Statement by Ambassador Mehdi Danesh-Yazdi
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In the name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Mr. Chairman,

At the outset, allow me to congratulate you for your election as the Chairman of the First Committee. I am sure that under your able chairmanship this committee will have a successful session this year. I would like to take this opportunity to extend my felicitations to other members of the bureau as well.

Let me also associate my delegation with the statement made by Indonesia on behalf of Non-Aligned Movement.

Mr. Chairman,

In 60th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, international community rightly expects the progress in nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects. However, the lack of progress towards accomplishing the total elimination of nuclear arsenals is a major source of international concern. The continuing existence of thousands of nuclear warheads in the stockpiles of nuclear-weapon States, development of new types of nuclear weapons and military doctrine for use of them are threatening the entire humanity more than ever.

The failure of the Seventh NPT Review Conference and the exclusion of the disarmament section from the Outcome Document are setbacks for the lofty goal of nuclear disarmament. Rejection of the disarmament commitments, resorting to the preemptive war in dealing with the international issues, new military doctrines such as the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review which lowers the threshold of use of nuclear weapons, plans to develop mini-usable nuclear weapons and most recently, the 2005 Doctrine for "Joint Nuclear Operations", which explicitly extends the doctrine of pre-emptive war to cover nuclear arsenals all are alarming signs to international peace and security.

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International community must not allow the taboo of prohibition of resorting to the threat of use of nuclear weapons established since 1945 to be broken.

After the end of cold war, significant progress was made in areas of arms control and disarmament. Conclusions of the 1993 Chemical weapons Convention (CWC) and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the 1995 indefinite extension of the NPT along with the decisions and commitments for nuclear disarmament, and the agreements of the 2000 NPT Review Conference particularly the 13 practical steps for total elimination of nuclear weapons were promising a brighter future for disarmament and non-proliferation.

However, since 2000 hopes have been fading gradually. A policy of rejection of international commitments and resorting to unilateral actions by the United States emerged and it began withdrawing from multilateral treaties one by one. We should not lose sight of the fact that the terrorist attack of 9/11 was not the starting point. Indeed, rejection of CTBT, blocking the negotiations of BWC Protocol, withdrawing from ABM, imposing certain decision on the 2001 UN Small Arms Conference and similar attitude on other international issues such as opposing the Kyoto Protocol, all have happened before September 11, 2001. The 9/11 tragic event was just an accelerator of this policy. And the invasion of Iraq to preempt the so-called imminent threats of WMD in 2003 was the climax of this unilateral policy.

Mr. Chairman,

Despite the sincere efforts and good intentions of a great majority of States Parties from all corners of the world, the 2005 NPT Review Conference ended without result due to the policy of the same nuclear-weapon State. Just before the start of the NPT Conference, a US high ranking official announced that "Article VI of the NPT is just one sentence long" and nuclear disarmament does not exist. He further argued that the unequivocal undertaking for nuclear disarmament in the 2000 Conference is something that has been lost to the past.

The same positions not only have been maintained throughout the Conference to lead it to a failure but also contained and extended to the negotiations of the GA Summit Outcome Document. In a position paper on the disarmament and non-proliferation section of the Outcome Document distributed by the US delegation all references to disarmament were deleted except the title. It was a clear indication that no political determination existed on its behalf to reach an agreement on the disarmament section.

Furthermore, while 117 countries participated in the recent CTBT Conference on facilitating its entry into force held in New York, the said nuclear-weapon State refrained to attend the conference due to its ideological opposition to CTBT. It simultaneously continues to follow up the plans for reduction of time necessary for nuclear tests and allocated millions of dollars to these plans. This seriously put into question its commitment on nuclear testing moratorium.
Actions and policies rigorously pursued by the United States without the slightest regard for the concerns of the rest of the international community clearly indicate what lies ahead if they remain unchecked. It is no wonder that this country has been trying to create smokescreens in the international fora to deflect attention from its record and actions by politically charging the superficial concerns over peaceful nuclear program of the others.

While this nuclear-weapon State cries wolf about the risk of proliferation of peaceful activities of the NPT Member States whose facilities are under the IAEA full scope safeguards, ironically it has concluded agreements for the transfer of all kinds of nuclear technology to non-Parties to the NPT. Particularly, its 2000 nuclear cooperation agreement with Israel, the only non-Party to the NPT in the Middle East with clandestine nuclear weapon facilities is in clear contradiction with its so-called non-proliferation strategy. Transfer of nuclear weapon technology to Israel and other forms of nuclear sharing constitute the non-compliance of the United States with its NPT obligations. These cases are clear evidence that the so-called proliferation concern over peaceful nuclear activities of some countries is just a mere pretext for pursuing political objectives and imposing a new “Nuclear Apartheid”.

The international community should firmly resist this discriminative approach and insist on the full implementation of all commitments of States Parties particularly the unequivocal obligations of nuclear-weapon States for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. World community should take effective measures to prevent development of new types of nuclear weapons, to stop nuclear sharing, to prohibit the threat of use of such inhumane weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and to renounce the unlawful unilateral actions and policies.

Mr. Chairman,

Nowwithstanding the failures in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, there are some good progress in the areas of the CWC, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), and Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). The destruction of the chemical weapons stockpiles is continuing under international inspection and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) is functioning professionally while negotiations on issues such as the implementation of Article XI of the Convention need to be pursued more seriously. Discussion among the States Parties to the BWC is also going on and the ways and means for strengthening the BWC, including a legally binding protocol is still on the table.

Perhaps one of the promising sections of the disarmament and arms control agenda is the implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action (UNPOA) on Small Arms and Light Weapons. Thanks to the leadership of Ambassador Thalmann of Switzerland and the flexibility shown by the delegations, the Working Group was able to finalize the draft international instrument to enable States to identify and trace illicit small Arms and Light Weapons. Although the final results were not completely satisfactory to all delegations and even some countries made valid reservations, the
conclusion of this instrument could be considered a step forward in the implementation of UNPOA.

Mr. Chairman,

Any sound legal instrument should strike a balance between rights and obligations which could guarantee the longevity of the legal regime by providing incentives for membership and compliance. The provisions of the international disarmament instruments such as CWC, NPT and IAEA Statute on the right to have access to the peaceful technology as well as the imperative of cooperation and sharing of the technology among those who have accepted the obligations testify to the wisdom and understanding of the drafters of these instruments.

In none of these instruments the inalienable rights of States Parties to peaceful technologies are limited to specific areas. For instance in CWC, while States Parties undertake not to divert the peaceful technologies and materials to the prohibited activities, they can have access to all kinds of technologies and even the scheduled chemicals which are chemical agents or precursors for chemical weapons with the peaceful applications could be produced but under strict verification regimes. A thorough study of the history of NPT negotiations clearly shows that the drafters of the treaty have never intended to limit the inalienable rights of the NPT States Parties. The NPT stipulates the IAEA Safeguards as an objective guarantee for the assurance of non-diversion to the prohibited activities.

There is no justification whatsoever to limit the inalienable rights of the NPT States Parties to the peaceful nuclear activities including fuel cycle. As it was reaffirmed here in this august body by the representative of the Non-Aligned Movement "each country's choices and decisions in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be respected without jeopardizing its policies or international cooperation agreements and arrangements for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and its fuel-cycles policies." There is only one condition which is provided in the Treaty and that is verification through the IAEA Safeguards.

There were some attempts in the past to monopolize advanced technologies through the establishment of non-transparent and exclusive clubs such as "Australian Group", NSG or MTCR. But developing countries are developing particularly in scientific fields and no nations can be stopped from the advancement and progress.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, as a State Party to NPT, CWC and BWC, continues to comply with its obligations and cooperate with the competent international organizations as it has done in the past. No politically motivated decisions by a block of countries can prevent Iran from exercising its legal and legitimate rights.

Thank you.