enforced export control measures, national physical protection and other related actions to prevent WMD technology from falling into the hands of terrorists. International assistance and capacity building continue to be important areas of attention.

To lend greater legitimacy to international efforts in this area, interim measures such as the adoption of UNSC resolutions 1540 and 1673 which were designed to “fill the gap” in international law need to be taken up by a more inclusive and representative UN forum. We agree with the widely held view that the best guarantee against the threat of possible use of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons lies in their elimination.
Faithful implementation of existing treaty regimes such as CWC can effectively address most of these threats. An early disarmament of chemical stocks would enhance the confidence level against the likelihood of their acquisition and use by terrorists. However, as long as the process of chemical weapons disarmament proceeds at a slow pace and huge quantities of chemical weapons exist, the possibility of their falling into terrorist hands shall remain as well.

Control of Biological Weapons should be of more concern particularly to the industrially advanced States due to the extensive use of biological agents by them. The Biological Weapons Convention should therefore be strengthened, including the possibility of concluding a Verification Protocol, which had been negotiated for over 8 years. We are convinced that revival of that process would fully serve the goal of promoting international peace and security as well as address the concerns expressed, for example, in this resolution.

We are convinced that a comprehensive strategy must be evolved to prevent the possibility of terrorists gaining access to WMDs, which must include a) depriving terrorist organizations of their operational and organizational capabilities, b) strengthening of the relevant existing multilateral regimes, c) negotiating a universal treaty to fill the gaps in current international instruments d) augmenting States capacity to implement global treaty obligations and e) addressing the root causes of terrorism. A distinction must be maintained between counter-terrorism and non-proliferation.

This resolution quite appropriately mentions the Final Document of the Fifteenth NAM Summit as having expressed itself on the issue of weapons of mass destruction and terrorism. We would like to remind that in the context of the issue of terrorism, the same document also stresses the need to address the causes which sometimes lead to terrorism; causes that lie in suppression, injustice and deprivation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.