STATEMENT

BY

AMBASSADOR MASOOD KHAN
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PAKISTAN
TO THE UNITED NATIONS, GENEVA

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ON

THE THEMATIC DEBATE ON
NUCLEAR WEAPNOS

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Thematic Debate on Nuclear Weapons

Speaking Notes

By now, we are familiar with the malady. What we need is the correct prescription to deal with it.

One way is to indulge in a subtle and not so subtle blame game. The other way will be to look at the existing and emerging threats, the existing and emerging issues, and to try to understand their correlation in an objective setting. Let's assess if a new security architecture, supported by a new infrastructure, is taking shape. What are its implications for the core objectives of disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy?

We must start from reality. The global security architecture is in a flux. The consensus dating back to SSOD-I and one that seemed to be developing in the post Cold War period is not holding well. Some choose to characterize the existing consensus as a relic of the past. There are varying approaches and perspectives in dealing with disarmament and non-proliferation.

The consensus underpinning disarmament and non-proliferation has eroded and the multilateral disarmament machinery has been weakened. This opens the way for unilateral or discriminatory or coercive approaches.

The NPT Review Conference ended, on, what one may euphemistically call, a "strategic pause". Negotiations broke down for the 2005 Summit Outcome because of the prevalent and divergent security interests.

The erosion of a consensus may create a vacuum, which will be dangerous for peace and stability, especially in regions of tension. Nature abhors vacuums.

President General Pervez Musharraf in his address to the UN General Assembly on September 14 called for a new consensus to achieve disarmament and non-proliferation. I'll try to elaborate this proposal in 11 quick points:

1. **Consultations and agreement among all member states**: Such a consensus should be promoted through consultations and agreement among all UN member states, not just some self-selected, even if well-meaning, group of countries.

2. **Equal security for all states**: The basic premise in the UN Charter that "security" is the right of every State. The Declaration of SSOD-I adopted the principle of "equal security" for all States.
3. **Multilateralism**: Such security should be promoted multilaterally, not through national means, or within restricted groups, no matter how powerful.

4. **Underlying motives**: We must address the motives which drive States to acquire weapons of mass destruction, which include:

   - threats posed by superior conventional or non-conventional forces;
   - the existence of disputes and conflicts with more powerful States; and
   - discrimination in the application of international norms and laws.

5. **A parallel effort**: WMD proliferation multiplies the threat of the possible use of such Weapons of Mass Destruction. The proliferation can be contained only if it is accompanied by a parallel effort to realize WMD disarmament.

6. **Non-discrimination**: Discriminatory and asymmetric possession of WMD will not ensure non-proliferation or regional or global stability. Nor are technology constraints a durable answer unless the motives for proliferation are addressed.

   We must address the new threat of terrorists acquiring WMD. Again, this can succeed only through collective and cooperative measures, not through coercion and discrimination.

   New threats cannot blind us to the danger posed by the existence and continuous improvement in vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons.

7. **Address existing and emerging threats**: A new security consensus should take into account the need to address existing and emerging global challenges to regional and international security. This goal can be achieved through the Conference on Disarmament or a special session of the UN Disarmament Commission (UNDC).

8. **The vehicle**: How to evolve the new consensus? The Chairperson of the First Committee can hold open-ended informal consultations. This could be a salutary build-up for SSOD IV.

9. **Four core issues**: **Disarmament**: the slow pace of disarmament and continued commitment to peaceful uses of nuclear energy under globally agreed conditions.

   **Fissile material**: How to make an FMT verifiable?

   **Linkages**: We have to sort out the question of linkages between the four core issues. These linkages in the context of a comprehensive and
balanced programme are not artificial, contrived or extraneous. They are anchored in history and substance.

_Nuclear reality:_ There is need to reconcile nuclear reality within the global non-proliferation regime i.e. the existence of 8, not 5, nuclear weapons States.

10. **Programme of work:** The A-5 proposal is good enough. It has distilled all the proposals on the table. Diplomacy is the art of the possible. This is minimum credible _desiderata_ that we have. If we want to commence work, we can do so, without preconditions.

11. **Machinery:** There is nothing wrong with the existing machinery or the rules of procedure. The machinery needs to be fully utilized for the specific role assigned to each of its constituents.

I close these remarks by reiterating our proposal that we ought to be working for a new synthesis, a new consensus. We should do so sincerely, earnestly and, I must say, effectively.