STATEMENT

BY

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OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, HEAD OF THE RUSSIAN DELEGATION
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Mr. Chairman,

Disarmament and non-proliferation issues cannot be considered in isolation from the current state of international security in general. The situation in this sphere arouses anxiety. Contemporary security problems cannot be solved by direct forceful methods or unilaterally established schemes that explode international law and assert the principle of permissiveness.

We have repeatedly, including from this tribune, urged all states to establish a genuinely equitable system of international security, of which disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control constitute an integral part. We can only confront the growing range of challenges and threats together.

That is the reason why Russia continues to stand for reinforcing the central role of the United Nations. We believe that the current situation objectively augments the importance of the UNGA First Committee in consolidating the efforts of the international community in the fight against global threats and challenges, as well as in increasing the effectiveness of the UN collective security system.

Whereas attempts to place reliance on the illusions of a unipolar world, to connive at double standards in the sphere of international security can only lead to further aggravation of problems in multilateral disarmament. We can hardly expect any serious progress in this field unless we change the overall political climate, depart from confrontation and reject the bloc mentality.

Unfortunately, recurrences into solving the most difficult security issues by adventurous, irresponsible, aggressive actions are still taking place. The recent aggression undertaken by Georgia against South Ossetia is an example of this. The results of Georgian intervention - numerous casualties among civilians and peacekeepers, grave humanitarian tragedy. All of these facts clearly demonstrated the deficiencies of the European security architecture inherited from the past.

History has taken another turn and reminded us of the “Munich agreement” and, above all, the conclusions we all, as it seemed to us, drew from it: we should
not be indulgent towards an aggressor and sacrifice a collective security system to narrow nationalistic interests.

The Caucasian crisis, the reckless enlargement of NATO, attempts to maintain the Cold War version of the CFE Treaty, the establishment of new military bases, including anti-missile bases that are closely approaching Russian borders, together with the elaboration of a Prompt global strike concept are nothing but aspirations to alter the parity of strategic forces in the world, to secure military and political domination, to fix the principles of a unipolar world, which, as life has demonstrated, has no historical prospects.

The time has come to reflect seriously on what we can all do together to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, to move progressively towards disarmament, to improve the existing arms control mechanisms and, perhaps, to create new ones.

On 5 June 2008 the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev put forward a positive alternative to the further escalation of tensions in the Euro-Atlantic region. The idea is to establish a new, progressive and open collective security system on the basis of equality and precise rules, binding on all.

The President of Russia has clearly formulated a proposal to elaborate a Treaty on European Security. A few days ago in the UNGA the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov spoke in detail on specific parameters of this idea.

I would like to emphasize that the principles of a multipolar world stipulated for in the Russian proposal would, if realized, in practice allow the creation of equitable foundations for interaction among all states. This, in its turn, would have a positive influence on peace and stability, and ensure the right of each state to develop independently, while reinforcing its sovereignty and territorial integrity. The proposed algorithm of international security would not permit any state to underpin its security at the expense of the security of another state.
Our positive program of action once again confirms that Russia does not desire confrontation with any state and is opposed to self-isolation. We will develop friendly relations with other states so far as our partners are ready for it.

Mr. Chairman,

We are convinced that in order to realize the idea of an equitable system of international security we need to take consistent, energetic measures in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation. For our part we are doing everything possible to make disarmament progressive and irreversible, and in the first place nuclear disarmament.

Since 1991 the Russian nuclear arsenal has been reduced fivefold, and the total amount of non-strategic nuclear weapons stockpiles by three quarters. The Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions is being successfully implemented. The START Treaty has fulfilled its mission. We are engaged in dialogue with the United States on a new legally binding agreement to succeed it. The Presidents of Russia and the United States confirmed this line in the Sochi Declaration of 6 April 2008. We seek to preserve everything that is useful and efficient in the START regime. This position enjoys support of the majority of the international community and, specifically, was reflected in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Statement of 4 September 2008.

Speaking about nuclear disarmament, it is necessary to take into consideration the organic inter-relation between strategic offensive and defensive weapons. Realization of unilateral plans to deploy a global missile defense without taking into account the security interests of other states creates the conditions for launching a disarming nuclear-missile strike. This undermines the strategic balance, and the need to maintain it makes the other party increase its strategic offensive armaments. We are convinced that the deployment of the US global missile defense bases in the Czech Republic and Poland will have a negative effect on the disarmament process.
We propose an alternative – a collective response to missile challenges and threats that does not undermine anyone’s security interests. It is based on a joint analysis of potential threats up to the year 2020, and the creation of a system for objective monitoring of changes in the strategic situation. Today we are asking whether the partners are ready for a genuinely equitable dialogue aimed at strengthening international security. We await a reply.

We are convinced that imparting a global character to the regime of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles (INF Treaty) would contribute to global security and countering future missile threats. We are disposed to have a most active discussion of the Russian initiative and look forward to proposals on how to effectively realize it.

Mr. Chairman,

The danger of weapons being placed in outer space causes growing and well-grounded anxiety.

The placement of weapons in outer space would undermine global stability and international security, and lead to a new cycle of the arms race, not only in outer space, but also on Earth. As the discussions at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) demonstrated, for a considerable number of states this issue is the highest priority. We have a simple question – why put weapons in outer space? Why waste billions, if in any case an adequate and, apparently, asymmetrical response will be found? Wouldn’t it be better to direct this money to solving the economic problems of developing countries or to the destruction of WMD, and chemical weapons in particular?

The Russian proposal to start deliberations at the Conference on Disarmament on the non-placement of weapons in outer space was motivated by concerns for international peace and stability. In February 2008 on behalf of Russia and China the Russian Foreign Minister S.Lavrov tabled at the CD a corresponding draft Treaty. We expect the Conference to revitalize its activities in this field.
The motivation to place weapons in outer space could be reduced by transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space (TCBMs). At this session of the UNGA Russia intends to table its traditional draft resolution "Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities" which is in line with the relevant resolution of the previous UNGA session.

We call on states to support the initiative by Russia and other CSTO Member States and join the moratorium on being the first to place weapons of any kind in outer space.

Another priority for us is the issue of international information security. We should not forget that the effects and consequences of the use of information and communication technologies for hostile purposes, especially in the era of global informatization, are quite commensurate with those of the WMD. In this regard we will table again our draft resolution "Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security". We call upon all delegations to support our draft resolution.

Mr. Chairman,

The NPT remains the backbone of contemporary international security. This Treaty has proved its role as the most important instrument to deter the spread of nuclear weapons. This Treaty provided the conditions for irreversible movement towards nuclear disarmament and ensured the development of broad international cooperation in the area of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Despite all the hardships faced by the nuclear non-proliferation regime, the Treaty remains valid, and provides the framework for solving all emerging issues.

Only one and a half years are left before the next NPT Review Conference in 2010. This Conference is an important milestone in the joint work on strengthening the non-proliferation regime. We need to elaborate a joint "package" of specific proposals, by implementing which we will multiply our efforts to further consolidate the whole basis of nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference will take place here in New York in May next year.
This session will have a decisive role; it will demonstrate the results with which we are approaching the Review Conference. We, on our side, will continue working in a constructive manner and supporting proposals that unite all Parties to the NPT and aim at finding compromises acceptable for everyone.

Russia has always supported the CTBT. Not only did our country ratify this Treaty, it is actively working on ensuring its early entry into force. Observing a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing is not enough to assure the world community that nuclear tests will never be resumed. We urge all countries whose ratifications are necessary for the CTBT’s entry into force to ratify the Treaty without delay.

Improving the efficiency of the IAEA’s verification activities is an important aspect of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We believe that the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreement is an efficient instrument of the Agency in this area. In the future, the Additional Protocol, which Russia ratified in 2007, should become a universally accepted standard to verify the compliance of states with their NPT obligations and an essential new standard in the field of nuclear supply arrangements. We expect that all countries that have not yet acceded to this document and, in the first place, those carrying out significant nuclear activities, will do so as soon as possible.

Mr. Chairman,

Today, the world witnesses a growing interest in the development of nuclear energy for peaceful use as a resource to ensure states’ own energy security. In this respect, ample opportunities for international cooperation are appearing today to implement national atomic energy projects with due respect of the nuclear non-proliferation regime’s requirements. We believe that the solution of those tasks lies in the promotion of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle aimed at creating an economically reasonable and feasible alternative to the establishment of nuclear fuel cycle elements on the national level. At the same time this does not undermine the rights of Parties to the NPT to access the benefits of the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Recent years have witnessed a number of interesting initiatives advanced in this area. The Russian Federation suggested working together to develop a global nuclear energy infrastructure and to set up multinational centers to provide nuclear fuel cycle services. Our contribution to these efforts was to establish the International Uranium Enrichment Center on the basis of the enrichment plant in Angarsk, Kazakhstan already takes part in it. The Governments of Armenia and Ukraine are finalizing their accession procedures.

Today, an essential factor in ensuring the security of each and every state and of the international community in general is the ability to counter the nuclear terrorist threat in an efficient and timely manner. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism put forward by the Presidents of Russia and the United States is a significant contribution to these efforts. We can see that it is being successfully implemented and has proved its relevance. Today, the Initiative is becoming truly global, with 75 States participating in it. This is a positive example of working together in today’s world in countering new challenges and threats.

Mr. Chairman,

Every year the problem of missile proliferation becomes more pressing. We are convinced that such global problems should be resolved first and foremost under the auspices of the United Nations through a broad discussion with all interested States. The elements of the Russian initiative on establishing a legally binding global missile non-proliferation regime could become a basis for this.

We assess positively the outcome of the CWC Second Review Conference that took place last April. We believe that its results will contribute to the further consolidation of the CWC. This document continues to be a unique multilateral agreement establishing new standards for global disarmament and non-proliferation.

We are satisfied with the joint work on consolidation of the BWC. The meetings of experts held within its framework show that states are interested in seeking new approaches to resolving problems of biological proliferation. It would
be good if we elaborated by the 2011 BWC Review Conference a complex of proposals which, when implemented, would make an additional reliable barrier against the development of biological and toxin weapons. We believe that we should go back to the idea of the early resumption of multilateral negotiations on a BWC mechanism for verification of compliance.

Mr. Chairman,

The revival of ideas of control in the sphere of conventional arms transfers, including the whole complex of problems from their production to their storage and use by importers, is obvious today. Illicit transfers of arms, and in particular small arms, that facilitate their acquisition by terrorists and imprudent users, remain a serious problem. The work in the UN has not yet produced the necessary results. The distressing results of the implementation of the UN Program of Action against illicit trade in small arms and light weapons are evidence of this.

The Caucasus crisis revealed serious problems in the existing mechanisms of arms transfers, including different sorts of Codes and Understandings within the framework of the Wassenaar Arrangements. Evidently, it is time to make a serious analysis in this sphere, to define the main problems and to identify ways to solve them. Decisions of the Group of Governmental Experts that was functioning this year on the issue of feasibility of the idea of an International Arms Trade Treaty could contribute substantially to that work. We call for that kind of elaborate work before we make any decision on working out some new arrangements in the field of transfers of conventional arms.

Mr. Chairman,

We have to accomplish hard and important work on formulating the disarmament and non-proliferation agenda for international community for the nearest future. We are ready for constructive, mutually respectful and open dialogue with a view to achieving practical results. Let me assure you, Mr. Chairman, of our support for your efforts to organize effectively the forthcoming work.