Statement

by

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to the United Nations,
Geneva

in the First Committee

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Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, Geneva,
in the First Committee (General Assembly)

Mr. Chairman,

Let me begin by congratulating you on your election as the Chairman of the First Committee. On behalf of my delegation, I wish you success in steering the work of the Committee and assure you of our full support in this regard.

I have recently assumed the charge of Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations in Geneva. My area of responsibility also includes the Conference on Disarmament and issues related to international peace and security. I look forward to benefitting from the wisdom and expertise of many of my experienced colleagues present here.

My delegation associates itself with the statement made by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

Mr. Chairman

Thirty years ago, the General Assembly, at its first Special Session on Disarmament (SSOD-I), adopted a landmark Final Document. This consensus document recognized the importance and urgency for the cessation of the arms race and achievement of general and complete disarmament and laid the foundation of the international disarmament strategy. Though we have seen progress with regard to some of the specific disarmament measures agreed to in the Final Document, the objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control remains elusive.

The end of the Cold War had generated hope that peace and security would not be held hostage to antagonistic, heavily militarized blocs. The ensuing prospect of disarmament had created an environment conducive to the achievement of the foremost UN principle of "equal security for all". However, today’s global scenario is marked by equally dangerous and complex realities.

The world is witnessing an erosion of arms control and disarmament measures, reversal of non-proliferation policies of key powers, violation of treaty obligations and weakening of UN disarmament institutions.
As a result, the consensus underpinning disarmament and non-proliferation has weakened. There are clear differences of perspective, approach and modalities among states to promote international and regional peace and security through disarmament and non-proliferation efforts.

Lack of progress towards nuclear disarmament and advocacy by few powerful states of doctrines such as pre-emption, development of new war-fighting nuclear weapons and the development and deployment of destabilizing systems like the Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems are perpetuating tensions at the regional and global levels.

Lack of progress in the resolution of long standing regional disputes, emergence of new forms of conflicts, which emanate from power asymmetries, as well as economic and social disparities and injustices, continue to obstruct the objective of equal security for all. In addition to horizontal and vertical proliferation of WMDs at state level, the threat of acquisition and use of WMDs by non-state actors has become a growing concern.

Discriminatory and short sighted policies for access to nuclear technology, for narrow gains, in disregard of any equitably applicable criteria, has further undermined the international non-proliferation regime and detracts from its credibility and legitimacy. This is compounded by the clear possibility of such arrangements leading to diversion of nuclear material for military purposes.

Mr. Chairman

Pakistan has been consistently calling attention to the need for evolving a new consensus on the entire range of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation issues. This new consensus should be based on the principles of the UN Charter, with full recognition of the role of the United Nations and reflecting the security interests of all states, and guided by the principle of 'equal security for all'. A partial and self-centered agenda imposed by some powers is a recipe for increased insecurity at the global and regional levels.

The architecture of a global consensus on disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation should rest on a solid foundation comprising the following elements:

- A renewed commitment by all states to general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Transparency, verifiability and irreversibility should be the fundamental principles applied to all disarmament measures.
• Pending general and complete nuclear disarmament, finalization of universal, non-discriminatory and legally binding negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states.

• An international agreement on universal and non-discriminatory criteria for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, including nuclear power generation.

• Commitment to evolving a universal and non-discriminatory agreement for addressing concerns arising from development, deployment and proliferation of missiles and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems, which are inherently destabilizing.

• Recognition of the need for strengthening the international legal regime in order to prevent the militarization of outer space.

• In parallel with negotiations on nuclear disarmament, there is an urgent need for negotiations on the balanced reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments. As laid down in the Final Document of SSOD-1, these negotiations should be conducted with particular emphasis on militarily significant states. The disturbing trend of escalation in the number and sophistication of conventional weapons has to be arrested as it has a causal relationship with the continuing reliance on nuclear weapons.

• Urgent efforts are also needed for peaceful settlement of disputes and removing underlying security concerns of states. Such arrangements should follow the principles enshrined in the UN charter. Forums to address security and political issues through dialogue and cooperation must be expanded and re-shaped to effectively cater to collective security within regions.

• In addition, states should be alive and committed to fulfilling their responsibilities to prevent the proliferation of WMDs and institute mechanisms to ensure the safety and security of their strategic assets.

Mr. Chairman

Once nuclear weapon states agree on the principles and elements to revive the consensus on international disarmament and non-proliferation, it will not be difficult to break the current impasse in the United Nations disarmament machinery. The decisive factor for reviving consensus on disarmament and non-proliferation is the 'political will' of states, in particular the nuclear weapon states
and other militarily significant states. They cannot achieve security for themselves at the cost of insecurity of others.

By demonstrating political will to move forward for promoting the objectives of disarmament and non-proliferation, member states can enable the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the sole multilateral negotiating body, to address all the priority issues on its agenda.

Pakistan will be ready to endorse any proposal for the CD’s programme of work which treats the four core issues on the Conference agenda in a balanced manner. Nuclear disarmament, Negative Security Assurances (NSAs) and Prevention of Arms Race in Outer Space (PARCS) have been on the international disarmament agenda for as long, if not longer, than the Fissile Material Treaty (FMT). To assert that any one issue is more ripe for negotiations than the others is not factually correct.

There was a universal consensus until recently that the CD would work towards a verifiable FMT. However, there are now attempts to set aside the principle of verification to cater to some specific interests. This goes against the security interest of the majority of states and undermines the principle of ‘equal security for all’. For Pakistan, incorporation of international and effective verification into an FMT mandate is of critical importance. It stems directly from our vital national security interest.

Moreover, in accordance with the Shannon mandate of 1995, space should be created for addressing the question of the existing and future stocks of fissile material. A ban only on future production of fissile material will freeze the existing asymmetries at the global and regional levels and such a treaty will neither promote disarmament nor non-proliferation.

**Mr. Chairman**

Illicit trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) continues to exacerbate inter-state and intra-state conflicts in many regions of the world. We need to strengthen the existing mechanisms for preventing and combating illicit trade in SALW and to identify means of fully implementing the United Nations Programme of Action (PoA) on SALW. The United Nations Conventional Arms Register serves as an important arrangement for promoting transparency in international transfers of conventional arms. The Register needs to be universalized.
Any proposal with regard to conventional arms trade has to take into account the right of all States to manufacture, import, export, transfer and retain conventional arms for self-defence and security.

Genuine efforts to prevent the adverse consequences of conventional arms proliferation must consider not only constraints on their transfer and trade, but also their production and deployment. Historical experience indicates that controls on the transfer or trade in armaments cannot be divorced from the reasons for arms production and trade as well as the motivation for their transfer and sale. Preservation of a balance in the defence capabilities of States at the lowest level of armaments would contribute to peace and stability and should be the prime objective of conventional arms control. Subjective criteria and standards suited to the interests of major arms producing states will neither serve the cause of international peace and stability nor would be any such prescription acceptable to the majority of the states.

Pakistan has been actively and constructively participating in the discussions in the Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) Group of Governmental Experts on Cluster Munitions. We believe that the GGE's last session next month is critical and all sides should demonstrate flexibility and commitment to the CCW framework. We look forward to an outcome that will strike a balance between military considerations and humanitarian concerns.

Mr. Chairman

As a responsible nuclear power, Pakistan is committed to the objective of non-proliferation. Our policy on the issue has been consistently stated and implemented. We share the concern that proliferation of WMDs and their means of delivery pose a threat to international peace and stability. Our commitment to non-proliferation derives from our national security interests.

Consistent with our commitment to non-proliferation, we have put in place a robust system of export controls which is at par with the export control standards being followed by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Australia Group.

In order to streamline the implementation of export controls in Pakistan, we established the Strategic Export Control Division (SECDIV) in March 2007, which is an independent authority for formulation of export control rules and licensing.

Pakistan's strategic assets are safe and secure. Pakistan established a National Command Authority (NCA) in February 2000 to ensure safe custodial
controls of all strategic assets and to place them under strong organizational, administrative and command and control structures. Attempts by some quarters to raise doubts in this regard are obviously driven by ulterior motives and deliberately ignore the safety and security measures we have put in place.

On the civilian side, the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) ensures the application of stringent safety and security standards for nuclear material, radioactive sources and nuclear facilities.

PNRA is implementing a National Nuclear Security Action Plan (NSAP) which aims at strengthening the security of nuclear and radioactive materials and facilities containing such materials as well as prevention of illicit trafficking in nuclear and radioactive materials. The IAEA is assisting PNRA in capacity building for the implementation of NSAP.

Mr. Chairman

Pakistan has always been against the introduction of nuclear weapons in our region and beyond. Pakistan’s consistent support for initiatives at international fora to curb the spread of WMDs has been a demonstration of our commitment. Our efforts in support of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and associated delivery systems in the period from 1974 to 1998 are well known. These include in particular our proposals for a Nuclear Weapons Free Zone in South Asia; conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon-states against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; adoption of a strategic restraint regime in South Asia, among others.

Pakistan was not the first to introduce nuclear weapons in South Asia. We were compelled to respond in view of our supreme national security interest. Our longstanding pursuit of a nuclear weapon free South Asia was thwarted in 1998 by the nuclear tests in our neighbourhood. We were forced to respond in order to restore the strategic balance in the region. Yet since 1998, as a nuclear weapon state, Pakistan has consistently stated and followed its commitment to restraint and responsibility.

Our proposal for the establishment of a Strategic Restraint Regime in South Asia encompasses conflict resolution, nuclear and missile restraint and conventional balance. In the interest of durable peace and stability in South Asia, the international community should support and promote a comprehensive approach to peace and security in this part of the world.
Policies that create nuclear disparities in our region and reinforce the discriminatory approach towards Pakistan can only contribute to exacerbating strategic asymmetries that would destabilize the entire region and indeed the world. Such an arrangement, driven by profit motives rather than any real non-proliferation gains, would in fact encourage further proliferation. It would have been more constructive to have promoted a level playing field for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under appropriate safeguards through an objective, non-discriminatory criteria-based approach.

Notwithstanding the grave implications of the discriminatory regime that is to be implemented in South Asia, Pakistan will continue to act with responsibility in maintaining its minimum credible deterrence and to avoid an arms race. However, we will neither be oblivious to our security requirements nor to the needs of our economic development.

Pakistan has a significant civilian nuclear programme and more than 30 years of nuclear power generation experience. This is designed to meet our growing energy needs, estimated to reach over 8000 MW by 2030. All our civil nuclear power reactors are under IAEA Safeguards. We will continue to develop our capacity for nuclear power generation in collaboration with the IAEA and in accordance with the international safety regime.

We will also persist in our efforts for a truly equitable, balanced and effective non-proliferation regime in the world which will meaningfully contribute to the overarching objective of nuclear disarmament and greater security for all in a stable international order.

I thank you.