STATEMENT
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Mr. Chairman,

Reaffirmation of the central role of the United Nations in world affairs has been the key element of the general political debate on the UN General Assembly 60th anniversary session. We are to address the paramount objectives of how to raise the efficiency of the Organization, consolidate the international community in the face of new challenges and threats, promote the principle of multilateralism for assuring international security in strict compliance with the UN Charter. As President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation stressed in his address to the current UNGA session on 15 September, “...there is a need to adjust this Organization to the new historic realities. But this process should be constructive. It should take into account both the lessons learned, and the positive experience gained by the United Nations. And this process must unite, not separate”. All of the above is quite relevant for issues discussed at the UNGA First Committee.

Recently, various views have been voiced about the critical state of multilateral non-proliferation regime, arms control and disarmament. We agree that our expectations in this field remain unfulfilled. Naturally, all of us expected more of the 2005 Summit final document and NPT Review Conference. Nevertheless, the balance of the UN activity remains positive. We have managed to prevent and settle dozens of armed conflicts, and to prevent WMD falling into hands of international terrorists.

We would like to clearly reiterate our firm support to the strengthening of multilateralism in addressing the objectives of disarmament and WMD non-proliferation on the basis of strict compliance with relevant international agreements in this field.

Russia fully complies with its commitments under Article VI of the NPT, treaties with the United States, and unilaterl initiatives on nuclear disarmament. This is clearly evidenced by the facts. As compared to 1991, there has been a five-fold reduction of the aggregate stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and a four-fold reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons. These reductions – and this is indeed a labor-intensive, technically complex, and very costly effort – are well underway
and are nan smoothly and without interruption. The Russian Federation is attached to the principle of irreversible nuclear weapons reduction. As stated by President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation, we are ready to take new constructive steps in this field.

The issues of WMD non-proliferation, including the counter-terror component, remain the focus of world politics. The G8 leaders have once again expressed their approaches to these issues in a special statement at the G8 Summit meeting.

We have to analyze yet the outcome of the 2005 NPT Review Conference. However, it can already be stated now that its work was useful. Fundamental principles shared by all its participants were reaffirmed. No one called the Treaty outdated or suggested that another document should be drafted to substitute the NPT. All participants stressed its vitality and its validity as the basis for the nuclear non-proliferation regime. We are certain that new challenges to the regime of nuclear non-proliferation can and should be tackled on the basis of the NPT.

Russia considers the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as one of the key instruments in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. We call upon all states that have not yet done so to sign and ratify the CTBT as soon as possible. Primarily, these are the states whose ratification is required for the entry of the Treaty into force. It is also important that the moratorium on test explosions of nuclear weapons and any other nuclear explosions continues to be observed until that time.

We note with satisfaction the outcome of the fourth round of six-party talks on the Korean Peninsula nuclear problem, concluded on September 19 in Beijing. We welcome the pledge taken by the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea to abandon nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, and to return as soon as possible to the NPT and the IAEA. We look forward to further successful continuation of the six-party process with the ultimate goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. We support the efforts to find a balanced solution and
ensure legitimate security interests of all parties involved in the negotiating process.

We regard the resolution on the Iranian nuclear program adopted on September 24 by the IAEA Board of Governors as a signal for continuing and expanding cooperation between the Agency and Iran to clarify the remaining questions. It is our belief that IAEA has enough potential to keep the resolution of the Iranian problem within the Agency. We are in favor of a more intensive dialogue between all the states concerned. It is necessary to work out decisions that, on the one hand, would remove all doubts about the peaceful character of Iran's nuclear activities, and on the other — satisfy the legitimate energy needs of this country.

New challenges require new solutions. We appreciate the broad support to Russian proposal on drafting the UNSC resolution 1540 and the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism. Now it is necessary to ensure their full and universal implementation.

Among the central threats to the global security is the danger of spread of arms race to outer space. We have the capacity to prevent such a scenario. This effort is in the interest of all nations. We appreciate wide support to the proposal of Russia and China, co-sponsored by a number of other states at the Conference on Disarmament, to elaborate a new universal arrangement on the prevention of the deployment of weapons in outer space and use or threat to use force against outer space objects. Our proposal is gradually getting substance. This work will be continued. We are looking forward to the earliest reestablishment of the CD ad hoc committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Transparency and confidence-building measures can contribute to discourage the intent to place weapons in near-Earth space. In recent years, Russia put forward several such initiatives. We would like specifically to recall the unilateral statement by Russia not to be the first to place weapons of any kind in outer space. We welcome the statement made by member states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization of June 23, 2005, which took the same voluntary
political commitment. Once again, we call upon all states to join the Russian initiative.

We believe that the time has come for us to take a comprehensive view of the possible range of potential confidence-building measures in outer space, and to update the proposals prepared in the United Nations back in early 1990s. We intend to submit for the consideration by the UNGA First Committee a new draft resolution "Transparency and Confidence-Building Measures in Outer Space Activities". We call upon all states to support this draft resolution.

The Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on international information security, chaired by the Russian expert, completed its two-year work in 2005. Though it was not possible to arrive at consensus language of the Final Report, the discussions of the Group were quite useful. The issue of information security is multifold, it affects national security of states and overall international stability. As many other delegations, we believe that the Group should continue its work. Taking this into account we submit for consideration by the UNGA First Committee a draft resolution "Developments in the Field of Informatization and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security". We call upon all States to support our draft resolution.

We stand for the unconditional fulfillment by all States of their obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), especially those relating to the destruction of stockpiles of chemical agents. We support the efforts aimed at the universalization of the CWC, and the creation and enhancement of national implementation mechanisms.

We believe it necessary to continue the search for the ways of strengthening the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BWC). Elaboration of legally binding BWC verification measures remains relevant. The program of work adopted by the Fifth BWC Review Conference is to be completed this year. Therefore, we attach great importance to successful and productive conduct of the Sixth BWC Review Conference next year.
We stand for the earliest breaking the deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament. We believe that the current situation has developed because of the interests and attitudes of states rather than its procedural shortcomings. We hope that the states that are not ready to support today the compromise proposals in Geneva will listen to the opinion of the overwhelming majority and demonstrate expected flexibility.

For many years now, and not due to our fault, the entry into force of the 1999 adapted Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (the CFE Treaty) has been postponed. Russia made its utmost to secure the earliest entry into force of the renewed Treaty, including the ratification of the Agreement on Adaptation of the CFE Treaty in summer 2004. Now it is our partners' turn. We have no intention to make it seem as if the CFE Treaty of 1990 functions and suits us well. Apparently, we are in for a quite tense discussion about the future of the Treaty at the Third CFE Review Conference next May.

Russia ratified the Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. The process of ratification related to the modified scope of the Convention (Article I) has been launched, and similar work has started on Protocol V.

The finalizing of an international instrument on marking and tracing of illegal small arms and light weapons can be listed among the achievements in the field of disarmament during this year. Its adoption at the current session of the UNGA will help the states to reliably and promptly identify and trace illegal SALWs.

Mr. Chairman,

Let me assure you that the Russian delegation stands ready to provide necessary assistance for achieving practical results in the work of our Committee.